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SUMMARY
This thesis explores the relationship between William Godwin and his ideas and 
William Wordsworth in the context of the significant reappraisal of Godwin since 
1950 (which has gained further momentum in the 1980’s) and more recent 
questioning of the biographical status of The Prelude, so long accepted by critics. 
The purpose is to challenge the inadequacy of earlier over-simplistic views of 
Godwin's rationalism, which have led (ever since Legouis' identification of 
Godwin as a significant "influence" in Wordsworth's thinking) to critical 
acceptance of Words worth's account of Godwin’s role in the poet’s development, 
culminating in the rejection of Godwin and what he represented during the period 
of alleged "moral crisis".
Such a view fails to respond to both the complexity and development of Godwin's 
ideas in the period from the publication of the first edition of Political Justice 
to The Enquirer. It also fails to respond to the conscious artifice of The Prelude 
and evidenceof Wordsworth's manipulation, in his poetry, of the facts concerning 
his life and development.
The complexity and development of Godwin's ideas over this period will be 
shown to be paralleled in the pattern of Wordsworth's responses to Godwin's 
ideas and in his own poetic development. The early poem Descriptive Sketches 
is examined to establish the manipulation that characterises Wordsworth's poetry, 
and questions are identified early on with regard to some of the tensions evident 
in The Prelude concerning the poet’s claims regarding his radicalism and his 
humanitarianism, prior to a detailed examination of Wordsworth's drawings
upon Godwin. These range from the initial undigested response to the first 
edition of Political Justice in the Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff. through the 
gradual cry stallistion of his ideas in his writing and development of the Salisbury 
Plain poems (reflecting both Godwin’s and Wordsworth's shift fromanessentially 
reformist to a psychological focus). Recognising the significance of the revisions 
in the 1796 second edition of Political Justice. Wordsworth's play, The Borderers, 
is seen as pivotal, and symptomatic of the literary crisis that Wordsworth presents 
(in The Preluded as a moral crisis; this play is seen as a conscious (but unsucces­
sful) literary experiment, intended to challenge Godwin's empirical perfectibil- 
ian morality and psychology.
In the light of the above evidence it can now be seen that Wordsworth, having 
established his poetic vision over the period of composition of the 1798 and 1800 
Lvrical Ballads, manufactures, in The Prelude, a pre-history for that vision, even 
at the cost of re-inventing his past. This allows him not only to provide a moti­
vation for his sudden rejection of the oretical principles in favour of lived 
experience in the development of his vision; he is also able to ennoble his own 
achievement and win the sympathy of his readers as he portrays his imaginative 
recovery.
Thus, an alternative is offered to the established critical view of the relationship 
between Wordsworth and Godwin, based on The Prelude as biography. This 
suggests that, in its portrayal of Wordsworth's period of rationalistic enquiry and 
the subsequent developments, The Prelude represents a conscious myth-making, 
a re-invention by Wordsworth of himself. A re-examination of the Wordsworth/ 
Godwin relationship is less important for itself than for what it reveals about
Wordsworth's intent and method in The Prelude (offering an explanation for 
many of the tensions in the poetry) and indicating in the 1805 Prelude a more 
conscious and sophisticated artistry than has generally been acknowledged.
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PREAMBLE
Why yet another study of Words worth and Godwin? It is a subject upon which 
much has been written; and there certainly might be a view that, whether one 
judges Godwin to be a major or insignificant ’’influence" on Wordsworth's early 
writing makes little difference to our understanding of Wordsworth’s achieve­
ment. This study will challenge and re-examine many of the views and assump­
tions that have emerged concerning the Wordsworth/Godwin issue since Legouis 
first raised it.(l) It will also suggest that a full understanding of the relationship 
between the two men is essential to respond appropriately to certain observable 
tensions in The Prelude. In doing so, it will be necessary, not only to re­
examine the writings of Wordsworth, but also of Godwin, particularly in light 
of the renewed interest in the philosopher and his works that has developed since 
1950, and especially in the past ten years, which has led to a substantial re­
appraisal of Godwin's ideas and their impact. Wordsworth criticism has not 
benefited as yet in any significant measure from the more recent studies of 
Godwin, and the existing discussion of the relationship between the two men tends 
to be unreliable.
To give one or two examples, Alan Grob in his 1967 article(2) re-assessing the 
Wordsworth/Godwin issue, (an article which he clearly regards as being his final 
comment on the subject since he refers readers to it in his later book The 
Philosophic Mind(3fi states early on in that article:
A letter of 1796 [by Wordsworth] briefly alludes to the second edition of
Political Justice as "a barbarous piece of writing" with "scarce one
sentence decently written. "(4)
What the letter actually states is:
I have received from Montagu,Godwyn’s second edition. I expect to find 
the whole work much improved. I cannot say that I am much encouraged 
in this hope by the perusal of the second preface,which is all I have yet 
looked into. Such a piece of barbarous writing I have not often seen.lt 
contains scarce one sentence decently written. I am surprised to find 
such gross faults in a writer who has so much practice in composition.
(my emphases)(EY,170)
This brief comment by Wordsworth does not express his reaction to the second 
edition of Political Justice, as Grob erroneously suggests by his selective quota­
tion. (5) Grob's error is repeated in the work of one of the more recent studies of 
Godwin.(6) As recently as 1988, Nicholas Roe(7) writes:
By mid 1796, however, Wordsworth's enthusiasm for Political Justice 
had cooled; he told Mathews in March that Godwin's "second preface" 
was "apiece of barbarous writing" and that he had not been encouraged 
to read any further. (My emphasis.)
This is a very liberal interpretation of Words worth's statement in the letter quoted 
above. Roe also quotes Pitt's alleged comment regarding the price of Political 
Justice having been three guineas, (8) strangely enough, using as his source, Don 
Locke (9) referring to the same page in which Locke establishes the actual cost 
as having been one pound, sixteen shillings; a figure now well established in 
Godwin commentary. (10) Gill, in his 1989 Life of Wordsworth, after comment­
ing favourably upon the Preface to the second edition of Political Justice, 
suggests, with no evidence to support his statement.:
Possibly Wordsworth even ploughed through the revised Political Justice 
and found it rebarbative.
On the same page, he then states:
Wordsworth may not have got beyond the Preface to the second edition 
of Political Justice...(11)
If, as Bateson has stated, the matter of Godwin's influence has become a
"veritable King Charles's Head"(12) in Wordsworth criticism, then one reason
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for this may be that Wordsworth scholars have not looked at the evidence of the 
relation between Godwin and Wordsworth carefully. Another is that they have 
too often argued from the basis of a simplified version of Godwin, leading to 
a continuing misunderstanding of the Wordsworth/Godwin relationship and its 
implications. (13)
It is such a limited response to Godwin’s own work that leads to such over- 
simplistic judgements as that by Merchant in his 1942 article assessing Words­
worth's Godwinian period. (14), where he writes of Wordsworth and The 
Borderers:
It is, however, already significant that [Wordsworth's] humanitarian 
sympathy and his exaltation of domestic affections in opposition to 
Godwin do not blind him to the necessity of seeking further than surface 
evidence of social evil, (p 23)
Whilst this may hint at the interest Wordsworth had developed in the question of
motivation (a result of his interest in Godwin’s Caleb Williams and the second
revised edition of Political Justice!, it fails to recognise the place of Godwin in
the development of Wordsworth's humanitarianism, and suggests a view of
Godwin's thought on the "domestic affections" that fails to recognise the increased
importance of these in the works of Godwin just mentioned. Much more recently,
in Roe, 1988,(15) we again find a willingness to cite such passages from The
Prelude as the following:
This was the time when, all things tending fast 
To depravation, the philosophy 
That promised to abstract the hopes of man 
Out of his feelings, to be fixed thenceforth 
For ever in a purer element,
Found ready welcome.. .  (1805,X,805-10)
as a source for arguing that the
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privileged working of passions among devotees of Godwin’s philosophy 
is a sly jibe at Political Justice, which had denied emotion for the "purer 
element" of reason (p 7).
What this fails to recognise is that Wordsworth's "sly jibe" is based upon a
misreading, intended or not, of Godwin.
Such views as that of Godwin representing "naked Reason"(16) have persisted, 
as has the idea of Wordsworth's "discipleship" to Godwin, a notion introduced 
by Legouis(17) and Harper(18) and to be found as late as 1962 in a work on 
Godwin.(19) Similarly, the view, again instigated by Legouis, and strongly 
followed in such studies as those by Havens,(20) Moorman, (21) and still evident 
in Gill (though he is considerably more cautious,(22)) which underwrites The 
Prelude as biography and therefore as a reliable source from which to challenge 
suggested alternative views on such matters as Wordsworth's relationship with 
Godwin, continues to accept the reality of Wordsworth's alleged "moral crisis" 
(23) which few critics have seriously challenged. (24)
It is in response to these issues that this study is undertaken. It will be necessary 
to acknowledge, take issue, or otherwise respond to the well-established 
"debate" over the Wordsworth/Godwin relationship. Account will be taken 
particularly of the most recent commentaries on Godwin which have done so 
much to illuminate the significance of Godwin's ideas and their impact.
In attempting such an examination,the manner of proceeding will be essentially 
chronological. There would appear to be sound reason for this: the intention is 
to show that parallels of development can be identified in the work of the two 
writers. Without pre-empting the ensuing argument,(and again at the riskof some
over simplification) this development can be seen as a move from an essentially 
"reformist" concern to one which which is informed by a "psychological" 
and "sociological" context - but,in relation always to a clear moral concern. The 
Prelude will be considered pivotal. Not really surprising; but the specific interest 
will be the question of Wordsworth's "landscape of memory"(25), his tendency 
to interpret or re-interpret what has already happened in accordance with some 
envisaged purpose.
I will not be concerned with the kind of influence that results in verbal echoes. 
What is examined here is the sustained and complex relationship between the 
two men and their ideas, and the significant role that Godwin played in Words­
worth's early development, and in the composition of Wordsworth’s greatest 
achievement, The Prelude.
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CHAPTER ONE : GODWIN'S POLITICAL JUSTICE 1793.
Part 1: The Ideas and Arguments of Political Justice.
Overview.
The purpose of this first chapter is to examine briefly the central ideas ofPolitical 
Justice. 1793 in the light of recent critical comment on Godwin, recognising the 
complexity(l) of his ideas and the coherence of the philosophical and moral 
construct he presented. Any discussion of Political Justice must take account of 
the context of Godwin's work, its reception, and Godwin's decision to produce 
a second, substantially revised edition (and, of course, subsequently, a third 
edition). Whilst debate and comment still continue regarding the significance 
of Godwin's revisions in the second edition, it is only since 1950 that there has 
been any real challenge to De Quincey's view of the second edition as a 
"palinode"; (2) this, in turn, has increasingly led to a re-appraisal of the first 
edition, its intent, and the impact of the work. Although disagreement is still 
evidenced, for example recently, in the challenge to the traditionally held view 
of Godwin as an early utilitarian thinker (3) by giving greater weight to the 
influence of the dissenting tradition(4) in the development of Godwin's ideas, 
there can be litde doubt that Godwin scholarship over the last twenty-five years 
or so has done much to rescue Godwin from the obscurity into which he had sunk; 
such studies have focussed less upon Godwin in the context of reaction to the 
French Revolution, and have examined more carefully Godwin's own integrity 
and the integrity of his arguments and beliefs.
Wordsworth criticism has scarcely benefited from the re-appraisal of Godwin, 
or from the now-acknowledged complexity of his ideas; the more simplistic view 
of the "cold rationalist" generally still colours Wordsworth commentary. 
Central to any considered view of Godwin's moral and philosophical stance is 
his belief in the concept of private judgement and the role and power of truth. 
The place of "reason" has, of course, historically been the central focus of 
comment on Godwin, and, in some ways, rightly so, since Godwin sees reason 
as the necessary agent whereby truth will eventually be perceived and error 
banished. Yet it is also his belief in the power of reason which opens Godwin most 
easily to dismissive criticism, suggesting a naivety that warrants little attention. 
Yet, important as reason is in Political Justice, it is not the central tenet of 
Godwin’s work; that is undoubtedly his belief in and commitment to the right 
of "private judgement".(5) It is Godwin's interest in the individual that is central 
to his ideas from the earliest stage; and it was Godwin's ideas on the motivation 
and morality, of the individual especially that attracted the attention of 
Wordsworth, and played a significant role in the development of his early 
poetry, to a greater extent than the reformist or political ideas of the first edition; 
or even "reason", upon which Wordsworth chooses to focus in his alleged 
rejection of rationalism and Godwin in Book X of the 1805 Prelude.(6)
Yet, because of the nature of Political Justice in the first edition, because 
particularly of the manner in which Godwin wrote it(7) (sending it off to the 
publisher in parts and unable to reflect on the developing work as a whole prior 
to publication), because of certain claims he himself made with regard to 
influences upon him(8) and because, above all, of the timing of its appearance
following upon Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, it is surely not 
surprising that the first edition of Godwin's book was seen by some (9) as a 
political tract and, in some ways, a fairly extreme one (though extreme in its 
ultimate utopian vision rather than its view of revolution - against which Godwin 
clearly takes a stand in the first edition). There is no doubt when reading the first 
edition of its unevenness as a work;but that very uneven quality, especially in 
the early books also contributes to its immediacy of impact. To read the first 
edition is an experience different from that of reading the second edition (a fact 
which deserves greater attention than it has had up to now),(10) but even in the 
first edition, Godwin was writing philosophy, not practising politics. Although 
Godwin would, in due course, become actively involved in the political scene 
through his publication of Cursory Strictures( l l )  at the time of the 1794 treason 
trials, even then he would do so from a reasoned and philosophical stance. This 
must be borne in mind when trying to understand any "influence" that Godwin 
is claimed to have had upon Wordsworth, and also when examining the genesis 
of Wordsworth’s political ideas from Beaupuy (Wordsworth's acknowledged 
mentor of this period) and Godwin. But, ultimately, Godwin's politics are less 
important for Wordsworth than his central ideas on the morality and psychology 
of the individual.
This opening chapter gives a brief account of two things: first, what, in the light 
of recent scholarship, are seen to have been the central ideas of Godwin's 
Political Justice of 1793: second, it looks briefly at the reception of that work, 
to see how it was perceived (as well as received) on its publication.
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The context of Political Justice: the centrality of ” private judgement".
Any modem reader coming to the early chapters of Political Justice is struck 
above all by their uneven quality; Godwin had not fully thought through his ideas 
as he was writing, as is evident in repetitions and contradictions(12). There is, 
however, a forcefulness in the style of the early chapters (and elsewhere in the 
book) which suggests a "revolutionary" spirit, yet the sometimes tortuous 
arguments reject violent revolution as a means of reform. There are various 
references and acknowledged debts, yet Godwin soon leaves these behind to 
develop his own committed, individual and ultimately absurdly idealistic vision. 
It is a book which one feels would inevitably have drawn attention in England 
at the time of a growing reaction against the French Revolution, and yet that was 
not the immediate context of Godwin’s work.
Political Justice is not a political tract; yet, especially in those earliest chapters, 
(as well as the earlier chapters of the second volume of the book) anyone could 
be forgiven for reading it as such. Even as late as the first chapters of Book IV, 
we read:
The true answer to these questions lies in the observation with which we 
began our disquisition on government, that this boasted institution is 
nothing more than a scheme for enforcing by brute violence the sense of 
one man or set of men upon another, necessary to be employed in certain 
cases of peculiar emergency. (PJ,'93,I,192)(13)
and, a few pages further on, Godwin concludes some of his arguments on the
situation regarding France:
To recur once more to the example of France, the works of her great 
political writers seemed for a long time to produce little prospect of any 
practical effect. Helvetius, one of the latest,in a work published after his 
death in 1771, laments in pathetic strains the hopeless condition of his 
country. "In the history of every people, " says he, "there are moments,
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in which, uncertain of the side they shall choose, and balanced between 
political good and evil, they feel a desire to be instructed; in which the 
soil, so to express myself, is in some manner prepared, and may be easily 
impregnated with the dew of truth. At such a moment the publication 
of a valuable book may give birth to the most auspicious reforms: but, 
when that moment is no more, the nation, become insensible to the best 
motives, is by the nature Of its government plunged deeper and deeper 
in ignorance and stupidity. The soil of intellect is then hard and 
impenetrable; the rains may fall, may spread their moisture upon the 
surface, but the prospect of fertility is gone. Such is the condition of 
France. Her people are become the contempt of Europe. No salutary crisis 
shall ever restore them to liberty."
But in spite of these melancholy predictions, the work of renovation 
was in continual progress. The American revolution gave the finishing 
stroke, and only six years elapsed between the completion of American 
liberty and the commencement of the French Revolution. Will a term 
longer than this be necessary, before France, the most refined and consid 
erable nation in the world, will lead other nations to imitate and improve 
upon her plan? (PJ,'93,I,223/4)(14)
To anyone in England in 1793, such statements might easily suggest that 
Godwin's intention in publishing Political Justice was a direct response to the 
French Revolution,(15) and actively political; at the very least, the quotation 
from Helvetius concerning "the publication of a valuable book" might be seen as 
a reference to Godwin's own book. In fact, as early as the Preface to the first 
edition, Godwin proclaimed his moral intent to be the most important, and did 
see his book as actively promoting not political but "moral improvement". (16) 
These sections have been quoted selectively to see how they can easily betaken 
out of context of the argument that Godwin is (rather loosely) trying to develop; 
an argument that is concerned essentially with what Godwin sees as the fundamen­
tal "right" (in the sense of a "duty", not a "liberty") of private judgement in the 
pursuit of truth. It is a theme which proclaims itself throughout Political Justice. 
In Book I, Chapter VI, entitled Of the Exercise of Private Judgement. Godwin 
warns:
The universal exercise of private judgement is a doctrine so unspeakably
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beautiful, that the true politician will certainly resolve to interfere with 
it as sparingly and in as few instances as possible.. .(PJ,’93,1,129)
having earlier concluded Book II, Chapter III with the statement:
a virtuous disposition is principally generated by the uncontrolled 
exercise of private judgement, and the rigid conformity of every man to 
the dictates of his conscience. (PJ,'93,1,103)
With regard to government, in Book IV, Chapter I, Of Resistance Godwin 
asserts:
wherever government subsists, the exercise of private judgement is 
substantially entrenched upon... (PJ,'93,1,193)
The same chapter opens with the paragraph:
It has appeared in the course of our reasonings upon political authority, 
that every man is bound to resist every unjust proceeding on the part of 
the community. But who is the judge of this injustice? The question 
answers itself: the private judgement of the individual. Were it not so, the 
appeal would be nugatory, for we have no infallible judge to whom to refer 
our controversies. He is obliged to consult his own private judgement in 
this case, for the same reason that obliges him to consult it in every other 
article of his conduct. (PJ,'93,1,191-2)
And when one reads the opening sentence of the key chapter on private
judgement, with its statement that,
To a rational being, there can be but one rule of conduct, justice, and one 
mode of ascertaining that rule, the exercise of his understanding.. .
(PJ,'93,I,120)(17)
we glimpse the challenge that Wordsworth was to take up in The Borderers and 
how it would be possible for him after the emergence of the poetic vision of 
Lvrical Ballads and Tintem Abbev to represent his rejection of such ration­
alistic over-confidence (and naivety) in the guise of an alleged moral crisis. For, 
although I intend to reject the established view that Wordsworth endured some 
deep moral crisis (in some manner involving his relationship with Godwin's 
* ideas), it is important even at this early stage to recognise the centrality of private
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judgement in Godwin's thought; a centrality Wordsworth himself came to 
recognise.
This belief in "private judgement" rather than any contractual or utilitarian
position such as would have derived from the "philosophes"(18) is what is so
unique to Godwin's beliefs and arguments, even in this first edition. And it is upon
this belief that so much of his reformist construct is built: it is this that makes him
"revolutionary" yet anti-revolution:
The true instruments for changing the opinions of men are argument and 
persuasion. (PJ,'93,1,202) (19)
Therefore:
We must carefully distinguish between informing the people and inflam­
ing them. Indignation, resentment and fury are all to be deprecated........
(PJ,'93,1,203) (20)
Although Godwin admits of what was in effect an eighteenth century Lockean
commonplace, that resort to force is allowable in extreme circumstances, he
warns, again in Book IV, Chapter I, Of Resistance:
as to the doctrine of force in general, that is in no case to be employed 
but where every other means is ineffectual.(PJ,'93,I,196)
In fact, perusal of the whole of the first edition of Political Justice reveals a
somewhat’ ambivalent attitude to violent reform. For instance, whilst Chapter
I of Book IV (entitled Mode of Effecting Revolutions! is a sustained argument
against violent reform and a warning, as we have seen, that it is important to
distinguish between informing the people and inflaming them;...
(PJ,'93,1,203)
Godwin admits that it is still possible
that the impetuous multitude will run before the still and quiet progress 
of reason;...
and that one should not
pass sentence upon every revolution that shall by a few years have 
anticipated the term that wisdom would have prescribed.(PJ,'93,I,204)
Whilst noting here that there are other instances of such an ambivalent attitude
to violent reform,(21) it will be more appropriate to deal with this later in the
context of Wordsworth's own attitude as evidenced in the Letter to the Bishop of
Llandaff.(22)
Nevertheless, Godwin's general argument is against the use of force, as the way
to genuine and lasting reform. Godwin even links this with his suspicion of
political associations:
associations must be formed with great caution not to be allied to tumult.
(PJ,’93,I,208)(23)
Godwin is suspicious of people associating to effect reform, which, he feels, will
come instead from "study and reflection" (PJ,'93,1,206) and there is a pointed
force in his statement:
There is nothing more barbarous, cruel and blood-thirsty, than the 
triumph of a mob.(PJ,'93,1,208)
Godwin's view of reform stems not from any revolutionary zeal but from a
belief in the individual in his role in society, a belief founded upon the role of
private judgement; one that is strongly and sincerely held by Godwin and
logically argued to the extent of proposing the absurdities of his utopian anarchism
in his Houyhnhm-like vision of the parishes. But it is not to the easily remembered
extremes of optimism(24) in the parishes that we should look to find the essential
arguments of the first edition; these lie in his premises regarding the role of
the individual in society and the place of individual thought, motivation and
judgement.
The Individual and Social Reform: necessity and perfectibility.
Godwin's vision of the reform of society is dependent upon his view of the 
individual and his role in society. It is to the individual and the process of his 
motivations that we must turn next to understand the coherence of Godwin's 
developing argument: his idea of perfectibility and the necessitarian basis of 
achieving this; and, in the first edition, his "perfectionist" rather than utilitar­
ian stance in his application of the power of reason in the exercise of private 
judgement for the pursuit of truth and the exclusion of error.
Godwin's stance on necessity and its role in relation to reason and the perception 
of truth is crucial to his view of perfectibility and the propitious development 
of mankind.(25) Despite Godwin's note as to the nature of these "abstruse 
speculations", (PJ,'93,1,284) (26) for the student of Godwin as moralist and 
reformer, the stance Godwin takes on necessity warrants careful examination 
and is crucial to any understanding of Godwin's belief in the human species as 
infinitely malleable, but also as moulded by his environment and circum­
stances. Only such an understanding can reveal the origin of the tensions within 
a poem such as Wordsworth's Salisbury Plain and the role of such a text 
in understanding Wordsworth’s poetic and humanitarian development.
It is from Godwin's necessitarian stance that are developed the moral and 
psychological foundations of many of his ideas.(27) In Chapter V of Book IV, 
he sets out, under the title Of Free Will and Necessity, to discuss "those general 
principles of the human mind"(PJ,'93,1,284) and at once states:
this doctrine of moral necessity includes in it consequences of the
highest moment, and leads to a bold and comprehensive view of man
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in society, which cannot possibly be entertained by him who has 
embraced the opposite opinion.(PJ,'93,1,284)
But what does Godwin mean by necessity and how does he describe it in this
first edition (for there are significant revisions in the later editions, influenced
heavily by Godwin's reading of Hume)? His exposition of necessity draws
heavily from Hartley, and from Priestley who took a less materialistic line of
approach than that material automatism to which Godwin took exception in
Hartley’s work. Godwin's definition of necessity in the first edition is as follows:
He who affirms that all actions are necessary, means, that, if we form a 
just and complete view of all the circumstances in which a living or 
intelligent being is placed, we shall find that he could not in any moment 
of his existence, have acted otherwise than he acted.(PJ,’93,I,285)
Godwin then goes on from this deterministic stance, however, to find the source
of his determinism not in any "principle of causation"(PJ,'93,I,289) but through
experience:
Association of ideas obliges us, after having seen two events perpetually 
conjoined, to pass, as soon as one of them occurs, to the recollection of 
the other;. .  .(PJ,'93,1,289)
The mind, in effect, after having observed consistent patterns, connects these
and develops a "species of foresight". (PJ,'93,1,289)
Upon this foundation Godwin builds his ideas of "character", "the result of a long 
series of impressions" and the "original and essential connexion between 
motives and actions"(PJ,'93,I,291) as the basis of "the idea of moral discipline". 
Essentially, Godwin is building a psychological and moral construct which 
is based upon the idea that to perceive the full consequences of any act will of 
necessity produce a certain action; all that is required is that the understanding be 
directed towards benevolent consequences, and these will, again of necessity be
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sought in any action; thus,"necessity" will make "perfectibility" inevitable. It is 
a bold statement, the kind of statement that Godwin often makes in his com­
mitment to his ideas and beliefs, and which ultimately leave him open to charges 
of absurdity, not least because he tends to assume rather than prove or even 
demonstrate benevolent intent in man (28) (perhaps showing Wordsworth's 
Rivers, in The Borderers to be a well-targeted challenge to a singularly weak link 
in Godwin’s argument).
However, Godwin wishes to take his arguments further, and does so principally 
in his chapter Of the Mechanism of the Human Mind (Book IV,Chapter VIII), 
where he acknowledges his debt to Hartley (but not Priestley from whom much 
of his subsequent argument derives). (29) In the note early on in that chapter, 
(PJ,'93,1,320) however, he points out that his chapter "may be considered 
as giving further stability to his principal doctrine, by freeing it from the material 
automatism with which it is unnecessarily clogged." Godwin is utilising 
Hartley's associationist ideas and adapting them to his own view of necessity 
in order to assure the process of perfectibility. Also to find a place for reason 
and motivation that will create a system which allows foresight of the conse­
quences so that appropriate choice (i.e. motivation) of action can necessarily 
follow, Godwin becomes tied up in an argument over the nature of thought;
All that the adversary of automatism is concerned to maintain is, that
thought is an essential link in the chain;. .  .(PJ,'93,1,324)
which allows Godwin eventually to conclude, in the final paragraph of this 
chapter:
[thought] is the medium through which operations are produced.
(PJ,'93,1,340)
Godwin has now established a process of mind, a "psychology” based on 
necessity and association which utilises the impressions received by way of 
thought and which will, through the susceptibility of the process of thought to 
the powers of reason, establish a process of continuing improvement.
Even the brief discussion here suggests that Godwin's argument requires further
elaboration to support his ideas and ensure, for example, that where choice is
involved, the appropriate choice is made: that which is going to produce the
greatest benefit. ( It was not until the revisions and additions of the second edition
in 1796 - particularly the new Book I, Chapter V The Voluntary Actions of Men
Originate in their Opinions - that Godwin was able to do this.) In Chapter VIII
of Book IV. Of the Principle of Virtue (to be replaced by Chapter X of Book
IV, Of Self Love and Benevolence in the 1796 edition), we see some reference
to Godwin's distinction between "voluntary" and "involuntary" actions,
(PJ,'93,1,342) where Godwin states:
One of the first inferences therefore from the doctrine of voluntary 
action, is the existence of the understanding as a faculty distinct from 
sensation,....
It is thus that man becomes a moral being. He is no farther so than he is 
capable of connecting and comparing ideas, of making propositions 
concerning them, and of foreseeing certain consequences as the result of 
certain motions of the animal system.(PJ,’93,I,343)
Godwin then takes this further:
But, if the foresight of certain consequences to result may be the suf­
ficient reason of action, that is, if there be such a thing as volition, 
then every foresight of that kind has a tendency to action. If the perception 
of something as true, joined with the consciousness of my capacity to act 
upon this truth, be of itself sufficient to produce motion in the animal 
system, then every perception so accompanied has a tendency to motion.
(PJ,'93,1,343-4)
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What Godwin is arguing towards here (only fully explored in Book I, Chapter II
of the second edition) is the role of reason in identifying tru th  which will in turn
motivate towards choice and action to the inevitable benefit and improvement
of mankind. It is in this same chapter that Godwin rejects the notion of self-
love as the prime motivating influence and asserts the principles of impartiality
and benevolence upon which, once again, he seeks to build his necessitarian
construct and ensure the soundness of his doctrine of the perfectibility of man.
It is to this idea of perfectibility that we must now turn if we are to understand
the full process that Godwin envisages in Political Justice, for if his necessitarian
stance is essential to ensure the inevitability of that process, perfectibility is
required to give direction to it. Despite Godwin's general lack of a historical
perspective in Political Justice, the second chapter of Book I, History of Political
Society, outlines the political and social conditions he seeks to counteract through
improvement of the human condition. It is in relation to this that he develops
his doctrine of perfectibility, (30) which he introduces, in the first edition, in
Chapter HI of Book I, The Moral Characters of Men Originate in their
Perceptions (a chapter greatly expanded as Chapter IV of Book I in 1796(31)).
Even the original chapter adopts an overtly sensationalist stance, as Godwin
very quickly rejects any "innate principles" theory,(PJ,'93,1,12) stating:
We bring into the world with us no innate principles: consequently we 
are neither virtuous or vicious as we first come into existence.
He later reinforces this:
We bring neither virtue nor vice with us at our entrance into the world. 
But the seeds of error are ordinarily sown so early as to pass with 
superficial observers for innate.(PJ,'93,I,16)
Then, having acknowledged his sources in a footnote,(32) he indicates the
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implications of this:
From these reasonings it sufficiently appears, that the moral qualities of 
men are the produce of the impressions made upon them, and that there 
is no instance of a propensity to evil. Our virtues and vices may be traced 
to the incidents which make the history of our lives, and if these incidents 
could be divested of every improper tendency, vice would be extirpated 
from the world. The task may be difficult, may be of slow progress, and 
of hope undefined and uncertain. But hope will never desert it; and the 
man who is anxious for the benefit of his species, will willingly devote 
a portion of his activity to an enquiry into the mode of effecting this 
extirpation in whole or in part, an enquiry which promises much, if it do 
not in reality promise everything.(PJ,'93,I,18)
This very brief chapter, with the quoted footnote, points up charac­
teristically the qualities of Godwin's first edition of Political Justice: for 
although the 1796 extended chapter develops Godwin's thinking much more 
logically and in a more substantiated manner, the earlier text has a "crusading" 
tone which the later editions do not share, one which would have appealed to the 
young Wordsworth, recently returned from France and filled with reformist zeal.
However, the importance for Godwin of establishing this view of "character" is 
two-fold: it focusses early in Political Justice on the individual, and presents 
that individual as a malleable being, capable of being improved. Both of these 
points are critical in Godwin's argument and in his ultimate vision; Godwin is 
somewhat unclear as to how any form of government (33) (even his idea of the 
parishes) might relate to the idea of perfectibility, and therefore it is to the 
implications of his idea of perfectibility for the individual that he turns his 
greatest attention, since he sees society as the sum of those individuals, and 
assumes that as individuals are increasingly improved, so there would be less 
need for any form of government. (34)
Whilst Godwin's idea of perfectibility was not new, and has a long tradition
behind it, (35) Godwin himself seems to feel the need to establish forcibly 
evidence to demonstrate a tendency in humankind to improve its condition (not, 
incidentally, by way of any primitivistic ideal - which he rejects from early on in 
his book(36) and throughout it(37)).
But if it can be shown that man can and already has improved himself (and it is 
worth stressing the links in Godwin's argument between malleability and 
perfectibility, relying heavily upon such malleability leading to improve­
ment, rather than the opposite), the reason why man might wish to improve 
himself is one Godwin finds less easy to identify.
It is important to stress, albeit briefly at this point, that Godwin's concern for 
improvement, regarding both the individual and society, is contextualised 
by a humanitarian concern that is a sustained feature of Political Justice: a 
feature it will be more appropriate to illustrate later on.
Truth and Sincerity
In his attempt to understand and present the motivation for perfectibility, Godwin
turns to his belief in the idea of truth. In apassage rewritten for the more reflective
and carefully composed second edition, Godwin opens his original Book IV,
Chapter IV, Of The Cultivation of Truth, with the following preamble:
Perhaps therecannotbeasubjectofgreaterpolitical importance,or better 
calculated to lead us in safety through the mazes of controversy, than that 
of the value of truth. Truth may be considered by us, either abstractly, 
as itrelates to certain general and unchangeable principles, or practically, 
as it relates to the daily incidents and ordinary commerce of human life. 
In whichever of these views we consider it, the more deeply we meditate 
its nature and tendency, the more we shall be struck with its unrivalled 
importance.(PJ,'93,I,230)
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Godwin's vagueness over exactly what truth is is evident here; the naivety of his
belief in the all-encompassing power of truth may make us smile; but his belief
in his views is evident in the energy and rhythms of his prose. It is in such a pursuit
of truth that Godwin appears to locate the motivation for his doctrine of
perfectibility: he speaks of "the tendency of truth to the improvement of our
political instutions",(PJ,'93,1,137) and in the long Appendix, Of the Connection
between Understanding and Virtue offers the view that "virtue consists in
a desire of the benefit of the species".(PJ,'93,I,255) In Book IV, Chapter
IV, Section II, Of Sincerity. Godwin opens with the assertion:
It is evident in the last place, that a strict adherence to truth will have the 
best effect upon our minds in the ordinary commerce of life. This is the 
virtue which has commonly been known by the denomination of sin­
cerity; . . .  (PJ,'93,1,238)
Two pages further on, again in prose that exemplifies the energy and enthusi­
asms of the first edition,(38) Godwin claims:
Animated by the love of truth, my understanding would always be
vigorous and alert,  Animated by the love of truth, and a passion
inseparable from its nature, and which is almost the same thing under 
another name, the love of my species, I should carefully seek for such 
topics as might most conduce to the benefit of my neighbours, anxiously 
watch the progress of mind, and incessantly labour for the extirpation 
of prejudice.(PJ,'93,I,241)
Yet such arguments, no matter how forcefully expressed, are tenable only if we 
can assume that sincerity, truth and virtue exist in all human beings; Godwin 
seems more anxious to assume this than to prove it, but he does this in order to 
further his argument that there is an underlying wish for improvement in man­
kind; one which will continue, thus underpinning his view that man is ultimately 
motivated to improvement, to perfectibility. (39)
It is difficult to overstate the importance of truth and sincerity in Godwin's view
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of the achievement of virtue and the perfectibility of man; it is as much a corner­
stone of his philosophy as is his belief in the right of private judgement. Whether 
he sees this motivation as being on utilitarian or teleological grounds is 
problematic; this need not detain us long for the purposes of this thesis, but it 
is important to note that Godwin has been seen as essentially utilitarian(40) in his 
thinking. However, although there does seem much evidence to support this 
in Godwin's constant references to benevolence and his explanation of 
motivation in terms of desire for pleasure and aversion from pain, this seems 
to ignore the sheer force behind his assumption of a striving after truth, as well 
as the Platonic view evidenced in the first edition of Political Justice. It is 
importantto recognise the significance of a recentview expressed that Godwin's 
stance in the first edition is not utilitarian, but is, rather, a "perfectionist” 
position deriving in fact from a teleological viewpoint.(41) This is strongly 
suggested in statements by Godwin such as:
It is in the disposition and view of the mind, and not in the good which 
may accidentally and intentionally result, that virtue consists.
(PJ,'93,1,356)
In Chapter XIV of Book V, Godwin states:
The road to the improvement of mankind is in the utmost degree simple, 
to speak and act the truth. (PJ,'93,11,494-5).
Then, in a passage deleted after 1793, he asserts:
Once establish the perfectibility of man, and it will inevitably follow that 
we are advancing to a state, in which the truth will be too well known 
to be easily mistaken,...(PJ,'93,II,495)
Finally,in Chapter XXIII of Book V, he asks:
How greatwouldbetheprogressofintellectualimprovement,ifmenwere 
unfettered by the prejudices of education, unseduced by the influence of 
a corrupt state of society, and accustomed to yield without fear to the guid­
ance of truth,...?(PJ,'93,II,569)
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It is clear from statements such as the above and many others like it, which feature 
frequently in the prose of the first edition of Political Justice, that Godwin's belief 
in human perfectibility and in the pursuit of truth are inextricably linked, and 
arise from a belief in truth itself and in man's tendency to follow truth when 
it is perceived, rather than any explicit utilitarian or contractarian stance (albeit 
Godwin does use the language of utility at times to discuss the implications of 
such motivation towards improvement). The danger (or naivety) of such a claim 
and such a passionate belief in the power and perception of truth through the 
rational process was one Wordsworth was to recognise in due course.
Essentially, Godwin's interest is in the individual and the right of private 
judgement, rather than man’s role in society; as he states in Book II Chapter VI, 
Of the Right of Private Judgement.
50.... it ultimately appears, that no man is obliged to conform to any rule 
of conduct, further than the rule is consistent with justice.(PJ,'93,I,129)
However, by 1798, it is worth noting that Godwin reinforces the theme of this
argument in this chapter, by putting his assertion of the centrality of private
judgement much more forcefully in his revision:
50.... it ultimately appears, that the conviction of a man's individual under­
standing is the only legitimate principle, imposing on him the duty of 
adopting any species of action. (PJ,'98,1,181)
This ultimate and key belief in the right of private judgement logically leads
Godwin to his conclusion in Book in Chapter II, Of the Social Contract:
Lastly, if government be founded in the consent of the people, it can have 
no power over any individual by whom that consent is refused.. .
(PJ,'93,1,148)
and, in a more forceful passage in this same concluding paragraph, deleted again 
from later editions, he states:
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The rules by which my action shall be directed are matters of a con­
sideration entirely personal....No consent of ours can divest us of our 
moral capacity. This is a species of property which we can neither barter 
nor resign;. . .  (PJ,'93,1,148)
Not, above all, to any elected or other form of government. It is this intense
individualism, leading to Godwin's anarchism, that makes essential Godwin's
belief in perfectibility, in truth, and now in "reason"; reason being the agent
or instrument whereby truth will always be identified and distinguished from
error, leading to the defeat of vice and the pursuit and triumph of virtue - to
the advancement of the human condition.
The Place of Reason.
It is as the "man of reason" that Godwin is most remembered and portrayed, often
exaggeratedly and inaccurately. It is perhaps worth making the point that in
reading the first edition of Political Justice, by the end of the first volume, there
has been only very limited use of the word "reason" (though the role ascribed
to reason is crucial in the exercise of private judgement and the perception of
truth). As we shall see, one of the effects of the 1796 revisions is to change this,
and the impression given of the role of reason is much enhanced. Yet even in this
first edition, there are statements which appear to ascribe to reason a role that is
more than just a means to perception of truth:
Reason is the only legislator, and her decrees are irrevocable and uni­
form. (PJ,’93,1,166)
Even here, in the context of Godwin's discussion in this chapter on legislation, 
his view of reason is of its being the only authority to whose judgement we can 
rightly submit. Reason therefore is, for Godwin, a means whereby we perceive 
truth and distinguish it from error. Again, there can be little doubt that the role
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of reason as well as that of "understanding" and "thought" are much more fully
explicated and developed in the second edition of Political Justice.(421 However,
even in this first edition, it can be seen that if the perception of truth was, for
Godwin, inevitable, all that was necessary was to identify the mechanism by
which truth is necessarily revealed, and that means is reason:
In a word, either reason is the curse of our species, and human nature is 
to be regarded with horror; or it becomes us to employ our understanding 
and to act upon it, and to follow truth wherever it may lead us.
(PJ„93,I,201)
These words from Book IV Chapter II, Of Revolutions. Section I. Duties of a
Citizen(43) show us, in his first edition, Godwin's belief in and enthusiasm for
his view of reason being the means of perceiving truth, and disposing of error. (44)
And the role of reason therefore, in Godwin's doctrine of perfectibility is seen
in Section II of the same chapter, in the concluding paragraph:
There are two principles therefore which the man who desires the 
regeneration of his species ought ever to bear in mind, to regard the im­
provement of every hour as essential in the discovery and dissemination 
of truth, and willingly to suffer the lapse of years before he urges the 
reducing his theory into actual execution. With all his caution it is 
possible that the impetuous multitude will run before the still and quiet 
progress of reason; nor will he sternly pass sentence upon every 
revolution that shall by a few years have anticipated the term that 
wisdom would have prescribed. But if his caution be firmly exerted, there 
is no doubt that he will supersede many abortive attempts, and con­
siderably prolong the general tranqillity.(PJ,'93,I,204)(45)
As this quotation shows, despite his ambivalence over the pragmatics of violent 
revolution, already referred to, Godwin's essential belief is in a rationalistically- 
guided reform. In this sense, reason will play its crucial role in social improve­
ment.
It is difficult at times to understand the "mechanics", so to speak, of Godwin's
concept of reason. At the end of the famous Fenelon incident in Book II Chapter
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II, Of Justice. Godwin states:
But understanding is the faculty thatperceives the truth of this and similar 
propositions;' and justice is the principle that regulates my conduct 
accordingly.(P.J.'93,I,82-3)
However, elsewhere, we find Godwin stating that:
There can be no doubt, that the proper way of conveying to my under­
standing a truth of which I am ignorant, or of impressing on me a firmer 
persuasion of a truth with which I am acquainted, is by an appeal to my 
reason.(PJ,'93,I,132)(46)
Whether or not Godwin sees " understanding" and "reason" as synonymous is
unclear; it certainly does not seem to be the case in the second quotation. What
Godwin does seem to suggest is that if understanding is seen as one of our
faculties, reason is to. be understood in more active terms: as the exercise of
understanding. Above all, reason is seen by Godwin as important not for its own
sake, but in its role in the identification of error and the pursuit of truth for
improvement of the individual who, in turn, will contribute to the good of the
sum of those individuals: society.
Even in this relatively brief discussion of this Political Justice it can be seen that 
there is a complexity and coherence in Godwin’s ideas; ideas, many of which, 
borrowed from a variety of sources,(47) represent, in Godwin’s use of them and 
in his own developing vision of "perfectibility", more than simply a response to 
the French Revolution or to the imported ideas of the philosophes; but rather 
a consistent (and Lockean) view of human individuality which he pushed to a 
stage of development which, today, we find absurdly optimistic. This shows 
Godwin's first edition of Political Justice, with its central focus on the belief in 
private judgement, its assertion of the power of truth and the role ascribed to 
reason in the context of these as a more complex attempt to systematise a
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perfectibilian construct for the individual (and hence for society) than earlier 
more simplistic views of "cold rationalism" have suggested. Furthermore, it 
is worth repeating at this stage that the radicalism of the ideas and the reformist 
energy emerging from the early chapters particularly express a crusading 
reformist tone which almost counteracts the support of gradualist and rational 
reform. As we shall see from a close examination of re views of Political Justice, 
it is possible to imagine two levels of response to the book ( which would not 
be the case with the revised 1796 edition): a "summary" reading might quickly 
be attracted to the radicalism of the text and the strong arguments against the 
various oppressions of government; whilst it takes a closer study of the book 
(particularly those chapters which Godwin had suggested the reader might pass 
over (48)) to recognise and digest the motivational process in his necessitarian 
and perfectibilian stance (somewhat unsatisfactorily presented in 1793, and the 
subject of the most substantive revisions in 1796). As we shall see, there is much 
evidence (both textual and external) to suggest that Wordsworth's contact with 
Political Justice and Godwin and his ideas involved a developmental process of 
study and increasing understanding of Godwin's ideas.
For anyone in England in 1793 seeing the French Revolution as the beginning of 
social and political regeneration, and then faced with the horrors of the Terror 
with its seeming repression of individual in another barbarous way, the alternative 
that Godwin offered must have seemed, if not attractive, at least worthy of some 
consideration. To the young Wordsworth, returning from the traumas of his 
recent visit to France in what was an emotionally charged state (as The Prelude 
does make clear even without any admission of his affair with Annette Vallon, but
concentrating on the poet's acknowledged response to the Revolution), it is 
difficult to believe that Political Justice and its reception could have escaped 
his attention.
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Part 2. The Reception and Impact of Political Justice.
The comments of two very different modem writers, E.P.Thompsonand Marilyn
Butler,(49) reflect recent views on the impact of Godwin and Political Justice-
In his essay The Poverty of Theory. E.P.Thompson, speaking of the Godwinians
and their impact states th a t:
Godwinism which freaked out the young intelligentsia in England
between 1794 and 98, was....a moment of intellectual extremism,
divorced from correlative action or actual social commitment those
Godwinians represented the only moment when the English intelligentsia 
adopted, in their theory, an ultra-Jacobin posture [and] had some spirit 
about them, (p 181)
Marilyn Butler, in her Romantics. Rebels and Reactionaries writes:
The radical classics of the mid-1790's, Godwin's Political Justice and 
Paine's Age of Reason, seemed subversive at a profounder level than any 
campaign for legal relief the Dissenters had ever engaged in, for they 
challenged secular and religious authority at its very roots, in the 
individual's simple habit of belief, (p 49)
The much earlier and often-quoted words of Hazlitt in his famous essay(50)
appraising Godwin tells us, that, for a brief period,
he was in the very zenith of a sultry and unwholesome popularity....no- 
one was more talked of, more looked up to, more sought after, and 
wherever liberty, truth, justice was there, his name was not far off.
De Quincey, a harsher critic ofGodwin(51) nevertheless states that as apolitical
philosopher Godwin
carried one single shock into the bosom of English society, fearful but 
momentary, like the electric blow of the gymnotus.(52)
The above strikes at the heart of the problem of assessing the importance and
limitations of Godwin's impact, and especially the reception and impact of the first
edition of Political Justice in 1793. Godwin's radicalism was not that of Paine's
Rights of Man: it was an intellectual reformism. Despite the impressive sales
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of the first edition,(53) Godwin's actual popularity deserves the epithets Hazlitt 
attaches to it. Godwin's was an ephemeral fame, and in view of the rather 
unattractive impression he made in social intercourse, he was not the person 
to develop an extensive network of close friends or acquaintances. Those who 
did attach themselves closely to him were few (e.g.Home Tooke, Montagu and 
even Coleridge) It is certainly not to this group that Wordsworth can be assigned. 
The very indeterminate nature of the Godwin-Wordsworth relationship(54) 
together with the rather summary comment on the reception and impact of 
Political Justice has limited the external evidence relevant to Godwin's influence 
on Wordsworth.
However, returning briefly to Thompson's point, it is in the very intellectual 
nature of Godwin's radicalism, a matter increasingly acknowledged in more 
recent studies of his work(55) and stressed in the first section of this chapter, 
that the real clue to the impact of Godwin is to be found: an intellectual and 
philosophically-based radicalism to which Wordsworth initially responded, 
and against which, ultimately, he reacted.
It is therefore as essential to recognise and understand the reception and impact 
of the first edition of Political Justice as it is to understand the intention and thrust 
of the book itself; though its sales were impressive, itis obvious that many, unable 
to read the work itself, would have read the various reviews written of it in the 
weeks and months immediately following its publication. Although commen­
tators on Godwin(56) have remarked on the reception of the first edition, most 
seem to have concentrated on the effect of its publication on Godwin's public
standing, and even those giving some account of its reception have not paid
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adequate attention to comment on the the book. Yet, from a reading of these, 
we can perceive exactly what areas of Godwin’s ideas and arguments caught the 
interest of the reviewers.
Godwin's book did attract a considerable amount of attention from some of the 
major journals of the time. Although the political leanings(57) of the journal 
concerned and the authorship of some of the reviews (58) have to be taken into 
account, it is clear that Political Justice was, in general, received favourably 
- though not with unqualified applause in even the most supportive reviews; it 
was also seen by all of them to be a very bold and even extravagant work.
However, before going on to discuss the opinions of the reviews, it is well worth 
making one rather obvious point: as well as offering some critical comment 
on Political Justice, these articles also undertook that other purpose of reviews 
very effectively: namely, the dissemination(59) of Godwin's ideas. Whilst 
inevitably the selection of the reviewer affected this, it should be noted that 
several of the extended reviews, overthree months,aredevoted to little more than 
extensive quotations from Godwin's book; and, as will be seen, although the 
various reviews do summarise Godwin's arguments it was often the same key 
issues and sometimes even the same passages that received attention. As we shall 
see, such passages tend to focus upon Godwin's criticism of oppression by 
government, his more overdy political passages.
Therefore, whilst a reflective review such as the brief summary of Godwin's 
topics in Political Justice in the New Annual Register for 1793/4 (pp 218-9) 
simply gives an outline of all his chapter titles, the more immediate responses
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in other reviews can be seen to concentrate on some of the seminal ideas in 
Godwin's book, as well as some of the ideas most likely to attract attention at 
such a time in English and French history. Godwin's central belief in the right 
of private judgement, and the oppressive and coercive limitations of government 
and the law on such judgement, is discussed at some length in the Analytical 
Review for June 1793, pp 125-6, (60) and is highlighted by Holcroft in the 
second instalment of his review in the Monthly Review, of April 1793, where he 
quotes Godwin:
That government therefore is the best, which in no one instance 
interferes with the exercise of private judgement without absolute 
necessity, (p 435)
Readers of these reviews would be left in no doubt as to Godwin's belief in the 
right of private judgement.(61) Yet one is struck by the fact that this and some 
of the other ideas that Godwin sees as seminal in the development of his argument 
are not those consistently disseminated or highlighted.(62) The role of truth and 
sincerity, (63) the doctrine of perfectibility,(64) receive attention with supporting 
summary quotation, as do his ideas on the role of thought, or, as the scathing 
reviewer in the British Critic puts it:”Man is a machine".(65) But these are not 
the topics which consistently pervade the reviews of Political Justice. For anyone 
reading the reviews, two themes would seem to characterise the writer who had 
published this work: these are Godwin's belief in the need for gradual reform 
allied to his anti-revolutionary stance, and, secondly, his stand against 
coercion by institutions and oppression, especially the oppression and inequities 
of monarchy and aristocracy.
It is this view of Godwin as a reformist, albeit in a rationalistic and philosophical
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context, that is the consistent theme of these various reviews. For instance, Price,
in the Analytical Review of June 1793 quotes Godwin's assertion:
When a great majority of any society are persuaded to secure any benefit 
to themselves, there is no need of tumult or violence to effect i t
(p 124)
And after having spent much of this review summarising Godwin’s arguments
against government and legislation and the manner in which these endanger and
repress private judgement, he closes this particular instalment of his review with
references to Book IV, particularly the sections on resistance and revolution,
with some of Godwin's assertions concerning his belief in "argument and
persuasion"(66) as opposed to revolution. Similarly, the Critical Review of
April 1793, having opened this first instalment of of its three-part review by
quoting from Godwin's arguments on the causes of war, soon turns to his
arguments against revolution, stating:
We have already intimated that Mr. Godwin is a declared enemy to force 
and violence in effecting changes in government. -On this subject we 
think his whole chapter deserving the attention of our readers.(p 367).
Then quoting a lengthy passage, including Godwin's statement in his argument
against political associations that there is
nothing more barbarous, cruel and bloodthirsty than the triumph of a 
mob.(p 369)
There is a sense in which these reviews in fact overstate or perhaps over­
simplify Godwin's rejection of revolution as a means of reform; for, as has been 
indicated in the previous section of this argument,(67) Godwin does, in this first 
edition, admit the legitimacy of less passive means of reform when no other 
alternative is available. However, despite the oppressions of the poor cata­
logued by Godwin, it is made clear by the reviewer that Godwin does not count­
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enance violence as the answer to such oppression, but promotes gradual reform. 
The second instalment in the Critical Review in July 1793 opens by drawing 
attention once again to Godwin's anti-revolutionary reformist stance:
Whatever may be the political heresies of our author, 
says the reviewer,
there is one article of his faith which has completely exempted him from 
our censure; and that is, that no revolution, no change of government, no 
innovation should be attempted, which is not preceded and called for by 
a radical and universal change of sentiment in the people-(p 290)
The reviewer then states, in the second paragraph:
While Mr. Godwin lays down so safe a principle as this, as the basis of 
his speculations, he is entitled to lenity, and even respect, respect from 
those who differ from him on particular topics; and we cannot but com­
pliment his sagacity, which has been so amply justified by the unhappy 
situation of France, even since the publication of his volumes. Other 
writers on the side of democracy have been less cautious, and we have 
therefore treated them with less reserve, as we shall ever do those whose 
writings are calculated to produce disorder or discontent in this 
country, (p 291)
Godwin is clearly being portrayed as no threat to the state, no instigator of violent 
upheaval, but as a rationalist and reformist thinker.
Even the very early and more summary review in the Literary Magazine and
British Review of March 1793, notes Godwin's reformist stance:
Reasoning, he observes, is the legitimate mode of revolutions, and the 
only good mode of effecting them; here too persuasion is the proper 
instrument.(p 225)
In the first of Holcroft's three-part review in the Monthly Review, also of March,
1793, he introduces Godwin's book by saying:
but that which ought to endear it even to those whose principles it may 
offend, is the strength of argument adduced in it to prove, that peace and 
order most effectually promote the happiness after which political re­
formers are panting; -that, as the progress of knowledge is gradual, 
political reform ought not to be precipitate; - and that convulsive
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violence is dangerous,...(p 311).
However, on the second page of the April 1793 instalment of the review,
Holcroft quotes from Godwin:
The objections (p. 195.) that offer themselves to an exertion of actual 
force, where there are no hopes of success, are numerous.(p 436).
Holcroft has obviously spotted that strain of ambivalence in Godwin's attitude to
violent reform, but having acknowledged it briefly in this way, quotes at length
arguments from Godwin against violence in pursuit of reform.
The second principal theme to feature consistently in the reviews of Political 
Justice is Godwin's stand against oppression by institutions monarchical and 
aristocratic. Godwin, as summarised by his reviewers, emerges as a rationalist 
reformer, but also a highly political one in his thinking. Price's second instalment 
in the Analytical Review of August 1793, whilst giving considerable attention to 
Godwin's belief in the role and power of truth and sincerity, quotes at length from 
Godwin's arguments against monarchy and despotism; and Godwin's views on 
the "education of a prince" are also quoted at great length. (68) (As we shall see 
in a moment, his chapter on the education of a prince is the one most consistently 
focussed upon by all of the reviewers; a chapter, where, in his description of the 
upbringing of a monarch, all of his empirically-based deterministic views and his 
stand against institution as an infringement of private judgement coalesce.)
The Critical Review of April 1793 quotes voluminously Godwin's arguments 
concerning the oppression of the poor by governments, legislation, and by the rich 
who,
keep their inferiors at a distance, [with] the splendour of their equipage, 
the magnificence of their retinue, and the sumptuousness of their enter­
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tainments. The poor man is struck with this exhibition; he feels his own 
miseries; he knows how unwearied are his efforts to obtain a slender 
pittance of this prodigal waste; and he mistakes opulence for felicity.
(p 365)
In the second instalment of the review in July 1793, the reviewer quotes again
directly from the chapter, On the Education of Princes, immediately thereafter
rehearsing Godwin's anti-monarchical arguments:
Hence the well-known maxims of monarchical governments, that ease is 
the parent of rebellion, and that it is necessary to keep the people in a 
state of poverty and endurance, in order to render them submissive.
(p 292)
However, the reviewer then, in a paragraph of comment that is hard to under­
stand in the context of a generally supportive though not uncritical review, 
expresses support for the nobility of England in an argument based upon title 
rather than wealth. (69) One wonders if such a comment might not have made 
readers more sympathetic to the consistency of Godwin's arguments.
In April 1793, the Literary Magazine in its review quotes at len gth from Godwin's
arguments against monarchy and aristocracy, again giving prominence to "the
education of the distinguished mortal destined to a throne" and notes how Godwin
"concludes on its total inaptitude to the purpose designed. "(70) After lengthy
quotation from Godwin's arguments regarding the education of a prince, the
review concludes:
Mr Godwin concludes that monarchy is founded on imposture; whether 
he is just in this conclusion, we must refer to those who have perused 
the book.(p 308)
Finally, in the Monthly Review of April 1793. Holcroft gives early prominence
to what is little more than lengthy quotation from Godwin's arguments on the
education of a prince and to his arguments against monarchy and its
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institutional trappings,(71) eventually quoting Godwin's challenge:
Is it well, that so large a part of the community should be kept in abject 
penury, rendered stupid with ignorance, and disgustful with vice, per­
petuated in nakedness and hunger, goaded to the commission of crimes, 
and made victims to the merciless laws which the rich have instituted to 
oppress them? Is it sedition to enquire whether this state of things may not 
be exchanged for a better? (p 444)
It is clear therefore that the perception of Godwin's ideas disseminated by the
major reviews appearing immediately after the publication of the first edition
of Political Justice is of Godwin as concerned reformist, but committed to
gradual reform in the interests of the individual against such institutions as
government (particularly monarchical government). His ideas are viewed as
open to criticism, but are also admitted to be challenging: the ideas of a thinker
who, in the political turmoil of the times, has not been afraid to publish such a
work.
Most reviews are favourable with the obvious exception of that in the British 
Critic (72) Whilst others are not uncritical, (73) they are generally highly 
supportive. Price opens his comment in the Analytical Review of June 1793 by 
stating:
We deem it our duty therefore to encourage every attempt, the object of 
which is, to illustrate the principles of sound and rational morality, and 
to establish the theory of a more equitable government. And we 
conceive, that the politician or philosopher whose labours are directed 
to this end, possesses a just claim to our most grateful acknowledgements.
(P 121)
The more qualified support of the Critical Review of April 1793 nevertheless
opens with a most laudatory paragrah:
There is certainly no employment in which the most eminent talents can 
be more laudably engaged, than in tracing out that scheme of political 
oeconomy which may most extensively promote the happiness and 
improvement of mankind. This is a subject which has occupied occasion­
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ally the greatest minds, from the days of Plato and Aristotle to those of 
Locke. We cannot therefore entirely agree with our author, "that the sci­
ence of politics is yet in its infancy," though there undoubtedly is still 
much room for improvement; andin this view the public are under consid­
erable obligations to the very ingenious author of this elaborate treatise.
(P 361)
Then, in response to Godwin's concerns expressed in his Preface over possible
reaction to his book, it proclaims:
We cannot for a moment believe that a British minister would attempt to 
fix shackles on the freedom of philosophical speculation, or that the 
nation would endure such an attempt.(p 361)
However, by October, in the third instalment of this review, the enthusiasm is
much more reserved:
The mind of the author is evidently warped by the false philosophy of the 
times, and however free he may fancy himself, writes more in fetters than 
any author we have lately perused. Where he disengages himself from 
these prejudices, and reasons with coolness and candour, we frequently 
discern the efforts of a vigorous mind, and have generally to admire 
his ingenuity, even where we cannot applaud his judgement.(p 154)(74)
Holcroft's review in the Monthly Review of March 1793 opens by drawing
attention to the context of Godwin's latest publication:
It may be doubted whether, at any period, since the fatal contest between 
Charles I and his parliament, the minds of men have been so much 
awakened to political inquiry, as they are at this moment.(p 311)
It continues:
we have no small degree of pleasure in announcing the present work to 
our readers; as one, which, from the freedom of its inquiry, the grandeur 
of its views, and the fortitude of its principles, is eminently deserving of 
attention.(p 311)
This is immediately qualified by Holcroft's stating that he does not necessarily 
hold with all of Godwin's views and ideas.
That Godwin's work was received favourably can certainly be argued; that it was
received with interest, puzzlement, excitement and even some dismay is evident.
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Looking back on the impact of Political Justice, the New Annual Register for 
that year catches the tone of the import and impact of Godwin's book very 
effectively
We have been the more full in our account of the subjects discussed in 
this work, as it has greatly excited public attention.... The author 
possesses a well-informed, bold and vigorous m ind,. .  .(p 219) (75)
It applauds Godwin's courage in publishing at the time:
Unfettered by system, and fearless of offending the prejudices of 
mankind, he contends for what appears for him to be truth,with an ardour, 
which it would be doing him an injustice not to ascribe to the best and 
most praise-worthy motives.(p 219)
And whilst even this review qualifies its support, it cogently finds Political Justice
highly deserving of the attention of philosophical politicians.(p 219)
It is this view ofGodwin as sincere if somewhat fanciful in developing his ideas, 
as a thinker committed to individual liberty and to the benefit of mankind that 
emerges from the reviews of the first edition of Political Justice. Yet, if one 
compares the experience of reading Political Justice itself with that of reading 
the reviews of it, the tendency of the reviews either to summarise very succinctly 
or for other reasons spend less time upon some of Godwin's more abstruse 
arguments inrelation particularly to, for example, necessity and his motivational 
construct in relation to perfectibility(76) has the effect of suggesting a more 
immediately politically oriented and directly reformist work than is actually the 
case. It is such an impression that might have caused many readers to read 
Political Justice itself, in the expectation of finding a political treatise, prior to 
reading Godwin's very full and complex arguments in the philosophical context 
in which they rightly belong.
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In approaching the question of Wordsworth's "radicalism" and the role that 
Godwin's thinking played in that, such a distinction should be remembered. 
Whether or not Wordsworth read any of the reviews is not known, but in 
examining his first substantial (but unpublished) prose piece following upon the 
publication of Political Justice, certain points emerging from this examination 
of these reviews and their portrayal of Godwin's ideas are worth bearing in mind. 
Those two sustained themes of Godwin's philosophic approach to reform and 
his strong attacks on the oppressions of government are important. If 
Wordsworth did read some of the reviews, it would have been difficult to avoid 
either of these issues. Moreover, the reception of Political Justice in the reviews 
might well have spurred him to read the book, not least because of the philosophic 
(rather than Painite) approach it offered. This, as we shall see, becomes relevant 
from the very opening sentences of Llandaff.
It will, of course, be more appropriate to examine the details of the relationship 
between Wordsworth and Godwin in the ensuing chapters; only in such a way 
can the pattern of correlations emerging between Wordsworth's development 
and Godwin's writings be understood. For, just as any simplistic idea of 
"influence" through mere verbal echoings or occasional parallels of details of 
themes orideas has already been rejected, so the understanding of the relationship 
between Wordsworth and Godwin is a complex one, which rests on no single 
issue or piece of evidence, but, rather, a series of interrelationships and patterns 
of development.
Yet, even at the end of an introductory chapter such as this, where it has already
been apposite to suggest some of the seminal issues and themes in Godwin's
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Political Justice that will be relevant to the emerging argument here, it is useful 
to re-iterate certain key points. Above all, the fact that the first edition of Political 
Justice has a complex coherence and a structural unevenness; a philosophic 
stance allied to a crusading tone and sometimes a crudity of style : all of this 
points to the potential for a variety of response to the text. It offers radical 
protest, yet an intellectualised philosophical and nascent psychological construct 
(flawed, and difficult to understand at times). It demonstrates a humanitarian 
spirit and a genuine interest in the individual, allied to a personalised anarchist 
belief that hinges on the pivotal role of a seemingly unfeeling rational principle.
All of which suggests a work that would take time to explore, assimilate and 
ultimately accept or reject. To this, in time, was to be added the exposition, testing 
and development of these ideas in the fictional pre sentation of Caleb Williams and 
then the substantive revisions of 1796. Perhaps then, a priori, it is not difficult 
to accept that this might be a book (and a person) with whom a young, impres­
sionable and initially radically-oriented poet might have a developing relation­
ship involving a variety of responses.
Such, it will be shown, is indeed the case with regard to Wordsworth and 
Godwin. It will be essential in this study to chart the nature and variety of Word­
sworth's responses, first of all to the first edition of Political Justice: an initial 
response that, not surprisingly, whilst responding to the essential philosophic 
character of the work, nevertheless focusses, in the borrowings evidenced in 
Llandaff. on its radicalism, that leads to a need to respond to the complexity of 
Godwin's construct, ill-fitted though it is in the manner in which Wordsworth
is to draw upon it in Salisbury Plain. And, looking beyond the first edition of
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Political Justice, to Caleb Williams and to the revisions of 1796 Political Justice, 
as well as Wordsworth's acquaintance with the philosopher during the time 
of the revision of these works, again a clear progression in Wordsworth's response 
can be evidenced.
However, with regard to the first edition and Godwin's role in the political 
reaction and repressions of 1793 and 1794, it is necessary first of all to consider 
aspects of what might be referred to as Wordsworth's radicalism.
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CHAPTER TWO : WORDSWORTH'S RADICALISM - 
THE ORIGINS OF HIS MORAL AND HUMAN CONCERN.
Part 1: The claims of The Prelude and 
the evidence from Descriptive Sketches.
Exactly how far Wordsworth became involved in the radical movements of his 
time can only be uncertain. His assertion that he had read "the master pamphlets 
of the day "(1) and his account of what he saw in France, as well as his correspon­
dence later on with William Mathews (and other brief letters dealing with radical 
issues(2))leave a sketchy picture.
The purpose of this initial argument is to identify preliminary evidence that raises 
questions concerning Wordsworth's claims in The Prelude regarding the early 
stage of his radical development. It will be the purpose of the concluding 
chapter of this thesis to revisit these questions, and, in light of the evidence 
emerging from detailed examination of key texts (as well as external evidence) 
to offer answers to those questions. Nevertheless, it is essential to identify at this 
early stage the existence of these questions by challenging Wordsworth's claims 
in The Prelude concerning the development of his radicalism; this will be done 
by focusing upon key passages in The Prelude in relation to evidence emerging 
from the much earlier composition. Descriptive Sketches.
Such a challenge should focus, at least initially, upon the role Wordsworth 
ascribes to Michel Beaupuy in the development of the poet's political, social and 
ultimately moral concerns. In Book IX of the 1805 Prelude Beaupuy is presented 
as the political, social and moral "mentor" of the young poet:
Oft in solitude 
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With him did I discourse about the end 
Of civil government, and its wisest forms,
Of ancient prejudice, and chartered rights,
Allegiance, faith, and law by time matured,
Custom and habit, novelty and change,
Of self-respect, and virtue in the few 
For patrimonial honour set apart,
And ignorance in the labouring multitude.
For he, an upright man and tolerant,
Balanced these contemplations in his mind,
And I, who at that time was scarcely dipped 
Into the turmoil, had a sounder judgement 
Than afterwards,...(1805,IX,328-341)(3)
The closing lines of this quotation are a clue to the self-consciousness one finds 
in Wordsworth's references to the period 1793-95, the period to be treated in 
BookXofthe 1805 Prelude. Whilst Wordsworth's writings of that period do offer 
evidence of a tormented soul, they raise questions regarding that "sounder 
judgement" in the various radical themes Wordsworth claims as the result of his 
conversations with Beaupuy. What examination of such texts as Llandaffand the 
first two versions of the Salisbury Plain poems suggest is a much more tortuous 
and complex process of coming to terms with these radical themes than the 
impression given, ascribing his clearest understanding of them to the discussions 
he had during his walks with Beaupuy. Whilst it would probably be impossible 
to distinguish exactly what, in the lines quoted above, Wordsworth learned from 
the radical ideas of the time, what he learned from a figure such as Godwin, (some 
of whose principal themes were indeed those such as "civil government", 
"prejudice", "rights") and what in fact he did absorb from his conversations with 
Beaupuy, Wordsworth's suggestion in The Prelude that the soundest and most 
lasting of his radical and political ideas came from Beaupuy alone raises funda­
mental questions as to whether or not this is true; and if it is not, as to why
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Wordsworth chooses to argue such a case.
An examination of Descriptive Sketches (published soon after Wordsworth's 
return from France, a poem he was probably writing at the time of his meetings 
with Beaupuy(4)) provides two essential clues in this early examination of 
Wordsworth's claims. First of all, through investigating Wordsworth's treatment 
in this poem of his love affair with Annette Vallon (and particularly the effect 
of his later revisions upon that treatment), evidence will be shown of a tendency 
in Wordsworth to mask or otherwise distort certain matters that he later found 
uncomfortable to reflect upon. This has considerable significance for later 
examination of The Prelude and Wordsworth's reflective presentation of certain 
events in his development (again with later textual changes often being an 
important clue as to his intent - witness the much quoted "crisis" ascribed 
to his period of rationalistic enquiry, a "crisis" added after the 1805 Prelude was 
completed). Secondly, evidence of the character of Wordsworth's radical 
thought in Descriptive Sketches will be shown to compromise his claims 
regarding Beaupuy's role and influence in his development; and hence further 
to reinforce the need to question and re-examine Wordsworth's claims in The 
Prelude regarding the development of his radical thought, especially in regard to 
the role played by William Godwin.
Descriptive Sketches 1793 and 1836-49 : W ordsworth's treatm ent of his 
affair with Annette Vallon.
Given the period of composition of Descriptive Sketches and the assumed timing 
of Wordsworth's affair with Annette Vallon,(5) it is inconceivable that Words­
worth wrote the poem unaffected by his feelings for her; yet critical comment
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has scarcely taken account of this. For instance, in the case of the opening lines
of the poem, despite the assertion by Legouis(6) that Wordsworth is probably
displaying in this poem(7) aresponse to the sentiment of Melancholy as a vehicle
of form (a view with which I would not wholly disagree), that critic soon finds
himself having to admit, but failing to explain adequately, the "despair" which
greets the reader of the opening lines of the 1793 edition of Descriptive Sketches.
most particularly the effect of the word "Pain"(8) (changed to "distress" in the
1836 edition), and also lines 13-16 of the original:
But doubly pitying Nature loves to show'r 
Soft on his wounded heart her healing pow'r 
Who plods o'er hills and vales his road forlorn,
Wooing her varying charms from eve to mom.
No sad vacuities his heart annoy,...
By 1836, these lines have been considerably softened:
Yet not unrecompensed the man shall roam,
Who at the call of summer quits his home,
And plods through some wide realm o'er vale and height,
Though seeking only holiday delight;...(9)
This example points early on the effect of Wordsworth's revisions, which is to 
enhance the conventional "melancholy" from which nature can easily draw the 
poet (the whole effect is very stylised, and the emotions recorded have much of 
affectation and convention about them); the effect of the revision, however, 
is also to remove the poignancy of the original - the sense of despair and real 
pain. The overall stylistic effect of this revision is scarcely an improvement, not 
least in the unfortunate "holiday delight". There are several examples of similar 
selective revisions to alleviate the sense of grief by deleting the more sharply 
expressed sorrows, and by replacing a word or phrase with one more in harmony 
with the general assumed context of poetic melancholy. (10) A reading of the
1793 edition also points to what seemed (presumably to the older Wordsworth) 
a weakness in lines 13-42,where the supposedly comforting balms of nature 
seem somewhat unequal to the task of bringing solace to the poet; not so in the 
1849 version, where the much diminished sorrows easily accede to the soothing 
balms of Zephyrs etc. Even in the closing lines of the two editions, 1793 presents 
a still-pining spirit, whilst there is an optimistic confidence pervading the close 
of the 1849 version.
What, then, is the cause of this despair and sorrow in the original edition? Has 
Wordsworth's assumed melancholy burst the bounds of its own convention? Are 
the revisions and the intent behind them merely stylistic, as the more experienced 
poet revises this early text? Perhaps another parallel and consistent set of 
revisions and deletions points to the cause.
Although Wordsworth does not delete the "dark-eyed maids" and other young
female figures that populate his scenes in this poem,(11) nor remove all
references to "love" or "passion", there is a careful and selective assuaging of their
overall effect within this poem. Particularly interesting is the deletion of the
following lines:
Farewell those forms that, in thy noon-tide shade,
Rest, near their little plots of wheaten glade;
Those stedfast eyes, that beating breasts inspire 
To throw the "sultry ray" of young Desire;
Those lips, whose tides of fragrance come, and go,
Accordant to the cheek's unquiet glow;
Those shadowy breasts in love's soft light array'd,
And rising, by the noon of passion sway'd.
-Thy fragrant gales and lute-resounding streams,
Breathe o'er the failing soul voluptuous dreams...(1793,148-157)
Whilst these lines are not very good,(12) one must ask if the revised form of 1836
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is any improvement:
Farewell those forms that in thy noon-tide shade 
Rest near their little plots of wheaten glade;
Those charms that bind the soul in powerless trance,
Lip-dewing song, and ringlet-tossing dance.
Where sparkling eyes and breaking smiles illume 
The sylvan cabin's lute-enlivened gloom.
-Alas! the very murmer of the streams
Breathes o'er the failing soul voluptuous dreams,... (1836,127-34)
or, particularly, the 1845-49 further revision:
But now farewell to each and all-adieu 
To every charm, and last and chief to you,
Ye lovely maidens that in noontide shade 
Rest near your little plots of wheaten glade;
To all that binds the soul in powerless trance,
Lip-dewing song,and ringlet - tossing dance;
Where sparkling eyes and breaking smiles illume 
The sylvan cabin's lute-enlivened gloom.
-Alas! the very murmur of the streams
Breathes o'er the failing soul voluptuous dreams,...(1849, 127-36)(13) 
Perhaps "sultry ray" in the original deserved to go - but so also surely did "the 
little plots of wheaten glade". The total effect of the revision (especially by 
1849), is absurd. At least the "beating breasts", "young desire", "tides of 
fragrance" and "cheeks unquiet glow" lead, in some form of climax, to the 
"voluptuous dreams". The same can scarcely be said of the "Lip-dewing song" and 
"sparkling eyes". Again, there are similar examples of this kind of revision to 
effect some diminuendo of an originally sharply (if sometimes clumsily) 
perceived consciousness and emotion.(14)
The questions must now be asked:whydid Wordsworth make these revisions 
(often risking so much); and what was the cause of the sharp intensity of that grief 
in the original poem? It seems odd that most of the significant critics of this 
period in Wordsworth's development seem to offer no real explanation; they
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become vague or speculative. (15) The general impression is that the later 
revisions are attempts to improve the style of the original. This is not always 
the result; but so obviously not in this case, that I doubt the view that stylistic 
improvement was the reason. As to the reasons for the despair, there seems to 
be no satisfactory explanation, until it is realised that although Descriptive 
Sketches recounts the happenings of the first journey to France, it does not confine 
itself to a description of Wordsworth's journey in 1790. There is no disagreement 
that the effect of the French Revolution and the developments of 1792, and also 
of the meeting with Beaupuy are all reflected in this poem.
So also, I would contend, is the matter of the love affair with Annette Vallon. 
This is the grief that Wordsworth feels so poignantly; this is his "wounded heart", 
(1793,14) the desperate love of which he is only too aware throughout the writing 
of much of this poem. And his memory of "those shadowy breasts"(1793,154) 
is only too recent and painful. It is just these poignant elements in the original 
poem which are removed by the 1849 version. What is allowed to remain (as 
with the later Vaudracour and Julia (16)1 is only the most veiled reference to 
"every charm"(17) of an incident in Words worth's life which only this very early 
text betrays in some of the fullness of its intensity, and which Wordsworth is 
anxious to present re-interpreted within the carefully affected version of 1849.
Exactly why Wordsworth would have wished further to obscure an incident in his
life that was undoubtedly extremely and personally painful to him, and to which,
elsewhere, he makes virtually no reference, we can only speculate upon: whether
for reasons of pride, concern for his former lover, the changing attitude of a
much older man coming to revise an early text, it is impossible to say with
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certainty. But that he did in the early text express a sense of pain and personal 
feeling is clearly evidenced in 1793; that he sought, in a pattern of revisions, to 
remove those feelings and substitute for them a more affected emotion associated 
with the convention of the original poem is equally evident. To explain this 
pattern of revisions on stylistic grounds alone contradicts the evidence of some 
of those revisions.
What is important to note is that, in revising an earlier text such as Descriptive 
Sketches. Wordsworth, through a process that might be presented as stylistic 
revision, in fact alters significantly the character and emotion of the original text; 
in a sense, he "re-invents" the assumed consciousness behind the poem.(18) It 
is a feature of his work that should be borne in mind when considering his claims 
in The Prelude as he reflects upon earlier and sometimes very personal incidents 
in his life.
Descriptive Sketches 1793: the evidence of W ordsworth's radical thought.
In the context that the above examination of Descriptive Sketches offers 
regarding Wordsworth's treatment of his affair with Annette Vallon, it is now 
appropriate to turn to the claims Wordsworth makes regarding Beaupuy’s 
influence on him: ineffectrejecting(inthelaterBooksXandXI of The Prelude) 
any lasting role in his political, humanitarian and moral development for Godwin 
or any other theoretical source, citing as his philosophical inspiration his 
conversations with Beaupuy (as well of course as the role nature was to play). 
There are mixed views from the critics regarding Beaupuy's influence in this 
poem.(19) Wordsworth's admission that most of Descriptive Sketches "was
composed during my walks upon the banks of the Loire in the years 1791- 
1792"(20) and the knowledge that he and Beaupuy had many of their longest 
conversations walking along the banks of that river in the same year (1792) point 
to the probability that Beaupuy’s ideas would find their way into a poem on which 
Wordsworth was working. However, examination of Descriptive Sketches, the 
first text to come from Wordsworth's pen immediately after his contact both 
with French Revolutionary thought and with Beaupuy's ideas, offers little 
evidence of the seminal influence Wordsworth claims Beaupuy had upon his 
ideas.
Descriptive Sketches began as an account of Wordsworth's journey in the 
previous year (1790); in asense, therefore, itwouldbe difficult for Wordsworth 
to incorporate the ideas to which he was just being introduced. The initial 
impression is of confusion. It is difficult to see exactly where Wordsworth might 
be drawing upon Beaupuy's thoughts; much is presented in a very sketchy 
manner, and it is impossible to extricate what might be attributed to a particular 
figure such as Beaupuy from the language of a surface - albeit sincere-response 
to the common "revolutionary" ideas that Wordsworth might have heard during 
his stay in France. (21) There would appear to be some dispute in established 
critical thinking over exactly where the evidence of Wordsworth's political 
beliefs begins in this poem;(22) certain passages have obviously drawn attention, 
and need further examination in light of the specific enquiry here. References 
to what might be termed "man's condition" (for a fairly wide term is needed to 
describe the various causes Wordsworth contrives to espouse in this purported
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account of the previous year's tour) appear as early as line 158, with the mention 
of "Slavery forcing the sunk mind", or the rather interesting conjoining in line 163: 
And smiles to Solitude and Want impart. . .  
whilst line 197 informs us that:
Hope, strength, and courage, social suffering brings.
There is the impression of a scattering and variety of comments by Wordsworth 
that are sincerely felt, yet ill thought out, and lacking any sound or cohesive 
basis at this stage.
The same is the case with the more extended passages. The passage referring to 
Lake Uri and the incident of the boatman seems little more than a rather stylised 
apostrophe to "Freedom";(23) whilst the metaphors of the "chamois" and the 
"chamois-chaser" and also the "Demon of the snow" and the threats to liberty and 
humanity that are apparently suggested evoke little more than a very general 
sense of concern for mankind. (24) Similarly, the passage referring to "Man 
entirely free"(1793,520ff) is clearly reminiscent of Rousseau, but scarcely 
specific enough to justify any assertion that linked Wordsworth's knowledge or 
understanding of Rousseau with Beaupuy's teaching. It is here that the form of 
the poem and Wordsworth's over-elaborate style obscures anything but the 
most general impression of Wordsworth's sympathies.(25)
Lines 598-661 clearly represent another section to which anyone interested in
Wordsworth’s developing social concerns might turn. The sixty-two lines to
which attention is drawn here - with their constant reference to e.g. "Penury" (11.
598 and 638), the "general sorrows of the human race" (1.603), "human ignorance"
(1.660), "Pain" (11. 639 and653) and "Labour" (1.639) -suggestmore than merely
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the immediate context of the difficulties of life in the Alps.(26) There is here 
the same nascent expression of general human concern, but one which is ill- 
defined, and presented in a manner which pays more heed to the style and form 
in which Wordsworth is writing this poem (especially with its grand sweeps of 
emotion and endless personifications)than the concern Wordsworth clearly has 
felt (not only during his trips through the Alps but also as a result of some of the 
"penury" he must have seen in France in 1792). It is as if the need for some firmer 
philosophical basis and a style more appropriate to such matters already make 
themselves apparent in this section of the poem.
There is also a stronger suggestion of the more "immediate" inspiration of the
section examined above in the lines:
In the wide range of many a weary round,
Still have my pilgrim feet unfailing found,
As despot courts their blaze of gems display,
Ev'n by the secret cottage far away 
The lilly of domestic joy decay;
While Freedom’s farthest hamlets blessings share,
Found still beneath her smile,and only there.(1793,719-25)
The unfortunate "lilly of domestic joy" is an echo of the earlier "little cottage
of domestic Joy"(601) - though, admittedly, "joy" has lost its capital letter; but
there seems to be suggested, despite the obfuscation of the tortuous syntax,
a causal relationship between the "decay" of the "domestic joy" and the "despot
courts" to which "Freedom" can bring some relief. However, it is all very vague.
It is in the last seventy-three lines of the poem, beginning:
And thou! fair favoured region...(1793,740ff) 
that the clearest indication comes of Wordsworth's contact with those 
associated with the revolutionary cause, and probably also with Beaupuy. These
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lines, belonging to 1792, are somewhat at odds with Wordsworth's last-minute 
attempt in the closing four lines to return to a tone more in harmony with the 
original intent of the poem. This whole section is poor stylistically,(27) but it is 
the very "high seriousness of purpose" (28) in these lines that causes a further 
weakness. That Wordsworth's enthusiasm for political liberty is displayed is 
not questioned; indeed this determination to profess his beliefs in a poetic form 
originally adopted for a very different purpose and theme shows Wordsworth's 
artistic immaturity at this stage (the lists of personifications, especially, 
undermine his intention here) suggesting the sheer strength of feeling that went 
into these ungainly lines.
But I cannot agree with the view expressed that the ideas in these lines derive 
from Beaupuy.(29) Indeed the question must be put: beyond an intense 
enthusiasm for liberty over oppression (surely a very widely expressed feeling in 
England as well as France at the time), what are Wordsworth's beliefs as 
presented here? He speaks out against pride, conquest, avarice, machination, and 
persecution; but presents these in a list of personifications that are merely 
condemned by being opposed to "Freedom's" omnipotence. Who, in revolution­
ary France would not have heard similar sentiments (and often equally 
unqualified) in many places? "Love and Truth" are mentioned and linked - 
perhaps an idea suggested by Beaupuy, perhaps not. "Justice" is also mentioned, 
and deleted by 1849 along with many of the other personifications in the list, as 
if Wordsworth had seen, by that time, the inadequacies of this section. There is 
even confusion over some of the more detailed concepts: "war’s dischordant 
habits" (1793,746) seems a clear condemnation of violence; yet a few lines later
on, Wordsworth writes:
-Tho' Liberty shall soon,indignant,raise
Red on his hills his beacon's comet blaze;
Bid from on high his lonely cannon sound ,...(774-6)
Does this now register approval for some violent support of Liberty's advance? 
It is not clear (and, as we shall see, contrasts with the stance Wordsworth is 
soon to adopt in his Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff after the publication of 
Political Justice). Very little here is terribly clear, except that a new enthusiasm 
has gripped Wordsworth; one that he feels compelled to express, but which the 
form and style of the poem he was then writing scarcely assisted. It is almost as 
if he has lost patience with the poem he was then writing.
Despite the general support that critical comment has provided for Wordsworth's 
claims regarding Beaupuy,(30) the lack of any semblance of ordered or 
structured thought in Descriptive Sketches casts doubt upon those claims. As 
well as making us wonder why, in the face of such extant textual evidence 
Wordsworth nevertheless insists in 1804 in ascribing so much to Beaupuy, it 
raises questions as to why he either rejects or simply ignores other sources that 
so clearly must be considered likely to have played a significant role in the 
development of his radical thought. With the perspective that a knowledge 
of Wordsworth's ultimate poetic vision (of Lyrical Ballads andTintem Abbev) 
brings, with his belief in the role of experiential nurture in his poetic development, 
the possibility must be considered that Beaupuy, as a man of the spoken word 
and as a man of action appealed to Wordsworth as a symbol and as a rhetorical 
device to which he might ascribe the principal source of and inspiration for 
his radical, humanitarian and moral belief.
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Whilst it will be appropriate to consider this possibility further, later on, in the 
light of more evidence regarding the development of. Wordsworth's ideas, it is 
appropriate now to look at further evidence of tensions in the poetry of The 
Prelude as Wordsworth offers an account of his radicalism, and also, ironically, 
Wordsworth's admiration for and attraction to Beaupuy as a man of action.
Wordsworth's radicalisnr.The Prelude.
Apart from the question of the degree of veracity or otherwise in Wordsworth's 
claims regarding Beaupuy, what such a passage also exemplifies is a series of 
tensions that can be found in other key sections in The Prelude relating to Words­
worth's radicalism. What they suggest is that, in giving us an account of the 
development of his radical thinking and its place in the emergence of his poetic 
consciousness, Wordsworth is, at times, uneasy in selecting what he wishes to 
present to us. Such uneasiness can be observed in the addition by 1850 into Book 
VI of the account of the sack of the Convent of Chartreuse,(31) the addition of 
the passage praising Burke in Book VII(32), and also the deletions in the account 
of Wordsworth's response to England's waging war on France in Book X(33) as 
Wordsworth tries, in his late revisions to his poem, to "manipulate" the view of 
his development that he presents to us. It is worth making the point that the poet 
himself admits that during his earlier trip to France and the Alps in 1790, he 
felt little involvement with the earlier stages of the Revolution:
I looked upon these things 
As from a distance-heard, and saw, and felt,
Was touched, but with no intimate concern-(1805,VI,694-6)
Yet there are two other important links with the Beaupuy passage that should be
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considered here: the first is Wordsworth's mention, just before describing his time
with Beaupuy, of the influences which had already pre-disposed him to a
sympathy with the radical cause. Wordsworth is somewhat inconsistent over this,
since he claims that he was:
untaught by thinking or by books 
To reason well of polity or law,
And nice distinctions - then on every tongue.- 
Of natural rights and civil,...(1805,IX,201-4)
He continues:
Yet in the regal sceptre, and the pomp 
Of orders and degrees, I nothing found 
Then, or had ever, even in crudest youth,
That dazzled me, but rather what my soul
Mourned for, or loathed, beholding that the best
Ruled not, and feeling that they ought to rule.(l 805,IX,212-7)
However, he admits, a few lines later, that his anti-monarchical and aristocratic
views were also one
Of many debts which afterwards I owed 
To Cambridge and an academic life 
That something there was holden up to view 
Of a republic,where all stood thus far 
Upon equal ground,...(1805,IX,227-30)(34)
But, again, a few lines further on, and just before the introduction of Beaupuy,
Wordsworth speaks of his first reactions to the Revolution being muted:
If at the first great outbreak I rejoiced
Less than might well befit my youth, the cause
In part lay here, that unto me the events
Seemed nothing out of nature's certain course-
A gift that rather was come late than soon.(1805,IX,250-4)
Itis such seemingly conflicting statements that create a tension in Wordsworth's
attempts to portray the development of his thinking; he seems unsure as to his
own motivations and the influences upon him, yet seems anxious to demonstrate
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the role of the experiential and nature as the seminal source of his radical 
humanitarianism, at the expense of any admission of "theoretical" principles. 
Such tensions inevitably draw attention to themselves, and raise questions 
regarding Wordsworth's intent
The second point again demonstrates a tension; one which lies at the heart of some
of Wordsworth's evident discomfort over his portrayal in The Prelude of this
difficult and confusing period in his life. In all of his admiration for Beaupuy, no
facet stands out more than Wordsworth's assertion that the soldier was, above all,
a man of action:(35)
Oh, sweet it is in academic groves-
Or such retirement, friend, as we have known
Among the mountains by our Rotha's stream,
Greta, or Derwent, or some nameless rill- 
To ruminate, with interchange of talk,
On rational liberty and hope in man,
Justice and peace. But far more sweet such toil 
(Toil, say I, for it leads to thoughts abstruse)
If Nature then be standing on the brink
Of some great trial, and we hear the voice
Of one devoted, one whom circumstance
Hath called upon to embody his deep sense
In action, give it outwardly a shape,...(1805,IX,397-409)
But it is not so much Wordsworth's acclaim of Beaupuy's active involvement in
the radical cause here, but the almost self-deprecating quality of the opening of
this passage that suggests the tension, as Wordsworth addresses Coleridge as
some companion "armchair radical". Whilst the thought and syntax here are
almost as abstruse as the "thoughts" that Wordsworth claims such "interchange
of talk" generated, there seems little doubt that, by 1804, the poet is rather
uncomfortably (but, to his credit here, apparently honestly) pointing up the
difference between the role played by himself and the active role of Beaupuy. This
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is an issue he raises again early in Book X as he turns to describe in the very 
uneven and involved structuring of that Book his contact with and involvement 
in the Revolution. Even in his recounting of these events, Wordsworth, as 
well as expressing the agitation(1805,X,l 17.) he obviously did feel at that time, 
becomes extremely self-conscious:
these are things 
Of which I speak only as they were storm 
Or sunshine to my individual mind,
No further.(1805,X, 103-6)
Then comes his admission,
Yet would I willingly have taken up 
A service at this time for cause so great,
However dangerous. (1805,X, 134-6)
There is no conclusive evidence that Wordsworth ever did become actively 
involved in the cause of the Revolution, and this statement can only vindicate the 
view that he did not. Yet it is clear that he did feel a yearning to become involved 
at that time; and that, by 1804 (when this section was probably being written), 
he still remembered and wished to reflect upon that yearning; or he wishes us, 
as readers, to think this. I say this because, having already raised questions and 
cast doubts on Wordsworth's intent in the portrayal of his development, it is 
possible now to see that earlier "honest" admission of his passivity (in contrast to 
Beaupuy's action), and also in this last incident, Wordsworth's obscuring of a 
fact that it was perhaps uncomfortable for him to remember. It is possible, if 
we move forward to 1794, to discover in the lives of Wordsworth and Godwin a 
possible reason as to why Wordsworth might have been hesitant to acknowledge 
any debt to Godwin. I refer to the period of Wordsworth's correspondence with 
William Mathews concerning the proposed monthly periodical, and of Godwin's
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significant involvement in the political and legal repressions of the time, 
particularly the celebrated Treason Trials.
Radicalism, active and passive : Godwin and the reaction of 1793/4, and 
Wordsworth’s correspondence with Wiliam Mathews.
Godwin acquired, and perhaps still has, the reputation of being something of an 
armchair radical; a thinker (and not a particularly brilliant one) as opposed to 
an activist. It is easy, but, as more recent scholarship on Godwin has shown, 
mistaken to label Godwin merely as a bookish reformer.
To do so is to ignore the part played by Godwin during the treason trials of 1794 
and the period of the suspension of Habeas Corpus. Though accounts have been 
given of this, (36) they have tended until very recently to be somewhat fragmented 
and have generally underplayed the significance of Godwin's role. Moreover, a 
full understanding of this issue is another clue in the puzzling relationship between 
Wordsworth and Godwin.
E.P.Thompson has again summed up the context for Godwin not simply as author
of Political Justice but as the active defender of human liberty in the face of
reaction against the French Revolution:
If the distribution of Rights of Man was nationwide, so also was the 
promotion of anti-Jacobin societies. Hence, in England, the revolutionary 
impulse had scarcely begun to gather force before it was exposed to a 
counter-revolutionary assault backed by the resources of established 
authority. (37)
That this reaction was indeed an assault on basic human freedoms cannot be 
doubted: witness the establishment of the Committee of Secrecy which, at the 
beginning of its first lengthy report states:
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The Committee have, therefore, thought it their indespensable Duty in the 
First Instance, to submit to the House the general view which they have 
been enabled to form of these Transactions, reserving a more particular
statement for a subsequent Report................ i.......................
From these it appears, that during almost the Whole of that Period, (end 
of 1791 - May 1794) and with hardly any considerable Interval, except 
during the Part of the Summer in 1792 and 1793, this Society (Constit­
utional Reforml has, by a Series of Resolutions, Publications and Corre­
spondence, been uniformly and systematically pursuing a settledDesign 
which appears to your Committee to tend to the Subversion of the estab­
lished Constutution, and which has of late been more openly avowed, and 
attempted to be carried into full Execution. (38)
It concludes that examination of all the evidence suggests
a Traitorous Conspiracy for the Subversion of the established Laws and 
Constitution, and the introduction of that System of Anarchy and 
Confusion which has fatally prevailed in France. (39)
Even before the celebrated arrest of Hardy and the others, there were earlier signs 
of the severity of establishment reaction, and from this period, Godwin was 
willing to voice his criticisms publicly, particularly through the letters of 
"Mucius".(40) Moving closer to the period associated with the treason trials 
(and into the initial stages of the reaction in England against the French Revo­
lution), Godwin contributed further letters of "Mucius" to the Morning Chronicle 
in February and March, 1793, and all of the letters completed in manuscript by 
18th January (before the publication of Political Justice') find him championing 
such issues as the individual (e.g. a tallow-maker who had fallen foul of the new 
repressive measures) against the government's measures, freedom of speech, and 
in a letter entitled,
To such persons as mav be appointed to serve upon juries for the trial of 
sedititious and treasonable words.
which is a plea to futurejurorstobe impartial and not respond to government
pressure:
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Do you know what miserable wretches the people of England will become, 
if they live in hourly fear of such prosecutions?
A year later, Godwin's beliefs were to be put to the full test.
The sentence to transportation in August 1793 of Thomas Muir(41) whereby Muir 
was to be treated merely as a common felon ran so counter to Godwin's 
principles that he joined the outcry against the sentence in his letter to the 
Morning Chronicle. It is important to see in this letter that Godwin is not 
questioning the court's verdict, but the way in which the sentence as felons was 
being used by the government as an example, a warning against all proponents 
of reform. Godwin is quite open about the target for his attack: the "officers of 
Government", "the Secretary of State for the Home Dept, and the rest of the 
Cabinet Junta":
Tiberius, and his modem anti-type, Joseph the Second, are mere novices 
in the arts of cruelty, compared with our blessed administration,...(42)
Godwin was taking actively and personally into the public and political arena
the beliefs he had discussed in his recently published book; in view of the
attention that book had already attracted, (43) this letter shows considerable moral
courage.
Godwin had not known Muir, nor was he a supporter of the corresponding 
societies with whom Muir was linked (indeed the recently published Political 
Justice,in its chapter on political associations(44) showed Godwin's mistrust of 
such associations). But the next person to become a victim of the goverment's 
reaction was a friend of Godwin, Joseph Gerrald; Gerrald's almost martyr-like 
determination to face trial aroused Godwin's admiration, and Godwin's letter
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to him while he awaited trial seems to explain Godwin's behaviour in the trial
of Hardy and the others:
For myself [Godwin writes to Gerrald] I will never adopt any conduct for 
the express purpose of being put upon my trial, but if I ever be so put, will 
consider that day as a triumph. (45)
This tendency of Godwin not to seek political martyrdom, but to be willing to face
any consequences in defence of justice(46) and tempered with a strong loyalty
to his close friends(47) is borne out to the full in his behaviour during the trials
of Hardy, Home Tooke, Holcroft and Thelwall. (Unfortunately, so also
is his tendency to indulge himself later in the resulting acclaim.) The facts of
Hardy and the others' arrest, trial and eventual acquittal are well enough known;
the importance of that acquittal should not, however, be underestimated, for
it represented an important victory not only for future reformist activity (though
in the longer rather than the immediate term) and a rejection of this attempt by
government to restrict individual liberty. Even if the prose of Hazlitt's account
seems to reflect his enthusiasm for Godwin(48) the comment of Crabb Robinson,
a lawyer, and one who does not mention Godwin's part in the trials, still shows
the jubilation with which the acquittal was greeted:
During the trial I was in a state of agitation that rendered me unfit for 
business. I had to beset the Post Office early, and one morning at six I 
obtained the London paper with "NOT GUILTY" printed in letters an inch 
in height, recording the issue of Hardy's trial. Iran about the town 
knocking at people's doors, and screaming out the joyful words. (49)
Godwin's diary,(50) at this time, records his dates of visiting the accused in
Newgate (which he did frequently), and also the period of the trials (written
vertically down the page). More important is the entry on the day of Hardy's trial
again written vertically down the page in a heavier ink, as follows:
Cursory Strictures(51) - To this pamphlet Mr. H.T. frequently declared
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that he was indebted for his life. One day, in mixed company, having 
insisted that the author should tell him without circumlocution whether 
it were of his own writing or no, and being answered in the affirmative, 
he called the author to him, and taking his hand conveyed it suddenly to 
his lips, vowing that he could do no less by the hands which had given 
existence to that production.(May 21,1795)
Jan. 29,1809.
Examination of Godwin's diary for 21st May, 1795 shows that Godwin did in fact 
dine at Batty's with Tooke and the mixed company of which he speaks, but, 
interestingly, not with Hazlitt who records this incident(52) and who surely must 
have heard it either from Godwin himself or perhaps from Tooke, whom he knew. 
Godwin made this superscription. There are few examples of Godwin going back 
to add things to his diary. It might reasonably be presumed that Godwin who, 
in 1809 was very much in his years of "decline", might have found some solace 
in such a form of reminiscence. (53)
Godwin's Cursory Strictures, first published anonymously in the Morning
Chronicle on October 20th, 1794 - several days before the start.of the trial - can
be seen as a culmination of this early period of Godwin's career: both in terms of
his active defence of individuals against government repression and also his
acting on the principles enunciated in Poltical Justice. Godwin had written in
protest after the legal injustices to Muir and Palmer; in this case, he was
determined not simply to write, but to forestall the inevitable injustices. Hence,
at the end of Cursory Strictures, he writes:
I anticipate the trials to which this Charge is the Prelude. I know that the 
Judge will admit the good intentions and honest design of several of the 
persons arraigned: it will be impossible to deny it; it is notorious to the 
whole universe. He has already admitted, that there is no law or precedent 
for their condemnation.(CS,p 25)
In his argument and in the language in which that argument was couched,
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Godwin's perspicacity and courage are evident.(54) His anonymous authorship of 
Cursory Strictures might seem an important personal protection, but that is 
doubtful; equally, it should be remembered that he did not choose to reveal his 
authorship publicly after the acquittals when he would doubtless have reaped 
public acclaim. There can be little doubt that Godwin showed what he meant by 
"sincerity" and showed an active moral courage which belies his reputation as 
an armchair radical. (55)
It is therefore important to remember that, by the time Wordsworth actually met 
Godwin, in 1795, (56) the philosopher was more than simply the author of 
Political Justice and Caleb Williams. Wordsworth had himself responded to the 
repressions and the treason trials in a very different manner. It has to be said, 
to be fair to Wordsworth, that the two men were in very different positions. (57) 
It is difficult, as we have seen, to assess the role Wordsworth played in liberal 
reforms and activities. His visits to France seem more rooted in his indecisions 
over his future than any commitment to a radical or reformist cause, at least at 
first; and it would not be unjust to say that given the financial predicament of his 
family, his second visit to France was not simply self-indulgent, but extremely 
irresponsible.
However, by the time of the treason trials, which Wordsworth alludes to only
briefly in The Prelude.(58) Wordsworth had written, but failed to publish his
Letter to the Bishop of Landaff(59) and was now , in correspondence with
William Mathews, planning to publish a "monthly miscellany" with overtly
liberal (and Godwinian) reformist intent. In the first of the letters that refer to
that plan, on 23rd May, 1794, after the Muir and Palmer sentences and very soon
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after the arrest of Hardy and Home Tooke and the suspension of Habeas Corpus,
Wordsworth writes:
I solemnly affirm that in no writings of mine will I ever admit of any 
sentiment which can have the least tendency to induce my readers to 
suppose that the doctrines which are now enforced by banishment, impris­
onment, etc etc. are other than pregnant with every species of misery.
(60)
That Wordsworth, even before this, must have been expressing abroad some of
his views is evidenced by the fact that, on the same day as Wordsworth wrote
this, Richard Wordsworth wrote to him a warning:
I hope you will be cautious in writing or expressing your political 
opinions. By the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Acts, the Ministers 
have great powers.(EY,pp 121-2)
This did not daunt Wordsworth, for in June he wrote his lengthiest and most
politically forceful letter concerning his intentions, determining to go ahead
with the journal. But on 7th November (interestingly, two days after the acquittal
of Hardy, though Wordsworth may not have heard of it), he tells Mathews that
he feels they should withdraw from the scheme, and it is interesting to note the
language in which he does this:
The more nearly we approached the time fixed for action, the more 
strongly I was persuaded we should decline the field.(EY,p 134)
He then makes further brief reference to the treason trials, stating,
I cannot in conscience or in principle abet in the smallest degree the 
measures pursued by the present ministry.(EY,p 134)
But neither, it would seem, was he prepared actively(61) to stand up against or
speak out against the repressions. When, therefore, he refers directly to Tooke
in his letter of 24th December, 1794,(62) his comments are accompanied by a
very muted comment upon the significance of the events:
The late occurrences in every point of view are interesting to humanity. 
They will abate the insolence and assumption of the aristocracy by
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shewing it that neither the violence, nor the art of power can crush even 
an unfriended individual, though engaged in the propagation of doctrines 
confessedly unpalatable to privilege; and they will force upon the most 
prejudiced this conclusion that there is some reason in the language of 
reformers. (EY, p 137)
Why this change of heart? Was Wordsworth heeding Richard's advice? Did he fear 
government reaction (for after the acquittal of Hardy, they still pressed ahead 
with Tooke's and Thelwall's trials)? The other important matter is that, through­
out October 1794, Wordsworth was involved in negotiations regarding the 
legacy he was to be left by the dying Raisley Calvert; this would mean that since 
it was intended that Wordsworth should look after Calvert through what was 
expected to be a lengthy illness, he would have little time to devote to writing, 
but the prospective legacy also took away the more pres singly immediate need 
for money.
Did Wordsworth eventually learn of Godwin’s role in the trials? There is no direct 
evidence that he did; but it is inconceivable that he did not. Wordsworth knew 
Hazlitt and even met Tooke later.(63) It is fruitless to speculate on whether 
or not Godwin and Wordsworth spoke of the matter,(64) and when, but it is 
valid to consider what might have been Wordsworth's thoughts as he composed 
the lines in The Prelude which allude to this period.
Perhaps it is these events that are in Wordsworth's mind when, coming to his
account of the repressions,(65) Wordsworth tells us that
this is passion over-near ourselves,
Reality too close and too intense,
And mingled up with something, in my mind,
Of scorn and condemnation personal
That would profane the sanctity of verse. (1805,X,640-4)
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Whilst I would not disagree that part of Wordsworth's intention here is to reflect 
the personal disgust he felt at these incidents, the evidence considered above 
not only fails to support the strength of feeling Wordsworth claims here (certainly 
the references to these events in the letters to Mathews show no evidence of 
the kind of fervour noted in the prose o fLlandaffh That evidence also suggests 
another reading of Words worth’s "scorn and condemnation personal": namely, his 
failure to act in the public manner he had proposed in his plans for The 
Philanthropist. And in the closing lines of this passage, Wordsworth's reference 
to the agents of the British government
As vermin working out of reach,...(1805,X,654) 
in order
to undermine 
Justice, and make an end of Liberty.(1805,X.655-6)
have such a ring of the language and protests of Godwin (66) that I find it
impossible not to believe that some reflection on his own behaviour at this time
and an uncomfortable awareness of the role Godwin had played were at the back
of his mind; and that these considerations explain in some considerable measure
the tensions and uneasiness in this passage. It will later be appropriate to return
to this passage in light of fuller evidence. (67)
Returning now to trace Wordsworth's own account of the development of his 
radicalism, it is clear from Book X, its repetitious and uncertain structure as well 
as what it records, that Wordsworth's experiences in France affected him deeply. 
One of the ways in which his distress and his determination, when writing Book 
X, to record his feelings and the role played by these in his poetic development 
can be seen, is in the manner in which, especially after recording his arrival in
England in December 1792(1805,X,202ff), Wordsworth continues to return to 
his experiences in France. The effect is at times confusing, but one of the issues 
Wordsworth is trying to present through this structuring is the tension and 
conflict he felt in relation to his own country as itrespondedto and reacted against 
the situation in France. Hence Wordsworth's allusion to the period of the treason 
trials; and recording of the shock to his "moral nature" at the time of the 
declaration of war on France. (68)
When, therefore, immediately following his brief reference to the treason trials 
of 1794, Wordsworth returns to "my own history" (1805,X,658) and to early 
summer 1792 and his meetings with Beaupuy, there is again a tension here in 
Wordsworth's assertion that his belief in
what there is best in individual man...(1805,X,666) 
and his arguments concerning "civil polity"(1805,X,660) stemmed simply from 
his own earlier experiential development. What I am suggesting is that much of 
the uncertain structure of this Book, though intended to be reflective of Words­
worth's confusion at the time, also reveals a consistent attempt by the poet to 
ensure architectonically that his poem will sustain his view that his early experi­
ential education and nurture (particularly through nature) was what ultimately 
guided him and brought him to the point at which he has arrived by the time 
of writing Tintem Abbey. I am suggesting that the tensions identified so far 
raise the possibility of a conscious and sustained "re-inventing" of himself by 
Wordsworth in The Prelude to a particularpurpose. Whilst it will be the intention 
of later arguments in this thesis to provide full evidence to substantiate that view 
and suggest the reason for such an intent, it is appropriate here to offer some
further limited evidence for the validity of raising such a question.
The resulting tensions in the poetry of Book X can be seen particularly in the
lengthy section where Wordsworth returns to his time in France(l 805,X,657-756)
as he seeks to maintain the view of himself as a "child of Nature"(1805,X,752)
throughout these experiences; whilst, at the same time he records with
enthusiasm the role played by reason:
When Reason seemed the most to assert her rights 
When most intent on making of herself 
A prime enchanter to assist the work
Which then was going forwards in her name.(1805,X,697-700)
This could be a reference to Godwin but Wordsworth has refused to acknowledge 
this by placing it prior to the appearance of Political Justice (i.e. in 1792 in France 
and ascribing it to the "Reason" of the philosophes which underpinned much 
of the thinking behind the French Revolution(69)). Similarly, in the lines 
closely following the "promise"(1805,X,702) of that time, there is the image of 
The budding rose above the rose full blown.(1805,X,705)
This is potentially as evocative ofthe idea of "perfectibility" as it is of the general 
ferment of ideas and hopes of the radicals at this time.(70) Again, a few lines 
further on, describing himself now as an "active partisan", (71) he refers 
quickly to his generally benevolent and optimistic view of man as something 
naturally within him:
I moved among mankind 
With genial feelings still predominant,
When erring, erring on the better side,
And in the kinder spirit-...(1805,X,738-41)
Yet, even as he records here what might be seen as his innate tolerance in reacting
to some of the violence of the Revolution, the lines closely following,
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that time
Gives rights to error; on the other hand 
That throwing off oppression must be work 
As well of license as of liberty;...(1805,X,744-7)
not only echo some of the ideas extant in many of the radical writings of the time,
but reflect, for anyone who has read Political Justice or, as we shall see, Letter
to the Bishop of Llandaff. ideas from sources other than only the personal
experiential development Wordsworth seems so determined to present as the only
lasting source of his humanitarianism.
It is at this stage in The Prelude that Wordsworth eventually arrives at the point
which, in less than two hundred lines, gives an account of the period during which
he wrote his unpublished Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff.the two Salisbury Plain
poems and The Borderers (as well, of course, as planning his monthly miscellany
with William Mathews); a period of complex development, but a period which
Wordsworth, in The Prelude, introduces as a time when
a way was opened for mistakes 
And false conclusions of the intellect,...(1805,X,765-6)
However, the tensions already identified in Wordsworth's account of his
radicalism must surely make us at least suspicious, and question whether the
textual evidence of that period (along with other appropriate external evidence)
bears out Wordsworth's summary dismissal of this time. It is, in my view, valid
to re-examine the textual evidence of this period, in light of such external
evidence concerning, for example, the treason trials, and the evidence now
available on the personal relationship between Wordsworth and Godwin.
The purpose of this initial examination of Wordsworth's claims in The Prelude
has been to identify those tensions in the poetry which draw attention to these
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clues and raise questions. A tentative thesis has been advanced that the reason for 
these tensions can be located in the relationship between what Wordsworth 
claims and what evidence will support. If it can be shown that Wordsworth 
obscures, distorts or in other ways re-interprets or even re-invents what 
happened, the question arises, why is this done?
Only with a full examination of some of the early texts in Wordsworth's 
development, and of his relationship with William Godwin, can the evidence of 
the veracity of the first of the first part of the question posed above be tested. The 
place to begin that process is with the unpublished Letter to the Bishop of 
Llandaff. and then further attention must be given to the correspondence with 
William Mathews.
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Part 2: The Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff and 
Wordsworth’s Correspondence with William Mathews.
Critical commentary on the "influence1’ of Godwin on Wordsworth's Letter to the 
Bishop of Llandaff(72) has produced conflicting views. (73) This text deserves 
fuller examination in its context: ostensibly a reply to Watson's Appendix, but 
also the next major piece to appear from Wordsworth's pen after he had met 
Beaupuy, after he had completed Descriptive Sketches, and very shortly after 
the well-publicised publication of the first edition of Political Justice. The matter 
of Wordsworth not having a copy of Godwin's book in his library at his death and 
not alluding directly to the first edition(74) are only two of the objections that have 
been raised on external evidence to reject any meaningful link between the poet 
and the philosopher. However, it is upon textual evidence that judgements must 
be based.
Whilst Wordsworth's enthusiasm for republicanism is evident throughout the 
Letter, probably fired by his conversations with Beaupuy, this, though at odds 
with Godwin's ultimate rejection of all forms of government and associated 
positive institutions, does not preclude Wordsworth's drawing upon Godwin 
(though it is probably one of the principal factors which prevents his movement 
from a conventional moral stance to a Godwinian view of social reform). 
Indeed, it must be acknowledged from the start that Wordsworth's Letter is 
indebted to several sources: Burke, Paine, and, I strongly believe, Godwin being 
the principal ones. Perhaps inevitably, the Letter is unsatisfactory as a coherent 
argument; yet it represents a significant development from the incoate out­
pourings of Descriptive Sketches.
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In this development, Wordsworth's drawings upon Godwin will be seen to have 
played a key role. Whilst therefore acknowledging the influence of other 
sources, and that previous critics have already identified certain details from 
Godwin's work upon which Wordsworth has drawn (mostly in relation to 
arguments concerning monarchy, reform of government and the vagaries of the 
law, which will be acknowledged), it is argued here that there are more 
fundamental drawings upon Godwin playing an important part in this text, and 
which point to important aspects of Wordsworth's development. The three 
central issues are: Wordsworth's adoption of a controlling rhetoric throughwhich 
he expresses the obvious outrage he felt over Watson's Appendix: the philos­
ophical manner and basis of his arguments (which relate to the style and tone 
of his arguments); and Wordsworth's ambivalent attitude to violent revolution 
in pursuit of reform. Additionally, it will be useful to add some further discussion 
of Wordsworth's drawing upon Godwin's criticisms of positive institutions in 
his attacks on monarchy, aspects of government, and the law. Such an 
examination is intended to demonstrate more than verbal echoings,(75) and will 
also consider the relationship of Wordsworth’s Letter to Watson’s Appendix, 
including the ordering of arguments. (76) Paine's influence on some of Words­
worth's arguments is acknowledged, but the view that Wordsworth has drawn 
upon Paine through Godwin for some of his arguments is accepted; (77) but, as 
I shall show, the philosophico-moral import of the Letter draws upon a reading 
of Political Justice.
The dating of the Letter is problematic,(78) but important; for it is necessary 
to consider whether or not Wordsworth had read Godwin's book, and with what
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degree of care;(79) or whether he had simply read one or more of the reviews 
which, as we have already seen, appeared very quickly after the publication of 
Political Justice. Wordsworth's writing of the letter can be narrowed down to 
between January 21 st, 1793 when Watson's reprinted sermon appeared with the 
Appendix attached (80) and early August, before Wordsworth set out on his 
walking tour from Salisbury to North Wales; the dating I assume is that of Spring, 
1793, probably nearer to June.(81)
Two things must have stung the young Wordsworth into the fervour with which
he writes the Letter: a text which so frequently transgresses its purported
intent of being an objective and considered response to Watson. The first was
certainly Watson's praise of the British constitution ( of which Wordsworth had
apparently felt so proud only two years earlier(82)):
I hope there is not a man in Great Britain so sensible of the blessings of 
that free constitution under which he has the happiness to live, so entirely 
dead to the interests of general humanity, as not to wish that a constitution 
similar to our own might be established, not only in France, but in every 
despotic state in Europe;...(83)
Bearing in mind the situation in England with the signs of establishment reaction
(which was to lead soon to the treason trials of 1794 and the suspension of
Habeas Corpus), as well as Watson's anti-liberal outbursts against the French
Revolution elsewhere in the Appendix. Wordsworth's indignation can be
understood. The second thing was the wide advertisement (in at least three daily
newspapers(84)) of the publication and reception of the new work by William
Godwin: the Preface of Political Justice not only proclaimed the general intent,
but identified "politics to be the proper vehicle of a liberal morality",(85) and
spoke stridently of "the omnipotence of truth".(86) These, as we shall see, are
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themes which underpin Wordsworth's argument in the Letter:
I shall not preclude myself from any truths, however severe, which I may 
think beneficial to the cause which I have undertaken to defend.(87)
The several reviews of Political Justice that had already appeared by June 
1793,(88) with their generally supportive response to Godwin's ideas and the 
manner in which Godwin argued his gradualist reformist case from a 
philosophical viewpoint, as well as the approach and language of Political Justice 
itself, demonstrated a manner of protest that had shown itself capable of 
challenging the establishment view, gaining a significant degree of acceptance, 
and avoiding direct confrontation with the government. To anyone reading the 
Letter, the possibility that, either from reading some of the reviews or Political 
Justice itself, this had impressed itself upon Wordsworth, has to be considered. 
For, iust as the first edition of Political Justice (especially those early chapters) 
has a force of argument and reformist fervour that the prose at times strains 
to control, so, in Wordsworth's Letter, the sheer energy ofthe poet's outrage gains 
most of its effectiveness as argument through restraint ofthe prose in which Word­
sworth has sought to express it, and the method of argument with which he has 
attempted to direct its force.
Godwin’s philosophic stance : (i) Wordsworth's controlling rhetoric.
Anyone who has read Political Justice will be struck by the closeness of its tone 
to that of the opening of Wordsworth's Letter. It is in the opening three or four 
paragraphs of the Letter (generally ignored by critics) that the first strong hints 
of a recent reading of Godwin are evident. These paragraphs are not a direct 
response to the opening of Watson's Appendix - they represent a a preamble to
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Wordsworth's main arguments - and the tone, much of the lexis used, even the 
syntactic structuring which carefully controls the "indignation",(89) reflects 
that of the early chapters of Godwin's book. For instance, the opening sentence 
of the third paragraph of the Letter is almost a repetition, not just in thought but 
also in tone and emotion, of the Preface and to some extent the first chapter of 
Political Justice:
On opening vour Appendix, your admirers will naturally expect to find an 
impartial statement of the grievances which harrass this nation, and a 
sagacious enquiry into the proper modes of redress.(39-41)
Whilst it might be suggested that a figure such as Paine could have inspired the
substance of such a challenge, this could not be said of the style! The "sagacious
enquiry" derives from Political Justice, and is almost certainly drawn from
Godwin's closing sentence of Book I Chapter III ( a chapter, which, as we shall
see, frequently attracts Wordsworth's attention considerably):
the man who is anxious for the benefit of his species, will willingly devote 
a portion of his activity to an enquiry into the mode of effecting this 
extirpation in whole or in part,..(PJ,'93,1,18)
Throughout these early paragraphs in the Letter, the quality of language
vindicates this view: "unseduced and undismayed",(11-12) "an enlarged and
philosophical mind".(35) The somewhat archly controlled language and thought
is not that of the more forthright Paine; it has both the force and, at times, the
inelegance of the "philosophical" manner of Godwin's writing. For Wordsworth
has set out, from the start, to attack the superficial ideas and objections of Watson
from a deeper basis than that of simply reformist (or even revolutionary) politics;
he wishes to present the moral arguments against Watson. And, in doing so he
adopts, in some measure, the ideas and the manner of Godwin's writing in Political
Justice.
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(ii) Wordsworth's drawings upon Godwin's philosophy.
Obviously Wordsworth's drawing upon Godwin's language and style relates
closely to his adoption of the substance and method of Godwin's philosophic
argument. In this preamble to his main challenge to Watson’s arguments,
Wordsworth does something which points forcibly to a recent familiarity with
Godwin's ideas and method of argument, as in these early paragraphs, he
touches on a subject he is later to take up more fully (while he is carefully working
his way through the arguments in Watson's Appendix): namely, the matter of
the clergy. Wordsworth's early mention of it here is nothing to do with Watson’s
complaints about the seizure of property from the church in France.(90) It is,
in fact, part of Wordsworth's "address" to Watson where he singles out the prelate
from the ranks of the English clergy acknowledging W atson's earlier more liberal
and humanitarian stance:
While, with a servility which has prejudiced many people against religion 
itself, the ministers of the church of England have appeared as writers 
upon public measures only to be the advocates of slavery civil and 
religious, your Lordship stood almost alone as the defender of truth and 
political charity.(27-32)
Wordsworth clearly does not adopt the atheistic stance of Godwin. But what is
obviously in Wordsworth's mind is the concatenation of ideas he had no doubt
heard in radical circles, and also Godwin's particular development of these ideas
in Part II of Book I, Chapter VII, entitled Of National Characters, which opens
with the paragraphs on The Character of the Priesthood.(91) This brief but very
powerfully-voiced criticism of the clergy is veiy reminiscent of what Words worth
is stating in the sentence quoted above, as Godwin links the "imperious
dogmatical" (PJ,'93,I,61) manner of priests as "patrons of prejudice and implicit
faith" to their being "enemies of freedom". What Godwin has set out to show is 
that
there areparticularprofessions,suchasthatof the priesthood,which must 
always operate to the production of a particular character... (PJ,'93,I,60)
His conclusion is that
priests of all religions....will have a striking similarity of manners and 
disposition.
These are essentially oppressive. Godwin then adds immediately:
In the same manner we may rest assured that free men in whatever country 
will be firm, vigorous and spirited in proportion to their freedom, and that 
vassals and slaves will be ignorant,servile and unprincipled. (PJ,'93,I,61)
The juxtapositioning of these arguments points its message only too clearly, and
Wordsworth has not missed the point as he uses it to try to distinguish between
the earlier Watson, champion of freedom, and the author of the Appendix. (92)
Worthy of note also here is the use of the terms "slavery" and "servility" by both
Wordsworth and Godwin; only two pages further on, Godwin uses the term again
and juxtaposes it with a reference to the priesthood:
The advantages of liberty over slavery are not less real, though
unfortunately they are less palpable Every man has a confused sense
of these advantages, but he has been taught to believe that men would 
tear each other to pieces, if they had not priests to direct their con­
sciences,... (PJ,'93,1,62-3)
Of course Godwin uses the term "slavery" throughout Political Justice to denote
the state that political oppression produces; nonetheless, this is the first section
in the book where it occurs so frequently; his use of the term is also different from
that of Paine. (93) Wordsworth had indeed also used the term in Descriptive
Sketches in an ill-defined manner;(94) his use of it here is much more precise
and, as has been shown, links civil and religious "slavery", as does Godwin
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throughout the passage referred to.
Wordsworth continues to draw upon Godwin's ideas, and particularly the
challenge to independence of thought in these early paragraphs, when, in the
fourth paragraph, he states:
Sensible how large a portion of mankind receive opinions upon 
authority, I am apprehensive lest the doctrines which they will find there 
should derive a weight from your name to which they are by no means 
intrinsically intitled. (42-5)
Once again, the importance of this lies in Wordsworth's challenging the external
authority on which a prelate such as Watson could presume to act and speak.
Watson's opening statement that he hopes his Appendix will have
some effect in calming the perturbation which has been lately excited, 
and which still subsists in the minds of the lower classes of the commu- 
nity...(95)
is presented with an assumed authority which Wordsworth sees as dangerous. 
This is exactly the basis of Godwin's criticism of the priesthood, upon which 
Wordsworth has already drawn. And seeing'that "the lower orders of the 
community" (96) are likely to accept this "authority" unquestioningly, Words­
worth is anxious to insist, prior to challenging Watson's arguments, that even 
clerical arguments must be examined on their own merits. This, above all, is 
Godwin's method of argument; it so pervades his work that any reading, no matter 
how cursory, cannot fail to note it. And once again it is pos sible to point to specific 
instances early in Political Justice whence Wordsworth might have drawn part of 
his argument. For instance, the empiricism of Chapter HI of Book I, which denies 
any form of "innate principles". Orperhaps Wordsworth might have been drawing 
on another paragraph (under the title, Foundation of Obedience^ in the critical
chapter Of Obedience, where Godwin states
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You present a certain proposition to my mind, to which you require my 
assent. If you accompany the proposition with evidence calculated to shew 
the agreement between the terms of which it consists, you may obtain my 
assent. If you accompany the proposition with authority, telling me that 
you have examined it and found it to be true, that thousands of wise and 
disinterested men have admitted it,... I may assent to your authority; but 
with respect to the proposition itself, my understanding of its reason­
ableness, my perceptions of that in the proposition itself, my understand­
ing of its reasonableness, my perceptions of that in the proposition 
which strictly speaking constitutes the its truth or its falsehood, remain 
just as they did.(PJ,'93,I,170-l)
And, of course, a similar line of thought (without any specific mention of
"authority") lies in Godwin's important chapter, Of the Exercise of Private
Judgement,(97) which, as I have argued earlier, is the one "right" which Godwin
recognises, and the central belief in his complex web of argument.
It is indeed such a threat to private judgement, in the form of an assumed external 
authority, that Wordsworth is challenging in the opening of the Letter. The 
rejection of acquiescence to any such authority, especially that which rests 
merely on a habit of obedience or assent from the past, is the essential challenge 
with which Wordsworth opens his arguments against Watson's Appendix. For 
this reason, he has warned at the outset, that it is crucial,in approaching Watson's 
arguments, not to
confound with argument a strong prepossession for [Watson's] talents, 
experience, and virtues.(47-8)
One can almost hear the spirit of "the more firm and independent habits of
thinking" (PJ,'93,I,73) that Godwin advocates from the earliest stages in
Political Justice. Later on in the Letter. Wordsworth retums(98) to the issue of
"obedience" along with that of equality; although the detailed argument referred
to here(402ff) probably derives more immediately from Paine, the cautions
regarding e.g."equality", "liberty", "perfection", "general good", and, above all,
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the "necessity of obedience" relate to Godwin's chapter, Of Obedience, as does,
above all, Wordsworth's clear challenge to Watson:
Is your lordship to be told that acquiescence is not choice, and that 
obedience is not freedom? (569-70)
In that chapter, Godwin stresses the relationship between authority and
obedience as a threat to private judgement, a view which Wordsworth adopts here.
What we see, therefore, in Wordsworth's opening to the Letter is an argument
founded on the Godwinian premise of the right of every individual to exercise his
private judgement.
Another attempt by Wordsworth to draw upon one of Godwin's fundamental 
philosophic arguments (one which, perhaps predictably, shows his failure as yet 
to to have fully assimilated what he has read) is evidenced in his argument 
concerning Watson's response to the execution of the French monarch. Words­
worth's reaction to Watson's outcry against the "murder" of Louis XVI is very 
exaggerated in its tone; but we have to recognise the full context of what he is 
reacting against.(99) What has upset Wordsworth is not simply the sanctimoni­
ous tone of Watson's argument, but, additionally, the nature of the argument, or 
rather the appeal that Watson makes to his readers' feelings.
The key to Wordsworth's anger can be seen in the following lines from his letter:
The passion of pity is one of which, above all others, a Christian teacher 
should be cautious of cherishing the abuse: when under the influence 
of reason, it is regulated by the disproportion of the pain suffered to the 
guilt incurred.(74-8)
Wordsworth is rather obscure here. (It is only one of several passages and
sentences where an idea becomes the victim of the syntax within which it is
presented.) But it is impossible not to recognise Godwin in this. What
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Wordsworth is suggesting is that any application of reason shows that although 
the pain of Louis at his death might have been great, it was considerably less than 
the guilt incurred throughout his reign; the "guilt" clearly refers to his moral 
responsibility for the oppression of (and pain consequently suffered by) the people 
of France. The inference is equally clear: that the death of Louis was of greater 
benefit (to a greater number of people) if a reasoned view is taken. Whilst it must 
be accepted that some of this argument and the emotion behind it, as evidenced 
in the earlier sentences and the exaggerated tone of Wordsworth's reaction, no 
doubt relate to Wordsworth's own recent experiences in France, the attempt to 
argue this case in a moral and quasi-philosophical form derives from Godwin; 
particularly, the celebrated Fenelon incident. (100)
What Wordsworth has done here istoconfuse, orpossibly try to extend the notion 
of the "passion of pity" from Godwin's arguments based on the closely related 
matters of "family affection" and "gratitude" (PJ,'93,I,83) (the question of 
feelings and emotions which Godwin himself acknowledged he had underplayed 
in the first edition, and which he consciously sought to redress in the second 
edition), where an overbearing feeling is seen by Godwin to be erroneous if not 
subjected to examination by reason. Wordsworth's extrapolation of Godwin's 
point is understandable, particularly in light of the fact that Godwin has dealt with 
the question of "pity"(PJ,'93,I,16) in the earlier Chapter III of Book I (a chapter, 
which, as we have just seen(lOl) has already attracted Wordsworth's attention), 
and has dealt with that issue in terms of
the existence ofpain in one subject and of pleasure and benefit in others,...
(PJ,'93,I,16)
What Wordsworth is doing here, once again, is drawing partly on Godwin's
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ideas; but, more important, drawing upon Godwin's philosophical approach to 
moral judgement to counter Watson's arguments. The lack of any philosophical 
foundation or systematisation of thought noted earlier in Descriptive Sketches is 
giving way to an attempt by Wordsworth to systematise his thinking; anditis upon 
Godwin that he principally draws in this attempt.
There are two further examples in the Letter of Wordsworth drawing upon 
Godwin's philosophic approach and arguments. The first concerns Wordsworth's 
response to Watson’s criticism of republicanism.(174-5) Whilst Godwin was not 
a believer in republicanism,(102) Wordsworth's arguments here concerning re­
publicanism take Watson's arguments deeper and further than simply 
challenging the points Watson makes. For the real issue once again is of political 
oppression which produces a state of "slavery" (103) which, as has already been 
shown,(104) is a constant theme of Godwin's. What Wordsworth is determined 
to advocate is resistance to that oppression as he argues that even
when redress is in our power and resistance is rational, we suffer 
...because we are taught from infancy [my emphasis] that we were bom 
in a state of inferiority to our oppressors.(188-91)
This is Godwin, as Wordsworth draws again on the crucial Chapter III of Book
I .The Moral Characters of Men Originate in their Opinions:
But the seeds of error are ordinarily sown so early as to pass with 
superficial observers for innate.(PJ,’93,I,16)
Wordsworth is drawing upon Godwin's central and seminal empirical stance to
undermine Watson's case. Further proof of this can be found on the next page
of Political Justice:
In this case we instil in them the vices of a tyrant; but we are in equal danger 
of teaching them [children] the vices of a slave.
(my emphasis) (PJ,'93,I,17)
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And Wordsworth, continuing to speak of those "fatal prejudices"(105) and the
role they play in oppression, uses the term "prejudice" as Godwin defines it in
the paragraph entitled Nature of Prejudice and Judgement Described:
An individual surrenders the best attribute of man, the moment he resorts 
to adhere to certain fixed principles, for reasons not now present to his 
mind, but which formerly were.(PJ,'93,n,668)(106)
Even within the paragraph that opens with Wordsworth's admission of republican
sympathies, (107) there is another reminder of Godwin, as Wordsworth, noting
the limitations of Watson's argument, goes on to state:
a philosopher will extend his views much further; having dried up the 
source from which flows the corruption of the public opinion, he will 
be sensible that the stream will go on gradually refining itself.(272-5)
While the idea of perfectibility pre-dates Godwin, the context of this perfecti- 
bilian reference strongly suggests, as its source, Godwin's perfectibilian 
response to the inevitable oppressions of individual freedom and private judge­
ment of all forms of government (though, clearly, Wordsworth's republican 
stand does not go so far). The use of the word "philosopher" characterises the 
philosophic stance Wordsworth again adopts in his approach to challenging 
Watson's arguments. This is now immediately followed by a reference to the 
"coercive power" that "is of necessity so strong in all the old govemments"(108) 
and Wordsworth's admission that
a people could not but at first make an abuse of that liberty which a 
legitimate republic supposes.(276-8)
The parallel with Godwin's chapter Of Coercion considered as a Temporary
Expedient (109) is obvious. Godwin there speaks of the temporary evil of
anarchy which may be the immediate result of the overthrow of despotism;
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exactly what Wordsworth is discussing here. Wordsworth's interest in Godwin’s
perfectibilian stance can also be detected in Wordsworth's later accusation that
Watson has sought to "lull the people of England" into a belief
that they have already arrived at perfection in the science of govern­
ment,... (640-1)
The earlier metaphor of the "stream" being capable of further improvement 
is clearly at the back of Wordsworth's mind.
Godwin and W ordsworth’s attitudes to violent reform.
Wordsworth and Godwin both admit the likelihood of a temporary anarchy
resulting from the overthrow of despotism,(110) and this is only one example
in a significant similarity of attitude to be detected in both writers in their attitude
to violence and its role in the reformist or revolutionary process. On the question
of revolution, Wordsworth challenges Watson:
What! have you so little knowledge of the nature of man as to be 
ignorant, that a time of revolution is not the season of true Liberty. Alas! 
the obstinacy and perversion of men is such that she is too often obliged 
to borrow the very arms of despotism to overthrow him, and in order to 
reign in peace must establish herself by violence.(99-104)
The whole of this argum ent(lll) again draws upon Godwin. For, whilst the view
is often taken and was certainly promoted in the reviews of Political Justice
(112) that Godwin rejected revolution, and a reading of Book IV,Chapters
I and II (Of Resistance and Of Revolutions) gives some support to this view, it
has already been shown earlier (113) that Godwin's view took account of the
Lockean stand that, in certain circumstances, violent revolution might be
justified. Indeed, a reading of the whole of the first edition of Political Justice
and some attention to references to physical resistance in other chapters (which
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were either deleted or heavily revised to tone them down in the second edition 
(114)) reveals a complex picture of Godwin's views on violent reform in this 
first edition.(115)
The first example of the somewhat ambivalent nature of Godwin's attitude to
physical resistance (to which attention has already been drawn(116)) occurs in the
chapter Of Resistance, where Godwin, after apparently rejecting the idea of
physical resistance in favour of achieving change "in a milder and more liberal
way", immediately states:
as to the doctrine of force in general, that is in no case to be employed but 
where every other means is ineffectual.(PJ,'93,I,196)(117)
This indeed points the tenor of many of Godwin's statements on the question of 
the use of force to promote reform, and suggests that the reviewers of this first 
edition of Political Justice disseminated, in their summaries, a rather more simp­
listic interpretation of Godwin's views on the use of force than is warranted. Only 
four pages further on, Godwin, speaking also of the "English constitution", 
asserts:
He that desires a revolution for its own sake is to be regarded as 
a madman. He that desires it from a thorough conviction of its usefulness 
and necessity has a claim upon us for candour and respect.
(PJ,'93,1,200)(118)
There are several other references to the possible necessity of the temporary 
expedient of force if it will lead to greater benefit in the long term; also, that the 
temporary result may be a state of affairs which not only resembles but might 
even surpass the violence and oppression of despotism before the new-found 
improvement arrives.(119)
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Perusal of these passages from Godwin, which were to be heavily revised or 
mostly deleted in the 1796 revisions, suggests that Wordsworth's arguments 
derive strongly from Godwin's stance. Wordsworth's arguments concerning 
revolution have not been gleaned simply from the reviews, of Political Justice 
which present Godwin as standing out unequivocally against violence; nor, I 
suggest, do they derive only from his own experiences in France in view of his 
recorded reaction to the excesses of the Terror. (120) Even the pattern of 
Wordsworth's language throughout this section with terms such as "benign", 
"best affections", "the very arms of despotism", "habit of oppression" are 
reminiscent of the language Godwin uses. Of course Paine does make reference 
to violence, but in a much more limited way, and does not anticipate Words­
worth, as does Godwin in accepting the possibility of a necessary temporary 
commotion as a prerequisite to a more permanent order.
Political and legislative institutions and processes.
Wordsworth's criticism of monarchy, aristocracy and the law have already been
acknowledged as drawing upon Godwin, and it is appropriate here simply to
acknowledge Roberts' very full and clear case regarding this, (121) and add some
brief additional comment. In challenging Watson's sympathy for the executed
Louis XVI, Wordsworth again challenges Watson on some fundamental
premises : first of all that the situation of the monarch is an unnatural one. As is
the case with several passages in the Letter, whilst there might seem to be echoes
of Godwin's chapters on The Education of a Prince(122) (a chapter, which, we
have seen, attracted considerable attention in the reviews of the first edition of
Political Justice") and The Private Life of a Prince. (123) the concluding paragraph
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of which speaks of "the unnatural office of a king", I find it impossible to 
distinguish with any certainty what has been derived from Godwin, and what 
from Paine. (124) Wordsworth's drawing upon Godwin up to this point is enough 
to suggest that he was equally aware of the views of both Paine and Godwin 
on this question. What is more important is Wordsworth's conclusion here: 
Any other sorrow for the death of Louis is irrational and weak.(89-90) 
The premise upon which Wordsworth bases this conclusion is more likely to come 
from Paine (since he seems to show some regret for the overturning of the law, 
for which Godwin shows scant regard), but the manner of the conclusion derives 
from Godwin, as it insists upon a "sorrow" that gains legitimacy only in so far as 
it is rational.
The long argument regarding reform of govemment(125) has attracted much 
attention; it is a pas sage where any attempt to extricate one influence out of Words­
worth's reading of radical texts, his links with radical circles, and his experience 
of revolutionary France is almost certainly doomed to failure. Reading Words­
worth's assertion that he appears "the advocate of republicanism",(126) 
my own conclusion is that although drawings upon Godwin could be cited, 
Wordsworth's sympathies are generally with Paine here.
Turning to the question of the law and its oppression, Wordsworth's argument 
develops over several pages on a theme on which Godwin obviously felt 
strongly.(127) The first echo of Godwin comes when Wordsworth states that
laws.... would be enacted only from an almost universal conviction of
their utility...(320-2)
What Godwin had said is:
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If on the contrary justice be a result flowing from the contemplation of 
all the circumstances of each individual case, if the only criterion of 
justice be general utility, the inevitable consequence is that, the more we 
have of justice, the more we shall have of truth, virtue and happiness.
(PJ,’93,II,771)(128)
The difference here is that Wordsworth is willing to accept and speak of "laws", 
but only if they are "the expression of the general will";(129) Godwin sees not 
the law but "justice" as the essential concept. But Wordsworth is seeking the same 
thing - a system of justice to the benefit of the greatest number, the same quasi­
utilitarian stance that Godwin adopts.
When Wordsworth indicates his intention to "repeat some of the objections,
which have been made to monarchy",... (360-1) it is clear that he is indeed
repeating arguments drawn from Godwin amongst others. (130) Similarly,
Wordsworth’s sources for his arguments concerning "the distinction of wealth
which will always attend superior talents and industry"(131) are no doubt many;
Godwin being one of them:
But it has been alleged, "that we find among different men very different 
degrees of labour and industry,andthatitisnot just they should receive 
an equal reward".(PJ,’93,II,794)(132)
And when Wordsworth objects to a system of distribution of wealth designed
to compel the workman to be content with arbitrary wages, evidently too 
small from the necessity of legal enforcement of them. (451-3)
we are again reminded of Godwin's questioning of the division of labour and
its consequences in human terms in such statements as:
The most industrious and active member of society is frequently with 
great difficulty able to keep his family from starving. (PJ,’93,13,794)
(133)
For accepting that the subject of the poor is a theme to be found constantly in
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the writings ofthe period, this concern for individuals, especially the oppressed 
poor in Wordsworth's arguments against the law and its "forced disproportion
of their possessions" is very reminiscent of Godwin's arguments (expressed more
poignantly in the first edition) as early as Book I, Chapter V:
Vast numbers of their inhabitants are deprived of almost every 
accommodation that can render life tolerable or secure. (PJ,'93,I,34)
(134)
Also, in this chapter. Of the Aristocratical Character, in the paragraph entitled
Aristocratical Distribution of Property. Godwin states:
No man can be a useful member of society, except so far as his talents 
are employed in a manner conducive to the general advantage.
(PJ,'93,II,484)
Indeed, almost all of Wordsworth's economic arguments here, and his arguments
concerning oppression and equality are to be found in Godwin; (135) also
Wordsworth's initial arguments on maldistribution of property, like Godwin's,
are juxtaposed to a comment on "titles" (136), while his arguments against
hereditary wealth (505-8 and 534) also strongly echo Godwin's argument:
Hereditary wealth is in reality a premium paid to idleness,...
(PJ,'93,II,804-5)
What, therefore, can be drawn from an examination of Wordsworth's Letter in
relation to Godwin's Political Justice? To see the appearance of Political Justice
as a major "influence" on Wordsworth at this time is to fly in the face of the
evidence that is available; however, to see Wordsworth simply as having a
"jackdaw" approach to Godwin's ideas is equally unfair. Wordsworth is no
plagiarist, neither is he totally original nor particularly skilled in an ordered
presentation of his arguments. But if we compare the order and structure of
Watson's Appendix, we can see Wordsworth drawing upon the most appropriate
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areas in Godwin's argument to counter that of Watson, yet often going beyond 
the limitations of Watson's views as Wordsworth adopts Godwin's philosophical 
method of argument and his politico-philosophical perspective.
Above all, what is evident in his response to Watson is his emerging deep concern 
with a moral standpoint that goes beyond revolutionary politics. He has, 
I suggest, been attracted by Godwin's humanitarian concern (137); and he has 
seen, in the philosopher's writings, the complexities which arise in any attempt 
to arrive at some kind of ordered response to oppression.
Wordsworth also has beliefs from which he chooses not to deviate: in his belief 
in Christianity, and in republicanism, and in the possibility of a more just legal 
system, he does not go as far as Godwin. Hence some of the difficulties in trying 
to apply Godwin's ideas.
The development, however, from Descriptive Sketches is of significance. Given 
the formal differences between the texts and granting Wordsworth's original 
intent in writing the poem; given also that Wordsworth had, in the poem, touched 
on many libertarian themes due to his recent experiences, what is new in the Letter 
is the depth of thought and the attempt at some sytematised(138) and ordered 
thinking and argument from a quasi-philosophical stance. Above all, the 
emergence of an attempt at an argued, morally-based humanitarian concern 
which seeks to address itself to the contemporary concerns of humankind is 
what strikes the reader of this early text of Wordsworth. Godwin’s recently 
published Political Justice has provided for Wordsworth a potential frame­
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work(139) for the disparate radical and moral ideas we have seen merely touched 
upon in Descriptive Sketches.
Despite Wordsworth's adoption of a philosophical stance and tone to challenge 
Watson's case, and despite his sharing with Godwin an ambivalent attitude to 
violence in relation to reform as well as many aspects of Godwin's criticisms of 
"positive institutions", itis important to reiterate that Wordsworth's moral stance 
remains essentially conventional; as yet, he has not accepted (or perhaps not even 
understood the full implications of) the Godwinian philosophy which rejects all 
restrictions upon the central right of private judgement with the philosophical 
anarchism that resulted.
However, although the Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff was not published, 
Wordsworth’s continuing politico-reformist intentions and his interest in the 
thinking of Godwin is much more clearly evidenced in his correspondence with 
William Mathews concerning his plans to publish a monthly periodical. Though 
there is no need to repeat comment already acknowledging the influence of 
Godwin on Wordsworth’s plans(140) several points are worth making.
The earliest letter by Wordsworth to Mathews of November 1791 (EY,61-3) 
shows little more than an exchange of news, and Wordsworth acting as a sort 
of mentor to the indecisive Mathews over his future career, whilst the letter from 
BloisofMay 19th, 1792(141) gives little information on Wordsworth’s reactions 
to the Revolution; (142) there is certainly no evidence here as yet of the impact 
of Beaupuy, such as is claimed in The Prelude.(143)
It is in the letter of 23rd May, 1794,(EY,118-20) some considerable time after
Wordsworth has written Llandaff and also his first version of Salisbury Plain 
(144) that we have Wordsworth's first reference to the "monthly miscellany"
he plans with Mathews. His assertion of his "democratic principles" and
his reaction to the treason trials and suspension of Habeas Corpus.(145) In this
letter, we have, in Wordsworth's intention to make his publication
a vehicle of sound and exalted Morality.(EY,119)
a first hint of his drawing on Godwin, which is reinforced in the next sentence as
Wordsworth complains of too many periodical miscellanies being
written to maintain the existence of prejudice and to disseminate error.
(EY, 119) (146)
But it is in the letter of 8th June, 1794,(EY,123-9) that we find sustained evidence
of Wordsworth's absorption of the ideas of Political Justice. As early as the fifth
and sixth sentences of this letter, we find what is surely an effective summary of
Godwin's stance, now being assumed by Wordsworth:
I disapprove of monarchical and aristocratical governments, however 
modified. Hereditary distinctions and privileged orders of every species 
I think must necessarily counteract the progress of human improvement: 
hence it follows that I am not amongst the admirers of the British 
constitution. (EY, 123-4)
This is more than simply a reflection of the general radical outpourings at this 
time; it is an advance on Wordsworth's position in Llandaff as he makes clear 
that he is no longer interested in any modification of despotic governments, 
and cites "the progress of human improvement" as his key focus: this willingness 
to countenance the "most atrocious doctrines to be recommended"(EY, 124) 
rather than "restrain the liberty of the press"(EY, 125) reflects the more extrav­
agant qualities of the first edition of Political Justice and its approach to reform, 
as does Wordsworth's sustained, tortuous and perhaps rather tortured debate in
this letter over the likelihood of whether open revolution would effect reform.
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He states,
The destruction of those institutions which I condemn appears to me to be 
hastening too rapidly. I recoil from the bare idea of a revolution; yet, if 
our conduct with reference to both foreign and domestic policy 
continues such as it has been for the last two years how is that dreadful 
event to be avoided?(EY,124)
He then admits that, although it is a writer's role actively to
convince the people that they can only be preserved from a convulsion by 
oeconomy in the administration of the public purse and a gradual and and 
constant reform of those abuses...(EY,124)
abuses, which, he points out, can
render even a revolution desireable.(EY,124)
Again, a few lines further on, he speaks of the need to
diffuse by every method a knowledge of those rules of political 
justice,... (EY,124)
so that
if a revolution must afflict us, they alone can mitigate its horrors and 
establish freedom with tranquillity.(EY, 124)
This is the very stuff of Godwin; of the first edition of Political Justice with its 
ambivalent attitude to revolution. (147) Equally, Wordsworth's wish to identify 
himself as an "enlightened friend of mankind"(148) and his commitment to 
Freedom of inquiry...(EY, 125) 
reflect Godwin’s manner of philosophico-political reform, just as Godwin's 
rather naively expressed belief in truth in the first edition (149) is reflected 
in Wordsworth's claim; "truth must be victorious."(EY,125)
So, also, his warning
I severely condemn all inflammatory addresses to the passions of men, 
even when it is intended to direct those passions to a good purpose.. .
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(EY.125)
reflects Godwin's own reservations over political associations in the pursuance
of reform, e.g. his warning that we must
distinguish between informing the people and inflaming them.
(PJ,'93,I,205)(150)
And when Wordsworth, referring to "the suspension of habeas corpus act" 
(EY,126) claims
We must then look for protection entirely amongst the dispassionate 
advocates of liberty and discussion;...(EY,126)
there can be little doubt that, whether or not Wordsworth was aware at that time
of the role of Godwin in the treason trials (which seems very unlikely), he is
drawing upon the stance Godwin adopts in his approach to reform.
Reflecting both Wordsworth and Godwin's early contact with the dissenting
tradition, we see in the poet's rather more pragmatic discussion of the likely
audiences and sources of patronage for his periodical his assertion that the clergy
of the Church of England "will turn from us", whilst
dissenters...[or at least some of them]..would receive a work like ours 
with pleasure. (EY, 126)
And in his commitment to
advancement of the human mind in moral knowledge...(EY,126)
we hear the influence of Godwin stridently; and expressed in a potentially more
systematic statement of intentions.
Yet, as seen in the earlier discussion of the role played by Wordsworth at the time 
of the treason trials,(151) the next letter, only five months later,(7th Nov., 1794, 
(EY, 134-6) shows Wordsworth retreating from his position, and by December 
1794, it is a much more "mellowed" reformer we hear as Wordsworth now states
that the experiences and acquittals at the trials
will convince bigotted enemies to our present constitution that it 
contains parts upon which too high a value cannot be set.(EY,137)
There is surely a strong irony here as Wordsworth, so contrary to the view
expressed in his June letter, apparently sees the responsibility for the acquittals
lying with the processes of law, not with the arguments of Cursory Strictures
penned by Godwin who had expressed no faith at all in the process of the law.
Perhaps the last point to be made, significantly, is that it is in his last letter to 
Mathews (of 21st March 1796) that Wordsworth makes the rather biting (and 
much mis-quoted) comment on the Preface to the second edition of Political 
Justice.
What does all of this mean? Does it suggest that Wordsworth, after having read 
and drawn upon Godwin in Llandaff. and then set in train plans to publish a 
periodical motivated by Godwin's approach to reform(152) simply turned his 
back on all of this, that he, to quote from The Prelude:
Yielded up moral questions in despair?(1805,X,900)
Such a view is clearly simplistic and erroneous, and it is unlikely that that claim 
in The Prelude refers to 1795-6. Yet there is apoint to be made here. For, despite 
Wordsworth's later collaboration with Coleridge on The Convention of Cintra. or 
even his earlier fragment known as the Essay on Morals. (153) his announcement 
that he intended not to pursue his plans with Mathews over the periodical does 
mark the end of a stage in Wordsworth’s radicalism. His overt interest in political 
radicalism and any intention of playing an active role has been increasingly
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coloured by his interest in moral issues, especially as related to his developing 
human concern, and it is to the moral and humanitarian dimensions ofWords­
worth's and Godwin's thinking that we must now turn.
Recognising, therefore, the limited role that Godwin and the first edition of 
Political Justice has played so far in the systematising of Wordsworth's ideas, 
it is appropriate to return to 1793, and to trace the development of Wordsworth's 
earliest versions of what have come to be known as the Salisbury Plain poems, 
in relation not only to Political Justice, but also to Godwin's fictional evocation 
of the principles of that work, in Caleb Williams.
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CHAPTER THREE : WORDSWORTH'S "love of mankind" - 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MORAL HUMANITARIANISM 
IN THE EARLY POETRY.
Part 1: The Claims of The Prelude.
My present theme 
Is to retrace the way that led me on 
Through Nature to the love of human-kind,...
The Prelude 
1805,Bk.Vm,586-588
A very small but significant textual change between the versions of The Prelude 
of 1805 and 1850 in Book VIII points the need to question Wordsworth's claims 
regarding the development of his humanitarianism. In the 1805 text, Wordsworth, 
speaking of his human concern, writes
until not less 
Than three-and-twenty summers had been told,
Was man in my affections and regards 
Subordinate to her,her awful forms 
And viewless agencies-...(l)
Wordsworth is here identifying the time when his interest in nature was made
"subordinate" to his concern for man. By 1832 (published in 1850), Wordsworth
has changed this to "two-and-twenty summers" (my emphasis). (2) A small
change; yet the dating is critical. (3) The 1805 text refers to the summer of 1793:
after the publication, and Wordsworth's first reading, of Political Justice, and his
writing of Llandaff. In particular, it refers to that period, that summer, of his
composition of the first and (as we shall see) the most overtly and clumsily
"Godwinian" version of Salisbury Plain: a poem which offers the first real
evidence in Wordsworth's poetry of his concern for man. This poem is obviously
important to him as evidenced by its mention at the close of Book XII of the
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1805 Prelude (discussed more fully in Chapter 6).(4) The dating given in the 
1850 version of course, is equally critical, since it places this claimed develop­
ment in Wordsworth's thinking during the period of his brief friendship with 
Beaupuy (April to July, 1792); which fits neatly with the impression Wordsworth 
has tried to create regarding the seminal influence of Beaupuy in the development 
of his human concern.
It is futile to base an argument wholly upon which date is likely to be the more 
reliable; obviously, in 1804, when Wordsworth was writing this section, he was 
nearer to the events than at the time of his revision, but the problem of Words­
worth's memory in relation to events in his life is well documented. Just as certain 
tensions in The Prelude have raised questions regarding Wordsworth's presen­
tation of the development of his radicalism, so a revision such as this, and other 
tensions in the poem, warrant some re-examination of Wordsworth's claims 
regarding the development of his humanitarianism. Such an examination must 
focus initially, at least briefly, upon Wordsworth's claimed intentions in writing 
The Prelude and also on Book VIII.
In a letter to Francis Wrangham of late January or early February 1804,
Wordsworth, writes:
At present, I am engaged in a poem on my own earlier life which will take 
five parts or books to complete, three of which are nearly finished.
(EY, 436)
Then, in a letter of 6th March, he tells Coleridge:
When this next book is done which I shall begin in two or three days 
time [referring to Book V of the five-book Prelude] I shall consider the 
work as finished. (EY, 452)
Yet, by the end of the same month, after sending off the five-book version to
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Coleridge, Wordsworth again writes to him indicating that he has started to 
compose further material for the poem. (5) Exact dating of the composition of 
Book VIII is possible; (6) it can be ascribed to October 1804, but it is not being 
unfair to treat that book (along with the others composed over late 1804 to Spring 
1805) as conceived as additions to the intermediate five-book version(7) of The 
Prelude (mentioned in the letter quoted above), itself a major extension of what 
we now recognise as the two-part Prelude of 1798-99.
It is, doubtless, partly the haste with which Wordsworth executed these 
additional books(8) which contributes to the loose and repetitious structure of 
Book VIE. (9) However, another reason for the rather erratic quality of this Book 
can be seen if a close study is made of what Wordsworth is trying to assert 
regarding the development in himself of that rather vague idea to which he refers 
in the title of this Book as "love of mankind". (10) As will be seen, Wordsworth’s 
earliest references to this subject in Books VI and VII demonstrate the same 
weaknesses, as he relates his gradual awakening humanitarian interest to those 
crucial "spots of time",(11) soimportant to his own view of his development. The 
title, Retrospect thus gives Book VIII a pivotal role in the development of his 
human concern, following his claims in Books VI and VII, and preceding Books 
IX to XI on the subjects of his experiences in France, his alleged moral crisis 
and subsequent imaginative restoration.
However, if instead of simply accepting the claims of Wordsworth, we again
compare these with the evidence available in his poetry and prose of the period
concerned (that part of the development of a poet's mind available to students of
Wordsworth), it will be seen that important questions are again raised. These
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questions, raised in Part 1 of this chapter, regarding the structure and architec­
tonics as well as the stylistic presentation of Wordsworth's claims regarding 
the development of his humanitarianism, will be set against evidence in Part 2 , 
demonstrating in the Salisbury Plain poems a search for a philosophic and moral 
humanitarianism that does derive from Godwin. That this fails to be acknowl­
edged by Wordsworth continues to raise further suspicions that Wordsworth's 
"love of mankind" as presented in the landscape of memory of The Prelude is 
an imaginative recreation which makes The Prelude no less a great poem, but 
which sheds some doubt on it as truly representing the development of this poet's 
mind.
The Prelude: theme and intention.
Examination of the intention behind Wordsworth's writing of The Prelude as well
as the history of its textual development attests to Wordsworth’s wrestling with
the idea behind the poem. This also involves, in some measure, the part played
by Coleridge,(12) one that is very difficult to evaluate due to the lack of evidence
from the "notes" he was supposed to provide as well as the the very fragmentary
nature of other evidence. Such comments as that by Coleridge on the two-part
Prelude of 1799 as being Wordsworth's "divine self-biography" (12th October,
1799),(13) and then his reference (26th March, 1804) to
the first two parts of the biographical, or philosophico-biographical 
Poem to be pre-fixed or annexed to The Recluse.
show Coleridge fairly confident regarding the nature and purpose of The Prelude.
Yet it is difficult in this correspondence to find a similar confidence in Words­
worth's statements regarding his own intent. Despite Coleridge's comment quoted
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above, Wordsworth restricts any intention of writing a philosophical poem for 
his plans for The Recluse, a "moral and Philosophical Poem" (letter to De 
Quincey of6thMarch 1804,EY,454). He does inform Wrangham, as mentioned 
earlier, of his intention to write "a Poem on my earlier life", and it is, indeed, such 
phrases as "my own earlier life" (again in the letter to De Quincey) or; in the 
same letter, simply "my own life", but with the qualification that of the three 
planned poems (The Prelude. The Recluse and The Excursion!, that "on my own 
life" is "the least important of the three" that characterises his own description of 
The Prelude at this time.
However, in correspondence with Sir George Beaumont in the period approach­
ing completion of the 1805 Prelude. Wordsworth first refers to the poem's theme 
as "the growth of my own mind" (25 th December, 1804, EY, 518); and then, on 
1st May 1805, informing Beaumont that he is within two Books of finishing his 
poem, a note of uneasiness enters the letter when, admitting to a planned overall 
length of not "much less than 9000 lines", Wordsworth exclaims:
an alarming length! and a thing unprecedented in Literary history that 
a man should talk so much about himself. It is not self-conceit as you will 
know well, that has induced [me] to this, but real humility;. . .
(EY, 586)
Humility or not, Wordsworth is clearly self-conscious about it, a tension which 
is reflected in the genesis and structuring of the poem, not least when Words worth 
is presenting the development of his humanitarianism.
However misleading(14) the Preface to the later Excursion may or may not be, 
it reinforces a sense of Wordsworth's anxiety over the theme of the poem which 
began as the 1798-99 Prelude. By 1805, the first Book of that text reinforces this
103
view. Even as he speculates on the theme of his poem, Wordsworth writes: 
Sometimes it suits me better to shape out 
Some tale from my own heart, more near akin 
To my own passions and habitual thoughts,
Some variegated story,in the main 
Lofty, with interchange of gentler things.
But deadening admonitions will succeed,
And the whole beauteous fabric seems to lack 
Foundation, and withal appears throughout 
Shadowy and insubstantial.( 1805,1,220-8)
Then, after a reference to his aspirations regarding The Recluse.(151 he quickly 
reverts to some of the very earliest material composed at Goslar, somewhat 
revised, but essentially recognisable as one of the earliest recorded fragments 
from MS JJ (which was eventually to contribute to what is now recognised as the 
two-part Prelude of 1799):
Was it for this 
That one, the fairest of all rivers, loved 
To blend his murmurs with my nurse's song,
And from his alder shades and rocky falls,
And from his fords and shallows, sent a voice 
That flowed along my dreams? For this dids't thou,
O Derwent,travelling over the green plains
Near my "sweet birthplace", didst thou, beauteous stream,
Make ceaseless music through the night and day,
Which with its steady cadence tempering 
Our human waywardness, composed my thoughts 
To more than infant softness, giving me 
Among the fretful dwellings of mankind,
A knowledge, a dim earnest, of the calm
Which Nature breathes among the hills and groves?(1805,1,271-285)
Here the confidence of Tintem Abbey (so recently completed and strongly
evoked both stylistically and thematically in the JJ manuscript version of this
passage) re-asserts itself. Y et even in the development of that earliest form of The
Prelude. Wordsworth's revisions show uncertainty regarding the nature and
purpose of the poem he was composing, as can be seen, for instance, from
the lines which, by 1805, read:
Meanwhile my hope has been that I might fetch 
Invigorating thoughts from former years,
Might fix the wavering balance of my mind,
And haply meet reproaches too, whose power
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May spur me on, in manhood now mature 
To honourable toil. Yet should these hopes 
Be vain, and thus should neither I be taught 
To understand myself, nor thou to know 
With better knowledge how the heart was framed 
Of him thou lovest, need I dread from thee 
Harsh judgements if I am so loth to quit 
Those recollected hours that have the charm 
Of visionary things,...(1805,1,648-660)
This part of the conclusion of Book I underwent several revisions(16) even in its
early stage;(17) MS JJ, the earliest recorded manuscript of the developing two-
part Prelude, has no record of these lines except for what appears to be part of
an intended conclusion to the poem.(18) Yet by MS 15, we find introduced
into what is now emerging as the closing of the first book an apostrophe by
Wordsworth suggesting the concern he has for the theme of his developing poem:
To understand myself, nor thou to know
With better knowledge how the heart was framfed]
Of him thou lovest, need I dread from thee 
Harsh judgements if I am so loth to quit 
Those recollected hours...(19)
Wordsworth's self-consciousness here is reflected in the "dread" of "Harsh
judgements", (not evident in the JJ version, to which he has now added). And this
is further reinforced when Wordsworth, in the same manuscript, further revises
the passage:
Reproaches from my former years, whose power 
May spur me on, in manhood now mature,
To honourable toil. Yet, should it be 
That this is but an impotent desire 
That I by such enquiry am not taught 
To understand myself,...(20)
The reference to "Reproaches from my former years" reinforces this sense of 
self-conscious tension in his act of creation here.(21) (This version is consoli­
dated in MS U and MS 16.(22))
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Even such a brief summary as this can scarcely conceal Wordsworth's unease 
over the danger that his poem might be seen merely as self-indulgent.
"Spots of Time": humanitarianism and the architectonics of re-invention.
One of the ways in which, throughout the development of The Prelude, from the 
1798-99 two part version, through the proposed and almost completed five-book 
version, to the 1805 text, Wordsworth manipulates the perception of his develop­
ment is through the device of the "spots of time". In his moving of the critical 
"spots of time" passage from Part I of the 1799 Prelude(23) first of all to the final 
book of the five book version of The Prelude (with which he had intended to 
conclude that version(24)), and then to Book XI of the 1805 text,(lines 251 if) 
we see the wavering hand of Wordsworth which architectonically undermines 
what was supposed to be the early focus of philosophical unity of his earliest 
version of The Prelude, and which points once again to his unease and his desire 
for some philosophical coherence in his poem. (25)
It is indeed this shift of his essential "spots of time" passage and the unease 
felt in the early drafts and the first book of The Prelude which draw our attention 
to his attempts to explain the development of his human concern. His as sertion that 
it is not his intention to
parcel out
His intellect by geometric rules,
Split like a province into round and square;...
indicating a knowledge of
the individual hour in which 
His habits were first sown, even as a seed;...(26)
must be respected and understood for what it is; not a snipe at Godwiniam
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"reason", but as an explanation of Wordsworth's belief in the imagination's
unifying perception, which the idea of the "spots of time" was intended to explain
from a coherent philosophic basis in advance in the earliest version of the poem.
MS RV shows(27) that the reference to
 that false secondary power by which
In weakness we create distinctions,...
(1798/99 Reading Text,Second Part,251-2/1805,11,221-2)
is clearly an addition and very much a secondary thought to a developing
argument in the poem, the main point of which is to try to justify Wordsworth's
presentation of his theme in his poem. The result again reflects his unease over
the intention behind and the philosophic basis of his poem. Such an addition was
unnecessary, having the effect of disturbing the movement of the poem in one
of its more triumphant passages as it stood in 1799, a disturbance exacerbated
by the further addition in 1805 of the unexplained andill-contextualisedreference
to science.(28)
In both of the revisions discussed above, Wordsworth's intention becomes clear 
if we consider their implications for earlier incidents in The Prelude: namely, 
to disavow any debt to a conventional or theoretically based source of inspiration 
in the poem, and to vindicate the roles of nature and the imagination as being 
the original source of his human concern. Yet, as will be shown, this was simply 
not the case, and it is not difficult to identify certain passages in The Prelude 
_ which betray Wordsworth's uneasy awareness of this.
For instance, Wordsworth identifies in himself towards the end of Book IV
(Summer Vacation! a growing awareness of humanity, as evidenced in the lines:
A freshness also found I at this time
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In human life, the life I mean of those
Whose occupations really I loved.(l805,IV, 181-3)
or, more extensively:
Nor do I less remember to have felt 
Distinctly manifested at this time,
A dawning, even as of another sense,
A human-heartedness about my love 
For objects hitherto the gladsome air 
Of my own private being, and no more- 
Which I had loved, even as a blessed spirit 
Or angel, if he were to dwell on earth,
Might love in individual happiness.(1805,IV,222-30)
But these assertions seem to come from nowhere. It is surely not adequate, as 
critics have done,(29) merely to admit puzzlement over exactly what Wordsworth 
is trying to distinguish here; it has to be said that the problem is not simply that 
his account of those "plain-living people"( 1805,IV,200-7) and the other descrip­
tions of individuals in these passages lack conviction and feels insubstantial. Any 
attempt to find proof of this "dawning...of another sense" in early texts meets with 
little success (perhaps not surprisingly in light of the very few and immature 
poems he had written by that time). More significant, the placing of these 
claims in this book seem much more of a prelude to the "dedicated spirit" passage 
and the incident of the discharged soldier which conclude this book; thus 
allowing Wordsworth to reinforce his view of himself as the solitary observer 
who developed his love of humankind out of such observations, rather than 
acknowledging any other influence.
The episode of the discharged soldier, the original version of which is to be found 
in the Alfoxden Note Book,(30) is the first of Wordsworth's extended descrip­
tions of solitary figures on which he relies so much to explain the development 
of his humanitarianism and the role of memory and imagination in the conversion
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of observation into true perception. The fact that some kind of original equivalent 
of this incident, dating from approximately 1798, exists is important, showing 
Wordsworth drawing upon an emerging poetic vision coincident with that of 
the earliest edition of Lvrical Ballads as well as the nascent Prelude.
Wordsworth's placing of this incident in Book IV of the 1805 Prelude is unfor­
tunate, (31) following the very brief introduction,
From many wanderings that have left behind
Remembrances not lifeless, I will here
Single out one, then pass to other themes.(1805,IV,361-3)
This, immediately followed by the description of Wordsworth's solitary wander­
ing prior to spotting the discharged soldier (an introduction he felt a need to extend 
by the 1850 text,(1850,IV,353ff) albeit still unsatisfactorily, and after several 
attempts at revision(32)), renders this incident rather lacking in motivation. It 
is here that the revised position of the "spots of time" causes difficulties, for if 
this incident is intended to show how Wordsworth's human concern was 
awakened and nurtured by such events, then, with no advance warning of the 
intended significance of such events (such as the original earlier placing of the 
"spots of time" passage would have achieved), the poem fails to make its point 
here. The discharged soldier episode sits uneasily where it has been placed, and 
for anyone who has read the much earlier 1793 and 1795 versions of the Salisbury 
Plain poems, this incident obtrudes and points up the tension in the poem that 
Wordsworth clearly recognised and sought to remedy in his struggles with those 
later revisions.
Apart from a very brief and rather vague reference to "mankind" in Book 
VI,(1805,VI,469ff) Wordsworth does not return to this theme until Book VII,
where his description of the prostitute's "blasphemy" (1805,VII,413ff) seems 
more an extension of the account of his time in London, after returning from 
France, and the effect of that on his consciousness. This is rather abruptly and 
self-consciously concluded, and is followed by an equally self-conscious and 
rather obtrusive opening to the next passage:
I quit this painful theme, enough is said
To show what thoughts must often have been mine...(l805,VII,436-7) 
This uneasy conclusion to what Wordsworth presumably considered to be one of 
the important "spots of time" in his developing concern for mankind is mirrored 
again in Book VII in the account of the blind beggar, where Wordsworth, 
in a rather unconvincing account of his feelings,(33) turns equally unconvinc­
ingly to open a new section with the lines:
Though reared upon the base of outward things,
These chiefly are such structures as the mind 
Builds for itself. Scenes different there are- 
Full-formed - which take, with small internal help,
Possession of the faculties:...(1805, VII, 624-8)
and proceeds to catalogue a number of such "scenes".
So far, Wordsworth's attempts to use his "spots of time" and the workings of the 
imagination upon memory as the locus for his humanitarian concern seems to be 
responsible only for the "hiccups" it introduces into the flow of the poem.
It is, in fact, only towards the final lines of Book VII that we find evidence of
Wordsworth attempting to indicate what it was that he gained from the
experience of London: (34)
O, blank confusion,and a type not false 
Of what the mighty city is itself 
To all, except a straggler here and there- 
To the whole swarm of its inhabitants-
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An undistinguishable world to men,
The slaves unrespited of low pursuits,
Living amid the same perpetual flow
Of trivial objects, melted and reduced
To one identity by differences
That have no law, no meaning, and no end-
Oppression under which even highest minds
Must labour, whence the strongest are not ffee.(l805,VII,696-707)
Whilst there is an energy here, both aesthetic and moral, which derives in great
measure from the scenes he has just described, this rather didactic reflective
summary suggests a very ambivalent attitude in Wordsworth: for there is as
much disgust overthe sight of the "trivial" activities heobserved as humanitarian
sympathy with the lot of those labouring under such "oppression". Even in his
protest against the lack of concern for the individual and the effect upon even
"the highest minds" (concerns that Godwin had also expressed in Political
Justice!, this judgement is unconvincing in its expression, not least because of
the impressiveness of the description by Wordsworth earlier of those trivialities
he now wishes to condemn. Frankly, he sounds rather a self-righteous spoilsport!
This all undermines his claim, a few lines later that
though the picture weary out the eye,
By nature an unmanageable sight,
It is not wholly so to him who looks
In steadiness, who hath......
..................a feeling of the whole. (1805,VII,708-13)
Wordsworth presents the cacophonies of London enthusiastically enough to
outweigh the humanitarian perceptions that this spot of time is supposed to have
brought. We are not convinced.
Book Vin.
Book VIII,entitled Retrospect, Love of Nature Leading to Love of Mankind, can
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now be examined from two perspectives: Wordsworth’s attempt, in that Book, to 
consolidate a perception that his love of nature was what led in some mysterious 
way to his "love of mankind"; secondly, his apparent anxiety to establish a firm 
sense of his human concern being a powerful, if perhaps latent, force within him 
prior to his "radical" period. The importance of the latter point is that he can then 
explain some aspects of his involvement in radical life and his contact for 
example with Godwinian philosophy as a temporary aberrration from which 
he recovered, partly through the help of Dorothy and partly because he had 
this essential foundation of a love of nature and mankind which his re-vitalised 
imagination restored.
In view, therefore of the importance of this Book,its failure to achieve its purpose
is even more significant. From the opening lines of the Book, Wordsworth's
inexplicable resort to a pastoral and idealised view of man seems totally
unjustified in view of the fact that Wordsworth must have been aware of how
untrue a reflection this was of the life of shepherds:
The elements,and seasons in their change,
Do find their dearest fellow-labourer there 
The heart of man- a district on all sides 
The fragrance breathing of humanity,
Man free, man working for himself,with choice 
Of time, and place, and object;...(1805, VIII, 148-53)
Nor is it valid either in terms of imagination or memory to present such a scene
without laying himself open to the charge of sentimentalising. His discomfort
over the whole passage can be seen in the changes and deletions at the opening
of this section between 1805 and the final 1850 version. (35) There is further
evidence of this in his self-conscious admission of his selective approach to what
he is portraying here ("I have singled out/Some moments"(174-5)), his attempts
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to deny any "Arcadian"(36) quality in what he has presented (despite the lines 
quoted above), and then the very unsatisfactory "parable" of the shepherd that 
follows (deleted by 1850, Wordsworth presumably having recognised later how 
poorly all of this illustrated the point he was trying to make).
What strikes the reader about this last lengthy description of the shepherd's life
(lines 222ff) is indeed how poorly it portrays what it was intended to,
Man suffering among awful powers and forms:
.............. enough to make
The imagination restless-...(1805,VIII,213-5)
compared with the humanitarian fervour of even the earliest and least effective 
version of Salisbury Plain. As in the case of the discharged soldier, there is 
a strong impression here of Wordsworth trying to fill a gap in the experiential 
development he intends to portray; a gap caused by his unwillingness to acknow­
ledge the humanitarianism that, as we shall see, exists in Salisbury Plain in a form 
overtly derivative of the thinking from William Godwin.
The result of this opening section ofBookVIII is that, byline 410, when Words­
worth informs us,
Thus was man 
Ennobled outwardly before mine eyes,
And thus my heart at first was introduced 
To an unconscious love and reverence 
Of human nature;...(1805,VIII,410-4)
we are unconvinced by the experience Wordsworth purports to share with us, and
we feel the heavy hand of a self-justifying and retrospectively imposed
didacticism. At the same time, it is becoming more and more clear that, for
Wordsworth, some explanation or re-invention of how his humanitarianism
developed is seen as a crucial theme of this great poem; one which he is
113
determined, that somehow, he must address before coming to deal with the 
period of his links with and experience of radical thought. Yet any reader will 
search in vain for some evidence, contemporary with the period Wordsworth is 
describing here, to support his repeated and self-conscious assertions on this 
theme.
As if he were aware of such developing suspicion in his readers, Wordworth
issues a clear challenge in the next section:
Call ye these appearances - 
Which I beheld of shepherds in my youth,
This sanctity of Nature given to man,
A shadow, a delusion?- ye who are fed
By the dead letter, not the spirit of things,...(1805,VIII,428-32)
It is an important challenge, in which Wordsworth rejects mere empiricism as
the basis of perception and asserts the power of the perception of the ideal ( in this
case, with reference to man) as a necessary prerequisite to understanding
of, as well as an ability to cope with, the more temporal accidents of the "coarse
manners, vulgar passions"( 1805,VIII,450-62) around us.
It is a bold assertion, and the language and rhythms of Wordsworth's verse betray
no uncertainty in this passage. Though it is difficult to find contemporary
evidence in the juvenilia and early poetry to support this, it is fairly easy to see
a reason for the confident, even defiant tone of his challenge here. Wordsworth
has, here, laid the foundations of a perceptive awareness, guided (perhaps
unconsciously at this stage) by the vision of the imagination which, although it
will suffer the storms of the events recorded in Books IX to XI,will ultimately
provide the foundation for the "imagination restored" of the final books. For
Wordsworth, the flaws and tensions in his argument up to this point melt away
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in the face of his vision of how the closing books and argument of his fast- 
emerging poem would be structured from here on; the relative speed and likely 
order of composition bearing this out. (37)
It is also worth noting that immediately after this section, Wordsworth's note of
caution returns:
Yet do not deem, my friend, though thus I speak 
Of man as having taken in my mind 
A place thus early which might almost seem 
Preeminent, that it was really so.(1805,VIII,472-5)
Wordsworth returns to the subject of the Book in hand, perhaps conscious of the
exaggerated confidence of the challenge in the previous lines, and concludes
with the statement regarding the "three and twenty summers" as marking his
recognition of the supreme importance of humanity. In its full context as
discussed here , Wordsworth’s choice of dating becomes even more critical.
Nevertheless, Wordsworth's confidence in his view of nature having led to his 
love of mankind re-asserts itself, to the detriment of the poem, as he informs us 
yet again of his increasing awareness of this feeling(38), and even at this stage he 
tells us:
It might be told (but wherefore speak of things 
Common to all?) that, seeing, I essayed 
To give relief, began to deem myself 
A moral agent,....(1805,VIII,665-8)
Even if this refers to Wordsworth's Cambridge days, as it would seem to, not only
is it as obscure as the passages discussed earlier, it also is used to introduce into
Wordsworth's account of his developing love of mankind an overtly moral
dimension, which, as we shall see, becomes such an important, but highly
derivative, feature of his early poetry. Again, there is no other contemporary
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textual support for this; Words worth's juxtaposed portrayal of London scarcely 
supports the rather idealised or reverential view of man he claims to have 
developed. We find it difficult to accept the logic of his belief that such 
experiences and "the history "of his "native land" (line 770) gave him a sense 
of man's endurance and gave him "individualremembrances" (line787), which, 
through the process of imagination, produced "vital functions of the soul" (line 
789) resulting in elevating thoughts of human nature".
It sounds an unlikely alchemy! We remain unconvinced, and read with some
surprise Wordsworth's assertion that all of these experiences did not cause his
belief in "what we may become" (line 807) to waver. Such optimism seems
unjustified,but its presentation in undisguised "perfectibilian" terms, so
reminiscent of Godwin who was the most popular (though not the only)
exponent of that philosophy, makes us even more suspicious about this
repetitious, contradictory Book, a Book which closes with the touching and
famous portrayal of the man with the sickly child which, for all its undoubted
power and poignancy, scarcely justifies or explains the "unity of man" (line 827)
or the optimistic pathos of "human creatures..."in "that vast abiding place"
Profusely sown with individual sights 
Of courage, and integrity, and truth,
And tenderness,...(1805,VIII,837-41)
We conclude Book VIII less than satisfied with the integrity of Wordsworth's
conclusion:
Thus from a very early age, O friend,
My thoughts had been attracted more and more
By slow gradations towards human-kind,...(1805,VIII,860-2)
Even given the overriding structural implications of Wordsworth's idea of the
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"spots of time", those "slow gradations" often seem more like haphazard remem­
berings linked by obscure passages of "philosophising"
If such a criticism seems over- harsh or simplistic, or, above all, open to Words­
worth's own challenge of being inspired by the "dead letter", it is worth drawing 
attention to Wordsworth's brief opening to Book IX where, we see his relief at 
being able to turn from such retrospective philosophising (reflected in the 
tortuous syntax and halting rhythms of the opening lines) to the energy and 
force of the narrative which, however painful in terms of the actual experiences 
recorded, lends itself to the blank verse he so clearly enjoys writing:
But now we start afresh: I feel 
An impulse to precipitate my verse.
Fair greetings to this shapeless eagerness,
Whene'er it comes,...(1805,IX,9-12)
It is, however, a long time before Wordsworth returns to the subject of his human
concern; for, with the exception of a rather obtrusive reminder to the reader to
note that the events of the French Revolution were being observed by
one tutored thus, who had been formed 
To thought and moral feeling in the way 
This story hath described,...(1805,IX,243-5)
Wordsworth is taken up with the question of his involvement in the Revolution
and his response to it, and also in the radical thought of the period from which
begins to emerge the human and moral concern which is to colour the poetry
he is to write between 1793 and 1798. It is to this period and to the earliest of
those poems that we now turn to examine what Wordsworth has chosen generally
to ignore, to distort, and to challenge with his thesis in The Prelude of nature's
nurture of his humanitarianism. It is to Godwin and the importance of Godwin's
writings and thought in Wordsworth's attempts to develop and establish a
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philosophical and moral basis for his human concern that we now turn in an 
attempt to offer an alternative view to that presented by Wordsworth himself in 
The Prelude, an explanation which reinforces the view that the tensions in his own 
purported view are caused, in no small part, by his attempts to disguise what 
other earlier texts clearly demonstrate: the role play by the thinking of William 
Godwin in his poetry.
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Part 2: The Salisbury Plain Poems of 1793 and 1795.
Whilst Wordsworth criticism has increasingly acknowledged the relationship 
between the Salisbury Plain poems(391 and the ideas of Godwin, such recognition 
has not included the important role of Godwin’s ideas in the earliest version, 
the 1793-94 Salisbury Plain, though most recent commentators now acknowledge 
the influence of Godwin in the revised Adventures on Salisbury Plain of 1795.(40) 
However, even in the case of the latter poem, the role of Godwin's novel, Caleb 
Williams has not had the attention it merits, though it is now increasingly 
recognised as an important source for the revised poem.(41) Above all, the 
full significance of Godwin, not only in Wordsworth's poetry of protest, (42) 
but in the poetry of suffering(43) has not been recognised ( and, of course, as is 
now becoming clear, would not have been acknowledged by Wordsworth 
himself). Without doubt, the unwillingness of earlier critics to recognise the role 
of Godwin in the protest of the earlier Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff and 
Salisbury Plain derives as partly a critical reluctance to disturb Wordsworth's 
own insistence on the greater importance in his development of lived experience 
rather than theoretical principles. One reason critics seem more willing in their 
handling of the second version of the poem to admit a significant role for Godwin 
may be that, in considering that version, they have the evidence of Wordsworth's 
letters to Mathews (with their Godwinian import), and the start of social inter­
course between Godwin and Wordsworth. (44) Yet to understand the role 
Godwin played only as an alternative to the explanations of Wordsworth in terms 
of his own lived experience is both to simplify the complexities of the 
relationship, and to play into Wordsworth's hands.
The purpose of this chapter is not only to draw upon these more recent critics 
who have accepted Godwin’s influence on the 1795 Adventures on Salisbury 
Plain, but also to establish the influence of Godwin on the earlier Salisbury Plain. 
Only then can the nature of Words worth's borrowings and the relationship bet­
ween the poet's experiential sources and his use of Godwin's ideas be established. 
What emerges will be arevised conception of the role of Godwin in Wordsworth's 
emerging poetry of suffering; his nascent moral humanitarianism.
The Origins of Salisbury Plain: the claims of the Fenwick Notes.
Before turning to the text of Salisbury Plain, it is necessary to deal with the
question of dating and Wordsworth's claims regarding the origins of Saliburv
Plain. There seems little doubt from the Fenwick Notes to Guilt and Sorrow and
The Female Vagrant(45) and from the researches of the most recent editors of
Wordsworth that the composition of this first version can be ascribed to the
period 1793-94;(46) within a year of the publication of the first edition of
Political Justice when Godwin's reputation was high and his book and ideas were
being circulated widely. Less certain, in my view, is exactly what inspiration
lay behind the poem. Most commentators (47) have been content to accept
Wordsworth's explanations of the origins of the poem as recorded in the Fenwick
Notes. In the Note to The Female Vagrant, he states briefly:
The chief incident of IThe Female Vagrant!, more particularly the 
description of her feelings on the Atlantic are taken from life. (48)
The Note to Guilt and Sorrow elaborates on this:
All that relates to the suffering as a sailor’s wife in America, and her 
condition of mind during the voyage home, were faithfully taken from the 
report made to me of her own case by a friend who had been subjected to 
the same trials and affected in the same way. (49)
120
Without doubting completely the reliability of these statements, but already 
cautious of a poet who at the much earlier period of the 1805 Prelude has already 
shown a taste for representing observation and the spoken word as virtually the 
only source he is willing to acknowledge in his own poetic development, certain 
problems emerge from Wordsworth's claims. The Note to The Female Vagrant 
suggests that Wordsworth derived from life merely the skeleton of a plot on 
which to hang his ideas and attitudes. The Note to Guilt and Sorrow seems to 
go further, suggesting that much of the detail came from Wordsworth's own 
memory - but in which version? The Note seems to suggest the 1793-4 Salisbury 
Plain, which differs considerably from the two later versions. Yet the Note 
is attached to Guilt and Sorrow, though perhaps only because this was the first 
occasion of publication of the complete poem. There is an area of confusion here, 
and I would tend to give greater credence to the Female Vagrant Note, a view 
which internal examination of the poem will bear out.
Another issue is Wordsworth's account in the Advertisement to Guilt and Sorrow
of how he was inspired to write what must have been the 1793 Salisbury Plain:
Not less than one-third of the following poem, though it has from time to 
time been altered in the expression, was published so far back as the year
1798, under the title of The Female Vagrant The whole was written
before the close of the year 1794, and I will detail...the circumstances 
under which it was produced.
During the latter part of the summer of 1793, having passed a month in 
the Isle of Wight, in view of the fleet which was then preparing for sea 
off Portsmouth at the commencement of the war, I left the place with 
melancholy forebodings. The American war was still fresh in memory. 
The struggle which was beginning, and which many thought would be 
brought to a speedy close by the irresistable arms of Great Britain being 
added to those of the allies, I was assured in my own mind would be 
of long continuance, and productive of distress and misery beyond all 
possible calculation. This conviction was pressed upon me by having 
been a witness, during a long residence in revolutionary France, of the 
spirit which prevailed in that country. After leaving the Isle of Wight, I
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spent two days in wandering on foot over Salisbury Plain.....
The monuments and traces of antiquity, scattered in abundance over that 
region, led me unavoidably to compare what we know or guess of those 
remote times with certain aspects of modem society, and with calamities, 
principally those consequent upon war, to which, more than other classes 
of men, the poor are subject. In those reflections, joined with particular 
facts that had come to my knowledge, the following stanzas originated.
(50)
This, of course, reflects the account in Book XII of The Prelude (51) of Words­
worth's visionary experience on the Plain of Sarum; but two points are worth 
raising here. First, where in either the poetry of Wordsworth written in the period 
1793-94 or even in his letters do we see evidence of what he claims about his state 
of mind at this time and what he had seen in France? There is very little text from 
this period, but what there is scarcely supports what he claims in this much later 
Advertisement (written when his beliefs had changed fundamentally). As we 
have seen, even in Descriptive Sketches, in those clumsy final ninety lines 
describing the "Fair favoured region",(DS, 1793, 740ff) Wordsworth appears 
to support even violent overthrow of oppression:
-Tho' Liberty shall soon, indignant, raise 
Red on his hills his beacon's comet blaze;
Bid from on high his lonely cannon sound,
And on ten thousand hearths his shout rebound;...(774-7)
In Llandaff. Wordsworth's admission of the possible need for violent upheaval 
is clear enough as we have seen him drawing upon Godwin's acceptance of the 
possible the need for temporary upheaval to secure further permanent improve­
ment.
And a study of Wordsworth’s sparse correspondence of the period 1792-94, 
before completion of the second version of the Salisbury Plain poems, shows a 
similar picture. Wordsworth's references to the war, or even to violent upheaval
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while he was in revolutionary France, its morality and the resultant suffering, are
very few. There are, in fact, only two letters written from France: the first from
Orleans, dated 19th December, 1791, unsurprisingly, gives little evidence of any
real revolutionary fervour or response to what he sees:
We are all perfectly quiet here and likely to continue so; I find almost all 
of the people of any opulen (ceare) aristocrates and all the rest are demo- 
crates. I had imagined that there were some people of wealth and circum­
stance favourers of the revolution, but there is not one to be found..
I have every prospect of liking this place extremely well...(EY,70)
The second, from Blois, of 19th May, 1792 initially introduces the events of
France almost "by the way".(52) Then ,in the same letter, we have some mention
of Wordsworth's feelings in relation to the calamities of war, admittedly only a
report he had heard:
The horrors excited by the relation of the events consequent upon the 
commencement of hostilities, is general. Not but there are men who felt 
a gloomy satisfaction from a measure which seemed to put the patriot 
army out of a possibility of success. An ignominious flight, the massacre 
of their general, a dance performed with savage joy round his burning 
body, the murder of six prisoners, are events which would have arrested 
the attention of the readers of the annals of Morocco, or of the most 
barbarous of savages. The approaching summer will undoubtedly decide 
the fate of France. It is almost evident that the patriot army, however 
numerous, will be unable [to] withstand the superior discipline of their 
enemies. (EY, 77-8)
Wordsworth's attitude and feelings are difficult to pin down here; but he seems
more concerned with taking the side of the patriot army than with any real
expression of distress over the carnage of war; indeed, his description of the
atrocity over General Theobald's body has a very detached tone.(53)
The few references to war in letters of 1794(54) confirm that there is no 
contemporary documented evidence to substantiate Wordsworth's claims in his 
Advertisement. Of course it can be argued that Wordsworth had no occasion or
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reason to present on paper what he was feeling and so we must inevitably turn 
to the relevant passages in The Prelude: but this is not totally satisfactory. The 
subject matter of some of the letters does give apotential opening for Wordsworth 
to write about what he later claims he felt so passionately at the time, but he does 
not take the opportunity. (55)
The second point concerning the Advertisement derives from the third 
paragraph. The reference to the "monuments and traces of antiquity" which led 
Wordsworth
unavoidably to compare what we know or guess of those remote times 
with certain aspects of modem society, and with the calamities, princi­
pally those consequent upon w ar, to which, more than other classes of 
men, the poor are subject
seems to me an unlikely piece of logic; it smacks more of Wordsworth again
returning after the event to what he has created and trying, so to speak, to re-create
its inspiration in terms of what was achieved, though Salisbury Plain itself
scarcely supports Wordsworth's claimed intent here. (56)
Though I would be unwilling to reject all that Wordsworth claims, there is undo­
ubtedly another and unacknowledged influence at work here: Godwin. That 
influence will, as we shall see, contribute much to the failures of this poem as 
Wordsworth draws on the philosopher's thinking yet fails to harmonise 
Godwin's ideas with his poetry.
Godwin on W ar.
In examining the text, particularly of Salisbury Plain, considerable attention 
should be paid to the nature of the war that has caused the sufferings of the vagrant.
124
It is a war, it is hinted, not related to a cause such as liberty versus oppression,but 
a war stemming from motives which are clearly described in Book V of Political 
Justice.
The chapters of particular interest in Political Justice, it should be stressed,
are easy to find: namely, chapters XVI to XX of Book V, the first of these entitled
Of the Causes of War. (We have already seen Wordsworth attracted to this
particular Book (PJ,'93,II, 512ff), in which is also to be found Godwin's most
concerted attack on the abuses of despotism, aristocracy etc.) In the first of these
chapters,after Godwin has established that the causes of war are to be found
in "those two great political monopolies, monarchy and aristocracy",(57) he
goes on to note, with regard to a state of war and conquest, that their
tendency is to elevate a few at the expence of the rest... (PJ,'93,11,512)
A few pages further on comes a much more important statement by Godwin as
he takes issue with Rousseau:
One of the most essential principles of political justice is diametrically 
the reverse of that which imposters and patriots, have too frequently 
agreed to recommend. Their perpetual exhortation has been, "Love your 
country. Sink the personal existence of individuals in the existence of the 
community. Make little account of the particular men of whom the society 
consists, but aim at the general wealth, prosperity and glory. Purify your 
mind from the gross ideas of sense, and elevate it to the single contem­
plation of that abstract individual of which particular men are so many 
detached members,valuable only for the place they fill."
The lessons of reason on this head are precisely opposite. Society is an 
ideal existence, and not on its own account entitled to the smallestregard. 
The wealth, prosperity and glory of the whole are unintelligible chimeras. 
Set no value on anything, but in proportion as you are convinced of 
its tendency to make individual men happy and virtuous.
(PJ,'93,II,513-4)(58)
This passage must surely have caught Wordsworth's eye; and as he remembered 
the suffering he had witnessed in France and considered England’s role ingoing
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to war with France, he must have come to agree with Godwin's view that
"patriotism" is a misplaced feeling;(59) he must also have agreed with Godwin's
views expressed here that a man's attachment should be to a cause and not to a
country.(PJ,'93,II,515) That war, like all evil, has originated in "error" when
individuals and then governments
suffered their apprehensions of justice to be perverted by a bias in favour 
of themselves.(PJ,'93,n ,515/6)
Godwin then continues:
We can have no adequate idea of this evil, unless we visit, at least in 
imagination, a field of battle. Here men deliberately destroy each other 
by thousands without resentment against or even knowledge of each 
other. The plain is strewed with death in all its various forms. Anguish 
and wounds display the diversified modes in which they can torment 
the human frame. Towns are burned, ships are blown up in the air while 
the mangled limbs descend on every side, the fields are laid desolate, the 
wives of the inhabitants exposed to brutal insult, and their children driven 
forth to hunger and nakedness. It would be despicable to mention along 
with these scenes of horror, and the total subversion of all ideas of moral 
justice they must occasion in the auditors and spectators, the immense 
treasures which are wrung in the form of taxes, from those inhabitants 
whose residence is at a distance from the scene.(PJ,'93,II,516-7)
What Godwin does here, very powerfully and very succinctly, is to illustrate not
simply the evils of war in general, but the error out of which war is bred, war
perpetrated by a few from the aristocratical classes to further their own avarice
on such a pretext as the "vindication" of ”nationalhonour";(PJ,’93,II,519) all
to the extreme detriment of the individuals of the lower classes. In other words,
almost exactly the thematic and moral focus adopted by Wordsworth in the
Salisbury Plain poems.(60)
At this time, it is appropriate to make two points. First, as I would concede,
Wordsworth's own experiences in France must have played a significant role in
his inspiration to write a poem of protest against war and its effects. What a reading
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of passages such as that quoted above did for Wordsworth was to focus his experi­
ences into a moral context (a formal one, in this case based on Godwin’s philo­
sophic arguments against war, oppression, and, as we shall see, the error of war), 
and thus crystallise for the poet the significance of his experiences in relation 
to the social and moral protest he wished to make; above all, the protest against 
sufferings caused to individuals by the oppression of war. In their comments 
on Wordsworth's 1795 revisions to the poem, critics have almost all been anxious 
to quote Wordsworth's comments in the closing sentence of his letter to Wrang- 
ham of 20th November, 1795:
I have made alterations and additions so material that it may be looked 
on almost as another work. Its object is partly to expose the vices of the 
penal law and the calamities of war as they affect individuals.
(EY, P 159)
However, despite the fact that Wordsworth uses the terms "may" and "almost", 
and refers to the effect of war on "individuals", a theme so obviously affecting 
the traveller and the vagrant in Salisbury Plain, critics have been unwilling to see 
this earlier poem in the light of Wordsworth's comment on the revisions, or in 
relation to the passages in Political Justice that I have indicated.
It is also worth noting that in Chapter XVII, Of the Conduct of War. Godwin 
returns to the theme of the effects of war upon "every individual who is not 
actually in arms",(PJ,'93,11,530) and immediately follows this with a strong 
objection to "the capture of mercantile vessels" and indeed a suggestion that 
"naval war" in particular "should be proscribed"" .(ibid) Again, it is worth 
highlighting the fact that Godwin's marginal paragraph headings are 
particularly frequent and detailed here, making accessibility to his ideas 
particularly easy.
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This paragraph is in turn followed by one entitled Humanity in which Godwin 
again points to the dangers of war brutalising man's nature - though this is not 
explored in any detail. This is an important point. Despite the obvious links here 
and in the next paragraph on Military Obedience (where Godwin explores the 
danger of such a concept making soldiers "machines"), between Godwin's ideas 
on necessity and his empiricism ( e.g. war and military service as environmental 
influences which - in modem terminology - can "condition" individuals), the 
conscious linking of the two ideas requires some careful study of Political Justice, 
a study which Wordsworth had not yet completed, but which will be evidenced 
in the later 1795 revised poem, further re-inforced by Wordsworth's knowledge 
of Caleb Williams.
More immediately relevant to the earlier Salisbury Plain. Chapter XIX, Of 
Military Establishments and Treaties also reveals an idea taken up by Words­
worth: that of the isolation of the soldier from society. One has to be careful here, 
because Godwin is in one of his more equivocal moods as he struggles with 
conflicting ideas: on the one hand, his wish to remove the need for any army, on 
the other hand (for Godwin is no "idealist"), the pragmatic problem of the defence 
of liberty. In this rather confusing (and unconvincing) discussion of the difference 
between a standing army and a universal militia, Godwin extrapolates on the 
environmental and psychological implications of "the man that is merely a 
soldier" (PJ,'93,II,535) (drawing, of course, on his doctrine of necessity). Godwin 
points out that such a man "is cut off from the rest of the community",(ibid) and 
then goes on to examine the "immoral tendency" (his paragraph title here) of 
the role of a soldier, an examination that has, once again, a distinctly psychologi­
cal (if, inevitably, a necessitarian/behaviouristic) orientation. Then, in an
exceptionally unclear passage, Godwin again reaffirms the link between error
and military discipline:.
If it be replied, "that the generating of error is not inseparable from 
military discipline, and that men may at some time be sufficiently 
guarded against the abuse, even while they are taught the use of arms;" 
it will be found upon reflection that this argument is of little weight. 
Though error be not unalterably connected with the science of arms, it 
will for a time remain so.(PJ,'93,II,536).
I find itimpossible notto believe that Wordsworth hadread these chapters before
writing Salisbury Plain. Another parallel between the philosopher and the poet
further reinforces this. Godwin tends, at times, to be the victim of his own
conflicts (his dilemma over the duties towards the individual and towards society
being the best example); this matter of the link between error and military training
is a case in point. As was noted in my earlier argument on Llandaff. Godwin
advocated, in several places in Political Justice the possibility of temporary
violence in the interests of permanent improvement. Yet his own arguments
against wars started by the aristocratic classes could equally be turned against
what will be perpetrated in a temporary anarchy by those whose attachment is to
a cause and not to a country. (PJ,'93,II,515) The same "anguish and wounds"
(PJ,'93,II,516) will result. (Of course, Godwin never followed his thought
through to this extent in his statements supporting necessary violent revolution.)
So, Wordsworth follows Godwin. In Llandaff. he admitted the possible need
for violence, even the execution of the king, in the interests of permanent
improvement. In Salisbury Plain, by contrast, he couches his arguments against
war in the context of w ar perpetrated for the gain of a few at the expense of
the many.
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Is this coincidence? I think not. Without totally rejecting Wordsworth's Fenwick 
Notes and other statements regarding the sailor's wife, his watching the fleet off 
Portsmouth, his wanderings over Salisbury Plain, it can be seen once again that 
Godwin's thought and manner of thought has once again provided for Words­
worth a formalisation of his moral stance, a crystallisation of the significance of 
his own earlier experiences. In themselves, the sources Wordsworth cites could 
not have produced Salisbury Plain as it was written; and certainly not the fuller 
Adventures on Salisbury Plain.
Even matters as accepted as Wordsworth's attitude to individuals and the idea of 
the "solitary" have to be questioned and re-examined at this early stage in his 
development. Whence came this sudden interest in the individual? For it is not 
much in evidence in the poetry he has written to date. As to isolation and sol­
itariness, these have been seen, in a sense, but not in the same manner in which 
they are presented in Salisbury Plain: isolation from society which brings the 
solitary a sense of desolation and unhappiness in his predicament.
But the greatestproof of Godwin's influence in Salisbury Plain comes in the poem 
itself - in its strengths, and, more important, its failures. For though we see some 
considerable advance upon Descriptive Sketches there is still a substantial failure 
to fuse the morality and the poetry in this earliest version. I turn now to the text.
Salisbury Plain
Salisbury Plain(61) is. in most respects, ultimately a failure; it has its moments
of power, but structurally (even admitting the problem of the missing stanzas) the
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poem is fragmented. The rather pedantic opening stanzas on the plight of the 
"hungry savage" do not, as Wordsworth intended, prepare us for the vagrant's 
tale in any other than a clumsy and obtrusive manner:
reflection on the state 
Of those who on the couch of Affluence rest 
By laughing Fortune's sparkling cup elate,
While we of comfort reft, by pain depressed,
No other pillow know than Penury's iron breast.(SP,3,23-7)
This is rather shallow stuff: the oppression of the poor by the rich, the cliche
of any radical of the time. Yet it is worth noting that Wordsworth points the moral
intent of his poem so early; and does so in a poem in which he intends to present
the miseries of war as an extreme example of oppression bom out of error, i.e.
how a few benefit from wars only at the expense of the many, a view he will
elaborate upon later in the poem, and which, as noted above, is exactly the view
of Godwin, upon whom Wordsworth now proceeds to draw for some of the details
of his moral argument in the poem.
Following on from the introductory section, the wanderings of the traveller seem
more convincing and perhaps do bear out Wordsworth's note about his own
wanderings on Salisbury Plain; however, the wanderings are interrupted with
the unconvincing "Gothic" interludes as the traveller comes across Stonehenge
and then the House of the Dead, and finally hears the vagrant's tale of
superstition. Those "monuments and traces of antiquity" which, Wordsworth
claims in the 1842 Advertisement, led to his comparison between ancient and
modem society and their respective cruelties, produce an unconvincing picture:
And oft a night-fire mounting to the clouds 
Reveals the desert and with dismal red 
Clothes the black bodies of encircling crowds.
It is the sacrificial altar fed
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With living men. How deep it groans - the dead 
Thrilled in their yawning tombs their helms uprear;
The sword that slept beneath the warriour's head 
Thunders in fiery air: red arms appear
Uplifted thro' the gloom and shake the rattling spear.(SP,21,181-9)
This stanza, intended to suggest that both ancient and contemporary war 
produce sacrifice, paints a very stiff and unconvincing picture, especially 
following the rather impressive stanzas describing the solitary wanderings of the 
traveller and the desolation of the plain. (63) Given that these stanzas concerning 
Stonehenge are deleted in the second version of the poem, does Wordsworth, 
therefore, in 1842, really expect us to accept that they are representative of what 
is central to the idea of the poem, and that "monuments and the traces of antiquity" 
were the inspiration of his central themes? For, as we shall see, it is the themes 
of moral and social protest, and the psychological enhancement of these, that 
are the focus of the revised poem.
Whilst I would accept the idea of a conscious pattern of contrasts(64) in the poem, 
especially as it relates to the descriptions, moods and colours in the nature 
imagery of the poem (though these patterns at times obtrude rather clumsily in 
places), such patterning does not disguise the structural weaknesses of the 
poem. What it does is to try to point up, rather clumsily, the poem's moral stance 
which lies at the heart of the vagrant's tale.
Before going on to the vagrant's tale, one further weakness in the poem merits
some consideration. Attention has often been drawn to the traveller, introduced
in some detail, but relegated to the role of a companion, listener, and occasional
commentator. It is as if Wordsworth intended his role to be more considerable,
and, of course, the potential parallels, especially his isolation and solitariness,
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underscored by the patterns of desolation in the natural imagery, make this lack 
of development seem even more frustrating.
Two points should be noted. There seems little doubt that Wordsworth did see 
the traveller's role as that of a listener or commentator, and probably tried to 
develop this further: a futile task, as can be seen from an interesting addition to 
the poem prior to the re-writing that became Adventures on Salisbury Plain. 
Wordsworth apparently intended to insert around line 400(65) an elaboration on 
the existing incident of the traveller's "Striving with counsel sweet"(SP,45,403) 
which would give the traveller even more of the role of a moral commentator, but 
Wordsworth's uncertainties over this can be seen in the revisions he makes to the 
addition he never printed.(66) It is a very unhappy attempt which seems doomed 
to failure from the outset.
The probable reason for his not going ahead with this line of development is
related to the second point that should be made: a point concerning the isolation
or solitariness of the traveller. This is the first real occurrence in Wordsworth's
poetry of the extended treatment of the "solitary" as a figure; and to anyone
familiar with the later version of this "type", the difference in Wordsworth's
attitude at this early stage is marked, if somewhat uncertain. What is at once clear
is not simply the sense of isolation, but the traveller's consciousness of this and
his unhappiness over it, as seen in stanzas 5 to 8, for instance:
Then sought, in vain, a shepherd's lonely thorn 
Or hovel from the storm to shield his head.
On as he passed more wild and more forlorn
And vacant the huge plain around him spread;...(SP,7,59-62)
The inhospitable natural scenery is suffused with the traveller's sense of
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isolation. Why? Clearly, he will parallel and become a natural companion to the 
vagrant; but that scarcely justifies the care with which Wordsworth paints him 
(these stanzas are, in my view, some of the best in the poem). We have to accept 
the fact that Wordsworth is possibly painting some kind of ’’tone picture" of 
individuals he has seen battling against the winds over the plain; but that is still 
not enough. Wordsworth is interested in this man's isolation, but he does not 
go on to explore or explain it yet. He will, however, do so in Adventures on 
Salisbury Plain by portraying the man as a soldier and as a murderer - after he 
has read Caleb Williams. What is so interesting is how easily, by rejecting 
much of the Gothic in the first version and simply retaining and building on 
his characterisation of the traveller of Salisbury Plain, he is able to effect the 
transformation. Most commentators have seen the change as a radical one; (67) 
but it is not. The "sailor" (and to some extent the "soldier" who makes a brief 
appearance) grow easily out of the "traveller". Could it be that Wordsworth 
already had in mind a reason for the traveller's isolation? It is difficult to say. But 
it is not difficult to see that this traveller does not have the resignation of other 
later solitaries; he feels, like the vagrant, unhappy in such a position of isolation 
from his fellow man: a view, seminal to Political Justice.(68) and which we have 
seen in the context of Godwin's discussion of the role of the soldier and military 
discipline. As we shall see, this is greatly reinforced in Caleb Williams and is 
reflected strongly in Wordsworth's revisions in 1795 in Adventures on Salisbury 
Plain.
The vagrant's story points, most dramatically, the moral of this poem (and it 
comes as a somewhat welcome relief after the unfortunate mixture of the
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didactic and the "Gothic" which precedes it). There is little that is difficult
here. The vagrant is ousted from her idyllic girlhood home by oppression -
"cruel chance and wilful wrong" (my emphasis), and in stanza 29 it is made quite
clear that Wordsworth is pointing to the despotic oppression by the aristocracy of
the lower class (her father lived in a "cottage" looking after a "little flock"). The
oppression is quite deliberate:
Oppression trampled on his tresses grey:
His little range of water was denied;...(SP,29,257-8)
It is possible that Wordsworth may have drawn this from personal memory; (69) 
but that does not explain why he introduced the incident as a precursor to the more 
central theme of the oppression of war, drawing a clear parallel between the two 
forms of oppression. Perhaps it is only something we might expect to hear from 
anyone with Wordsworth's sympathies at this time; yet his having read Political 
Justice, his letters to Mathews of the period 1793-94, especially the quintess­
ential^ Godwinian letter of 8th June 1794 with its disapproval of monarchy and 
aristocracy,(70) and his use of this incident in parallel with the woman's misfor­
tunes as a result of war (war fought for gain, "for empire", as we read in the later 
stanza 50), all of this points to Wordsworth drawing on those criticisms voiced 
by Godwin in the chapter. Of the Causes of War, and a decision to use this incident 
of civil oppression as a conscious parallel.
And in the vagrant's account of what she suffered, the treatment she received, the 
starvation of herself and the children, the "dog-like wading at the heels of war" 
we are reminded of Godwin's invitation to visit, "at least in imagination, a field 
of battle", with
the wives of the inhabitants exposed to brutal insult; and their children 
driven forth to hunger and to nakedness,
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and of the whole thrust and development of Godwin's criticism of the evils of war 
being greatest in their effect on those not directly concerned with war. Words­
worth's theme is Godwin's theme.
Suspicion that Wordsworth is using Godwin's moral stance, war as another form 
of oppression against individuals, as the moral basis of his poem is vindicated 
when, after the very unsatisfactory close of the vagrant's tale (another weakness 
Wordsworth will try to rectify in Adventures on Salisbury Plain by drawing, for 
a resolution, on Caleb Williams). Wordsworth returns to an unfortunate combi­
nation of the didactic and the declamatory in the closing stanzas.
As early as stanza 48, Wordsworth appeals, in a somewhat problematic reference 
to "reason":
Though from huge wickers paled with circling fire 
No longer horrid shrieks and dying cries 
To ears of Daemon-Gods in peals aspire,
To Daemon-Gods a human sacrifice;
Though Treachery her sword no longer dyes 
In the cold blood of Truce, still, reason's ray,
What does it more than while the tempests rise,
With starless glooms and sounds of loud dismay,
Reveal with still-born glimpse the terrors of our way?(SP,48,424-32)
The Gothic element here is as unconvincing as ever. But the main import of this
stanza is clear enough: only through reason can the errors of war be revealed.
(If the phrase "still-born" sheds some doubt on what otherwise is clearly a
Godwinian line of thought, Wordsworth's earliest revision of the poem, before
going on to write Adventures on Salisbury Plain, re-inforces the Godwinian thrust
as he changes "still-born" to "short".(71)
The drawings upon Godwin are reinforced as we read the following stanza:
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For proof, if man thou lovest, turn thy eye 
On realms which least the cup of Misery taste.
For want how many men and children die? •
How many at Oppression's portal placed 
Receive the scanty dole she cannot waste,
And bless,as she has taught, her hand benign?
How many by inhuman toil debased,
Abject, obscure, and brute to earth incline 
Unrespited, forlorn of every spark divine?(SP,49,433-41)
Here we have repeated the arguments from Godwin on the effects of war on those
not involved in the theatre of battle, (72) as well as an extension from this to
Godwin’s view of the brutalising effects of unremitting toil.(73)
Then, in stanza 50, the term Justice is used:
Not only is the walk of private life 
Unblessed by Justice...(SP,50,442-3)
Wordsworth is drawing upon Godwin's fundamental ethic here; Godwin states
that we must
assume the term justice as a general appellation for all moral duty .. .
(PJ,'93,1,80)
and, clearly, following his criticisms of the oppression of war, such treatment
of individuals is not just, as Wordsworth points out. This is particularly true
in wars motivated by some acquisitive interest at the expense of individual
suffering. Wordsworth makes just this point, as, in the same stanza, he states:
The nations, though at home in bonds they drink
The dregs of wretchedness, for empire strain,...(SP,50,447-8)
In stanza 57, Wordsworth juxtaposes his declamations against and address to
monarchs with an appeal to reason:
Say, rulers of the nations, from the sword 
Can ought but murder, pain, and tears proceed?
Oh! what can war but endless war still breed?
Or whence but from the labours of the sage 
Can poor benighted mortals gain the meed
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Of happiness and virtue, how assuage
But by his gentle words their self-consuming rage?(SP,57,507-13)£74)
Godwin's belief that the exercise of reason, and not war, can alone bring happiness
and improvement is expressed in the metaphor of the "labours of the sage" in this
rather lyrical passage, which fits ill into the stanza and the experience of the poem
as we have understood it. It is rather immature stuff. Just as the stylistic failure
emanating from the inability to fuse the moral didacticism of the poem with the
narrative form was evident early in the poem, for example, in the lines,
When men in various vessels roam the deep 
Of social life,...(SP,4,32-3)
which, as ametaphor, fails miserably, so in stanza 58, Wordsworth does little more
than catalogue (in a manner reminiscent of sections of Descriptive Sketches')
the distortions that war causes, using, as the centre of his theme, the three ideas
so central to Godwin's book: justice, truth and the law:
Insensate they who think, at Wisdom's porch 
That Exile, Terror, Bonds, and Force may stand:
That Truth with human blood can feed her torch,
And Justice balance with her gory hand 
Scales whose dire weights of human heads demand 
A Nero's arm. Must Law with iron scourge 
Still torture crimes that grew a monstrous band 
Formed by his care, and still his victim urge,
With voice that breathes despair, to death's tremendous verge?
(SP,58,514-22)
The poetry is very poor, but Godwin would, no doubt, have approved of the 
sentiment: this rejection of the view of the "insensate" who promulgate war and 
thus distort truth and justice and bend the institution of the law to their own 
purpose.
The final stanza is easily recognisable as drawing upon Godwin:(75)
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Heroes of Truth pursue your march, uptear 
Th' Oppressor's dungeon from its deepest base;
High o'er the towers of Pride undaunted rear 
Resistless in your might the herculean mace 
Of Reason; let foul Error’s monster race 
Dragged from their dens start at the light with pain 
And die; pursue your toils, till not a trace 
Be left on earth of Superstition’s reign,
Save that eternal pile which frowns on Sarum's plain.(SP,61,541-9) 
With its appeal to "Reason" as a manner of resisting oppression, this is surely 
too obviously Godwinian in its source to require comment; perhaps the mention 
by Wordsworth of "Error" should be highlighted as Wordsworth concludes the 
poem with Godwin's fundamental perception of vice as error which can only be 
overcome by the perception of truth through the process of reason, reinforcing 
that earlier image of "reason's ray" in in stanza 48 (428-31). But the only merit 
of the verse here is that it does indeed sum up the moral stance of the poem. 
Despite the use of the metaphor of conflict between truth and error, so evocative 
of the language of the first edition of Political Justice.(76) Wordsworth's 
determination to reveal the error of war as deceit by those who promulgate it and 
seek to gain by it at the expense of others and to proclaim the role of reason in 
perceiving such error is at the expense of some pretty heavy-handed didacticism, 
under which the poetry creaks and protests; except, perhaps, for the final line 
which has a rhythmic and bleakly triumphant assertiveness. Yet, ironically, that 
line also fails as do all of the final three lines; for we have, by this time, virtually 
forgotten those early stanzas about Stonehenge. As to "superstition", Wordsworth 
has not properly explained this point throughout the poem, though he clearly 
wishes to relate it to error and the failure of reason.
There is so much that is unsatisfactory in this poem. It fails structurally. 
Stylistically, it has its moments of power, in the description of the traveller
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on the plain, in parts of the vagrant's story; yet, in general, it is a failure. But that 
is not the final verdict.
For coming after Descriptive Sketches (and, of course, An Evening Walkj.it 
excites any reader of Wordsworth. It is imbued with the same feeling and the same 
conviction as Llandaff: (77) it strains to contain that conviction within a form and 
style over which Wordsworth does not, as yet, have adequate control. Unlike 
the two earlier poems, Wordsworth shows less rigid adherence to traditional 
form; (78) also, he has something specific to say here, and though he rarely 
succeeds in saying it well, he does not deviate from his theme. Where he fails 
is in his attempts to find a form and a style whereby he can most effectively and 
convincingly present his convictions. The power of Salisbury Plain lies, for the 
reader, in this conviction which permeates the whole poem. There is a spontaneity 
here, not inspired by "monuments" or other remains of antiquity; but by a belief 
in the moral and social arguments he presents, and the suffering he wishes to 
portray. But those experiences upon which he has drawn to present this have been 
crystallised and focused with a didactic force from another source. His themes 
originate partly from his own experiences, but also, as they are expressed in this 
poem, in large measure from Godwin. The logic of Godwin's thinking is evident, 
not simply in the development from those early ill-defined liberal generalisations 
towards the close of Descriptive Sketches, but also in the way in which it 
underpins the moral and thematic arrangement of this poem.
In many senses that is why it fails; for Wordsworth is so anxious to present these
ideas that he becomes rather repetitive. He demonstrates, in the vagrant's tale,
the criticisms Godwin levels against war; and then he insists on further sum­
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marising his position in the unashamed didacticism of the final stanzas, going over 
the same ground.
What Wordsworth has failed to do, perhaps not surprisingly, is to harmonise his 
ideas and his art. But the fervour with which he seeks to express his obvious 
moral and emerging human concern, the struggle to express that in terms of a 
"borrowed" philosophy (still ill-comprehended yet, I would suggest, sincerely 
embraced), the latent sense of a new purpose to his poetry all show the contri­
bution of Godwin to Wordsworth's faltering poetic development: namely, a 
spur to throw off the earlier poetic models to which he still clings, and create 
a poetic form that will allow the freedom to express belief in and understanding 
of the human condition as both Wordsworth's obervations of man and his 
reading and response to the ideas of the time develop. Seen in this way,Salisbury 
Plain and the attempt to import Godwin’s ideas into that poem must be seen for 
the failed but bold experiment they are.
Caleb Williams
Between Wordsworth's completion of Salisbury Plain and his commencing the 
substantial revision that became Adventures on Salisbury Plain, came two 
important developments. The first is the publication by Godwin of his novel 
Caleb Williams, and the second is the beginning of what was to become a 
lengthy if somewhat erratic acquaintance between the poet and the philosopher. 
Considerably more light has been shed on this personal relationship by 
researches into Godwin's diary through such sources as the Abinger papers;(79) 
and Moorman has given a comprehensive account of the meetings between the
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two in her biography of Wordsworth. However, my own researches suggest her 
account is not yet complete, and evidence of further contact between Godwin 
and the Wordsworths, through Richard Wordsworth, as well as an unpublished 
letter by Wordsworth to Godwin make it important to have, as part of the 
developing argument here, an up-to- date summary of what is known of the 
relationship between Godwin and Wordsworth. This is included as Appendix I 
to this chapter.
The publication of Caleb Williams(80) in May, 1794, was an important stage in 
the development of Godwin's ideas as well, as those of Wordsworth. It is an 
injustice to the novel to see it simply as a fictionalised version of Political 
Justice. It obviously draws heavily upon Godwin's magnum opus, but, in this 
novel, Godwin takes the opportunity to explicate and present more clearly the 
implications (especially the human implications) of his theories; and, as he does 
this, he develops some of these further.(81) For the purposes of this thesis, it is 
necessary to limit a discussion of Caleb Williams to those aspects in the novel upon 
which Wordsworth draws.
In his Preface dated 12th May, 1794, (withdrawn from the original edition of the 
novel and printed in the second edition of 1796(83)) Godwin immediately draws 
attention to what was originally the title, Things as They Are: (84) a subject which, 
he claims,
is the most interesting that can be presented to the human mind.(85) 
There can be little doubt that Godwin, in this very politically oriented Preface 
intends this novel to be seen ( in his own words) as "no refined and abstract 
speculation..." but, rather
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a study and delineation ofthings passing in the modem world....a general 
review of the modes of domestic and unrecorded despotism, by which man 
becomes the destroyer of man.
Thus, the conscious concern of the novel and Political Justice are made clear: an
interest in individual liberty, in the relationship of individuals to each other. Yet,
in its presentation of the essential role of truth, so central to the vision of Political
Justice, the novel goes beyond the claims of the Preface to the first edition, as
Godwin himself was later to acknowledge. For in his choice of the novel form,
Godwin showed himself aware that such a literary form(86) could offer
something beyond the theorisings of a tract such as Political Justice. Godwin's
later reflection on his writing of this novel (in the Preface to the Standard Novels
edition of Fleetwood, dated November 20th, 1832) draws attention to the
importance of feeling and emotion in Caleb Williams. Thus, Godwin speaks of
how his"imagination revelled the most freely" in:
the analysis of the private and internal operations of the mind, employing 
my metaphysical dissecting knife in tracing and laying bare the involu­
tions of motive, and recording the gradually accumumlatingimpulses...
(87)
This psychological focus in a novel that does draw heavily upon the earlier 
Political Justice shows how a study of Godwin's novel often throws light on the 
ideas and motives behind Political Justice, to the extent that the novel often 
explains the feelings behind statements in the philosophical work, even though 
it was not made explicit there.(88)
Despite the variety of themes explored in Caleb Williams, the central concern of 
the novel is with truth.(89) However, the final triumph of truth in this novel is 
not a simplistic one; it brings, in fact, no pleasurable outcome or happiness 
to either of the protagonists. For what we see in Godwin's novel is an emergence
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oftheteleological perfectionist stance we have sometimes glimpsed in Political 
Justice. Godwin’s concern with motivation reflects a perfectionist belief in the 
necessary triumph of truth. What must result from such a triumph of truth is 
justice; not necesssarily happiness. Thus, in the final scene of confession by 
Falkland, neither Caleb nor Falkland stands triumphant before us; indeed, it is 
Caleb's sense of melancholy after so long a pursuit of truth and his perception 
of his own self-deceptions that gives added power and credibility to the novel 
and forces us to to examine what is the positive outcome of the experience of the 
book. (90)
That such a concern with truth should be the principal focus of Caleb Williams 
should come as no surprise.(91) The final sentence of the first paragraph of the 
novel states:
My story will, at least, appear to have that consistency which is seldom
attendant but upon truth. (CW, p 3)
It is also, of course, through the perception of truth that Caleb will seek those 
other central moral concerns of Political Justice that are also mentioned in 
this first paragraph: justice and sincerity. Against these values, Godwin lays 
many snares: tyranny ( in the guise of Tyrrel and, eventually, Falkland); the 
injustices of the law; the "honour"of Falkland; and the curiosity of Caleb. In a 
novel that Godwin never allows to slip into mere moral didacticism,(92) Godwin 
does point a moral; however, he also explores the human condition, and the 
matter of human motivation that so fascinated him in the pages of Political 
Justice. WhatTyrrell, Falkland and Caleb all do istoallowsome "ruling passion" 
to dominate their actions without submitting such passions to the guidance of
reason; hence the error of their behaviour and its consequences (inhuman 
oppression by Tyirel, murder by Falkland, and self-indulgence by Caleb) cannot 
be perceived.
It is this warning that Godwin puts into the words of Clare who says of Falkland:
you have an impetuosity and an impatience of imagined dishonour...
(CW, P 34)
It is appropriate that Clare, representative of the voice of reason ( but a reason 
accompanied by sympathy and human feeling) "the person who could most 
effectually have moderated the animosities of the contending parties "(CW, pp 
36-7), should die early in the novel. The result of Falkland's crime and his attempt 
to conceal it is insincerity: separating his actions from the guiding force of reason, 
and therefore from perception of truth. The immediately changed character of 
Falkland bears this out; he knows he acts in error , yet not until his final 
confrontation with Caleb will he admit to this. Hence, only vice and suffering 
can ensue.
What "honour" is to Falkland, curiosity is to Caleb. There can be little doubt that 
Godwin is critical of Caleb at times, and he constantly parallels Caleb and 
Falkland as the two pursue their ungovemed obsessions. Although we do have 
sympathy with Caleb at times, and can feel a strong sympathy with Falkland 
(though we know him to be guilty), it is in these very conflicts that the triumph 
of the novel lies.(93) Out of these conflicts arise those impressive portrayals 
of human feeling, sympathy and suffering which, above all, mark a distinct 
advance on Political Justice. For though Godwin's humanitarian concern is a 
constant theme of his theoretical work, inevitably it becomes diluted in the
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schematic argument of such a work; but, in Caleb Williams, the oppression of
both a humanitarian concern and of human feeling is convincing and impressive.
For example, the love between Falkland and Emily ( Volume I, chapters VI and
X) produces language such as:
she flew into his arms with the rapidity of lightening. She embraced and 
clung to him, with an impulse that did not wait to consult the dictates of 
her understanding. Her emotions were indescribable. In a few short 
moments she had lived an age in love. (CW, p 44)
Falkland's sufferings are portrayed with equal power:
Misery was at that time inscribed in legible characters upon his 
countenance. But now he appeared like nothing that had ever been visible 
in human shape. His visage was haggard, emaciated and fleshless. His 
. complexion was a dun and tarnished red, the colour uniform through
every region of the face His eyes were red, quick, wandering, full
of suspicion and rage.(CW, p 280)
This physical description evokes the emotions both of Falkland and the
observing Caleb. And in the scenes of Caleb's imprisonment, Godwin's obvious
protest against the penal code is expressed through the sheer misery of the
protagonist:
Cruel, inexorable policy of human affairs, that condemns a man to 
torture like this; that sanctions it and knows not what is done under its 
sanction; that is too supine and unfeeling to enquire into these petty 
details; that calls this the ordeal of innocence and the protector of 
freedom! A thousand times I could have dashed my brains against the 
walls of my dungeon; a thousand times I longed for death, and wished 
with inexpressible ardour for an end to what I suffered;...(CW, p 184)
Perhaps the most significant example of the role that Godwin gives to feeling in
this novel is in Caleb's perception of the truth of Falkland's guilt, which comes
not from the cold deduction of reason alone, but also from a strong intuitive
sympathy felt for the suffering yet genuinely honourable Hawkins, (evoked so
powerfully in the letter from Hawkins (CW, pp 114-5)); in response to this letter
Caleb informs us:
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I read this letter with considerable attention, and it occasioned me many 
reflections. To my way of thinking it contained a very interesting picture 
of a blunt, downright, honest mind. It is a- melancholy consideration, 
said I to myself; but such is man! This is a fellow, to have taken fortune's 
buffets and rewards with an incorruptible mind. And yet see where it all 
ends!(CW, pp 115-6)
Godwin is no mere presenter of a rationalistic didactic self-righteousness; the
pursuit of truth, he suggests, is often painful. Falkland's insincere stand on
honour is, we surely agree, the "miserable project of imposture" that Caleb calls
it (CW,p 326), just as Caleb's several deceits through his disguises are ultimately
discovered and lead him only to further suffering while he fails to face Falkland
and himself with the truth. Both of the protagonists, in their different ways,
find their lives of error and insincerity increasingly intolerable.
All of the incidents in the novel, of course, take place against the background
of Godwin's social and moral stance in Political Justice. Godwin portrays
Falkland’s murder of Tyrrel in necessitarian terms as a response by Falkland to
the external circumstances which ensured his adulation of the principle of
honour. Falkland admits to Caleb that he did murder Tyrrel:
All are but links in one chain. A blow! A murder! My next business was 
to defend myself, to tell so well digested a lie as that all mankind should 
believe it true.
He further admits his error at this stage:
This it is to be a gentleman! a man of honour! I was the fool of fame. My 
virtue, my honesty, my everlasting peace of mind, were cheap 
sacrifices to be made at the shrine of this divinity.(CW, p 135)
Yet he refuses to follow the guidance of what his understanding has made so clear
to him. Godwin's criticisms of the law and its injustices that support despotism
and its oppression are reinforced by demonstrating how the procedures of the law
allow, for instance, circumstantial evidence to override and obscure truth or,
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when Caleb tries to put his case to the magistrates, he finds himself blocked by 
technicalities:
And this at last was the justice of mankind! A man under certain 
circumstances cannot be heard in the detection of a crime, because he has 
not been a participator in it.(CW, p 277)
It is the law that is portrayed as hostile to the individual and to society as Godwin
shows by portraying in the band of robbers and their situation a microcosm
of the ills of society. Raymond, the leader, tells Caleb:
Those very laws, which by a perception of their iniquity drove me to 
what I am, preclude my return. (CW, P 227)
Yet it is of this band that Caleb says:
I found among them benevolence and kindness, they were strongly 
susceptible of strong emotions.(CW, P 218)
As in Political Justice, the role of the individual in society is one that is constantly
fo cused on in the novel, and these scenes dealing with the robbers allow Godwin
to present his view of the balance between the liberties of the individual and the
restrictions society can rightfully impose to create social harmony. Yet, just as
Caleb abhors the tyrannies of Tyrrel and Falkland, he does not ultimately approve
of the robbers:
But though I did not cease to love them as individuals, my eyes were 
perfectly open to their mistakes. I saw that in this profession wereexerted 
uncommon energy, ingenuity and fortitude, and I could not help recol­
lecting how admirably beneficial such qualities might be in the great 
theatre of affairs; while, in their present direction, they were thrown away 
upon purposes diametrically at war with the first interests of human 
society. (CW, p 226)
But, of course, as the words quoted by Raymond above make clear, this is
impossible.
In the care of the robbers, Caleb finds himself yet again isolated from society,
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a position that has been an increasingly powerful theme throughout the novel, 
and one paralleled by the isolation of Falkland. As early as chapter one of the 
novel, Godwin introduces this theme of isolation in a very early description of 
Falkland:
His mode of living was in the utmost degree recluse and solitary.... He 
avoided the busy haunts of men; nor did he seem desirous to compensate 
for this privation by the confidence of his friendship.(CW, p 6)
Falkland's decline is traced through a path of increasing solitariness until Caleb 
faces the figure described earlier. Caleb himself, in his wanderings and impris­
onment becomes increasingly isolated:
I was shut up a deserted, solitary wretch in the midst of my species.
(CW, p 255)
This is a situation Godwin reinforces by giving the views of others:
the public was warned to be upon their watch against a person of an 
uncouth and extraordinary appearance, and who lived in a recluse and 
solitary manner.(CW, p 269)
Above all, the lengthy passages given to Caleb's solitary deliberations in prison
(Vol. II, chapters XII to XIV) reflect Godwin's disapproval of such a relationship
between the individual and the society in which he lives. Just before the final
scene of the novel, after his separation from Laura Denison, Caleb states:
Fool that I was, to imagine that there was any room for me in the abodes 
of friendship and tranquillity! It was now first that I felt, with the most 
intolerable acuteness, how completely I was cut off from the whole human 
species.(CW, p 303)
In these increasingly intolerable circumstances, haunted by a burgeoning sense of
their own error and guilt, the two protagonists eventually find release (though
not happiness) in the revelation of truth. It is here that the perfectionist stance
of Godwin is reinforced; for the truth here derives not from a perception of the
consequences (though, admittedly, the consequences of error have now been
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perceived more consciously by both), but from the motivations of the prota­
gonists in relation to their perceptions of themselves and each other. Just 
as Caleb's perception of the truth of Falkland's guilt was the result of both 
rational perception and intuitive feeling, so Caleb becomes aware of the loss of 
that feeling in himself:
Sympathy, the magnetic virtue, the hidden essence of our life, was 
extinct. Nor was this the sum of my misery. This food, so essential to an 
intelligent existence, seemed perpetually renewing before me in its 
fairest colours, only the more effectually to elude my grasp, and to mock 
my hunger.(CW, p 308)
But when he faces Falkland who now has "the appearance of a corpse"(CW, P318),
it is that feeling of sympathy that causes him to recognise his error:
the hateful mistake into which I fell...(CW, p 323)
Godwin underlines how the perception of error is necessary to reveal truth
underlines, after Falkland's confession, in Caleb's reflection:
He would have thanked me for my kindness. But, atrocious, execrable 
wretch that I have been! I wantonly inflicted on him an anguish a 
thousand times worse than death.(CW, p 325)
Similarly, it is the confrontation with truth and the final perception of error that
causes Falkland to confess:
Williams, said he, you have conquered! I see too late the greatness and 
elevation of your mind. I confess that it is to my fault and not yours, that 
it is to the excess of jealousy that was ever burning in my bosom, that I 
owe my ruin.(CW, p 324)
From his acquaintance with this novel, Wordsworth drew much inspiration, as
will be evidenced in Adventures on Salisbury Plain, and later, in the bolder
experiment of The Borderers.
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Adventures on Salisbury Plain.
The pursuit and final triumph of truth through the perception of error, the protest 
against oppression and social deprivation, the resultant suffering; above all, the 
exploration of feelings and motivations that are the humane and human dimen­
sions of these: all of this, Caleb Williams contains. And all of it caught the 
imagination of Wordsworth when he came to his major revision of Salisbury 
Plain. As early as 1927, there was some recognition of this, (94) but despite the 
more substantial critical comment there has been since,(95) more needs to be 
said. In particular, it must be recognised how Adventures on Salisbury Plain is 
indebted not only to Political Justice but to the lesson Godwin had given in Caleb 
Williams of how his ideas might be embodied within a fiction of considerable 
dramatic and psychological power; a development Wordsworth was eventually 
to overtake in Lyrical Ballads successfully (96), but only after the experience 
of writing The Borderers failed in the manner in which it did.
Adventures on Salisbury Plain is more complex in its themes and shows shifts 
of emphasis as well as of interest in Wordsworth's intentions compared with the 
earlier poem. The increased narrative and dramatic power of the second poem 
is obvious at once, not least because the didactic generalisations of the original 
have gone. One thing Wordsworth has learnt from his reading of Caleb Williams 
is that even deeply held convictions are best expressed within the narrative and 
dramatic framework of the poem. However,he does still provide an introduction 
to his theme, and a very pointed one: for the traveller, the sailor, is introduced 
giving kindly assistance to another wanderer who has been a soldier. Words­
worth's intention here is two-fold. First of all, he wishes to point to the lingering
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natural benevolence of the sailor (that essential element of Godwinian phil­
osophy that he will remove in his next experiment. The Borderers'), in order to 
stress the view that it has been his subjection to military discipline which has 
led to the murder he has committed. Wordsworth also links these individuals 
in their position as solitaries, outcasts from society, because of their military 
roles: the sailor has also been "Death's minister"(ASP,10,83), a clear parallel 
to the "Soldier's wrongs"(ASP,3,21).
However, Wordsworth quickly moves on, unlike the laboured introduction of the
earlier poem. Yet we note at once that even with the new economy of narrative
technique and with the deletion of much of the "superstitious" incident,
Wordsworth is anxious to expand on the sense of solitariness and desolation of the
sailor with his additions and revisions,e.g.
That inn he long had pass'd and wearily 
Measured his lonesome way; the distant spire 
That fix'd at every turn his backward eye 
Was lost, though still he turn'd, in the blank sky.
By thirst and hunger press'd he gaz'd around 
And scarce could any trace of man descry,
Save dreary corn-fields stretch'd as without bound;...(ASP,6,47-54)
where the sense of the sailor's distress in his exclusion from society is obvious.
It is here that we have the first hint that Wordsworth, continuing to draw from
Godwin, is now influenced less by Political Justice than by Caleb Williams. For
what is being expressed throughout this poem much more emphatically than
its predecessor is the sense that an individual isolated from society (for whatever
reason, either through the effects of a military career or through guilt - and in
Political Justice and in Caleb Williams, interestingly, we have reference to both)
is in an unhappy situation. This is the view that underpins Political Justice, and
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which Godwin so convincingly portrays and dramatises throughout Caleb 
Williams (97)
The improvement in Wordsworth's ability to handle his subject within the
narrative and yet not lose the essential moral point can be seen to considerable
effect in the addition,in this poem,of the sailor's involvement in war:
For years the work of carnage did not cease,
And Death's worst aspect duly he survey'd 
Death's minister:...(ASP,10,82-4)
This is economic and effective; it makes its point, Godwin's point, then passes
on to explain the inevitable outcome, as Wordsworth draws on Godwin's
necessitarian link between military discipline and what it will produce:
The man that is merely a soldier, must always be uncommonly 
depraved. War in this case inevitably degenerates, from the necessary 
precautions of a personal defence, into a trade, by which a man sells 
his skill in murder...(PJ,'93,II,535)
It is also interesting to note that Wordsworth, just before the narration of the
murder itself, adds to the sailor's sufferings his being deprived of his payment for
service. I say "deprived" and not "defrauded" as other critics do. It is in a later
revision that Wordsworth presents the sailor as the victim of fraud:
By fraud he lost what fairly he had eamed(98)
In Adventures on Salisbury Plain we have only:
He urged his claim; the slaves of Office spumed 
The unfriended claimant;...(ASP,11,91-2)
The original version,with its use of the phrase, "the slaves of Office" suggests
oppression of the poor by the rich,or rather by the administrators of the rich;
reflecting Wordsworth's Godwinian views on the dependants of ministers. (99)
The narration of the murder itself is of some interest. Firstly, its motivation
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reflects Godwin's views on the effects of oppression and consequent poverty:
A numerous class of mankind are held down in a state of abject penury, 
and are continually prompted by disappointment and distress to commit 
violence upon their more fortunate neighbours.(PJ,'93,I,9)
The actual killing itself is accomplished in three lines:
He met a traveller, robb'd him, shed his blood;
And when the miserable work was done
He fled, a vagrant since, the murderer's fate to shun.(ASP,l 1,97-9)
Comparison with the earlier more detailed version of the poem and with the later
description of the brutal beating of the child in this poem might make one
somewhat surprised at the brevity of this. However, in Caleb Williams. Godwin
relates Falkland's murder of Tyrrel in a very similar brief manner, as we have seen:
All are but links of one chain. A blow! A murder! My next business was 
to defend myself, to tell so well-digested a lie, as that all mankind should 
believe it true. Never was a task so harrowing or intolerable.(CW, p 135)
The parallels are striking. What both Godwin and Wordsworth stress in their
narratives are the causes and motivations for the murder and then the effects upon
the individuals.(100) Yet, there is more than this; for both Falkland and the sailor
"live" a lie till they are eventually faced with their "error" and submit to truth.
All links in a chain! Might this not indeed adequately summarise stanzas 9-11 of 
this poem? Wordsworth is not slavishly following Godwin; he is selectively using 
the ideas of Godwin which are of more value to him (his interests in the effects 
of war in this poem are subordinated to his new psychological interests), and 
particular incidents and details from the novel. As we shall see, Wordsworth has 
drawn from the psychological power of the novel's presentation of the solitary 
outcast from society for both of his characters (just as Godwin has done, for 
Caleb, the "innocent" is just as hunted and outcast as Falkland,the guilty party).
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Wordsworth is not merely selecting a few Godwinian highlights of morality and 
creating another aesthetic "hotchpotch" as he did in Salisbury Plain. He is
learning from Godwin's re-creation of his political, moral and philosophical ideas 
in an artistic form about the fusion of narrative form, didactic intent and psych­
ological depth.
And it is this last point that strikes us particularly about Adventures on Salisbury
Plain. We see it particularly in the fears of the sailor, and it is worth turning to
some examples. A particularly interesting one comes in stanzas 12-15 where
we find the incident of the gibbet(lOl) which Wordsworth claims is based on
an incident from his own experience. Whilst I have my reservations about this,
the real interest lies in stanza 15, where, after the somewhat "Gothic" qualities
of his initial reaction to the gibbet, we have this:
As doth befall to them whom frenzy fires,
His soul, which in such anguish had been toss'd,
Sank into deepest calm; for now retires
Fear; a terrific dream in darkness lost
The dire phantasm which his sense had cross'd.
His mind was still as a deep evening stream;
Nor if accosted now,in thought engross'd,
Moody, or inly-troubled, would he seem
To traveller who might talk of any casual theme.(ASP,15,127-35)
It is this exploration of the nature of fear and guilt that is new to the poem; this
has true psychological depth, and in his interest in this, in his description of the
variations of the sailor's moods, we see Wordsworth drawing upon Godwin.
Compare Caleb when, in one of the many incidents in which we see such
fluctuations of mood portrayed, he says
To an ordinary eye I might seem destitute and miserable, but in reality I 
wanted for nothing. My fare was coarse; but I was in health. My dungeon
was noisome; but I felt no inconvenience I had no power of
withdrawing my person from a disgustful society in the most chearful and
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valuable part of the day; but I soon brought to perfection the art of 
withdrawing my thoughts...(102)
There are other examples of this controlled study of psychological movement -
one of the qualities of Caleb Williams that gives the novel its power.(103)
Anotherinterestingresultof this growing psychological interest in Wordsworth's
poem is the way in which the nature imagery blends more successfully with
the shifting moods than in the patterns of natural imagery so obtrusive in Salisbury
Plain. Stanzas 19 and 20 show this well. Stanza 20 is an amalgam of stanzas 12
and 13 of Salisbury Plain, and shows Wordsworth's new-found narrative
economy and dramatic power:
No swinging sign creak'd from its cottage elm 
To bid his weary limbs new force assume;
'Twas dark and void as ocean’s watery realm 
Roaring with storms beneath night's starless gloom;
No gipsey cowr'd o'er fire of furze or broom;
Nor labourer watch'd his red kiln glaring bright,
Nor taper glimmer'd dim from sick man's room;
Along the heath no line of mournful light
From lamp of lonely toll-gate stream’d athwart the night. (ASP,20,172-80)
Again, it should be noted that this fusing of natural imagery and mood is found
to great effect in Caleb Williams:
The morning,which had been bleak and drizzly, was succeeded by a day 
of heavy and incessant rain; and the gloomy state of the air and surround­
ing objects, togther with the extreme nearness of my prison, and a total 
want of food, caused me to pass the hours in no very agreeable sensations. 
This inclemency of the weather however, which generated a feeling of 
stillness and solitude, encouraged me by degrees to change my retreat...
(CW, p 208)
Turning to the vagrant's tale, we see that Wordsworth has again drawn from 
Godwin's novel to make changes and additions to his poem in order to create 
the new structure he was trying to achieve and also point an additional moral issue
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he had derived from Godwin's book.
The first change occurs when the vagrant tells of her father's being subjected 
to oppression. Wordsworth, as we have already seen,has decided to take a less 
overtly polemical approach in this revised poem; he is also subordinating the 
details of the results of war to the premises from which these derive. In writing 
the new version of the poem, he deletes from the oppression of the vagrant's father 
any mention of war. Hence, line 295 from the original Salisbury Plain.
For war the nations to the field defied 
is deleted, and through the effect of the fact of war juxtaposed to the children 
starving, Wordsworth stresses Godwin's view of the effects of war on non- 
combatants. The "saddistress"(ASP,39,348)that "reduced the children's meal" 
in the new version is a little unsatisfactory, but Wordsworth has achieved his 
aim: the effect of oppression by way of war is held off till the next stanza. 
Wordsworth has done this so that he can make his statement about civil oppression 
and war being parallel evils through structural juxtaposition rather than the overt 
didacticism of the original version. To this end, he has also introduced one or two 
very revealing revisions in the description of the start of the oppression of the 
father. We are now told of a "mansion"(ASP,34,300) which appeared near 
the vagrant's father's cottage, and the owner's avarice; we remember Godwin's 
view on this: as with oppression, avarice must be countered by a more equitable 
distribution of property. This leads to the vagrant’s father trying to stand against 
the landowner’s greed ("his greedy wish gainsay"(ASP,34,304)) and even the 
landowner's attempt to buy him out ( "he had refused the proffered gold" 
(ASP,35,307)). It is as a result of this defiance of his landlord that the father 
suffers the oppression and the gradual persecution which break him. This is very
different from Salisbury Plain where, characteristically, the oppression was 
mentioned as "Oppression" with little explanation.(104) If we wish to see where
Wordsworth got the details of his enhanced plot, we need only turn to the incident
of the persecution and oppression of Hawkins by Tyrell.(105) Already,
coincidentally, Wordsworth has, from his earlier poem, a wife and three children
(SP,33,291) and the matter of the abuse of water rights (parallels can be found
in Godwin's novel); Wordsworth only has to select and add the "mansion" and
one or two other details from this long and complex incident in the novel to
enhance his picture of the futility of standing up to oppression by the aristocracy.
The result is a convincing and economic narrative of civil oppression; he can then
turn to the oppression of war, already introduced in Salisbury Plain.
The second incident which Wordsworth borrows is much more revealing. After 
the rather unsatisfactory ending to the vagrant's tale in the earlier poem, Words­
worth now adds some further wanderings, at the end of which the vagrant is given 
help and sanctuary by a band of vagabonds. In all its detail and in its moral stance, 
it can be seen that this is derived from the incident in Caleb Williams, where 
Caleb is captured by the vagabonds.(106) Wordsworth's "earth's rude tenants" in 
their "vagrant ease"(ASP,57,507) reminds us forcibly of Raymond's gang; not 
only in their kind treatment of the vagrant(107) (Wordsworth is making exactly 
the same point as Godwin with regard to human benevolence), but also in details 
such as the fact that Caleb, like the vagrant in Wordsworth's poem, was also 
injured and wandering. Caleb, as we have seen, speaks of how the vagabonds 
demonstrated in their profession
....uncommon energy, ingenuity and fortitude... (CW, p 226) 
and that
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it was one of the rules to commit no depredations but at a considerable 
distance from the place of their residence,..(CW, p 221)
Wordsworth elaborates admirably: the vagrant joins in the gang's sorties and in
the subterfuges of their profession:
"But ill it suited me, in journey dark
O’er moor and mountain, midnight theft to hatch;
To charm the surly house-dog's faithful bark,
Or hang on tiptoe at the lifted latch;
The gloomy lantern, and the dim blue match,
The black disguise, the warning whistle shrill,
And ear still busy on its nightly watch,...(ASP,59,523-9)
This allows Wordsworth the opportunity to reflect on another of Godwin's key
themes. Although the vagrant and Caleb have found solace and security, and
human companionship, their sense of sincerity is troubled. Caleb states:
My habits of thinking were such as gave me an uncontrollable repugnance 
to the vocation of my hosts.(CW, p 226)
What Wordsworth has the vagrant say is even more direct:
But, what afflicts my peace with keenest ruth 
Is, that I have my inner self abused,
Foregone the home delights of constant truth,
And clear and open soul, so prized in fearless youth.( ASP,61,546-9)
This is rather unconvincing, because, on looking back to Wordsworth's 
narrative of her youth, there seems insubstantial evidence of a fearless cham­
pioning of truth;(108) though she admittedly does not sound "the kind of girl" 
who would do this sort of thing. (Such inconsistency of characterisation by 
Wordsworth only highlights his determination to draw on this incident from 
Godwin's novel to give added focus to the role of tru th  in the poem, echoing 
Godwin's assumptions in both Political Justice and Caleb Williams.) Neverthel­
ess, she has stated her concern over the gang's activities. Wordsworth's 
determination to draw on Godwin’s belief in the inevitable final triumph of truth
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leads to the change in stanza 62 from "hope" in Salisbury Plain(SP.44.39(V) to 
"fortitude"(ASP,62,552) in this version of the poem, leaving her with "that
perpetual weight which on her spirit lay ". (ASP,62,558) This is very different from
the unsatisfactory ending of the vagrant's tale in Salisbury Plain: yet this is also
unsatisfactory. We can see Wordsworth's intention: that the woman’s perpetual
wanderings, carrying the weight of her having to be untrue to herself is to be
compared with the resolution the sailor finds as he faces squarely the truth of
his error in living a lie. (Again, this question of the sailor's living a lie shows some
parallels with Falkland's "impostures" and Caleb's disguises.) Yet it is not
convincing. It is not faithful to the poem's development up till now; indeed, this
addition of the vagabond incident from Godwin's novel has produced not a
resolution of the unsatisfactory ending of the Salisbury Plain version, but,
another unsatisfactory ending.
Which brings us to a rather challenging question. Had Wordsworth seen or heard 
from Godwin (whom he was visiting in 1795) of the original ending of the man­
uscript of CalebWiUiams? As I shall go on to show, the sailor's experience with 
the beaten boy and with his wife closely parallels the revelation at the end of Caleb 
Williams as it was published, with Falkland finding some release from suffering 
in his admission of guilt. But, in the original ending, the persecution by Falkland 
of Caleb simply went on. Perhaps this is to stretch the parallels in Wordsworth's 
poem too far (as well as the relationship between Wordsworth and Godwin, 
though they did meet regularly in 1795). I can see no satisfactory explanation for 
the problem of this revised ending to the vagrant's tale. (109)
However, with the vagrant's story finished for now, Wordsworth returns to the
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sailor, and here, in the closing stages of the poem, we see Wordsworth once again 
draw from Caleb Williams. Perhaps a further flaw in this poem is the way in
which, on returning to the sailor's story, we have to make some effort to remember
the sailor's state of mind. Wordsworth is anxious that we should, and in stanzas
66 and 67 we are reminded of the relationship between Caleb and Falkland as the
woman's presence and affection merely exacerbates the sailor's fears (rather like
the effect of the presence and admiration of Caleb(llO)):
And still the more he griev’d, she loved him still the more.(ASP,66,594)
Wordsworth now introduces the incident of the sailor finding the man beating
the child, "confident in passion" (ASP,71,633) and uncontrolled by reason.
Wordsworth's intention is unmistakable; he dramatises the role of reason in the
revealing of error (and how differently from the didactic and proclamatory
metaphors of the conclusion to Salisbury PlainV:
Nor answer made, but stroked the child, outstretch'd 
His face to earth, and as the boy turned round 
His batter'd head, a groan the Sailor fetch'd.
The head with streaming blood had dy’d the ground,
Flow'd from the spot where he that deadly wound 
Had fix'd on him he murder'd. Through his brain 
At once the griding iron passage found;
Deluge of tender thoughts then rush’d amain
Nor could his aged eyes from very tears abstain.(ASP,72,640-8)
And this is not cold unfeeling reason; it is reason accompanied by sympathy for
the child's predicament, exactly the combination of reason and sympathy shown
in Caleb Williams.
It is with this incident of the beaten child that we see the start of the sailor’s 
determination to rid himself of the burden of his guilt. He sees now the error of 
his murder in all its brutality, and the effect of the lie he has lived in concealing
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the murder. As with Falkland, his life has become increasingly intolerable. 
In the rather unfortunate stanza 74, where Wordsworth appeals - somewhat
out of the blue - to the "bond of nature" (whatever that means, unless it simply
refers to a bond of kinship), the sailor apparently comes to terms with truth and
with himself. But the whole effect of the revelation of "these homely truths"
(ASP,74,665) is sentimental rather than anything else; it is as unsatisfactory as
the end of the vagrant's tale, but it is not the end.
Before turning to the end of the poem, it is worth noting (in stanza 84) that 
Wordsworth reveals the same suspicion of the law and of the unsatisfactory 
nature of "evidence" as does Godwin in both Political Justice( l l l )  and in the 
Hawkins indictment and the first trial of Caleb, where circumstantial evidence is 
accepted instead of truth.
But it is as the sailor is faced with his dying wife that we see the final parallel
with Godwin's novel. Faced with someone whom he loves and respects, he has
to face the truth and indeed, as he does so,the description of the mental and
physical state of Falkland before Caleb at the final revelation of the novel is
strongly echoed:
His ears were never silent, sleep forsook
His nerveless eyelids stiffen'd even as lead;...(ASP,88,788-9)
Just as Falkland suddenly bursts out with the truth, affirming in this dramatic 
fashion Godwin's belief in the ultimate triumph of truth, so the sailor, on the 
death of his wife, realises he must confess his guilt and reveal the truth. And it 
is at this point that the moral stances of Godwin and Wordsworth coalesce. Caleb 
regrets at once the "mistake" of bringing Falkland before the law:
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I now see that mistake in all its enormity. I am sure that, if I had opened 
my heart to Mr. Falkland, if I had told to him privately the tale that I am 
telling, he would not have resisted my reasonable demand. (CW, p 323)
Wordsworth expresses exactly the same view as, inevitably, the sailor finds his
way into the hands of the law:
"Though we deplore it much as any can,
The law," they cried, "must weigh him in her scale;. .  ."(ASP,90,89-90)
And Wordsworth underlines his point in his address to the punishment of the
law, so evocative of Godwin's own sentiments on this subject(112):
Blest be for once the stroke which ends, tho' late,
The pangs which from thy halls of terror came,
Thou who of Justice bear’st the violated name! (ASP,91,817-9)
What we have seen in this second version of the Salisbury Plain poems is Words­
worth continuing to draw upon Godwin, but there is a considerable shift of 
emphasis. The political focus is much diminished; it is in the moral and 
psychological areas of Godwin's works that Wordsworth seeks a philosophic 
stance upon which to build his poetry. And it should be recognised how 
derivative Wordsworth is here; those closing stanzas with their strong 
condemnation of the legal process and its violation of "justice", the earlier 
necessitarian link between military training and its moral and isolating effects; 
above all the central Godwinian tenet of the power of truth and the role of reason 
in perceiving error and revealing truth. This reason is not the abstract concept of 
the earlier Salisbury Plain, but a rational faculty accompanied and enhanced by 
feelings such as sympathy, reflecting Godwin's own advance in Caleb Williams.
It is this new interest in motivation and the psychological dimension of his 
characters which points to the real contribution that Godwin makes to
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Wordsworth's development at this stage; and such a psychological interest, 
linked to the strong moral stance that characterises Godwin's two published
works, form the basis of his emerging humanitarian concern, so evident in the
second poem particularly.
Equally important, we have seen Wordsworth attempt to assimilate those 
derivative ideas into his poetry, rather than trying to impose them upon it. This 
is much more the case with the second poem, where he has tried to avoid the 
overtly polemical ( hence, partly, his diminished interest in the political arena 
and in the more abstract dimensions of Godwin's rational system). What we 
see in Adventures on Salisbury Plain is evidence of a more studied and 
assimilated interest in Godwin's ideas, as Wordsworth sifts and selects from 
them, turning his attention through, for example, an interest in Godwin's 
necessitarian view to his essential interest in the individual, and the relationship 
of that individual to the society in which he lives. The vision of society and the 
individual in it that emerges from these poems is, in some ways, a more gloomy 
one than Godwin's (though it should be noted that the natural benevolence of the 
sailor has survived his brutalisation, and hence Wordsworth's portrayal is not 
totally negative). Hence we perhaps have here already the seeds of doubt that 
were to be tested later in The Borderers as Wordsworth further questioned the 
ideas he seems so content to have espoused in these poems, unwilling to accept 
the ultimate vision of Godwin's perfectibilian construct.
Yet, unquestionably, these poems evidence a different view of Wordsworth's 
emerging human concern from that presented in The Prelude. The "love of 
mankind", though glimpsed in Salisbury Plain, has to fight for breath under the
dead weight of a borrowed and ill-digested moral stance which the poetry 
struggles to contain. There is little spontaneity; even less evidence of a human-
itarianism nurtured by nature. Even in Adventures on Salisbury Plain, though
there is clear evidence of the writing that will characterise the 1798 Lyrical
Ballads, the derivative nature of much of the morality and philosophic basis that
drives the poem scarcely supports the claims of The Prelude. There is a power,
a considerable power in the second poem (enough to lead to the decision by
Wordsworth to publish The Female Vagrant in Lyrical Ballads): and part of that
power does lie in the emerging humanitarianism of the poem. But the birth of
that humanitarianism seems to have been an even more painful process than
Wordsworth wishes, in The Prelude, to acknowledge.
It is important to recognise just how derivative Wordsworth has been; Godwin's 
ideas and now his literary approach have been adopted by Wordsworth. Yet, in 
his next major work, The Borderers. Wordsworth sets out to challenge and test 
Godwin's ideas again, aware now of the revisions that were made in the second 
edition of Political Justice in 1796. It is the poet's continued drawing upon 
Godwin as a literary source, once again through Caleb Williams, in order to 
challenge Godwin's ideology, that, ironically, leads to the failure of The
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CHAPTER FO U R: POLITICAL JUSTICE. 1796 A N D  THE BORDERER S
Part I: Godwin's Revisions to the Second Edition of Political Justice
Thus I fared
Dragging all passions, notions, shapes of faith,
Like culprits to the bar;  .......................
 I lost
All feeling of conviction, and, in fine,
Sick, wearied out with contrarieties,
Yielded up moral questions in despair.(The Prelude. 1805.X.888-900)(l)
The much-quoted lines above from The Prelude of 1805. re-inforced in the 
published 1850 text by the addition of the "crisis of that strong disease" (1850, 
XI,306) have been generally accepted as referring to Wordsworth's final rejection 
of Godwin's ideas,(2) particularly through the process of writing The Borderers. 
Wordsworth's problem play has not gone without attention.(3)
However, any meaningful understanding of the relationship between The 
Borderers and Godwin's ideas, the role that played in Wordsworth's devel­
opment, and Wordsworth's treatment of this in The Prelude can only come from 
a full recognition of the developments in Godwin's thinking, signalled in Caleb 
Williams (discussed in the previous chapter), and as these then appear in his 
revisions in the second edition of Political Justice. For, as will be seen, whilst 
the impact of Caleb Williams was still considerable when Wordsworth came 
to write The Borderers ( to the extent that he again drew upon the novel in the plot 
and themes of his play), it is in response to Godwin's revisions to Political Justice, 
doubtless reinforced by his meetings and discussion with Godwin during the 
period when the philosopher was revising both of his works,(4) that Wordsworth
initiates his experiment in writing The Borderers.
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In examining the revisions to Political Justice. I wish to comment on four key 
areas: the stylistic effect of Godwin's rewriting; the adoption of a more phil­
osophic tone replacing the reformist zeal of the first edition; the apparently 
enhanced role of reason emerging in the second edition; and the presentation of 
a moral psychology to reinforce Godwin's moral philosophy.
De Quincey's "palinode” and W ordsworth's "barbarous writing"; the 
impact of Godwin's revisions.
All modem commentators on Godwin find themselves in disagreement with De 
Quincey's comment on the second edition of Political Justice as being "atravesty
of the first all but a palinode." (5) There is, in fact, general agreement with
Godwin's own view that the main principles of his work were not affected.
In many ways, this is true; but it is worth returning to De Quincey's statement,
especially, to the sentences preceding the one so often quoted:
And yet, in that [Godwin] carried one single shock into the bosom of 
English society, fearful but momentary, like that from the electric blow 
of the gymnotus; or, perhaps, the intensity of the brief panic which, fifty 
years ago, he impressed on the public mind, may be more adequately 
expressed by the case of a ship in the middle ocean suddenly scraping 
with her keel a ragged rock, hanging for one moment as if impaled upon
the teeth of the dreadful 'sierra In the quarto (that is, the original)
edition of his Political Justice. Mr. Godwin advanced against thrones 
and dominations, powers, and principalities, with the air of some Titan 
slinger or monomachist from Thebes and Troy, saying - "Come hither, 
ye wretches, that I may give your flesh to the fowls of the air". But in the 
second or octavo edition - and under what motive has never been 
explained - he recoiled, absolutely, from the sound himself had made: 
everybody else was appalled by the fury of the challenge, and , through 
the strangest of accidents, Mr. Godwin also was appalled.
De Quincey, although appearing to express a sense of betrayal at Godwin's
distortion of the principles of his book, is actually responding to another quality
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in the first edition which, he feels, is missing in the second. As any examination 
of the two editions shows, the principles remain much the same, and the Books 
containing Godwin's criticisms of monarchy etc. (to which DeQuincey has made 
specific reference) remain practically unaltered from their original form. So what 
is the target of De Quincey's impassioned criticism? It is his rather flamboyant 
prose which betrays his real concern: the loss,in the second edition, of the energy 
and force, especially of the first four Books (no matter how ill-structured at times), 
of the first edition. As suggested early in this argument,(5) the first edition is, 
in a sense, more "crude”, more immediately forceful, more overtly reformist 
in tone.than the revised edition. For De Quincey, the literary reader and critic, 
such tonal and stylistic changes would be immediately obvious. His judgement, 
seen in its correct literary context, offers a useful perspective on the revisions 
and their impact.
It is just such a perspective that must be borne in mind when looking also at the
much-quoted and equally misrepresented comment by Wordsworth(6); who, in
1796, probably losing much of his initial reformist ardour, writes:
I have received from Montagu, Godwyn's second edition. I expect to find 
the work much improved. Such a piece of barbarous writing I have not 
seen. I cannot say that I have been encouraged in this hope by the 
persusal of the second preface,which is all that I  have yet looked into. 
[My emphasis.] It contains scarce one sentence decently written. I am 
surprised to find such gross faults in a writer who has had so much 
practice in composition.(EY, 170-1)
Wordsworth's comment, as stated earlier, refers specifically to the Preface to the
second edition of Political Justice. It is worth considering how fairWordsworth's
comment is. (7)
Any reading of the Preface(8) to the second edition vindicates Wordsworth's
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preliminary response. Its style is exceptionally tortuous, the manner of address
obsequious, even 'umble; and the reader feels distinctly uncomfortable as he plods
through the piece. Quotation even from the first paragraph reveals the problem:
The reception of the following work has been such as to exceed what the 
author dared to promise himself. Its principles and reasonings have 
obtained the attention of the public to a considerable extent. This 
circumstance he has construed as imposing upon him the duty of a severe 
and assiduous revisal. Every author figures to himself, while writing, a 
numerous and liberal attention to his lucubrations: if he did not believe that 
he had something to offer that was worthy of public notice, it is impossible 
that he should write with any degree of animation. But the most ardent 
imagination can scarcely be expected to come in competition with sense. 
In the present instance there are many things that now appear to the author 
upon a review not to have been meditated with a sufficiently profound 
reflection, and to have been too hastily obtruded upon the reader. These 
things have been pruned away with a liberal hand. The wish dearest to his 
heart is, that there should be nothing in the book unworthy of the cause it 
was intended to serve. But though he professes to have done much, much 
yet remains to be done. After repeated revisals, the jealous eye of a man 
habituated to the detection of errors, still discovers things that might be 
better. (PJ,'96,I,xiii-xiv)(9)
Very little of the Preface to the second edition escapes this tone, and the final
sentence of the second paragraph gives another example of what was, no doubt,
the target of Wordsworth's critical comment:
He has in several instances detected error; and, so far is he from feeling 
mortified at the discovery that he hopes yet, by such activity and 
impartiality as he shall be able to exert, to arrive at many truths, of which 
he has scarcely at present the slightest presentiment. (PJ,'96,I,xv)
In thisexample, thedictionmayhaveescapedrelativelyunscathed; yetthesyntax
positively groans!
Perhaps Wordsworth's comment shows no great critical perspicacity since the 
flaws are so glaring. Yet, in his comments, Wordsworth expresses surprise; he 
had expected better. It has already been shown that Wordsworth had read the 
first edition, including its very different Preface, with its assertive rhythms,
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its relatively simple style, its unadorned and unself-conscious diction:
Few works of literature are held to be in greater estimation, than those 
which treat in a methodical and elementary way of the principles of 
science. But the human mind in every enlightened age is progressive; and 
the best elementary treatises after a certain time are reduced in value by 
the operation of subsequent discoveries. Hence it has always been 
desired by candid enquirers, that new works of this kind should from time 
to time be superseded, and that other productions including the larger 
views that have since offered themselves, should be substituted in their 
place.
It would be strange if some thing of this kind were not desirable in politics, 
after the great change that has been produced in men's minds upon this 
subject, and the light that has been thrown upon it by the recent 
discussions of America and France. A sense of the value of such a work, 
if properly executed, was the motive which gave birth to these volumes. 
Of their execution the reader must judge.(PJ,'93,I,v-vi)
The difference is marked, and this is reflected in Wordsworth's comment on the 
Preface to the second edition. However, is Wordsworth's single brief remark 
useful as a guide to his likely reaction to the second edition as a whole? It is 
dangerous to try to read too much into so little; yet it is relevant.
The differences between the two Prefaces points to a quality that soon emerges 
in any reading of the second edition itself (a quality that should also be considered 
in response to De Quincey's criticisms). What is immediately obvious in 
comparing the two editions is another effect of the revisions given scant attention 
by any critic on Godwin so far: the matter of the style and consequent tone of 
the revised Political Justice. This reflects Godwin's growing sense of confidence, 
both in his own abilities, and in the power of reason as he presents it. Godwin 
does not make any substantially greater claims for reason in the second edition; 
however, the stylistic and tonal effects of the revisions give exactly that 
impression, on anything but the most careful reading.(lO)
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The result is indubitably unattractive. The mixture of bold reformist asser­
tiveness and (sometimes tentative) testing of ideas, so obvious in the first edition, 
especially in the first four Books, is much diminished.
The first signs of this new confidence can be seen even in the Preface to the 1793
edition as it was rewritten for the second edition with many acknowledged
revisions, a few of considerable import. Most important, in the Preface to the 1793
edition, Godwin writes, of his preparations for undertaking Political Justice:
Long before he [Godwin] thought of the present work, he had familiarised 
to his mind the arguments it contains on justice, gratitude, rights of man, 
promises, oaths and the omnipotence of truth.(PJ,'93,I,viii)
However, in the revised version of this Preface the final phrase of this sentence
is changed to "omnipotence of opinion" (my emphasis).(ll) This is a significant
change, and reflects Godwin's increasing scepticism in his epistemology as
he retreats from his earlier Platonic view in the first edition. Godwin recognises
now that we
cannot penetrate into the essences of things....cannot discover the cause 
of things , or ascertain that in the antecedent which connects it with 
the consequent, and discern nothing but their contiguity. (PJ,'96,I,95)
Whilst Godwin’s belief in the role of reason in the perception and ultimate
triumph of truth remains, reason is now presented operating in an empirical
world, where the senses are our agents of perception, a world where we have
"opinion contending with opinion" and hence "judgement with judgement"
(PJ,193,1,72).
As the figure of Mortimer in The Borderers suggests, it is a shift in Godwin's 
views (partly developed out of his experience of writing Caleb Williamsl. of 
which Wordsworth became only too aware.
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Most of the changes, however, are stylistic. Yet the effect is marked. For instance, 
the final tentative sentence of the original second paragraph,
Of their execution, the reader must judge.. . .  
is deleted, and is replaced by those irritating "apologias" already quoted above. 
There is also a conscious heightening of the diction. Again, using the paragraphs 
already referred to, '93's "great change" becomes, in '96, "concussion"; '93's 
"that has been produced in men's minds" becomes in '96 "that the minds of men 
have suffered". Godwin's new confidence is seen in '93's "Authors who have 
formed the design of superseding the works of their predecessors" becoming in 
1796: "Authors who have formed the design of supplying the defects of their 
predecessors..." The syntactic effect of Godwin's new-found confidence 
(responsible for the assumed humility and agonised sentence structures of the 
paragraphs quoted above), can also be seen in the revision to the original'93 
Preface. (12)
One cannot help but feel that the Godwin whom so many found unattractive in 
personal contact is beginning to creep into the revisions of his work; important 
when considering Wordsworth's personal contact with Godwin during the period 
of revision. Secondly, these revisions, especially of the Books I to IV in the 
second edition, affect the presentation of his belief in the power of reason. For, 
whilst I would not accept the idea of the "palinode", the effect of the revisions 
has been materially to alter the character of the work. What De Quincey was 
pointing to, and what modem critics of Godwin are ignoring - perhaps because 
they are too intent on his ideas in the two editions (and in defending Godwin 
against De Quincey's charge) - is that the impact of the first and second editions
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1 (especially the first four Books) is very different. The first edition, Jb r  all its 
crudities, presents itself as the assertive opinions and beliefs of a sincere reformer; 
the second edition is much more in the vein of a philosophical enquiry.
I have little doubt that this is a change that Wordsworth noticed; one to which 
he responded; one against which he ultimately reacted. It is only through an 
understanding of the nature and the impact of the revisions of Political Justice 
that the very complex and confusing position he adopts in The Borderers can be 
understood.
Reformist Zeal to Philosophic Reflection.
The most noticeable effect of Godwin's revisions is a distinct "toning down".
(13) This might seem to conflict with earlier comments regarding Godwin's
more confident tone; however, this is not so. What is lost from the first edition,
especially the early Books, is the assertiveness, the sense of personal (if, perhaps,
not fully considered) commitment. It is replaced by a more assured confidence
in the philosophical and moral stance of the writer. This can quickly be illustrated
from Chapter II of Book I at the end of the chapter.The first edition reads:
This account of the history and state of man is not a declamation, but an 
appeal to facts. He that considers it cannot possibly regard disquisition as 
a trifle, and government as a neutral and unimportant concern. I by no 
means call upon the reader implicitly to admit that these evils are capable 
of remedy, and that wars, executions and despotism can be extirpated 
out of the world. But I call upon him to consider whether they may be 
remedied. I would have him feel that civil policy is a topic upon which 
the severest investigation may laudably be employed.
If government be a subject, which, like mathematics, natural philosophy 
and morals, admits of argument and demonstration, then we may 
reasonably hope that men shall some time or other agree respecting it. 
If it comprehend everything that is most important and interesting to man, 
it is probable that, when the theory is greatly advanced, the practice will 
not be wholly neglected. Men may one day feel that they are partakers
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of a common nature, and that true freedom and perfect equity, like food 
and air, are pregnant with benefit to every constitution. If there be the 
faintest hope that this shall be the final result, then certainly no subject 
can inspire to a sound mind such generous enthusiasm, such enlightened 
ardour and such invincible perseverance.
The probability of this improvement will be sufficiently established, 
if we consider, FIRST, that the moral characters of man are the results 
of their perceptions: and, SECONDLY, that of all of the modes of op­
erating on mind government is the most considerable. In addition to these 
arguments it will be found, THIRDLY, that the good and ill effects of 
political institution are not less conspicuous in detail than in principle; 
and, FOURTHLY, that perfectibility is one of the most unequivo­
cal characteristics of the human species, so that the political, as well as 
the intellectual state of man, may be presumed to be in a course of 
progessive improvement.(PJ,'93,I,10-ll)
However, by the second edition, the closing paragraph of Chapter 2 reflects the
changed character and tone of Godwin's early Books in 1796:
Certainly, every man who takes a dispassionate survey of this picture 
will feel himself inclined to pause respecting the necessity of the havoc 
which is thus made of his species, and to question whether the existing 
mode for protecting mankind against the caprices of each other are the 
best that can be devised. He will be at a loss which of the two to pronounce 
most worthy of regret, the misery that is inflicted, or the depravity by 
which it is produced. If this be the unalterable allotment of our nature, 
the eminence of our rational faculties must be considered as rather an 
abortion than a substantial benefit; and we shall not fail to lament that, 
while in some respects we are elevated above the brutes, we are in so many 
more important ones destined to remain their inferiors. (PJ,'96,1,14)
Both editions contain Godwin's reference to Locke's view of despotism as "vile
and miserable" and "more to be deprecated than anarchy itself'.(14) However,
the paragraphs which follow this statement in the first edition are more lengthy
and more positive in tone; indeed the final one of that edition, sub-titled
Enumeration of Argument (quoted above), has a committed assertiveness and
sounds like a catalogue of Godwin's "social cures". Contrast the opening sentence
to the 1796 final paragraph, with its stress on a "dispassionate survey", which
prefaces a paragraph which is more negative in tone and indeed in argument.
Examination of the re-ordering of the chapters of the early Books, and of the
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more careful and logical attempts by Godwin to arrive at his ideas on reform in 
this second edition show that his revision is "editorial" in intent; from such a 
viewpoint, these final paragraphs of the '93 edition of this chapter might have 
seemed somewhat dogmatic and naive. Nevertheless, the effect of the '96 revision 
is undoubtedly to tone down the reformist zeal of the earlier edition.
Herein lies, I suspect, the reason why De Quincey's criticisms have received so 
little support; and, to a great extent, justly so. In fact, as already stated, his acute 
sense of a changed tone in Political Justice is obvious to any reader approaching 
the second edition after reading the first. Examples abound, but it would be better 
to limit discussion to only a few in order to demonstrate this toning down of the 
reformist idealism of the first edition. At the same time, two other consequences 
of the revisions can be seen: an impression of a more philosophic approach to 
the arguments concerning reform and improvement, and an attempt to explain 
more fully the role of reason in the perfectibilian view of man and society.
Apart from the extension of '93, Book I, Chapter III into '96, Book I, Chapter IV 
and the addition o f '96, Book I, Chapter V (with which it will be more appropriate 
to deal later on(15)), it is worth noting once again, the rather equivocal effect of 
Godwin's editorial decision to bring the chapter entitled The Spirit of Political 
Institutions forward in 1796 to follow immediately upon the previous Chapter 
II, The History of Political Society. The cohesion of Godwin's argument is 
improved, as he strives in these two chapters (concerned with political abuses) 
to remove any acceptance of government as playing a role in human improve­
ment. Yet, in '96, Chapter III, there is a detachment in the language of the 
concluding sentences, (intentionally in light of his revised conclusion to what
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is now the previous chapter with its insistence on a "dispassionate survey")
generalising, in a self-conscious rhetoric and rather tortuous syntax:
By the operation of these causes the insolence of wealth has been in some 
degree moderated. Meantime, it cannot be pretended that even among 
ourselves the inequality is not so strained, as to give birth to very un­
fortunate consequences. If, in the enormous degree in which it prevails in 
some parts of the world, it wholly debilitate and emasculate the human 
race, we shall feel some reason to believe that, even in the milder state in 
which we are accustomed to behold it, it is still pregnant with the most 
mischievous effects.(PJ,'96,1,24)
Contrast this to the sense of humanitarian outrage and defiance in 1793:
In England at the present day there are few poor men who do not console 
themselves, by the freedom of their animadversions upon their superiors. 
The new-fangled gentleman is by no means secure against having his 
tranquillity disturbed by their surly and pointed sarcasms. This 
propensity might easily be encouraged, and made conducive to the most 
salutary purposes. Every man might, as was the case in certain countries, 
upon record, be inspired with the consciousness of citizenship, and be 
made to feel himself an active and efficient member of the great whole. 
The poor man would then perceive, that, if eclipsed, he could not be 
trampled upon; and he would no longer be stung with the furies of envy, 
resentment and despair. (PJ,'93,I,42)
Another similarly equivocal example can be seen in '96, I, Chapter VII
(originally '93,1, Chapter VIII). The most substantial revision in this short chapter
is the deletion of this passage:
The question may in reality be reduced to an enquiry, whether the human 
understanding can be made the recipient of truth, whether it be possible 
for an effort so strenuous to exist as to make men aware of their true 
interests. For let this be granted, and the consequence is inevitable. It has 
already sufficiently appeared, that whatever is politically right or 
politically wrong, must be in all cases of trivial consequence to the 
welfare of mankind. Monarchy for example will by all men be acknow­
ledged to be attended with many disadvantages. It acts upon insufficient 
and partial information, it generates intrigue, corruption, adulation and 
servility. If it could be proved that, it produced no advantages in 
equal proportion, and that its abolition would not lead to mischief, anarchy 
and disorder, is there a nation upon the face of the earth to whom these 
propositions were rendered papable, that would endure to submit to it? Is 
there a nation upon the face of the earth, that would submit to the impo­
sitions of its administration, the wars it occasions, and the lavish revenues 
by which it is maintained, if they knew it merely to be an excrescence and
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a disease in the order of society? (PJ, '93 ,1, 74-5)
Deletion of the above might be seen as editorially sound since the anti- 
monarchical diatribe does disturb the argument of this chapter; yet the deletion 
of this passage, the language of which amounts virtually to incitement, is 
interesting. Again, the effect is to lose yet another passage which is actively 
reformist; for reading it in the context of the '93 Book I, it does not seem the 
somewhat self-indulgent interpolation it might have been if it had been left in the 
'96 edition.
These revisions, materially affecting the overall tone of Political Justice, can be
seen to create that sense of a more philosophical approach in Godwin's work that
I have mentioned, especially on reading the second Book of the revised edition.
The first chapter was completely re-written, and the reason for this becomes
fairly clear if we take the trouble to read carefully the sentence with which
Godwin has opened the second chapter of that Book:
From what has been said itappears, that the subject of our present enquiry 
is strictly speaking a department of the science of morals.
(PJ,'96,1,126)
In fact, this sentence follows on much more meaningfully from the more
methodical '96 Chapter I of Book II than from the very sketchy equivalent in
'93.(16) Godwin was, no doubt, aware of this. In the '96 chapter, an attempt to
adopt a more reasoned utilitarian stance is clear, and this, in turn, is linked to
the earlier '96 additional Book I, Chapter V on voluntary and involuntary
actions, where a utilitarian premise underpins much of Godwin’s thinking. (17)
Not only in what is said, but in how the argument is presented, we see a conscious
attempt at a more philosophical approach to the question of improvement and
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reform. Accompanying it, we also have an echo of that assumed self-conscious 
confidence of tone already noted in the Preface to the second edition. It is this 
tone - almost dogmatic in places - which replaces the "bravado" of 1793.
The Role of Reason.
The impression of an increased emphasis on the role of reason is partly 
associated with the revisions to Book I (Chapters IV and V) which must be 
examined separately (see below pp 183ff); however, it is not difficult to point 
to other instances where this effect of the revisions can be seen. It is worth making 
the point that in the first edition, the word "reason" appears very rarely in the 
first four Books of Political Justice: although the rational process is often 
referred to and assumed throughout. In Chapter VI of the '96 edition, Godwin's 
main revisions are limited to a deletion of several paragraphs from 1793 in a series 
under the heading, "Arguments in favour of positive institution" in which he 
explores several possible reasons for substituting some form of institutionalised 
superintendence of opinion for the free exercise of private judgement, and pro­
ceeds to reject each of them. He also re-arranges some of the paragraphs and adds 
some new ones. The effect is again more cohesive, but, more important, the effect 
is also to vindicate and underwrite his central belief in the right of private judge­
ment, (18) in which, despite the earlier introduction of the notion of imperfectly 
voluntary actions in the extension of his ideas on voluntary and involuntary 
actions, the role of reason in directing motivation towards benevolent action 
(as opposed now to perception of some assumed, and unexplained notion 
of "truth"), remains paramount. In such a process, there is no role for any form 
of positive institution, and Godwin confidently dispenses with arguments he had
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at least tested in 1793.
Another brief example, in Chapter V of Book III of '96, is Godwin's small but 
significant change in referring to "Reason" of '93 as "Immutable reason" in '96. 
Despite the apparent retreat in the rest of the revision, it can be seen, by studying 
it in its context, that the effect is again to give an increased sense of reason's 
power. (19)
A more substantial illustration of this general effect is provided by the revisions
to Book IV, Chapter II. This chapter, Of Revolutions, points the diminishing
"reformist" tone of Political Justice and stresses the increasingly philosophical
approach, including the enhanced sense of the role of reason. The revisions here
are complex(20): the effect, with regard to what became '96, Chapter II, is clearly
an extension of the arguments against revolution. For instance, Godwin deletes
the sentences from '93:
He that desires arevolutionforits own sake is to be regarded as amadman. 
He that desires it from a thorough conviction of its usefulness and 
necessity has a claim upon us for candour and respect.(PJ,93,I,200)
Standing as they did, without any immediate qualification (though Godwin did
go on to qualify the statement in Section II), they sound, to say the least,
ambiguous if not inflammatory. Godwin was clearly not happy to leave them in
his revised chapter. The brief objections Godwin makes against revolutions in the
first edition are substantially revised and extended in 1796, stressing the horrors
of revolution (Godwin's arguments against revolution in 1793 are actually rather
weak). More positively, violent revolution is rejected due to Godwin's increased
emphasis on perfectibility. The role of reason is now quite clearly Godwin's
principal premise in this extended argument against revolution, e.g.:
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Thirdly, it is a mistake to suppose that the system of trusting to reason 
alone is calculated to place fundamental reform at an immeasurable 
distance.(96,I,280-1)
These revisions underline just how equivocal Godwin was in the first edition of
Political Justice over revolution and violent reform ( as I have argued earlier,
see volume I pp 13-14 & 86ff). The numerous and substantive revisions in '96,
taking a muchstrongerlineagainstviolentrevolutionasameansof reform (more
confidently underlining the role of reason in the process of reform) suggest that,
in revising his work, Godwin realised that his earlier stance was ambiguous,
if not ambivalent.
Once again, Godwin's style and thought reflect a growing confidence and a more 
ordered argument as he reinforces his central belief in private judgement as the 
key to social reform, with the role of reason seemingly enhanced as it guides the 
senses in judgement upon the various opinion that it is the role of the senses to 
perceive. The effects of these revisions could not pass unnoticed by any 
interested reader.
The revision effected by changing'93, Book IV, Chapter II, Section III to '96, 
Chapter III (though both carry the same title, Of Political Associations, and 
deal with same issue), is a rather confusing one, though possibly largely 
explained by Godwin removing the arguments in relation to revolution (which 
he has now dealt with in '96, Chapter II). The principal effect of this change 
is again a re-emphasis of private judgment (guided by reason) as opposed to 
arguments in favour of some corporate opinion, where, again, confidence in 
reason underpins the revised arguments.
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Yet, in a sense, perhaps the most interesting part of this lengthy and complex
revision is the deletion from '96 of the '93 section entitled Of the Species of
Reform to be Desired. It is as if Godwin is retreating from his stance in 1793 as
an active reformist, and does not wish to speculate on what kind of society he
would wish to see. (21) Perhaps his reason for this can be seen to be justified when
we look at some of his arguments in the following deleted passage:
To recapitulate the principal object of this chapter, I would once again 
repeat, that violence may suit the plan of any political partisan, rather than 
of him that pleads the cause of simple justice. There is even a sense in 
which the reform aimed at by the true politician may be affirmed to be less 
a gradual than an entire one, without contradicting the former position. 
The complete reformation that is wanted, is not instant but future 
reformation. It can in reality scarcely be considered as of the nature of 
action. It consists in an universal illumination. Men feel their situation, 
and the restraints, that shackled them before, vanish like mere deception. 
When the true crisis shall come, not a sword will need to be drawn, not 
a finger to be lifted up. The adversaries will be too few and too feeble 
to dare to make a stand against the universal sense of mankind.
Nor do these ideas imply, as at first sight they might seem to imply, that 
the revolution is at an immeasurable distance. It is of the nature of human 
affairs that great changes should appear to be sudden, and great discov­
eries to be made unexpectedly, and as it were by accident. In forming 
the mind of a young person, in endeavouring to give a new bent to that of 
a person of maturer years, I shall for a long time seem to have produced 
little effect, and the fruits will show themselves when I least expected 
them. The kingdom of truth comes not with ostentation. The seeds of 
virtue may appear to perish before they germinate.
To recur once more to the example of France, the works of her great 
political writers seemed for a long time to produce little prospect of any 
practical effect. Helvetius, one of the latest, in a work published after his 
death in 1771, laments in pathetic strains the hopeless condition of his 
country. "In the history of every people," says he," there are moments, 
in which, uncertain of the side they shall choose, and balanced between 
political good and evil, they feel a desire to be instructed; in which the 
soil, so to express myself is, in some manner prepared, and may easily 
be impregnated with the dew of truth. At such a moment the publication 
of a valuable book may give birth to the most auspicious reforms: but, 
when that moment is no more, the nation, become insensible to the best 
motives, is by the nature of its government plunged deeper and deeper 
in ignorance and stupidity. The soil of intellect is then hard and impen­
etrable; the rains may fall, may spread their moisture upon the surface,
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but the prospect of fertility is gone. Such is the condition of France. Her 
people are become the contempt of Europe. No salutary crisis shall ever 
restore them to liberty*."
But in spite of these melancholy predictions, the work of renovation was 
in continual progress. The American revolution gave the finishing stroke, 
and only six years elapsed between the completion of American liberty 
and the commencement of the French Revolution. Will a term longer than 
this be necessary, before France, the most refined and considerable nation 
in the world, will lead other nations to imitate and improve upon her plan? 
Let the true friend of man be incessant in the propagation of truth, and 
vigilant to counteract all the causes that might disturb the regularity of 
her progress, and he will have every reason to hope an early and a 
favourable event.(PJ,'93,I,222-6)
The deletion of the reference to the French Revolution reflects Godwin's 
growing disenchantment with events in France Also, in the first two para­
graphs, the language reflects the unsubstantiated assumptions of some of his 
idealism. Godwin no doubt recognised this, and decided that it had no place in 
this second edition with its more reflective and structured arguments. The 
reformist once again gave way to the philosophical moralist.
1796, Book I, Chapters IV and V: the development of a moral psychology.
The revisions in these two chapters deserve considerable attention. The place to
begin is with Godwin's footnotes in Book I Chapter IV, and Book IV, Chapter
VII. (22) There is a conflict here, especially in the two pieces of advice to readers
to pass over these chapters and the notes in the later chapters which refer back
explicitly to the earlier ones. So much of Godwin's approach and emphasis in the
second edition is dependent upon '96, Book I, Chapters IV and V, that it is
difficult to see how one can approach, with any level of sympathy, his arguments
on gradual reform based on the role of reason without having read these chapters.
Also, (as Godwin admits in his note to Book I, Chapter IV in '96), there would
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seem to be a weakness in the foundations upon which he built his arguments 
in the later Book IV in his necessitarian approach to improvement in 1793. 
Perhaps there was a case for his advice to readers to pass over these early chapters 
in 1793 when the book still derived much of its power from its reformist zeal and 
when Godwin had not worked out the psychology of his moral philosophy. But 
this is not the case with the revised edition.
The revision of '93, Book I, Chapter HI, which produced '96, Book IV, is more 
than a mere extension of the original chapter; it also involves the reinter­
pretation by Godwin of some of what was in '93, I, Chapter IV (Three Causes 
of Moral Improvement Considered!, and his decision to delete that chapter. 
There are no fundamental changes of principle; but the consequent shifts of 
emphasis have a considerable effect on the early Books of Political Justice as a 
whole. The change in style is immediately obvious. Instead of the rather abrupt 
and forceful assertion of '93,
We bring into the world with us no innate principles: consequently we 
are neither virtuous nor vicious as we come into existence.(PJ,'93,I,12)
we find, in '96, a more cautious and considered approach:
I shall attempt toprovetwo things: first, that the actions and dispositions 
of mankind are the offspring of circumstances and events, and not of 
any original determination that they bring into the w orld .
First, the actions and dispositions of men are not the offspring of any 
original bias that they bring into the world in favour of one sentiment or 
character rather than another, but flow entirely from the operation of 
circumstances and events acting upon a faculty of receiving sensible 
impressions.
There are three modes in which the human mind has been conceived 
to be modified, independently of the circumstances which occur to us, and 
the sensations excited: first, innate principles; secondly, instincts; 
thirdly, the original differences of our structure together with the impres­
sions we receive in the womb. Let us examine each of these in
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order.(PJ,'96,27-8)
The tone of the second edition suggests a more reflective and objective stance. 
This effect (together with both of the notes appended to the opening) demonstrates 
the change of emphasis and tone when compared with '93; the reformist zeal 
gives way to a philosophical disquisition upon matters of morality and psychol­
ogy.
Godwin is attempting, in this second edition, to prepare the ground much earlier
and more thoroughly for his empirical and necessitarian stance. The link with
the later chapters in Book IV (most of which remain almost unaltered in the second
edition) is clear enough. Godwin's more general intentions are best seen in a
revision whereby he utilises an idea slipped in towards the end of '93, Chapter IV
( a chapter he was deleting) in a rather negative manner:
All vice is nothing more than errors and mistakes reduced into practice, 
and adopted as the principle of our conduct. But error is perpetually 
hastening to its own detection. Vicious conduct is soon discovered to 
involve injurious consequences. Injustice, therefore, by its own nature, 
is little fitted for a durable existence.(PJ,'93,I,31)
In '96, this is much more confidently asserted:
If we entertain false views and be involved in pernicious mistakes, this 
disadvantage is not the offspring of an irresistable destiny. We have been 
ignorant, we have been hasty, or we have been misled. Remove the cause 
of this ignorance or this miscalculation, and the effects will cease. Show 
me in the clearest and most ambiguous manner that a certain mode of 
proceeding is most reasonable in itself or most conducive to my interest, 
and I shall infallibly pursue that mode, as long as the views you suggested 
to me continue present to my mind. The conduct of human beings in every 
situation is governed, by the judgements they make and the sensations that 
are communicated to them.(PJ,'96,1,46)
A few pages earlier, Godwin has said:
Speak the language of truth and reason to your child and be under no 
apprehension as to the result.(PJ,'96,1,44)
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It is statements like these which point the real intention and effect of the revisions 
of this chapter. In '93, Chapter HI, entitled The Moral Characters of Men 
Originate in their Perceptions had dealt only with a rejection of the "innate ideas" 
approach to morality, refuting this stance in favour of an empirical approach. 
In 1796, Godwin extends his arguments on this matter in a more systematised 
manner, at the same time consciously laying more substantial foundations for an 
empirical necessitarian morality and psychology. In deleting Chapter IV of 
the original edition (entitled Three Principal Causes of Moral Improvement 
Considered!, he removes some of the more idealistic-sounding and rather weak 
arguments early on in the book, and also re-appraises some of those ideas. Ed­
ucation in the '93 chapter received rather scant and over-simplified treatment in 
terms both of its advantages and dangers, and is dismissed in that first edition with 
the remark that it is "though in one view an engine of unlimited power,.... 
exceedingly incompetent to the great business of reforming mankind." (PJ,'93, 
1,46) By 1796, Godwin realises the importance of the empirical necessitarian 
stance he had described in the later Book IV in '93. So, now he informs us:
Children are a sort of raw material put into our hands, a ductile and 
yielding substance, which, if we do not ultimately mould to our wishes, 
it is because we throw away the power committed to us, by the folly with 
which we are accustomed to exert it.
He continues:
The success of an attempt to mislead can never be complete. We 
continually communicate in spite of ourselves the materials of just 
reasoning; reason is the genuine exercise, and truth the native element of 
an intellectual nature; it is no wonder therefore, that, with a crude and 
abortive plan to govern his efforts, the preceptor is perpetually baffled, 
and the pupil, who has been thus stored with systematic delusions, 
and half-discovered, clandestive truths, should come out anything rather 
than that which his instructor intended him.(PJ,'96,I,49)
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This is a more considered view of education - one which stresses the role of 
impressions received and the role of reason in recognising truth. All of this leads 
to the process of reform Godwin now proposes in his revisions: reform effected 
by way of the application of reason in the individual, from which will come social 
reform. Godwin now requires one further step to ensure such a process: the 
description of voluntary and involuntary actions which will come in the new 
Chapter V that is to be added to complement Chapter IV. However, before 
turning to this added chapter, it is important to note one other effect of Godwin’s 
revisions here. As well as the change to a more considered philosophic approach 
in these early chapters of Political Justice, and a concentration upon the nature 
of perception and motivation (moral and psychological) Godwin has sown much 
earlier in this edition the seeds of a criticism that can be levelled against him: 
an assumption that perception of what is beneficial to man inevitably leads to the 
choice of that action; an assumption which is surely questionable, despite 
Godwin’s lengthy expansion of his ideas on voluntary actions (including the 
recognition now of what he terms "imperfectly voluntary actions") in the added 
Chapter V.(23)
I say "expansion" because the idea of voluntary action is present in the '93 edition 
in a very sketchy form (in '93, Book IV, Chapter V, Of Free Will and Necessity! 
and there is also some further treatment of the idea in Chapter VII. Of the 
Mechanism of the Human Mind. However, it would appear that Godwin, in 
working on his second edition, recognised the significance of the idea of 
voluntary action in its relation to his belief in the power and role of reason in the 
process of human perfectibility. As aresult, he expanded his ideas andplacedthem
earlier in his revised work.
Once again we find, not a change in principles, but a shift of emphasis of 
considerable significance. For, after being "held up" by the expanded chapter on 
the importance of "external circumstances", the reader is drawn into a further 
and detailed examination of the nature of human perception and motivation.
The intention of this additional chapter is clearly indicated by Godwin: to extend 
his empirical stance to include a process of motivation that ensures perfectibility. 
It is necessary only to direct attention to the first three paragraphs of the chapter, 
which demonstrate how crucial this chapter is to Godwin's thought.(24) Within 
this chapter can be found the key to Godwin's altered emphasis in his approach 
to reform; in some ways, the raison d'etre of this chapter is as the premise to '96, 
Book I, Chapter VII (essentially the same as '93, Book I, Chapter VI), Human 
Inventions Susceptible of Perpetual Improvement. For in this chapter, Godwin 
tries to prove, on "external grounds", that the idea of perfectibility is already 
shown to exist in such matters as the development of language. What the addition 
of Chapter V of the second edition shows is Godwin's attempt to explore and 
justify the motivations and psychological processes behind such an idea of 
perfectibility; and also the way in which these make the process of perfectibility 
inevitable. In doing so, Godwin again shifts the emphasis of his work from 
"outside" to "inside" man, falling back on his empirical necessitarian stance and 
upon an apparent assumption of a natural benevolence in mankind.
Almost immediately after he gives his definition of voluntary actions, we find 
Godwin stating:
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But, if every voluntary action be performed for the sake of its con­
sequences, then in every voluntary action there is comparison and 
judgment. Every such action proceeds upon the apprehended truth of 
some proposition, The mind decides "this is good" or "desirable"; and 
immediately upon that decision, if accompanied with a persuasion that we 
are competent to accomplish this good or desirable thing, the limbs 
proceed to their office. The mind decides "this is better than something 
else"; either wine and cordials are before me, and I choose the wine rather 
than the cordials; or the wine is only presented or thought of, and I decide 
that to take the wine is better than to abstain from it. Thus it appears that 
in every voluntary action there is preference or choice, which indeed are 
synonimous terms."(PJ,'96,I,58-9)
This somewhat mechanistic approach might appear at odds with Godwin's claim
that, although drawing heavily upon the ideas of Hartley, he tries to superimpose
upon it the dimension of "thought" and thus reduce the "automatism" of
Hartley's system.(25) Nevertheless, the role of "mind" here is, in Godwin's view,
fully justified in terms of the empirical stance he has laid down in the previous
chapter as well as the necessitarian view of human motivation he developed in
BookIV (Chapters Vff. o f '93 edition, Chapters Vllff. of '96) in the first edition.
Godwin seems unaware that, in his arguments concerning choice based upon
the consequences for others, his attempt to show a disinterested benevolence
leaves him open to the view that he has assumed rather than established the
existence of natural benevolence. For him, the role of reason adequately explains
the inevitable choice for good and on this premise he builds his further revisions
of the book.
So it is that, in further exploring the motivation behind this, Godwin explicitly 
states, a few paragraphs further on, that his attention must now turn to his 
"phenomena of the human mind".(PJ,'96,I.46)Thus, in his discussionof the phe­
nomena of "volition" and "foresight" he arrives whither he clearly intends to 
arrive, at a final vindication of voluntary action, and then adds:
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In the meantime, it is obvious to remark that the perfection of the human 
character consists in approaching as nearly as possible to the perfectly 
voluntary state.(PJ,'96,I,69)(26)
What Godwin needs now is some means of regulating all actions so that they can
become voluntary. It is through reason that he sees the possibility of this:
Having thus explained the nature of human actions, involuntary, 
imperfectly voluntary and voluntary, let consider how far this expla­
nation affects the doctrine of the present chapter  All the most
important occasions of our lives are capable of being subjected at pleasure 
to a decision, as nearly as possible, perfectly voluntary. Still it remains 
true that, when the understanding clearly perceives rectitude, propriety 
and eligibility to belong to a certain conduct, and so long as it has that 
perception, that conduct will be infallibly adopted. A perception of 
truth will inevitably be produced by a clear evidence brought home to 
the understanding, and the constancy of the perception will be propor­
tioned to the apprehended value of the thing perceived. Reason therefore 
and conviction still appear to be the proper instrument, and the sufficient 
instrument for regulating the actions of mankind.(PJ,'96,1,70-71)
However, Godwin at this stage also sees another problem such as has been
suggested by Monro,(27) and others, who claim that Godwin is confounding
seeing something as desirable with desiring it. For Godwin returns to one of his
earliest points in this chapter: the idea of the powers of reason and sensation
being in perpetual conflict. Through extensive argument, such as showing that
sexual pleasure relies as much on the intellectual dimension as the sensual,
Godwin rejects the notion of such a conflict and asserts instead that our
sensual pleasures, commonly so called would be universally despised had 
we not the art to combine them with the pleasures of intellect and 
cultivation. (PJ,'96,1,77)
and that
We are no longer at liberty to consider man as divided between two 
independent principles, or to imagine that his inclinations are in any case 
inaccessible through the medium of his reason. We find the thinking 
principle within us to be uniform and simple; in consequence of which, we 
are entitled to conclude that it is in every respect the proper subject of 
education and persuasion, and is susceptible of unlimited improvement.
(PJ,'96,1,80-81)
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So, in reconciling reason and passion, Godwin appears, to his own satisfaction
at least, to have justified his view stated a few pages further on, in his discussion
of the nature of "passion", that
nothing is necessary, but to show us that a thing is truly good and worthy 
to be desired, in order to excite in us a passion for its attainment.
(PJ,'96,I,82)(28)
Godwin goes on to enunciate his famous five propositions:
Soundreasoning and truth, when adequately communicated, must always 
be victorious over error: Sound reasoning and truth are capable of being 
so communicated: Truth is omnipotent: The vices and moral weaknesses 
of man are not invincible: Man is perfectible, or in other words susceptible 
of perpetual improvement. (PJ,'96,1,86-87)
The whole purpose of the revisions and additions in Chapters IV and V of the 
second edition has been to provide the psychological basis for these 
propositions. In turn, they now form the moral foundations for Godwin's view 
of reform as he turns his attention increasingly towards the individual; for only 
from moral improvement of the individuals who comprise society can true social 
reform come.
The result in the first Book of Political Justice is a considerable shift of emphasis
in the second edition - towards a psychological premise for Godwin's moral and
reformist views. The effect on the first four Books is equally considerable; for
example, in BookIV Chapter II. Of Revolutions.(29) arguments are substantially
enhanced as a result of additions from the new Book I Chapter V:
If such are the genuine features of revolution, it will be fortunate if it can 
be made appear that revolution is wholly unnecessary, and the conviction 
of the understanding a means fully adequate to the demolishing political 
abuse. But this point has already beeen established in a former part of our 
enquiry.* It is common to affirm "that men may sufficiently know the 
error of their conduct, and yet be in no degree inclined to forsake it". 
This assertion however is no otherwise rendered plausible, than by the
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vague manner in which we are accustomed to understand the term, 
knowledge. The voluntary actions of men originate in their opinions.* 
Whatever we believe to have the strongest inducements in its behalf, that 
we infallibly choose and pursue. It is impossible that we should choose 
anything as evil. It is impossible that a man should perpetrate a crime 
in the moment that he sees it in all its enormity. In every example of this 
sort, there is a struggle between knowledge on the one side, and error or 
habit on the other. While the knowledge continues in all its vigour, the ill 
action cannot be perpetrated. In proportion as the knowledge escapes from 
the mind, and is no longer recollected, the error or habit may prevail. 
But it is reasonable to suppose that the permanence, as well as vigour, 
of our perceptions is capable of being increased to an indefinite extent. 
Knowledge in this sense, understanding by it a clear and undoubting ap­
prehension, such as no delusion can resist, is a thing totally different 
from what is ordinarily called by that name, from a sentiment seldom 
recollected, and, when it is recollected, scarcely felt or understood. * 
Book I, Chap. V.(PJ,'96,1,277-8)
It is important, finally, to consider how the revisions in Book I affected Godwin’s 
chapters in Book IV where he discusses the doctrine of necessity. (30) Because of 
the process of writing much of the later part of the first edition while earlier 
manuscripts were already with the publisher, Godwin found himself in some 
difficulties. Therefore, these chapters, in some ways, present the arguments 
on which the earlier chapters are based in that they examine and establish (in 
Godwin's view at least) the underlying necessitarian stance adopted in Book I. 
The result in 1793 is that one comes across the "proof underpinning the idea of 
perfectibility very late on. Also, itis justpossible to accept Godwin’s advice to pass 
over these chapters ( in a way that I have now indicated it is not possible to do in 
the second edition); but to do that is to change the effect of reading Political 
Justice. Forreadingthe'93 edition and accepting Godwin's advice to pass over 
these chapters undoubtedly gives the impression of a reformist rather than a 
philosophical work.
There are few revisions to these later chapters in 1796. Scrutiny of them shows
191
that the first three of this group, which deal with Godwin's psychology or, in his
own phrase, the "mechanism of the human mind", reveal very little change. And
yet, though most of this is simply a matter of "tidying up" by either making clear
the links between these chapters and Book I, Chapter V of the revised edition,
or deleting references to voluntary and involuntary actions which have been
overtaken by the expansion of these ideas in the earlier chapter, a key change
can be seen in the introductory paragraph to the chapter Of Free Will and
Necessity. For, whereas Godwin simply stated in 1793 that it would not
however be useless to pause in this place, in order to consider those 
general principles of the human mind, which are most intimately con­
nected with the topics of political reasoning. (PJ,'93,1,284)
in 1796 his aim is stated much more clearly:
It remains to turn our attention to the other branch of the subject proposed 
to be investigated in the present book; the mode in which, from the 
structure of the human mind, opinion is found to operate in modifying the 
conduct of individuals.(PJ,'96,1,364)
This change sums up the effect of the two groups of chapters in the respective
editions, and points once again (despite Godwin's rather unwise retention in '96
of the note to the above quotation still inviting readers "indisposed to abstruse
speculations" to pass over these chapters) the importance of these chapters in
Book IV, since it is largely from this necessitarian stance and the psychology
Godwin has now set in place to underpin it that he will base his process of
reform. Thus, I would contend that it is only in the full context of the revised
Political Justice that Book IV, Chapters VII to XI take on their full role and
prominence; and this undoubtedly significantly alters the impact of this second
edition in comparison with the first.
For any reader of Godwin's second edition of Political Justice, the effect of the
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revisions is marked; as I have said, to read the second edition is a different 
experience from reading the first. The obvious changes in tone, the more phil­
osophic milieu would seem, in fact, justify to some degree De Quincey's 
much-criticised comments, without undermining the general critical view that 
Godwin did not fundamentally alter the principles of his argument. (31)
As a nascent "man of letters" (like De Quincey), Wordsworth would, no doubt, 
have been sensitive to these changes, as the brief recorded reaction to the Preface 
to the second edition suggests. As we shall see, the increasingly philosophic 
stance, Godwin's efforts to create a psychology for his view of moral improve­
ment, and the impression of the increasing confidence in reason in the revised 
work became a focus for Wordsworth as he approached his next major work : 
The Borderers.
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Part 2: The Borderers.
In approaching The Borderers, it is important to be aware of the developing 
context of this argument. Godwin's Caleb Williams has been seen not just as a 
fictionalising of the first edition of Political Justice, but as an extension, and, to 
some extent, a testing of those ideas, particularly in the key areas of the relation­
ship between reason and feeling, and the perception of truth through the vagaries 
of opinion. It is partly following upon this experience and what he learned from 
it that Godwin developed and consolidated his ideas in the major revisions to 
the second edition of Political Justice (the revisions to the thirdedition of 1798 
were minor). Only in this context, aware of Wordsworth's consciousness of these 
developments in Godwin's thought as he read the philosopher's works (and, 
doubtless, discussed his ideas in the early stages of their acquaintance), can we 
understand both the conscious literary experiment(32) and Words worth's failure 
in The Borderers. For the purpose of this chapter is not to see The Borderers 
as a "final rejection" of rationalistic enquiry as represented in the figure of Godwin 
(its most famous contemporary exponent); it is, rather, to offer a view of the 
play which recognises that Wordsworth's attempt in it to challenge Godwin's 
fundamental belief in private judgement as the premise to his perfectibilian vision 
is rendered invalid as a criticism (never mind rejection) of "Godwinism" due to 
Wordsworth's conscious removal of benevolence from the character and 
motivation of the protagonist, Rivers, and his separation of reason and feeling. 
This, along with the dramatic failures in the structure and conflicts of the play, 
leaves Wordsworth, like Mortimer, isolated and undecided: an essential
prelude to the poetic statement and vision of the 1798 Lyrical Ballads and,
furthermore, to the resolution of that inconclusiveness that came only with the 
process of re-invention in The Prelude of 1805.
In order to examine The Borderers adequately, therefore, it will be necessary to 
investigate four key areas. Once again, Wordsworth's own statements on the play 
and his intentions in writing it must be questioned: relevant to this will be the 
date of the play's composition. It will then be important to examine the role 
of Caleb Williams as a principal source. Finally, it is necessary to examine 
Wordsworth's central moral intention and literary achievement as a response 
to the revised second edition of Political Justice. Through this final stage of the 
argument of this chapter, the emerging literary crisis that becomes the legacy 
of Wordsworth's experiment will emerge.
It is also important early on to note that it is not the intention to claim here that 
Godwin's ideas or that the second edition of Political Justice and Caleb Williams 
are the only sources for The Borderers. Clearly, Shakespeare's Othello. Lear and 
(to a lesser extent) Macbeth are sources, as, indeed is Wordsworth's own Frag­
ment of a Gothic Tale: and such sources, where appropriate, are acknowledged 
(just as Schiller's The Robbers is considered as an important source). The 
importance of Caleb Williams as a source has certainly not been adequately 
recognised; (33) neither has the second edition of Political Justice and the impact 
of its revisions been adequately acknowledged as the statement of Godwin's 
ideas to which Wordsworth was responding in The Borderers.
Commentary on the play abounds(34) offering contradictory views regarding the
central concerns of the play, and how good (or, more often, how bad) it really is.
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That the play is neither consistently good drama nor poetry is clear; but to 
condemn it as a complete failure is unfair. Even an initial reading shows some 
passages of great power, and the creation of Rivers deserves more recognition 
as an achievement than as some shadow of Iago;(35) whatever Rivers is or 
represents, ultimately, he is not Iago.(36)
Of considerable relevance is the version of the play to be considered; for the 
purposes of an examination of the Godwin-Wordsworth relationship and the role 
of this in Wordsworth's development, the relevant text is the earliest possible 
complete version of the play. (37) Although the differences in the text completed 
in 1797 and that which was to result from Wordsworth's revisions in 1841- 
42 are notparticularly extensive, they are significant; especially when considering 
the overall pattern of minor amendments in addition to the more substantive 
changes in Act I,i, (affecting III,iv),II,ii, IV,ii, and the most important changes 
in the final scene of the play.(38) The pattern of Wordsworth's changes can be 
seen to relate to three key issues: his wish, in the revised text to remedy some of 
the weaknesses of psychology and motivation in his early version of the play 
(reflecting also what he claims to have intended in his Preface to the play); a 
tendency to "tone down" some of the more overt Godwinian themes in the play 
and the language in which these are sometimes presented; and, especially in 
the revision of the conclusion of the play, a change from Caleb Williams as his 
source (which, by the time he had written the play, he probably recognised as 
over-restrictive, though there are other reasons for this change in, for example, 
the introduction of the idea of expiation).
W ordsworth's commentary on The Borderers: (i) the 1842 and Fenwick
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Notes
Wordsworth's principal comments on the play are to be found in his notes,(39) 
and, more significantly, following its discovery,(40) the Preface to the Borderers. 
(41)
To take the notes first, the most significant comments by Wordsworth concern 
"sin and crime" and the play being yet another reaction to his dismay over the reign 
of terror which emerged out of the French Revolution,(42) the latter idea being 
repeated in the Fenwick note. (43) Whilst not doubting that Wordsworth's 
reaction to the French Revolution played some role in the composition of this 
play, this scarcely explains the ingenious and impressive creation of Rivers. As 
tothe tendency of "sin andcrime" being "aptto start from their opposite qualities", 
this is a gross over-simplification of the exceedingly complex (if not always 
successful) portrayal of motivation and circumstance in the play. This is again 
suggestive of Wordsworth's anxiety to obscure some of the very real and complex 
struggles in the development of his thought and his poetic philosophy and vision, 
especially where these have involved the theoretical principles of a figure such 
as Godwin. Perhaps the statement which comes nearest to a true reflection of the 
depths of this drama is his reference to the Preface,(44) which, I feel, is a more 
just but still inadequate comment upon the play itself. But what is clear from any 
reading of the notes is, again, Wordsworth's lack of any reference to Godwin; 
no critic today can seriously doubt the existence of a "Godwinian element" in the 
play; yet, as with The Prelude. Wordsworth, in his reflective comments on the 
play, studiously refuses to acknowledge this.
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The other important point which is made at length in the Fenwick note, one which
has received inadequate attention from commentators, is Wordsworth's assertion
that he had not written the play for the stage, but to be read. (45). Scrutiny of the
text vindicates this statement, which is an important clue to the nature of the
"experiment" Wordsworth was attempting in writing this play. Such a view
of the play as a conscious "experiment" puts in doubt Wordsworth's claim in The
Prelude that in his attempts
"to probe 
The living body of society 
Even to the heart." (1805,X,874-76)
he
"pushed without remorse 
[His] speculations forward,. . . "  (1805 ,X,876-7)
It is not adequate to see this as a summary expression of remorse for his period
of rationalistic enquiry and its effects upon his developing poetic consciousness.
(ii) The Preface to the Borderers.
The Preface to the Borderers, is undoubtedly, a more problematic document. 
Accurate dating seems impossible(46) and one would have to agree with the view 
that it was written after the play since, many of the arguments derive from the 
play itself. Yet, at times, one wonders how Wordsworth could write this Preface 
in response to the completed play.
The Preface is not a true reflection of the dramatic structure of the play; for though 
Rivers is the key and dominant character, he is not the central figure of the play. 
That role belongs to Mortimer. The Preface almost totally ignores the part played
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by Mortimer and certainly gives no attention to the equally substantial roles of 
Herbert and Matilda. Given the original intention of the Preface, as one of a series 
of essays on the principal characters of the play,(47) this is understandable; 
however, as a result, the Preface is not a valid guide to the experience of the play 
as a whole.
However, I would contend that it does act as a guide to Wordsworth’s 
intentions, to his particular interest in the play; at the same time, pointing to some 
of the weaknesses of the play. For instance, despite the description of Rivers at 
the beginning of the Preface as having "master passions" of "pride and love of 
distinction"(48) (further amplified a few lines further on in the Preface(49)). the 
play itself fails to establish any such sense of "pride and love of distinction". 
At times Rivers (in a manner reminiscent of Iago) indicates his jealousy of 
Mortimer, and there are, of course, his speeches in Act IV where he describes 
how he came to despise and see the falseness of pride and popularity, but these 
outbursts are few, and this aspect of his character is not consistently sustained. 
However, the description in the Preface and Rivers' temporary withdrawal into 
solitude and subsequent return with malevolent intentions, point to a principal 
source of Wordsworth's initial ideas on his characters and plot: Caleb Williams 
and the character of Falkland with his "ungovemed passion" of "honour". 
Moreover, this is a source which can be demonstrated more persuasively than 
some of Wordsworth's other claims. For example, Wordsworth's arguments on 
the innate attractivnes of "vice"(29-41) are difficult to follow and the sources 
of his ideas suggest some confusion on his part. (50).
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What is most puzzling, however, is the premise from which Wordsworth begins. 
If The Borderers and the Preface are intended as a rejection of Godwin's central 
beliefs, then given Godwin's belief in benevolence and its role in the process of 
motivation, evident throughout the second edition of Political Justice, (and 
present in the first edition, though admittedly less clearly explicated), to show 
reason working without benevolent motivation, is scarcely to present a valid 
criticism of Godwin.(51) It is in fact in statements such as "He presses truth and 
falsehood into the same service" that Wordsworth occasionally touches upon 
the central theme of his play and its relationship to Godwin's belief in the power 
of reason in the perception of truth and rejection of error.This, as I intend 
to show, is at the heart of the experience of the play.
Yet Wordsworth soon veers away from this central issue of the play and turns 
to the rather speculative attempt to explain the motivation of the character of 
Rivers. Unlike some critics(52), I can find little(53) in the bulk of this argument 
except a rather obscure and tedious exposition of a very tenuous idea. (54) Where 
Moorman, particularly, has gone wrong is in trying to trace the source of these 
ideas back to some autobiographical incident; this is surely wrong for, by this 
stage in the Preface Wordsworth is drawing his psychological theory, if one 
might use that term, from the play, from the behaviour of Rivers. One effect 
is to further highlight Wordsworth's difficulty in coping with the areas of psy­
chological and moral motivation (those areas explored in Caleb Williams and 
given much greater attention in the revised Political Justice). Although Word­
sworth, by the time he wrote the Preface, would not have wished to reveal
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Godwin's works as a source for his play, it is possible to glimpse allusions to 
Godwin's necessitarianism(55) and his belief in the role of reason in the 
perception of truth and exposure of error:
Such a mind cannot but discover some truths,but he is unable to profit by
them,....
presses truth and falsehood into the same service. (70-72)
Wordsworth's Preface openly challenges the claims of Godwin for truth's ability 
to overcome the sophistry of error in the claims that Rivers has "a sophism for 
every crime."(line 60)
Dating of the Play.
Dating of composition is not the problem it once was. Though I am unwilling to 
accept the arguments MacGillvray(56) offers as a result of his dating of the 
play,(57) I think it does have to be accepted that the play was written between 
the autumn of 1796 and the spring of 1797. This is significant for three reasons. 
First, as the letter to Wrangham of 21st March, 1796 shows, Wordsworth had 
time to read at least some of the second edition of Political Justice. Secondly, 
composition went on for several months; not surprising in itself, but important to 
remember in light of inconsistencies evidenced in the earliest complete edition of 
the play. Finally, it should be remembered that The Borderers is Wordsworth's 
next significant composition after his extensive revisions to create Adventures 
on Salisbury Plain, the latter having been completed at the end of 1795, and 
having drawn upon Caleb Williams (most significantly, in how it reflects the 
psychological depth of Godwin's novel and also, of course, in the use of the 
"robbers" incident with Godwin's very ambivalent treatment of Caleb's moral
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response to this group)
It is also important to remember at this point that, after publication of his novel,
Godwin spent much of 1795 revising Caleb Williams as well as preparing the
second edition of Political Justice. Godwin's autobiographical notes for 1795
open with the following statement:
This and the following year were employed in revising my two works 
of Political Justice and Caleb Williams..
and he goes on to speak of his work on Political Justice and his "great earnestness
of diligence to reconsider its doctrines."(58). 1795 was also the year in which
Wordsworth had his earliest, most frequent, and probably most influential
personal contact with Godwin (see Appendix I to Chapter Three). Wordsworth
therefore had every opportunity to make himself familiar with both texts.
Caleb Williams as a Principal Source of The Borderers.
Having established Wordsworth's interest in Godwin's novel and the reflection 
in Adventures on Salisbury Plain of psychological (as well as moral) pre­
occupations, a continuing interest by Wordsworth in Godwin's work might not 
be unexpected. Yet critical opinion has seen little more than either rejection 
or unquestioning repetition of Godwin's ideas in The Borderers. (59) But the 
relationship between Wordsworth and Godwin is more complex, as are the links 
between the play and Godwin's novel. It is necessary to examine the links 
between the two texts both in terms of Wordsworth's drawings upon the plot and 
structure of Caleb Williams: and also his interest in the novel as a development 
from the first edition of Political Justice. The link between these two works
deserves some closer examination than it has been given to date. (60) Only in this
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context can we progress to examine The Borderers as a response to the revised 
Political Justice of 1796.
As already suggested, the Preface opens with a description which, in many ways, 
parallels Falkland, the man of "honour", of talent, of great intellectual ability, 
who suffers a public humiliation (at the hands ofTyrrel) and who commits 
a crime and retreats into solitude. Like Rivers, Falkland later decides to return 
to society, and to "reason" his way into disguising his guilt with a determination 
to visit the effects of his crime upon Caleb in a way that involves him in a sophistry 
of untruths. The links between the characters of Falkland and Rivers are strong 
enough to draw attention to Caleb Williams as a principal source for The 
Borderers: (certainly, I would contend, more so than Schiller's TheRobbers(61)).
As with Adventures on Salisbury Plain. Wordsworth's drawing on Caleb Williams 
involves more than either mere verbal echo or incidents of plot. As we have 
already seen in Wordsworth's reaction to Godwin's works, what he often 
attempts to adopt is Godwin's approach: for example, his manner of thought 
and argument as in Llandaff. or his presentation of reformist ideals or human 
psychology and morality as in the Salisbury Plain revisions up to 1795. So it is, 
that in examining Caleb Williams and The Borderers, five areas require explora­
tion: namely, the character of Falkland and "honour"; the presentation of 
motivation, where not only Falkland but aspects ofTyrrel and even Caleb become 
relevant (because Godwin spreads his presentation of the human psyche across 
these three characters); the setting of the play, particularly the use of the band of 
thieves once again; the use of "reason" to justify a crime (to the cost of another
character) and, finally, what I intend to show as truly central to The Borderers.
203
the question of truth and error.
(a) The Character of Falkland.
The Preface reminds us of Falkland in Wordsworth's description of Rivers' need
for "reasoned" malevolent action.(49-59) At the same time, Wordsworth's
comment that "the mild effusions of thought, the milk of human reason are
unknown to him" not only reminds us of this young man's lack of "any solid
principles of benevolence" (as asserted in the first sentence of the Preface), but
also of Caleb's statement whilst he is held by the robbers:
I found among them benevolence and kindness; they were strongly 
susceptible of emotions of generosity.. .(CW, 218)
as well as his later cry of despair,as a result of his isolation through the malevo­
lence of Falkland:
Sympathy, the magnetic virtue, the hidden essence of our life, was
extinct  This food, so essential to an intelligent existence seemed
perpetually renewing before me in its fairest colours, only the more 
effectually to elude my grasp, and to mock my hunger. (CW, 308)
Some passages from Godwin's novel seem to presage Wordsworth's conception
of The Borderers and the character of Rivers as described in the Preface to a quite
extraordinary degree; for example, Clare's warning to Falkland:
I am acquainted with your weaknesses as well as your strength. You have 
an impetuosity and an impatience of imagined dishonour, that, if once set 
wrong, may make you as eminently mischievous, as you will otherwise 
be useful. Think seriously of exterminating this error! (CW, 34)
A similar notion is presented in the play, as well as the Preface, first of all in
Mortimer's early speech:
I do more,
I honour him.(I,i,ll-12)(62)
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This is reminiscent of the novel since much of Godwin's presentation of 
Falkland's "honour" and his popularity comes through. Caleb's expression of his 
feelings for Falkland in rather similar terms.(63) Yet, after this, there is little in 
the play to substantiate what Wordsworth claims in the Preface regarding the 
motivation of Rivers, until the opening of Act IV where Rivers reveals the 
background to his motives and present actions. True, we have statements of 
considerable generosity by Rivers, for example, in his speech regarding 
Mortimer's band:
This band of ours 
Which you've collected for the noblest ends,. .  .(I,i,32-3)
However, evident to anyone reading the Preface and the play is the gap that exists
between Wordsworth's claims in the Preface and the dramatic presentation
of what we might call the "prehistory" (64) of Rivers' immediate motivation.
Wordsworth has failed in this aspect of River’s characterisation, so that, when
we eventually do come to Act IV and hear of the trick which resulted in the
adoption by Rivers of his moral stance, we' are scarcely convinced.(65) To
someone who has read Caleb Williams, the lapse is all the more glaring; and one
that has serious implications for the play as a whole. Whatever Wordsworth thinks
regarding his presentation of a figure with "master passions" of "pride and love
of distinction" (as stated in the Preface!, in the play itself, he has failed to realise
this adequately. The reason for this is partly Wordsworth's difficulty in coming
to terms with matters of dramatic characterisation; but also his inability to cope,
in any sustained manner, with the presentation of human motivation. The
possibilities of the novel form with its lengthy passages of reflective prose and
the relationship this creates with the reader are not available to the dramatist; so
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in drawing so heavily upon Godwin's novel, Wordsworth has created a difficulty 
for himself.
(b)The Presentation of Motivation in the Play
The portrayal of Falkland, Tyrrel and Caleb is achieved principally through what 
each thinks; what they do generally simply points many of Godwin's didactic 
themes or forwards the plot. Hence the accusation that can be levelled at the 
novel that, despite its triumphs of characterisation, it does, at times, suffer from 
over-didacticism and a rather creaking plot. A reading of The Borderers shows, 
to some extent, a similar pattern. The motivations of Rivers and the responses of 
Mortimer tower over, for example, the exchanges between Mortimer and Idonea, 
and Herbert and Matilda,(66) and even over much of the action of the play. This 
reflects Wordsworth's interest in human motivation with particular regard to 
moral issues.
In places, Rivers' motivation and his careful contriving of what is to become 
Mortimer's downfall is reminiscent of Godwin's carefully developed account of 
the rivalry between Falkland and Tyrrel and the motivations of the latter, for 
example:
But, though he could not openly resent this rebellion against his 
authority, he brooded over it in the recesses of a malignant mind; and 
it was evident enough that he was accumulating materials for a bitter 
account, to which he trusted his adversary one day should be brought.
(CW, 23)
In the same vein, another of several possible examples, are the words ofTyrrel:
The scoundrel knows his pitiful advantages, and insults me upon them 
without ceasing. He is my rival and my persecutor.(CW, 54)
Though Wordsworth's intentions are different as far as details of theme and plot
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are concerned, it is such reminders of the manner of Godwin’s presentation
of motivation that we see in Wordsworth's attempts:
They chose him for their chief! - 1 had a gnawing 
More of contempt than hatred!- Shame on me,
'Twas a dull spark - a most unnatural [?fire].
- It died the moment the air breathed upon it.(II,i,l-4)
Here we can see both the strength and the weakness of what Wordsworth is 
doing. We can see that Rivers is not Falkland; nor is he Iago.(67) Rivers goes 
beyond Iago in his detachment, his self-conscious awareness of his motives. 
Similarly, we see in the passage quoted above how Rivers is a bold and exciting 
development of Falkland in his recognition of the paltry nature of his jealousy 
and his sense of anger at his earlier loss of status.(68) It is here that the impli­
cations of Wordsworth’s failure to realise fully what was earlier referred to as 
the "prehistory" of Rivers' immediate motives emerge; for the pride and "sickly 
food of popular applause "(V, ii, 150-1) that he now despises seems scarcely 
realised in the play, and hence detracts from the dramatic impact of Rivers' 
rejection of such motives. (Even the 1842 revision, adding
False shame discarded, spurious Fame despised,
Twin sisters both of Ignorance,... (IV, 1834-5)
does not help, since the weakness is in the early portrayal of Rivers' character
and motivation.)
Though the reason for this lies principally in Wordsworth's inadequate dramatic 
powers, it is possible to identify an emerging pattern. Wordsworth, in the play 
as first conceived, draws upon Caleb Williams, but fails to sustain the psycho­
logical strength of that source; at the same time, he tries again to develop the
idea beyond Godwin's conception. Falkland's loss of benevolent intention and
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sincerity is carefully developed by Godwin; Rivers’ is simply assumed at the 
start of the play with a rather inadequate explanation towards the end. In this 
way, Wordsworth draws upon,and then tries to develop from Godwin's novel, but 
becomes entrapped by the restrictions of his original source.
(c) The Setting of the Play.
In the Fenwick note, Wordsworth states:
As to the scene and period of action, little more was required for my 
purpose than the absence of established law and government; so that the 
agents might be at liberty to act on their own impulses - nevertheless, I do 
remember that, having a wish to colour the manners in some degree from 
. local history more than my knowledge enabled me to do, I read Redpath's 
'History of the Borders', but found there nothing to my purpose.(69)
The play is set around the time of the "Dictum of Kenilworth"(October 31st, 
1266) - as opposed to Wordsworth's more general setting of "the reign of Henry 
III"; but this fact, deduced from the reference to Herbert's restored lands,(70) 
is scarcely relevant. Wordsworth's lack of a realised setting is important; (71) for 
it shows that his interest in political reform(72) has been subordinated to a focus 
on the motivation of the individual (parallelling Godwin's developing interest 
in both his novel and the revisions to Political Justice) within a social context. But 
that social context is very scantily realised. Despite what Wordsworth says in 
the Fenwick note about the need for an "absence of established law and govern­
ment", the play would scarcely have suffered without this particular setting.
The reason is clear: the only "colour" Wordsworth is really interested in is not 
historical, social or local, but moral; and his source for the band of robbers has 
again been Caleb Williams. For Godwin's band of thieves also lived in a moral 
"limbo":
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He listened to my story with eagerness, and commented on the several 
parts as I related them. He said that this was only one fresh instance of the 
tyranny and perfidiousness exercised by the powerful members of the 
community against those who were less privileged than themselves. 
Nothing could be more clear than their readiness to sacrifice the human 
species at large to their meanest interest or wildest caprice. Who that saw 
the situation in its true light would wait till their oppressors thought fit to 
decree their destruction, and not take arms in their defence while it was 
yet in their power? Which was more meritorious, the unresisting and 
dastardly submission of a slave, or the enterprise and gallantry of the man 
who dared to assert his claims? Since by the partial administration of our 
laws innocence, when power was armed against it, had nothing better 
to hope for than guilt, what man of true courage would fail to set these laws 
at defiance, and, if he must suffer by their injustice, at least take care 
that he had first shown his contempt of their yoke? For himself he should 
certainly never have embraced his present calling, had he not been 
stimulated to it by these cogent and irresistable reasons; and he hoped, 
as experience had so forcibly brought a conviction of this sort to my mind, 
that he should for the future have the happiness to associate me to his 
pursuits.- It will presently be seen with what event these hopes were 
attended. (CW, 220)
As in the case of Adventures on Salisbury Plain, it is the potential moral
ambiguity in a group of people doing what is, by conventional moral criteria,
"wrong", but in a situation which changes the moral perspective on their actions
which intrigued Wordsworth in Godwin's novel. Ultimately, of course, Caleb
does reject what the robbers are doing, but only after much heart-searching.
This reminds us of Wordsworth's use of this moral ambiguity in the complex
relationship between what the borderers are doing, their avowed intentions
(particularly Mortimer's), and Herbert's criticisms:
My child, forgetful of the name of Herbert 
Had given her love to a base freebooter 
Who here, upon the borders of the Tweed,
Doth prey alike on two distracted countries,
Traitor to both.(I,ii, 174-8)
There is the added complication that the strongest praise of the borderers'moral
stance comes from Rivers, whose falsehood is already clear:
this band of ours,
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Which you've collected for the noblest ends,
Here on the savage confines of the Tweed
To guard the innocent, - he calls us outlaws,. .  .(I,i,32-5)
One cannot help but admire what Wordsworth is doing here as he pushes the
moral ambiguity even further through these levels of deceit. Yet, ultimately, the
setting of the band is not successful because it soon ceases to be relevant; and
though it is sustained to some degree, it is inconsistent as a backcloth to Rivers'
motivation.
Why? Because Wordsworth's attention is being turned increasingly upon the 
individual and his motivation, as reflected in the Preface.(73) Though it is 
possible to trace some similarities between the borderers and Rivers, and the 
thieves in Caleb Williams and the expelled Gines. it is clear that once again 
Wordsworth turns away from his original source, as far as the setting of the play 
is concerned. (74)
Wordsworth, however, has now turned his attention to the more central themes 
of Caleb Williams, the exploration and presentation of human motivation, 
which, as shown (in Part 1 of this chapter), is the principal focus of Godwin's 
revisions in Political Justice. It is important, at this point, that the developmental 
relationship between the first edition of Political Justice. Caleb Williams and the 
revised Political Justice of 1796 be stressed. For Wordsworth has been aware 
of the manner in which Caleb Williams tested some of the particularly idealistic 
assumptions of the first edition of Political Justice: a process to which he has 
responded positively by his decision to attempt the experiment of The Borderers. 
But, in his play, what he sets out to test, above all, is how Godwin, despite the 
experience of writing a novel in which he plainly tested his earlier theorisings
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such as the omnipotence of truth, can, in the more soundly empirical context 
of the second edition of Political Justice, retain his belief in the power of truth 
and the role of reason in the perception of truth. In view of this, further study 
of the play must therefore be in the context of both of Godwin's works.
(d) Reason "versus" Sophistry.
Perhaps the most effective way of pointing the relationship between Words­
worth's play and Godwin's second edition of Political Justice is by focussing 
upon another quotation from the added Chapter V to Book I, where Godwin 
posits the first of the his well-known "five propositions":
Soundreasoning and truth, when adequately communicated, must always 
be victorious over error;. . .
and then continues:
The first of these propositions is so evident that it needs only be stated 
in order to the being universally admitted. Is there anyone who can 
imagine that, when sound argument and sophistry are fairly brought 
into comparison, the victory can be doubtful? Sophistry may assume 
a plausible appearance, and contrive to a certain extent to bewilder 
the understanding. But it is one of the prerogatives of tru th , to follow 
it in its mazes and strip of it disguise, (my emphasis)
The relationship here to the earlier Caleb Williams could not be clearer. Godwin
goes on:
Nor does any difficulty from this consideration interfere with the 
establishment of the present proposition. We suppose truth not merely to 
be exhibited, but adequately communicated; that is, in other words, dis­
tinctly apprehended by the person to whom it is addressed. In this case the 
victory is too sure to admit of being controverted by the most inveterate 
scepticism. (PJ,'96,1,87-8)
The relevance to The Borderers is surely equally obvious; for the play can be seen
as an experiment in which Wordsworth tests Godwin's belief in "truth" and the
role of reason in perception of truth, in particular, the relationship between truth's
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ultimate power over "sophistry", and the assumption of truth being "adequately 
communicated" (which Godwin has explained as meaning "distinctly appre­
hended"). It is the confident assumption that still lies behind Godwin's con ­
cession regarding the apprehension of truth that Wordsworth intends to question. 
For, in the more sustained empirical context of Political Justice 1796, and 
following upon the experience of Caleb Williams, the ability of truth to be 
"distinctly apprehended" in the face of opinion (often conflicting opinion, as 
Godwin's novel demonstrated so effectively) is an assumption that Wordsworth 
considers worth challenging. Caleb's experience in the novel, in fact, does not 
reflect the rather naive assertion of the power of truth as quoted above from the 
second edition of Political Justice: and it was exactly this that Wordsworth had 
recognised. What he wished to do in The Borderers, therefore, was not simply 
to draw attention to the weakness of such a theoretical moral and philosophical 
stance, but to put it to the test in his play. (75)
It is essential, to be aware of Wordsworth's conscious intent in the play; his
drawing upon Godwin is neither peripheral nor incidental, it is central. This can
be shown in many ways, but perhaps the most glaring example is to be found in
Rivers' statement in Act ID:
Now, if I were a moralist 
I should make wonderous revolutions here.
It were a quaint experiment to shew 
The beauty of truth (III,v,143-6)(76)
Though this speech has some tenuous link to the immediate context, it stands out
(almost clumsily) to such an extent that Wordsworth's reference in the Preface
to Rivers becoming a "speculator in morals" is clearly an insufficient explanation.
More relevant is my point already made from the Fenwick note that Wordsworth
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intended the play to be read rather than acted. For the challenge of the lines above 
belongs only tenuously to Rivers' character: it is Wordsworth's challenge to 
his readers. A challenge to sift the text of his play at their leisure, as only a reader 
can do, in order to understand the fundamental structure of his play, which points 
the focus of Wordsworth's central concern.
(e) Truth and Error
That structure is related to the principal theme: of truth and error, and the difficulty 
of perception of truth through received opinion. (77). The importance of this 
theme in Wordsworth's play is overtly stated in Rivers' famous early lines in the 
play, the enigmatic reply to Mortimer's question:
Mort. The wild rose, and the poppy, and the night-shade-
Which is your favourite, Rivers?
Rivers That which, while it is
Strong to destroy,is also strong to heal.(I,i,17-19)
This may be partly a reference to Rivers' own experiences, but the ambiguity and
balancing of contraries(78) here is only the first of many throughout the play
which point the theme of truth and error and the role of of reason in perceiving
both. It is Godwin's assertions as to the power of truth and his unquestioning belief
that it will always, through reason, triumph (expressed so often particularly in
the second edition of Political Justice!, that Wordsworth is testing. In doing so,
he draws heavily upon Godwin's own test of his ideas in Caleb Williams in order
to challenge Godwin's confident assumptions in the second edition of Political
Justice. His play focuses upon the conflict between truth and error, and the
difficulty of distinguishing the two in the absence of unambiguous evidence
and faced with conflicting opinions.(79) The dramatic structure of the play
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therefore hinges on the central issue of truth and error (it is worth noting that 
the word "truth" occurs remarkably frequently, and the word "error" is also used 
on several significant occasions(80)).
A view of the structure of this drama might be presented thus:
Rivers Mortimer Herbert and Matilda
(whose initial motivation
originates in his "betrayal"
and "deception" -i.e.error,
which he failed to perceive)
Mortimer Herbert Matilda
Herbert Lacy Mortimer/Rivers(81)
This pattern explains the principal action of the play and conflicts of the drama.
The character "in the middle", so to speak, seeks to perceive the truth, and is
faced by conflicting opinions, supported by evidence. Mortimer seeks the truth
about the relationship between Herbert and Matilda and has to judge between
what he has known and thinks he still knows, on the one hand, and, on the other,
the evidence of Rivers (cunningly presented), which offers an alternative opinion
and erroneous picture. Herbert (whose physical blindness is also symbolic)
is distressed over Matilda's attachment to Mortimer whom he perceives to be
a Freebooter, and at whose hands he is to experience even greater suffering;
yet it is Matilda who presents the alternative view. The matter of Lacy is
perhaps a minor one, but is nevertheless important in the way it reinforces the
pattern identified here, as Lacy must judge between what he has believed earlier
concerning Herbert, and Mortimer's account (the real source, being, of course,
Rivers'deception). Here, indeed, we have "opinion contending with opinion, and
judgement with judgement".(PJ,'96,I,72)
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What gives the Lacy incident greater importance is the fact that Lacy makes the
one suggestion that Rivers sees as a real threat to his plans:
To the camp 
He shall be led, and there, the country round 
All gathered to the spot, in open day 
He shall be sacrificed. (II,iii,425-8)
Lacy's suggested "revenge" is rather too impetuous, butit causes Mortimer to take
up the idea of bringing Herbert back to the camp to face some sort of inquiry
(though not a legal trial):
He shall be brought 
Before the camp, and would that good and just 
Of every age might there be present.-There 
His crimes shall be proclaimed-and for the rest,
It shall be done as wisdom shall decide- (II,iii,430-4)(82)
Significantly, this idea closes the action of the second Act, and in the opening
of the third we immediately see it taken up again in Rivers' lengthy speech.
(ID,ii, 1-32) This is is a very confusing speech; the first few lines show the link
with Lacy's and Mortimer's idea when Rivers says of the intention to carry
Herbert back to the camp:
This last device must end my work-(ffl,ii,4)(83)
Rivers is afraid of such a meeting. Why? The answer lies in Political Justice and
also Godwin's novel.
What Rivers fears most is that the band, when they witness a confrontation
between Herbert and Mortimer, will uncover the truth.(84) But how? We have
to go back to Godwin and also to that long speech by Rivers on matters of
"passion" and "proof. In Caleb Williams. Caleb eventually perceives the truth
concerning the innocence of Hawkins from a combination of feeling and factual
evidence, through his suspicions regarding Falkland's behaviour after the
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murder of Tyrrel and, more important, through his strong feelings of doubt
regarding such a character as Hawkins being capable of committing murder
-such doubts having been raised by Caleb's reading of Hawkins' letter.(CW,l 15)
Then, there is Falkland's own confession which Caleb recognises as the truth.
(CW, 119-120) It is an interaction of feeling and reason rather than the earlier use
of reason alone in the pursuit of Caleb which produces his admission of guilt.
This, of course, accords with Godwin's view of the relationship between reason
and feeling in the second edition of Political Justice:
We are no longer at liberty to consider man as divided between two 
independent principles, or to imagine that his inclinations are in any case 
inaccessible through the medium of his reason;(PJ,'96,I,80)(85)
With regard to his first division of the idea of "passion", Godwin says:
In the first sense it has sufficiently appeared that none of our sensations, 
or, which is the same thing, none of our ideas, are unaccompanied 
with a consciousness of pleasure or pain; consequently all our volitions 
are attended with complacence or aversion. In this sense without all doubt 
passion cannot be eradicated; but in this sense alsopassion is so far from 
being incompatible with reason, that it is inseparable from it. Virtue, 
sincerity, justice,and all those principles which are begotten and cherished 
in us by a due exercise of reason, will never be very strenuously espoused, 
till they are ardently loved; that is, till their value is clearly perceived and 
adequately understood. In this sense nothing is necessary, but to show 
that a thing is truly good and worthy to be desired, in order to excite in 
us a passion for its attainment. (PJ,96,1,82)
Yet Wordsworth has Rivers construe reason and passion as antithetical(86):
-Methinks 
It were a pleasant pastime to construct 
A scale and table of belief - as thus - 
Two columns, one for passion, one for proof;
Each rises as the other falls...(in,ii,5-8) (87)
We see here Wordsworth's interest in consciously exploring moral issues
presented in the very thin guise of Rivers as a speculator on moral matters.
However, despite this seperaration of reason and feeling, Wordsworth does two
things. He does not allow the confrontation Mortimer has suggested (and which
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Rivers fears) to take place; therefore, he does not test Godwin's confidence in the 
perception of truth in the way that Godwin had done in Caleb Williams. Secondly, 
such a division invalidates much of Wordsworth's challenge to Godwin’s ideas. 
(Perhaps Wordsworth had forseen this, and hence did not proceed with 
Mortimer's suggestion, for it would have been dramatically unsound to try to 
replicate Godwin's presentation of the revelation of truth.) Hence, Wordsworth's 
literary crisis begins to emerge.
The Borderers: Wordsworth’s challenge to the revisions of Political Justice
It is now appropriate to consider the nature of Wordsworth's experiment, and his
challenge to the revised Political Justice of 1796. A challenge as significant
in its literary implications as in its moral and philosophic assumptions. In
considering this, I intend to examine, first, the nature of Wordsworth's moral and
philosophic challenge as it focuses on the central theme of perception of truth
and rejection of error. It will at once be necessary to examine also the dramatic
failures and consequent distortion of that challenge, particularly the imbalance
between the portrayal of truth and error resulting from these failures. As a result,
the traditionally held view of an emergent "moral crisis" must itself be challenged
by the possibility of a literary crisis being the real consequence of Wordsworth's
experiment. The sheer power of the presentation of Rivers must be further
examined; and the validity of its potential as a challenge to Godwin's confidence
in the role of reason reconsidered in the context of those dramatic failures. So also,
the effect upon the intended dramatic conflict of the separation of reason and
feeling must be re-considered. Only in light of all of this can the isolation of
Mortimer and the inconclusiveness of the ending of the play in its original form
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be interpreted.
To see The Borderers as either a rejection of or advocating Godwin's ideas in 
Political Justice (without either specifying the edition of Political Justice 
concerned or recognising the role of Caleb Willi amsl is oversimplistic and wrong. 
The play, consciously experimental, often prone to weakness, is also courageous 
and critical to Wordsworth's development.(88) The Borderers is an attempt by 
Wordsworth to examine the ideas of Godwin and work out their implications, 
both morally, and in terms of his own relation to them. The use of Godwin's novel 
as a source(89) has been a conscious decision because Wordsworth is interested 
in exploring Godwin's ideas by taking them further, as Godwin himself did with 
his novel, consolidating this in the second edition of Political Justice.
Wordsworth's Moral Challenge
The nature of Wordsworth's moral challenge can best be seen in Wordsworth's
description of the character of Rivers:
a young man of great intellectual powers, yet without any solid principles 
of genuine benevolence.(Preface, 1-2)
This Rivers is most certainly seen to be in the play. Yet such an idea runs totally
contrary to Godwin's ideas, as expressedin the second edition of Political Justice.
Godwin states quite clearly:
Morality is nothing else but a calculation of consequences, and an 
adoption of that mode of conduct which, upon the most comprehensive 
view, appears to be attended with a balance of general pleasure and 
happiness.(PJ,'96,I,344)
This linking of morality and utilitarian benevolence permeates the revised
Political Justice: there could be no question of Wordsworth not noticing this. One
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of the many lengthy discussions of benevolence occurs in the chapter and app­
endices on the subject of "sincerity", which were subject to revisions and which 
underline the central role of sincerity in Godwin's ideas. For, in a sense, reason 
is not the foundation of Godwin's perfectibilian and moral stance: rather 
sincerity, the process of acting on the basis of truth perceived, is what will 
bring benefit and improvement to mankind. Though the quality of argument on 
the subject of sincerity is often weak, and even assumptive, it is central to 
Godwin's moral and perfectibilian vision:
Above all, Rivers lacks sincerity. Consider this passage from Godwin’s revised
chapter on sincerity:
The value of sincerity will be still further illustrated by a brief consid­
eration of the nature of insincerity.......Its features are neither like virtue,
nor compatible with virtue. The sensations it obliges us to undergo are of 
the most odious nature. Its direct business is to cut off all commerce
between the heart and the tongue  We must be upon our guard, or
our cheeks will be covered with a conscious blush, the aukwardness of our 
gestures will betray us, and our lips will falter with their unwonted task. 
Such is the issue of the first attempt, not merely of the liar, but of him 
who practises concealment, or whose object is to put the change upon the
person with whom he happens to converse  We are not, as at first,
detected by the person from whom we intended to hold what we knew; but
we fear detection. We feel uncertainty and confusion; ...... Is it thus a
man ought to feel? At last perhaps we become consummate in hypocrisy, 
and feel the same confidence and alacrity in duplicity that we before felt 
in entire frankness. Which, to an ordinary eye, would appear the man of 
virtue; he who, by the depth of his hypocrisy, contrived to keep his secret 
wholly unsuspected, or he who was precipitate enough to be thus misled, 
and to believe that his neighbour made use of words for the purpose of 
being understood? (PJ,'96,I,338-9)
This reminds us in many ways of Rivers, above all, of his confidence in his
"duplicity". Rivers has indeed "cut off all commerce between the heart and the
tongue"; and, as pointed out, he feared the "unexpected occurrence" (ofLacy's and
Mortimer's suggestion that Herbert be brought to the camp) that would "fail to
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maintain the delusion" Rivers had "imposed". Mortimer of course believed that 
Rivers "made use of words for the purpose of being understood". But because of 
Rivers' sophistry and deceit, what was not communicated (as Godwin assumes 
it will be) was "truth".(90)
Wordsworth has gone to almost clumsy lengths to inform the reader of Rivers' 
deception; it is essential to Wordsworth that the reader is constantly aware of how 
the beliefs and "truths" of Mortimer, Herbert, Lacy, Matilda and the beggar 
woman are constantly being undermined by the untruths of Rivers' machina­
tions.^!.) What we are in fact witnessing is Wordsworth's reaction to statements 
by Godwin such as that quoted earlier, in which Godwin claims that, as far as 
sophistry is concerned, "it is one of the prerogatives of truth to... strip it of 
disguise". Wordsworth's intention in his play is to test this idea and demonstrate 
that, in this case at least, sophistry does overcome truth. Wordsworth is putting 
to the test Godwin's confidence in the role of reason, by consciously attempting 
to create a conflict between Rivers, who possesses neither the characteristics of 
benevolence nor of sincerity,but clearly does have a powerful rational perception, 
and Mortimer, portrayed and recognised by other characters in the play as 
possessing the characteristics of benevolence and sincerity - a sincerity, of 
course, based upon the the benevolent application of reason. Wordsworth was 
more than aware, that, according to Godwin, reason and benevolence, accompa­
nied by sincerity, should triumph.
The Failures of the Dramatic Challenge.
From the start, this experiment seems doomed to failure. As in the case of Rivers'
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pride and love of distinction, and also the setting of the play, Wordsworth's 
dramatic abilities are simply not up to the task of creating a character of ben­
evolence and sincerity who is equal to his opponent (a fact he clearly recognised, 
as can be seen in his revisions to the play).(92) Though there are moving and 
credible moments in Mortimer's mental turmoil, part of the reason lies with 
Godwin, who has carefully argued the nature and role of reason (on which 
Wordsworth can draw), but whose trust in a natural benevolence in man is 
based on unargued assumption. Even the arguments in favour of sincerity seem 
shallow, and would not offer to Wordsworth such a rich source as Chapters IV 
and V of Book I on motivation and the role of reason therein.
Hence, his attention is drawn to those chapters, to the much expanded empirical 
and necessitarian stance.(93) Mortimer is confronted with external circumstances 
and with opinions that are conflicting; additionally, many of the circumstances 
are the inventions of Rivers. So, truth and error are constantly played off against 
each other in the play, and Wordsworth points a potentially serious challenge 
to the empirical basis of Godwin's perfectibilian view; for, if truth cannot 
perceive such inventions, and we are so subject to circumstances, then we are at 
the mercy of such manipulation. But, mainly through Wordsworth's dramatic 
failings, error dominates throughout most of the play, ironically as a result 
of the care he has lavished upon Rivers' machinations and speeches. As a result, 
Wordsworth appears simply to have "loaded the dice" against Godwin's faith in 
truth from the start of the play. This militates against a realised dramatic conflict, 
and therefore the literary flaws undermine the potential of the moral challenge. 
Wordsworth's use of "truth" and "error" is too obvious to miss:
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Rivers Nay, Mortimer, I prithee be not hasty,
For sometimes, in despite of my conviction,
He tempted me to think the story true;
'Tis plain he loves the girl, and what he said 
That savoured of aversion to thy name 
Appeared the genuine colour of his soul,
Anxiety lest any harm should reach her 
After his death.
Mort. I have been much deceived.
Rivers But sure, he loves the girl; and never love
Could find delight to nurse itself so strangely, 
And thus to plague her with inventions! Death! 
There must be truth in this- 
Mort. False! False as hell-
Truth in the story! Had the thing been true
He must have felt it then, known what it was,
And thus to prey upon her heart had been 
A tenfold cruelty-... (I,i,198-213)
The levels of irony here are impressive, and the truth does seem difficult to
"...follow...in its mazes".(94) Little wonder that Mortimer's closing lines in Act
I are:
The firm foundation of my life appears 
To sink from under me. This business, Rivers,
Will be my ruin.- (I,iii,181-3)
These closing lines of Act I are unconvincing. Mortimer’s "benevolence" (the
"firm foundation" of his life, witnessed by others,(95) and which is threatened
by Rivers), has been as scantily presented as Rivers' early motivation. More
important, we know what is to happen; necessity ordains it. And that is what
Wordsworth wishes to demonstrate. Despite the parallelling of the problem of the
perception of truth by Mortimer through the symbolically blind Herbert who
responds to Matilda's assertion of Mortimer's sincerity with his view of Mortimer
as a "Freebooter", this does not bring dramatic strength to Mortimer's dilemma.
Again, Wordsworth is less convincing than Godwin, who, despite his own
necessitarian stance in his novel, did sustain the sense of suspense and dramatic
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concflict, and hence moral dilemma. The reason for this is not only the lack of 
dramatic stature of Mortimer (in Caleb Williams all three principal characters are 
fully realised in terms of their own beliefs); with Wordsworth, the necessitarian 
stance lacks the complement of convincing psychological portrayal; there is no 
dramatic conflict. (96)
With such an inauspicious first act, Wordsworth adopts Godwin's own empirical
and necessitarian stance, and challenges Godwin’s moral beliefs with the ill-
portrayed Mortimer pitted against a figure of intellect and insincerity oflago-
like stature, who says to Mortimer (with reference to Herbert's alleged misdeeds):
He dreads the presence of a virtuous man
Like you, he knows your eye would search his heart,
Your justice stamp upon his evil deeds 
The punishment they merit.-(I,i,238-41)(97)
and who also, in dealing with anything, claims they must "sift the matter
artfully" (I,ii,266)(98) rather than approach itin amanner of open sincerity. So the
play begins.
But, for the reasons already indicated, the play is, dramatically, over. That is not 
really where the interest lies: it is in the moral and philosophical discussions 
which comprise such a large proportion of this play that Wordsworth's true 
interest can be seen to lie.
Dramatically, there is little to commend the development of Wordsworth's
challenge to Godwin's belief in the triumph of truth through reason throughout
the remaining acts of the play. Not least amongst the reasons for this are the
tedium of the plot at times and the unconvincing nature of the exchanges between
Herbert and Matilda and, later, Herbert and Mortimer. Herbert is so poorly
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realised that one wonders what he could ever have done to assert the truth in order
that Mortimer might have a chance of perceiving it. Matilda is, on the whole, 
merely ineffectual, and the obscurity of the plot over the incident of the letter 
scarcely helps. It is to Rivers that the real stuff of the play is given. He dominates 
even when the matter of his speech concerns some other character:
 Self-stationed here,
Upon these savage confines we have seen you 
Stand like an isthmus 'twixt two stormy seas 
That checked their fury at your bidding- 
'Mid the deep holds of Solway's mossy waste 
Your single virtue has transformed a band 
Of fierce barbarians into ministers 
Of beauty and of order. (11,1,60-67)
The "stormy seas" here go beyond the immediate context of Rivers' reference to
the role of Mortimer's band: the ambivalence of intention and meaning in River's
speeches is familiar enough for us to recognise that this refers also to Mortimer's
dilemma, standing between the opposing forces of truth and error, as he
attempts, in the face of conflicting opinions, to perceive the truth.
The Significance of Rivers
Before looking at the final implications of the play and, for Wordsworth, of 
Mortimer's failure, it is necessary to give some attention to the already much- 
discussed Rivers. In light of what has already been shown regarding the incon­
sistencies of the play, it now becomes clear why Wordsworth wrote his Preface 
to the play: in the play itself, all that Wordsworth has intended to show regarding 
Rivers has not been realised. The Preface reflects the fact that Wordsworth's 
interest in the play, as drama, is not considerable. Rivers is very much a vehicle
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for Words worth's true interest in the play: his discussion of philosophical, moral
and psychological matters, and at times, this is almost clumsily overt:(99)
Benevolence that has not heart to use 
The wholesome ministry of pain and evil 
Is powerless and contemptible : as yet 
Your virtues, the spontaneous growth of instinct,
From vigorous souls can claim but little praise. (II,i,72-6)
These lines from the same speech in which Rivers refers to the "stormy seas" are
juxtaposed against the earlier lines, again in that speech, where Rivers had already
referred to Mortimer's "single virtue" having transformed the band (see above).
The conscious balancing of ideas, already pointed out as reflecting the dilemma
between choice of error and truth, is shown here as Wordsworth uses Rivers to
manipulate Godwin's ideas. In the Fenelon incident, or in other incidents where
voluntary action is required, Godwin has shown distrust of mere sentimental
feeling unguided by reason; however, at no point has he suggested explicitly that
"pain", or especially "evil" are part of benevolent intent or motivation. This is
Rivers' suggestion, not Godwin's; and what Wordsworth is doing in this rather
puzzling exchange (for the whole context of this speech and Mortimer's 
reactions are necessary to a full understanding of it), is experimenting with
Godwin's ideas and trying to ask the question: if reason is allowed to dominate,
can it justify actions which, on any normal basis, would be regarded as evil?
In Mortimer’s response to Rivers' challenge here,(100) we see how reason
apparendy can justify such an action; how voluntary action, taken as a result of
foresight, can lead not to the furtherance of perfectibilty or good, but indeed to
evil. However, once again, even though "benevolence" here (of which Rivers
supposedly has none) is in danger of being used by reason to the perversion
of itself, this, as Godwin would have pointed out, derives from the insincerity of
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Rivers. For all of Rivers'reasoning is based upon false evidence which he 
himself has in fact created for Mortimer's benefit. Once again we see that 
Wordsworth's real questioning of Godwin's moral and philosophical stance 
lies not in Rivers, but in Mortimer, whose sincerity fails to triumph over the 
sophistry of Rivers.
Yet Rivers continues to present the most effective philosophical and moral
discussions in the play (as opposed to dramatic presentation of the theme).
Wordsworth continues to use Godwin's ideas to explore the moral stance of
Political Justice. We have already seen how Rivers reacted to Lacy's suggestion
that Herbert be brought back to be questioned by the gang; Rivers saw that as a
threat, yet he, himself, had suggested earlier on:
Twelve neighbours,
Plain honest men, might set us right. Their verdict 
Would fortify your spirit-end this weakness- (II,iii, 188-90)
Rivers shows no fear of the traditional legal system, and the link with Godwin and
Caleb Williams (specifically Falkland's "trial" and then that of Caleb) is clear
enough.
So, we come now to Rivers' statement of his beliefs:
To day you have thrown off a tyranny 
That lives but by the torpid acquiescence 
Of our emasculated souls, the tyranny 
Of moralists and saints and lawgivers.
You have obeyed the only law that wisdom 
Can ever recognize; the immediate law:
Flashed from the light of circumstances 
Upon an independent intellect. (Ill,v,26-33)
That this is Godwinian in basis cannot be doubted:(10I) the rejection of the moral
authority of positive institutions is clear,but there is a dangerous logic now, for
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the word "circumstances" has been chosen carefully; not only does it remind us
of how Rivers created his deceptions, it also reminds us of Godwin’s two
important chapter titles and the themes of those chapters in the second edition:
Book I, Chapter 4 - The Characters of Men Originate in their External 
Circumstances (my emphasis)
Book I, Chapter 5 - The Voluntary Actions of Men Originate in their 
Opinions.
Godwin's confidence in this empirical view is being questioned by Wordsworth 
here, as is his consequent belief in the power of truth, its ability to be communi­
cated, and the role of reason in perceiving truth. It is important to see what 
Wordsworth is doing here. To return first of all to that earlier scene in Act II, 
where Rivers begins to reveal his intentions and motivations towards Mortimer, 
in the speech beginning, "They chose him for their ch ief (102), Rivers also 
states:
-These fools of feeling are mere birds of winter (II,i,5)
Having established briefly here his contempt for the feelings that Mortimer is
indeed subsequently shown to have (e.g. his feelings for Matilda and, of course,
over his killing of Herbert), Rivers concludes this same speech with the words:
and a flash (my emphasis)
Of truth enough to dazzle and to blind,
And he is mine for ever. (II,i, 10-12)
Here is the "perverted reason" mentioned in the Preface.(1.149)
A few lines further on, as Rivers praises
No law but what each man makes for himself.
Here justice has indeed a field of triumph! (II,i,53-4)
the web of Wordsworth's criticism can be traced. Yet ultimately it cannot be seen
as a criticism of Godwin's stance, despite what Wordsworth tried to claim in The
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Prelude (1805,X,805ff); for Wordsworth's plot and the premise of his criticism 
is based upon a separation of reason and feeling (and withdrawal of benevolent 
intent) that Godwin would not have accepted.
It is useful to refer here to the Summary of Principles of the third (1798) edition
of Political Justice (where revisions are minor and which draws upon the 1796
edition for its text):
The voluntary actions of men are under the direction of their feelings. 
Reason is not an independent principle, and has no tendency to excite us 
to action; in a practical view, it is merely a comparison and balancing of 
different feelings.
Yet, despite this, that impression of the enhanced role of reason in the revised
Political Justice suggests why Wordsworth uses separation of reason and feeling
to criticise Godwin. Here also is a clue to why, in quoting the lines,
the light of circumstances,flashed 
Upon an independent intellect.
in The Prelude. Wordsworth does so in the context of a separation of feelings and
intellect (see conclusion to this chapter). Yet it is not simply a response to
the role given to reason by Godwin in the revised Political Justice.
What is being questioned is Godwin's assumptions regarding sincerity.
Wordsworth has again pointed to a flaw in Godwin's thinking; by demonstrating
that truth and sincerity are not necessarily the objects of reason. Reason, in
Godwin's second edition, deals in terms of the empirical: opinion. This is an
explanation for that strange but significant alteration in the Preface to the first
edition of Political Justice as it was printed in the second edition, where he
changed his belief in "the omnipotence of truth" to "the omnipotence of opinion".
In writing the second edition, Godwin has tended to shy away from an earlier
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tendency to a Platonic view of truth to an empirical one; Wordsworth, we know, 
read and reacted unfavourably to that Preface, and has not been oblivious to this 
change or its import. Opinion, like circumstances, can only be perceived, 
and is open to inventions and manipulation such as Rivers initiates. Wordsworth 
therefore wishes to test whether private judgement can ultimately be depended 
upon alone, given that it mustrely upon perception of circumstances and opinion. 
For Wordsworth's experiment suggests that it is naive to assume apprehension 
of truth through reason in the face of such sophistry..
Yet why do reason and sincerity (supposedly present in Mortimer - who is not 
merely the representative of feelings) fail to see through the sophistries of untruth 
and insincerity? At least, until it is too late. The answer lies firstly in the sheer 
power of the creation of Rivers who, dramatically, is not only more than a match 
for Mortimer, but also for the combination of Matilda and Herbert who represent 
an alternative force of truth. Wordsworth has, perhaps unconsciously, cheated 
here: for whereas we do see genuine conflict in the battle between reason and 
feeling in Mortimer (in fact, some of the speeches mirroring his moral agony 
are quite moving), the representation of feeling(103) is presented through 
Herbert and Matilda. In this drama, Wordsworth has made an assumption 
to which Godwin could not accede: a separation of reason and feeling: Rivers 
"versus" Matilda/Herbert - with only the relatively inadequately portrayed 
Mortimer having the potentiality for both. This not only invalidates his moral 
challenge to Godwin, it further weakens the dramatic presentation of the play.
Herbert is very poorly presented in this play, and some of his exchanges with
Mortimer show that it is little wonder that Rivers' dramatic power should
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overcome such apitiful expression of feeling (indeed, the play would surely have 
come in for even greater criticism, had truth triumphed). It is significant that, 
in the scenes involving Herbert and Mortimer,(104) Wordworth most obviously 
draws upon Shakespeare: for example, the chamber scene from Macbeth, and 
Edgar and Gloucester on the way to Dover. (105)
As the play, in its final two Acts, draws towards its conclusion, two things are 
very noticeable. After Rivers' confessions, the play loses most of such power as 
it had. The long narration of Herbert's plight by Matilda, Eleanor and Eldredis 
almost tedious at times; ifthisismeanttobe "compassion", then it could scarcely 
stand up against Rivers’ "reason". Even Mortimer's breast - beating becomes 
trying.
Literary Crisis: the Emergent Solitary.
The failure to offer some meaningful resolution to the 1797 version of the play 
points the significance of The Borderers in Wordsworth's development. And it is 
to Caleb Williams that we must again turn to understand this. For a theme which 
Wordsworth chooses to introduce initially almost exactly half way through the 
play is now brought to a rather ambivalent fruition, as Wordsworth explores the 
idea of "solitude".
In the third act, during the scene where Mortimer seeks to betray Herbert, he says,
in a particularly moving speech:
I do believe he weeps - 1 could weep too - 
There is a vein of her voice that runs through his.
Even such a man my fancy bodied forth 
From the first moment that I loved the maid
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And he was still a brother in my love-
These tears-I did not think that aught was left in me
Of what I have been.- Yes, I thank thee, heaven:
One happy thought has passed across my mind.- 
It may not be - 1 am cut off from man,
No more shall I be man, no more shall I 
Have human feelings! (Ill,iii,62-72)
What Mortimer echoes here is Godwin's view of "solitude": a position of being
"cut o f f  from one's fellow man, which Godwin sees as being an unhappy and
unacceptable position and not conducive to good(106) since virtue involves
benevolence towards one's fellow man. Caleb felt this, pursued by Falkland;
Falkland and Rivers, having felt it, have returned from such solitude but with a
philosophy of insincerity and lack of benevolence which produces suffering. As
we have seen.in both of the earlv Salisbury Plain poems. Wordsworth has taken
the same view of isolation and solitariness as he does at this stage in the play.
However, in Caleb Williams. Godwin briefly presents an alternative view of
isolation and solitude, as Caleb, in his imprisonment, despite his general distress
over his isolation, reflects on solitude:
But, if the intercourse of our fellow men has its pleasures, solitude on the 
other hand is not without its advantages. In solitude we can pursue our 
own thoughts undisturbed; and I was able to call up at will the most 
pleasing avocations. (CW,201)
As Wordsworth develops his theme of solitude towards the end of the play with
its ultimately ambivalent inconclusiveness, it is interesting to reflect the parallel
with Godwin's novel in the passage quoted above.
For, as the suspicions of the band and the moral dilemma of Mortimer grow, 
there is this exchange between Rivers and Mortimer:
Mort. I had fears
Which now I feel are vain - but 'tis my wish
To be alone, and therefore we must part.
Rivers Nay, then - 1 am mistaken.- There's a weakness
About your heart-you talk of solitude 
Ask yourself if you fear a human face.
I am your friend-(III,v,9-15)
Rivers seems to invoke here the Godwinian notion of solitude as anti - social;
Mortimer sees solitude differently, as the "solitude" which brings time to think,
time to reflect. Only a few lines further on, we have an extraordinary outburst from
Rivers:
Rivers It may be
That some there are, squeamish half-thinking cowards, 
Who will turn pale upon you, call you murderer,
And you will walk in solitude among them- 
A mighty evil! Bodies are like ropes:
When interwoven, stronger by mutual strength.
Thanks to our naturel’tis not so with our minds.
................................Solitude! -
The eagle lives in solitude- (III,v,43-55)
What Rivers is doing is imposing his own view of solitude, the solitude out of
which he gained the strength of an eagle; the solitude which made him despise
the weakness of other men. Mortimer's wish to be solitary is seen by Rivers as
dangerous - for in such solitude Mortimer's reason could not be fed the opinions
and circumstances that the inventions of Rivers' sophistry has provided.
(Incidents such as this preclude a simplistic anti-Godwinian reading of the play.)
It is in Act V that we see the conclusion to all of this as Wordsworth, through
Mortimer, in a rather ambivalent tone, asserts that solitude is not the unnatural
thing that he (and Rivers, and also Godwin) earlier believed:
I remember,
'Twas the first riddle that employed my fancy,
To hunt out reasons why the wisest thing 
That the earth owns should never chuse to die 
But someone must be near to count his groans.- 
The wounded dear retires to solitude-
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And dies in solitude- all things but man,
All die in solitude- an awful lesson:
There is much wisdom in it- (V,iii,30-38)
There are no clear conclusions. For if we examine the ending to the early version 
of the play, as opposed to the revised version,(107) we see how Wordsworth's 
choice of Caleb Williams as a source has proved unsuitable to his theme. For just 
as Caleb shows no pleasure at his final exposure of the truth, so also with 
Mortimer, but Godwin did not allow Caleb to injure anyone except perhaps 
himself as a result of his search for truth. Wordsworth, in his attempts to 
experiment with and go beyond Godwin has done just that, by introducing an 
element which Godwin could not have contemplated in Political Justice: evil- 
someone gaining pleasure through malevolence (rather than benevolence) to­
wards others.
Wordsworth's ending is pessimistic; and Mortimer's words,
I will go forth a wanderer on the earth,. . .  (V,iii,265) 
with their suggestions of isolation from man, point the inconclusive "ending" to 
his play.
It is as if Wordsworth, in returning to Caleb Williams to complete the play, has 
become entrapped by his principal source (from which he attempted to extricate 
himself in the 1842 revision with the unjustified idea of "expiation") With 
the theme of solitude, there is an inconclusiveness and an ambivalence; for 
though those closing lines echo the kind of solitude that Godwin, followed by 
Wordsworth, had criticised, there is a sense that only in such solitude has 
Mortimer turned away from Rivers. What we find, in embryo, is a distinction 
between harmful solitude,(108) the solitude in which Rivers used his "perverted
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reason" to snap the links that bound him to the rest of humankind, and a different 
kind of solitude that may have a real value.
It is in its inconclusiveness, as well as its experimental nature that the strengths, 
weaknesses and significance for Wordsworth of this play lie. To see it simply as 
a rejection of the rationalistic stance of Godwin is to distort the boldness of its 
original intent as much as the inconclusiveness of its ending. The significance 
of The Borderers lies, ultimately, not in the work itself, but in its place in 
Wordsworth’s development. Ultimately, this can only be perceived from the 
perspective of the Lvrical Ballads of 1798 and 1800 and The Prelude of 1805. 
However, following this detailed examination of The Borderers, it is important 
to place it in its context.
To return momentarily to the Salisbury Plain poems, what is evident is a clear 
development from the first overtly didactic and fragmentary Salisbury Plain to the 
narrative and (inconsistent) psychological power of Adventures on Salisbury 
Plain: a development which derives in part from Wordsworth's drawing not 
simply on Godwin's ideas, but on his narrative and psychological presentation of 
these in Caleb Williams. In his conception of The Borderers. Wordsworth has 
tried to go further: his intention here has been not simply to use Godwin as a 
source, but to use fiction as a medium to test the fundamental moral and philo­
sophic ideas in which he had been interested, as Godwin himself had done with 
Caleb Williams.
His experiment was not, therefore, a "personal" one, in the sense of portraying or
trying to come to terms with his own belief in or rejection of Godwin's ideas;
I suspect that by this stage in his development, Wordsworth's scepticism over
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many of Godwin's central tenets was growing, as the challenge to the roles of truth 
and reason in The Borderers demonstrates. However, these ideas, particularly in 
Adventures on Salisbury Plain, produced a stimulus and even a direction for some 
powerful poetry from a committed philosophico-moral standpoint: and had fed 
Wordsworth's developing poetic vision with a strong humanitarian concern.
The role of Caleb Williams is now seen to be crucial. For Wordsworth drew upon 
Godwin's novel originally as an illustration and development of the ideas of 
Political Justice 1793. With the publication of the revised edition of Political 
Justice, however, the testing and development of those ideas by Godwin in his 
novel seemed contradicted by the effect of the revisions and the assumptions to 
which Godwin continued to hold. This, undoubtedly, affected Wordsworth's 
view of the novel itself: it now became an example of how literary form can 
challenge the pronouncements of theoretical principles. This was a challenge 
Wordsworth decided to take up. However, what Godwin was able to translate 
sopowerfully into a psychologically convincing prose narrative, Wordsworth has 
been incapable of sustaining in terms of drama or of poetry. Where Godwin 
could develop and sustain a number of characters convincingly, Wordsworth 
cannot: the sheer power of Rivers' presentation renders true dramatic conflict 
impossible. Yet, despite his drawing upon other sources, Wordsworth clung to 
Caleb Williams as his seminal source.
The Borderers is, then, an attempt at a dramatic, moral, philosophical and
psychological "gestalt" which Wordsworth simply could not handle; his
revisions of 1842, as well as his 1798 comment on the play (109) testify to that.
It was a lesson that Wordsworth had to learn before the vision of the Lvrical
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Ballads could become possible.
However, rather than attempting at this stage to make any final judgement upon 
the significance of The Borderers in Wordsworth's development,(110) (for this 
will only emerge fully from the later perspective of both the Lvrical Ballads and 
The Prelude of 1805), it is important here to reinforce the closing image of the 
play: of Mortimer, solitary, undecided, seeking the solitude of relection. It 
is an image that reminds us strongly of his loss of that "firm foundation" of which 
he was so apprehensive under the influence of Rivers. Wordsworth should not 
be seen in the same light with regard to the moral stance of Godwin; but the 
closing image of the 1797 version of The Borderers, with its isolation and 
indecision, is a most fitting metaphor for Wordsworth's poetic consciousness 
(111) at the conclusion of composition of the play. In the patterns of poetry we 
will see in the Lvrical Ballads of 1798. through the statement of Expostulation 
and Reply and The Tables Turned to the assertion of Tintem Abbev and the 1800 
Lvrical Ballads we will see the legacy of The Borderers as Wordsworth responds 
to the crisis of 1797, to which, in The Prelude of 1805, he will have to return 
to resolve, through re-invention, this critical period in his development.
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CHAPTER FIVE : LYRTflAL BALLADS - RE-INVENTION OF SELF.
P art I: Re-invention as Process - Lvrical Ballads of 1798.
In his article on The Borderers, William Jewett(l) writes:
The play is built around a plot in which selves are not just examined, 
but constructed and manipulated, as in all the more familiar forms of 
autobiography...
He then goes on to speak of the
self-mirroring [which] was shortly to serve as the germ for some of 
Wordsworth's best reflective poetry, (p 400)
Jewett's pointis important to the perception of Wordsworth emerging undecided,
and lacking poetic direction following the experience of The Borderers, and
approaching the task of what was eventually to become Lvrical Ballads of 1798
and then 1800. In the very uneven spectrum of poems that constitute the Lvrical
Ballads of 1798. we see a developing view, by Wordsworth, of himself, which
emerges and eventually asserts itself with some confidence in Tintem Abbev.
and, more assuredly, in Lyrical Ballads of 1800. The purpose of this chapter is
to trace that development with particular regard to the relationship between
Wordsworth and Godwin's ideas as it develops over that period.
In doing this, the perspective brought by another recent critic becomes highly
relevant. In his book, Wordsworth's Historical Imagination. David
Simpson(2) refers to
formulations that remain recognisably specific to one writer but at the 
same time draw heavily upon semantic residues that are verifiably 
objective.
The potential for ambiguities and ambivalences that results from this, and also 
the way in which such "semantic residues "affect the interrelation of subjective
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and objective responses to a poem seems to me essential in responding to 
Wordsworth's development during the period of Lvrical Ballads (and The 
Prelude, which I shall revisit in the final chapter). The "semantic residues" with 
which I shall deal, are those left behind after Godwin's reading of Wordsworth, 
residues of which Wordsworth may or may not have been aware. To quote 
Simpson again:
What makes a poet's voice most convincingly individual may in fact be the 
degree to which it is exemplary of these common semantic resonances. 
Given the likelihood of these resonances sounding in the unconscious as 
well as the conscious ear, we cannot be guided in our interpretations by 
a poet's declared intentions, but neither can we ignore them entirely, (p 6)
Bearing this in mind, it will be apposite at this stage to consider further the earlier
evidence (discussedinPart2ofChapterTwoand Three) of a conscious decision
by Wordsworth to "re-invent" the development of his poetic sensibility, at the
same time, distorting the role that Godwin played in that development.
It is therefore intended here to consider the 1798 Lvrical Ballads, examining, as
well as the recognisably "Godwinian" poems, those seen as showing evidence of
a rejection(3) of Godwinian beliefs (Simpson's perspective is particularly impor
tant here), and also of that crystallisation of experience to which I referred, in
my discussion of Adventures on Salisbury Plain. Also, as Wordsworth's
explicit rejection of the role of any theoretical or "bookish" learning in favour
of the nurture of experience and Nature emerges in the later poems of Lvrical
Ballads of 1798, the motivation behind such poems will be re-examined. It is
essential to complement this examination with two further dimensions: first,
before progressing to examination of the 1800 Lvrical Ballads, some brief
attention should be given to the fragment, Essay on Morals(4) and Wordsworth's
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overt rejection there of theoretical works such as Godwin's Political Justice. 
Secondly, it is necessary to examine the view that Wordsworth, in Lvrical 
Ballads, rejected the rationalism of Godwin for the "wise passiveness"(5) that 
some critics claim derives from Hartley's associationism; in my view, an 
erroneous view,(6) and one as fraught with contradictions as the Godwin/Words­
worth issue. Finally, consideration will be given to the 1800 Lvrical Ballads and 
to the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads.
The purpose of this is to show that, though it is possible to find evidence of a 
rejection of the kind of theoretical work that Political Justice represented, this 
does not entail an explicit rejection of Godwin's ideas. What increasingly 
becomes important, however, is the implications of this shift in Wordsworth's 
thinking, and in the emergence of his new poetic sensibility as evidenced in 
the 1798 Lvrical Ballads and finally asserted in Lvrical Ballads of 1800: notleast 
the questions this raises for Wordsworth himself as that poetic stance becomes 
the premise for the re-exploration and reconstruction of self that provides the 
focus for The Prelude emergent from 1798.
It is to the very divided work of Lvrical Ballads of 1798 that we must turn first 
of all; divided and confusing, for whilst we are confronted with apparently 
obvious "anti-Godwinian" pieces such as Expostulation and Reply and The Tables 
Turned, so also we find The Female Vagrant and The Convict, which derive in 
large measure from Wordsworth's drawing upon Godwin.
Some account must be taken of the balanceof content of Lvrical Ballads of 1798 
and of the order of their presentation; but we must be very cautious. Words­
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worth’s dislike of the labour of publication is a factor, and it is impossible to 
discover to what extent he had a say in the order of presentation. Whilst 
there is some evidence of consultation between Wordsworth, Coleridge and 
Cotde on matters of typography,(7) which would suggest a conscientious 
attitude to the presentation of the poems in the volume, there is evidence also 
that Wordsworth’s attitude to this first edition of Lvrical Ballads was motivated 
more by money than anything else.(8) Additionally, there is apparent confusion 
in Wordsworth's case over the printing and publishing of the poems; (9) 
William's and Dorothy's letters contemporary with the period of publication 
offer no guidance, and even Wordsworth's Fenwick notes are of no help in this 
matter of intention in the order of presentation.
It is from internal evidence that we have to arrive at conclusions regarding the 
presentation and the intention of the poems; and here, the picture is of a rather 
piecemeal approach. The title itself, Lvrical Ballads with a Few Other Poems 
suggests this, as does the fact that some of the last poems to be written, part­
icularly Expostulation and Reply. The Tables Turned, and, of course, Tintem 
Abbev ( the very last written) all appear towards the end of the collection. How­
ever, to add to the confusion, we have the appearance, at the end, of Old Man 
Travelling (which, despite dispute over exact dating, seems to ante-date many 
of the other poems in the volume); and, of course, The Convict which, in its 
manuscript form, certainly pre-dates the "mainstream" of the Lvrical Ballads, 
reflecting an earlier stage in Wordsworth’s response to Godwin. This view of 
a divided arrangement seems further vindicated by the last paragraph of the 
Advertisement, especially the last sentence,(10) for it is clear that two of the
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poems related to Expostulation and Reply and The Tables Turned, namely Lines 
written in early Spring and Lines written at a small distance from mv house ( later 
called and more commonly known as To mv Sister) do not "follow" as the words 
of the Advertisement suggest.
It would appear safe to assume that as the relationship between the 1798 
Advertisement and the 1800 Preface (and, of course, the 1802 addendum) 
suggests strongly that any holistic conception that Wordsworth developed of 
Lvrical Ballads was consequent upon the process of writing the poems. It seems 
dangerous, therefore, to impose any overall theme in this 1798 collection 
such as rejection of Godwinism. Any view of what the 1798 Lvrical Ballads 
reveals regarding the relationship between Wordsworth and Godwin’s ideas must 
emerge from a careful study of individual poems.
The Godwinian Poems
The most obvious texts with which to begin are those acknowledged to be the 
two most "pro-Godwinian" poems. The Female Vagrant and The Convict, and to 
ask why they are in this collection.
There is no need to repeat my earlier arguments concerning what is here 
presented as The Female Vagrant: Chapter Three, Part 2 has shown the con­
scious and detailed changes whereby Wordsworth drew upon Godwin's ideas and 
Caleb Williams particularly, giving the revised Adventures on Salisbury Plain its 
greater psychological power. Did Wordsworth include the poem for any 
stronger reason than to have yet another poem for printing in Lvrical Ballads? 
There is evidence to show that Wordsworth was interested in having his poem
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published, particularly in two references to the poem in his letters; the first,
interestingly enough, in the Spring of 1798 when the Lvrical Ballads volume was
being projected. Wordsworth wrote to Cottle:
I say nothing of the Salisbury Plain 'till I see you, I am determined to finish 
it, and equally so that You shall publish I have lately been busy about an­
other plan which I do not wish to mention till I see you;..(EY,218)
Wordsworth's possible intention to publish Adventures on Salisbury Plain in
Lvrical Ballads is suggested by his statement in February 1799,after publication
of the first edition:
I took courage to devote two days (O Wonder) to the Salisbury Plain. I 
am resolved to discard Robert Walford and invent a new story for the 
• woman. The poem is finished all but her tale..(EY,256)
Clearly,he was not content with what he had published, though he was never to
make the changes suggested in his comment. Nevertheless,it is worth noting that
the very powerful Female Vagrant included in the first edition of Lvrical
Ballads, has a substantial debt to Godwin in terms of psychological power as well
as social and humanitarian concern.
The Convict, in a sense, has as much of a textual history behind it as The Female
Vagrant. First published in the Morning Post on December 14th, 1797, the fact
that it was printed over the name "Mortimer" has led to the belief that
Wordsworth affixed it to this poem because he also was or had been a 
"Mortimer" in his self-deception and absorption in false doctrines.(11)
But the fact that Coleridge sent it in, and also sent in two other poems to the
Morning Post over the name ”Mortimer"(12) surely puts Mrs. Moorman's
speculation (shared by other critics) in perspective. Even the dropping of this
particular "Godwinian" poem from the 1800 Lvrical Ballads has little to do with
Wordsworth's rejection of Godwin. It is simply because it is a poor poem; in my
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view, quite the poorest in the 1798 collection, making the possibility that it 
had become a family joke(13) quite credible.
Perhaps the number of revisions to The Convict testifies to Wordsworth’s 
dissatisfaction with this poem. That it does draw upon Godwin is not 
challenged, but it should be stressed that, especially in its earliest form, it shows 
that same unhappy relationship between Godwinian-inspired outrage and poetic 
form already evidenced in the earliest draft of Salisbury Plain. This supports De 
Selincourt's suggested dating of around 1793;(14) rather than Reed’s later dating 
of 1796.(15) Examination of the revisions to this poem present an interesting 
picture,(16) and one which, though it makes Wordsworth's decision to include 
this very uneven poem in the 1798 edition all the more puzzling, does suggest 
a conscious decision to do so. Most of the Godwinian background to this poem 
is too well known to require repetition here. However, critical commentary 
has shown some lack of care here; for though the poem does draw upon Godwin's 
arguments against punishment, it is not correct to say that Godwin favours 
"transportation". In fact, Godwin condemns this as much as he condemns 
"simple banishment", and advocates, instead, "colonisation".(17) What is inter­
esting here is why Wordsworth insisted in placing this poem in the 1798 Lvrical 
Ballads. Was it merely as a companion-piece to Coleridge's The Dungeon ? 
Unlikely, since Coleridge's poem survives in the 1800 collection. The revisions 
perhaps offer an explanation.
All three versions of the opening of Wordsworth's poem are weak, both in terms 
of descriptive power and the jarring shift of focus from the natural setting to the 
convict himself. Yet Wordsworth persisted: because the convict, a figure who
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derives not only from the Salisbury Plain poems but also continues to some extent 
in the Fragment of a Gothic Tale and as Herbert in the dungeon in The Borderers, 
originates both in Godwin’s intellectual arguments against punishment, and also 
in his psychologically convincing portrait of the inward agonies resulting from 
punishment in Caleb Williams.(18) For it is interesting that Wordsworth, in his 
revision of the poem prior to its inclusion in the 1798 Lyrical Ballads moves 
quickly from the description of the external appearance of the convict, to his 
psychological suffering;(19) this reflects the whole train of Godwin's chapters on 
punishment where the prisoner's state of mind in relation to his motives, reaction 
to punishment, possible remorse etc. is the central theme. Anyone who has 
read the powerful chapters describing Caleb's first imprisonment could not fail 
to recognise the source of Wordsworth's attempts to portray the psychological 
suffering of the prisoner.(20) This pattern of revisions suggests a first draft of 
the poem around 1793, as De Selincourt suggests, where the manuscript version 
of the poem shows Godwin's ideas from Political Justice as the dominant source, 
fitting ill with the form and style Wordsworth has adopted. By 179.8, Words­
worth's move to the psychological emphasis - drawing upon Caleb Williams vet 
again and from the experience of Adventures on Salisbury Plain-scarcelv suggests 
a rejection or even diminution of his interest in Godwin, but rather a further 
example of the pattern of response to Godwin shown earlier in this thesis: the 
move from exposition of ideas, often in an overtly didactic and ill-assimilated 
way to portrayal of these same ideas in a more psychologically convincing 
manner. Hence the decision, in the version finally included in Lyrical Ballads, 
to delete all three of the manuscript's final stanzas and finish on Godwin's 
positive note, more in accord with the concentration on motivation earlier in the
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poem. There is a sense of conscious intent behind this "Godwinian" piece.
As poetry, it fails; and Wordsworth's recognition of this by 1800 causes him to 
delete the poem; yet his determination to include it in 1798, along with The 
Female Vagrant, evidences a belief in this kind of socially and psychologically 
motivated verse of protest and suffering in Wordsworth's developing canon.
The final poem to be dealt with (briefly) in this group is Coleridge's The 
Dungeon, from his tragedy,Osorio. It has been suggested that the influence of 
Wordsworth can be seen in this poem to a greater or lesser extent. There would 
appear from the text to be a strong case for such a view, and I would here simply 
wish to add two points to support it. The link between The Dungeon and The 
Convict is clear enough: the outcry against punishment and the attempt at some 
presentation of the psychological effect upon the prisoner. Once again, reading 
of the relevant chapters of Caleb Williams points a possible source for this; yet 
this is a very unlikely source for Coleridge, who, despite his earlier association 
with Godwin, apparently did not appreciate Godwin's novel.(21) Wordsworth, 
as we have seen, did, and drew upon it heavily.
The "anti-Godwinian" poems
It is apposite now to turn to those poems where Wordsworth appears to reject 
some specific aspect of Godwin's ideas (though, as we shall see, and as has been 
recognised by most critics, such purported rejection is often accompanied by 
acceptance of some other area of Godwin's teaching). The poems in question are: 
Lines left upon a Seat in a Yew-Tree. Simon Lee. Anecdote for Fathers and The 
Last of the Flock.
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Lines left upon a Seat in a Yew-Tree, despite the source quoted by Words­
worth,(22) clearly points to The Borderers. The dating of the poem (approx­
imately Spring to Summer of 1797) shows it was written either very soon after 
or possibly even contemporaneously with Wordsworth finishing the play. Whilst 
the link with Godwin is clear, (23) response to the poem inevitably depends upon 
reaction to Wordsworth's play and particularly Rivers, whose character has been 
seen as a source for the central figure of the poem:
In youth, by genius nurs'd,
And big with lofty views,he to the world 
Went forth, pure in his heart, against the taint 
Of dissolute tongues, 'gainst jealousy, and hate,
And scom, against all enemies prepared,
All but neglect: and so, his spirit damped 
At once, with rash disdain he turned away,
And with the food of pride sustained his soul 
In solitude. (13-21)
However, although much of this can be traced to Rivers,(24) there are
considerable differences between Rivers and the central figure of the poem; for
Rivers did not really suffer from "neglect", and the nature of his complaints
and his own self-criticisms are different. (25) In fact, the true origins of this
figure lie again in the source of characterisation of The Borderers: Caleb
Williams. In the lines quoted above, we find again, the "psychological amalgam"
of Falkland and Tyrell (though, indeed, Falkland is probably the principal
source) which inspired the motivation of Rivers. Both Falkland and Tyrell
showed pride, andreacted badly to neglect (in the case of Falkland, neglect in the
sense that he felt unable to live up to the ideal of "honour" which had so fired him
and brought him attention); and Falkland's solitude is of the kind that we saw
merit Wordsworth's disapproval in earlier works. Such solitude,
A morbid pleasure nourished, tracing here
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An emblem of his own unfruitful life: . . .  (28-9) 
would no more have warranted the approval of Godwin than of Wordsworth; 
once again, Wordsworth has borrowed Godwin's ideas and psychological 
approach to present his own views. Caleb Williams, as a source, emerges also 
in the lines:
Nor that time,
Would he forget those beings, to whose minds,
Warm from the labours of benevolence,
The world, and man himself, appeared a scene 
Of kindred loveliness: then would he sigh 
With mournful joy, to think that others felt 
What he must never feel: . .  .(34-40)
This is not Rivers - not even a "harmless edition of Rivers "(26) - but it does reflect
the sufferings of Falkland (who, of course, suffers through seeing others act
whilst he can no longer do so); and, of course, it is scarcely necessary to give
detailed argument regarding Godwin's belief in "benevolence". Perhaps in
the lines,(27)
Stranger! henceforth be warned; and know, that pride,
How e'er disguised in its own majesty 
Is littleness;. . .  (46-8)
we see Wordsworth rephrase Rivers'own self-criticisms (without the rest of his
philosophy of destruction); but again the character of Falkland lies behind this.
More interesting still (though perhaps one should be wary of overstating the
case) is that in speaking of the "faculties" which his character "has never used",
he singles out "thought": that important element in Godwin's "mechanism of the
human mind" which not only differentiates his system from Hartley's,(28) but
is a critical element in Godwin's system of moral motivation and decision. And
the exhortation to be
Instructed that true knowledge leads to love,. . .  (1.56)
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echoes Godwin's assertion in the second edition of Political Justice, that only 
a true understanding of anything can lead to genuine love and the wish to attain 
it:
Virtue, sincerity, justice and all those principles which are begotten and 
cherished in us by a due exercise of reason will never be very strenuously 
espoused until they are ardently loved; that is, till their value is perceived 
and adequately understood. In this sense, nothing is necessary but to 
show us that a thing is truly good and worthy to be desired, in order to 
excite in us a passion for its attainment. (PJ,'96,I,82)
An understanding of the real context of this poem and Wordsworth's
borrowings(29) points its importance: its pivotal role as Wordsworth begins to
see the significance of his experiment in writing The Borderers both reflectively
and prospectively. That there is rejection of Rivers’ intellectual philosophy
is obvious; equally clear is an emerging sense of an alternative that the closing
of the play and Mortimer's self-imposed solitude never defined. The closing lines
of this poem turn inward in a context of man as part of, as evidence of, Nature's
paradigm. Yet the positive assertion that "true knowledge leads to love" is as
much an acceptance of Godwin's presentation of benevolent motivation as the
rest of the poem represents Wordsworth's rejection of a belief in the ultimate
power of reason (already well demonstrated in The Borderers!. The poem looks
backwards, yet forwards at the same time, and in the increasing selection from
and critical reaction to Godwin, Wordsworth's emerging vision can be perceived.
Simon Lee has attracted attention, again instigated by Legouis,(30) as another
anti-Godwinian poem. This poem, one of several written in that prolific Spring
of 1798, is highly representative of the "ballads" of this volume. The accepted
reading of it up till now, as a rejection of Godwin's views on "gratitude",(31)
has no doubt arisen at least in part for the reason that Godwin's brief and explicit
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comments on gratitude occur in the celebrated "Fenelon" chapter, an easy target 
for cursory readers of Godwin. But this is a blatant misreading of this poem and 
of Godwin’s views.
The pro-Godwinian stance of this poem is obvious from early on in the poem.
More clearly even than in Goodv Blake and Harry Gill, we have a view of the
demeaning nature of labour for bare subsistence, a view which permeates.
Political Justice(32) and later works.(33) When we are told of how Simon is
"forced to work" and read the stanza,
Beside their moss-grown hut of clay,
Not twenty paces from the door,
A scrap of land they have, but they 
Are poorest of the poor.
This scrap of land he from the heath 
Enclosed when he was stronger;
But what avails the land to them,
Which they can till no longer? (57-64)
this is evocative of Godwin's outburst against poverty in his various passages
regarding property in Political Justice, for example:
What a contrast does this scene present to the present state of. society, 
where the peasant and the labourer work till their understandings are 
benumbed with toil, their sinews contracted and made callous by being for 
ever on the stretch, and their bodies invaded with infirmities, and 
surrendered to an untimely grave? What is the fruit they obtain from this 
disproportioned and unceasing toil? In the evening, they return to a 
family, famished with hunger, exposed half naked to the inclemencies 
of the sky, hardly sheltered,..(PJ,'96,II,454)
Godwin's comments above, in the context of inequality in distribution of
property and its effects(34) in terms of physical misery as well as its effects
upon intellectual development are underlined by the disparity between Simon's
early life and his present enforced toil. What we see here is evidence of a
residual effect of that crystallisation of ideas that Wordsworth derived from his
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reading of Godwin's work.
It is therefore with some surprise that one finds the accepted reading of the final 
incidents of the poem to be interpreted as a reaction against Godwin's ideas on 
"gratitude". The truth is that, first of all, what Wordsworth is really describing 
at the end of the poem relates not so much to "gratitude" as to "benevolence". (35) 
For Godwin's famous criticism of "gratitude" defines its own terms,abnd is a 
perfectly reasonable statement in that context. Moreover, the quotation that 
Legouis chooses from Godwin (and, incidentally, from the first edition(36)), 
shows what Godwin had in mind by this view of gratitude. This is very obviously 
not what Wordsworth means in the incident he describes at the end of his poem. 
On the other hand, what could be a better description of the emotions Words­
worth presents than the following passage from Godwin:
The man who vigilantly conforms his affections to the standard of 
impartial justice, who loses the view of personal regards in the greater 
objects that engross his attention, who, from motives of benevolence, 
sits loose to life and all its pleasures, and is ready without a sigh to sacrifice 
them to the public good, has an uncommonly exquisite source of 
happiness. When he looks back, he applauds the state of his own 
affections; and, when he looks out of himself, his sensations are refined 
in proportion to the comprehensiveness of his sentiments. He is filled with 
harmony within; and the state of his thoughts is uncommonly favourable 
to what we may venture to style the sublime emotions of tranquillity. 
It is not to be supposed that an experience of the pleasures of 
benevolence, should not tend to confirm in us a benevolent propensity. 
(PJ,'96,1,430-1)
In terms of Godwin's views of "virtue" and "duty", his notion of gratitude is 
perfectly consistent, as is this view of benevolence. It is this latter concept which 
reflects the true experience of this poem. For we do not see or experience Simon 
Lee’s emotions directly, we experience them through the poet-narrator; the 
feelings of the old man are "filtered" through the poet who is experiencing some
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of the rewarding emotions of benevolence. It is in Godwin's attitudes to "virtue"
and "duty" that he develops, at great length, what "gratitude" really is, beyond
the more limited view of fawning gratitude that he so strongly criticised. And
we should not forget Godwin's remark to Hazlitt:
I had the honour, in the talk of one evening, to convert Wordsworth 
from the doctrine of self-love to that of benevolence - ask him. (37)
So, why does Wordsworth use the term "gratitude"? Partly, no doubt, because it
is the term which would probably spring most easily to mind. Or perhaps we are
still misreading Wordsworth. The tone of the poem changes dramatically in the
last four lines; but perhaps not simply to the obvious overt didacticism, but also
to an ironic tone. For though Wordsworth's final two lines may simply mean that
he has often received no thanks for favours done, this seems an eminently trite
and selfish note on which to finish. Is it not possible that he is consciously
drawing attention to the difference between the kind of "gratitude" criticised by
Godwin, and the response to genuine benevolence? Frankly, I find the closing
lines of the poem puzzling in light of the experience of the rest of the poem -
on any reading. However, they seem even more discordant in relation to the
main body of the poem if the more self-interested interpretation is to be accepted,
Finally, though it does belong to two years later, the poet's comment on Simon
Lee in the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, where he speaks of
placing my Reader in the way of receiving from ordinary moral sensations 
another and more salutary impression than we are accustomed to receive 
from them...
is obscure and potentially ambivalent. Yet I suggest it accords more with my 
interpretation of the poem (given a careful reading of Godwin) than has been the 
more accepted view. (38)
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It would seem more logical to deal next with Last of the Flock since this poem 
and Simon Lee are related in terms of what they reveal about Wordsworth and 
Godwin. The accepted view of this poem is that it is a rejection of Godwin's 
view that property is the cause of vice,(39) yet, once again, such an oversimpli 
fication of Godwin leads to misreading of Wordsworth's intentions in this poem. 
The view that Wordsworth is here showing that pride of property is an emotion 
worthy of encouragement has, no doubt, gained weight from Wordsworth's 
letter to Fox,(EY, 312-5)(40)in which he exhorted that politician to read The 
Brothers and Michael (in the 1800 edition) in the hope that it would encourage Fox 
to defend
small independent proprieters of land here called statesmen, men of re 
spectable education who labour daily on their own little properties.
(EY, 314)
Wordsworth's further comment to Fox,
You have felt that the most sacred of all property is the property of the 
Poor. The two poems which I have mentioned were written to show that 
men who do not wear fine clothes can feel deeply.(EY, 314-5)
even in 1801, shows Wordsworth at little variance with Godwin on this point.
His picture, earlier in the letter, of "the encreasing disproportion between the
price of labour and that of the necessaries of life" (EY, 313) and also of his "two
neighbours"(EY, 314) are reminiscent of Simon Lee and the picture of poverty
drawn around him, and also of Godwin's statements of the effects of poverty
already mentioned above.
So, careful reading of the letter to Fox letter shows how Wordsworth's sense of 
"property" is associated with property derived from personal industry rather 
than accumulated wealth; this is also the case with Last of the Flock. This is not
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at variance with Godwin's stance, for he did not see property in itself as the root 
cause of vice, rather, it was the social evil of disproportionate distribution 
ofpropertytothe rich, and especially as exacerbated by the inequities between 
property associated with personal industry as opposed to inherited and accu­
mulated property and wealth against which he spoke out.Godwin devotes a whole 
Book of his work to this; to sum up his arguments as being simply against 
property is to oversimplify greatly. Clark's summary of Godwin's complex views 
admirably sums up the position:
He also presents a system of property based on utility. The ideal is, he 
argues, voluntary distribution based on the needs of all. The best 
altemtive to this is distribution according to labour, or the producer’s 
retention of the full product of his work. The established system, he says, 
entails great injustices based primarily on the existence of vast inequali­
ties. (41)
Godwin has no real objection to men having the fruits of their own industry, but 
he wishes to temper that with a sense of "duty" towards others, hence his views 
regarding "the second degree of property" (namely, the fruits of personal 
industry) and the inevitable clash between his individualism and his utilitarian­
ism. But on the question of poverty, Godwin is again adamant in condemning 
this, a viewpoint clearly in accord with this poem.
Before turning to that, there is another difficulty with this poem. Basically, the
narrative of the poem is weak, as is the attempt at psychological motivation:
the third stanza relating the young man's early carefree life, and then introducing
the acquisition of his "property" (his sheep) lacks a sense of psychological
credibility; equally, we find it hard to understand how, or why, or even to what
degree he found himself in the position:
Ten children, Sir! had I to feed,
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Hard labour in a time of need! (41-2)
With even the shallowest response, one must have some sympathy with the 
"parish" if they received as much information as we have. It is as if Words­
worth's didactic intent regarding his attitude to the poor law is undermining 
the psychological and motivational validity of his poem here.
However, when we come to the effects of the growing poverty of the central
figure of the poem, Godwin's views loom large. Godwin does not have much
to say in Political Justice regarding the poor laws in England, but what he does
have to say is relevant here:
In England the poors' rates amount to the sum of two millions sterling 
per annum. It has been calculated that one person in seven of the 
inhabitants of this country derives at some period in his life assistance 
from this fund. If to this we add the persons who, from pride, a spirit of 
independence, or want of a legal settlement, though in equal distress, 
receive no such assistance, the proportion will be considerably 
increased.(PJ,'96,I,16-17)
Though it would be difficult to categorise the father in the poem under any of
Godwin's last three particular headings (again, because of the lack of narrative
and motivational detail in the poem), he clearly could come under the general
heading of those in distress, yet not receiving assistance.
More important, the above reference by Godwin to the poor laws occurs in the
context of an argument by Godwin on the evils of poverty and how a
perpetual struggle with the evils of poverty, if frequently ineffectual, must 
necessarily render many of the sufferers desperate.(PJ,’96,I,17)
This comes on the same page as the reference to the poor laws, and leads to the
argument that the rigours of poverty often lead to crime, an idea on which Godwin
elaborates in the later book on Property:(42)
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the fruitful source of crimes consists in this circumstance, one man's pos­
sessing in abundance that of which another man is destitute. We must 
change the nature of the mind, before we can prevent it from being 
powerfully influenced by this circumstance, when brought strongly home 
to its perceptions by the nature of its situation.(PJ,'96,II,456)
Could not a passage such as this be behind the following lines:
To wicked deeds I was inclined,
And wicked fancies crossed my mind,
And every man I chanc’d to see,
I thought he knew some ill of me.(71-4)
And are not the lines which close stanza 4 -
And now I care not if we die 
And perish all of poverty.(39-40)
reminiscent of Godwin's descriptions of the despair of poverty, and, despite
Godwin's supposed underplaying of the "domestic affections", his awareness of
the sufferings of those in poverty trying to support a family?(43) Once again, that
crystallising of his ideas through contact with Godwin and his thought is present
in the poem as a residual but significant factor.
Ultimately, I find this rather stark poem unsatisfactory as Wordsworth appears to 
struggle in his attempts to portray the conflict between the shepherd's feelings 
for his children and the brutalising effects(44) of growing poverty upon those 
feelings. There is here a quintessential moral dilemma, not just regarding what 
Wordsworth is portraying but in his actual portrayal, his writing such a poem. 
The drawings upon Godwin's particular views on the Poor Law and the issue of 
poverty may, by this stage in Wordsworth's development, rely on memory of 
reading Godwin’s works or of conversations with him as opposed to acontinuing 
active involvement with his ideas, yet they still contribute centrally to Words­
worth's intention in this poem. Contrary to any view of a conscious contradiction
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of Godwin's ideas on property .Wordsworth is here,consciously or unconsciously, 
(45) drawing upon the ideas of Godwin which in themselves may represent no 
more at this time than a particular crystallisation of a range of views on the 
effects of poverty that were current at the time, and to which Wordsworth would 
probably have been exposed. Yet, even as he tentatively develops his "new" poetic 
voice, of which Last of the Flock is an example, the role that the ideas of a thinker 
such as Godwin has in motivating that poetry is evident. Wordsworth later may 
have been anxious to deny that and invent some other more acceptable motivation, 
but the evidence here shows that such "re-invention" of his early development 
cannot totally obscure or in any way preclude such a residual "influence" as we 
see here by Godwin.
In Anecdote for Fathers, we have Wordsworth's own subtitle to contend with: 
"shewing how the art of lying might be taught"; once again, the anti-Godwinists 
have sallied forth.(46) It is impossible to find anywhere in Political Justice a 
passage where Godwin explicitly states that lying is in opposition to the nature of 
humankind or especially children. What can be found is the following statement 
which occurs in one of Godwin's passages on "education":
Speak the language of truth and reason to your child, and be under no
apprehension for the result.(PJ,'96,I,44)
This is very different from saying that lying is unnatural to children.
Before turning to the texts of Wordsworth and Godwin, to examine Godwin's 
possible influence in this poem, it might be useful to turn to other evidence, from 
the letters of the Wordsworths. Those who wish to see an "anti-Godwin" stance 
in this poem can easily turn to Wordsworth's well-known comment regarding
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the child who is the subject of this poem: Basil Montagu (junior). The fact that 
the child's father was an acknowledged devotee of Godwin to a rather extreme 
degree (especially if it is assumed that Wordsworth's immediate enthusiasm for 
Godwin began to wane around 1796), and also Wordsworth's closing remark 
about young Basil's lying,(47) have led to the accepted interpretation of 
Wordsworth's rejection of Godwin's view. However, closer scrutiny of the 
letters referring to young Basil also reveals another interesting picture. The 
gap in time between Wordsworth's comment about young Basil's lying and the 
date of this poem is surely one reason for doubting a direct link between the two. 
Moreover, in two letters, one of March 1797(48) and the other of June/July 1798, 
(49) we find evidence of Dorothy Wordsworth's strong interest in the education 
of young Basil.
In the first letter, we are told by Dorothy that in their upbringing of Basil,
We have no punishments except such as appear to be, as far as we can 
determine, the immediate consequence that is to grow out of the offence.
Godwin’s long discussion on punishment does not occur in the context of
children, but what is common to both Godwin and Dorothy is a rejection of the
retributive idea of punishment, and a concern for the consequences of the
wrongful act as the principal reason for any act of punishment. (PJ,'96,Book
VII,Chapter I).
In the later letter, we find more of Dorothy's comments regarding Basil's 
"education”. Although her words manifest a clear belief in the power of nature and 
the positive effects of the "solitude" at Racedown,(50) there is again a conscious 
sense of the idea of "nurture" of the child, all in a context of the rejection of formal
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patterns of education and favouring freedom and example as educative forces:
Much of [Basil's] good temper must be owing to our regularity of temper, 
and the consequent equable treatment which he receives from us. If he had 
been more with other children whose minds were upon the same level 
with his own I think he could scarcely have been without selfishness.
(EY.221)
The question must arise: is this all from Dorothy herself (which is possible), or 
has such conscious consideration of "education" had some inspiration? And could 
that conceivably have been Godwin? We know that Wordsworth himself ex­
pressed a mild interest in Godwin's publication in 1798 of Memoirs of the Author 
of a Vindication of the Rights of Woman and also that Dorothy took the trouble 
to note in her Journal on 14th April, 1798 that the Wordsworths had received a 
copy of the book. Not only was Wordsworth acquainted with Political Justice, 
but, in 1797, Godwin had published The Enquirer, sub-titled Reflections on 
Education. Manners and Literature. External evidence indicates that Words­
worth had a series of meetings (in June 1796) with Godwin at the time that the 
latter was preparing to write his Essays, later to be entitled The Enquirer.(57) 
and that during those visits Wordsworth was accompanied by Montagu, at the 
time that young Basil was staying with the Wordsworths at Racedown. A perusal 
of even the titles of the essays in The Enquirer shows the possible attraction to 
either Dorothy or William, e.g.: Essay I. Of Awakening the Mind: Essay III. Of 
the Sources of Genius: Essav V. Of an Early T aste for Reading. Moreover, in the 
ideas expressed in these essays, we find developments from the extensive 
statements Godwin had already made regarding education in Political Justice. 
(52) Godwin's stress upon the malleability of the human mind and the consequent 
responsibility upon their teachers is everywhere:
The more inexperienced and immature is the mind of the infant,
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the greater is its pliability.(Enq, p 4)
Godwin places great stress on the relationship between "teacher" and "pupil", to
the extent of criticism of Rousseau, where Godwin lashes out against what he
considers the greatest crime against the child, deception:(53)
His [Rousseau's] whole system of education is a series of tricks, apuppet- 
show exhibition of which the master holds the wires, and the scholar 
is never to suspect in what manner they are moved.(Enq, p 106)
This enhances his arguments in Political Justice against a system of national
education(54) and his discussion in that work of the education of the young: (55)
The miscarriages of education do not proceed from the boundedness of its 
powers, but from the mistakes with which it is accompanied. We often 
inspire disgust, where we mean to infuse desire.(PJ,'96,I,45)
This important discussion comes from the extended chapter in the second
edition, The Characters of Men Originate in External Circumstances, to which
we have already seen Wordsworth's attention attracted.
The above is essential to the consideration of any "Godwinian background" in 
the education of young Basil Montagu and to an understanding of this poem in 
which he appears, as opposed to the isolated and inaccurate reference to Godwin 
by critics of Wordsworth. (As an added parallel, note that Godwin, like Dorothy, 
has mixed feelings over the "solitary" upbringing of children: whilst private 
education does promote "sympathy" in children, there are the wideropportunities 
and self-confidence that public education can promote. (56)) As I have suggested, 
such a context constitutes a residual "influence" on Wordsworth's thinking 
in this poem, of which evidence can be shown.
The fact that Wordsworth deleted the subtitle of Anecdote in 1845 and put in its
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place a quotation from Eusebius, translated from the Greek of Porphyry,
the Delphian oracle's rebuke to those who tried to extort an answer by 
force(57)
can in no way disguise, but rather highlights, the real intention of this poem and 
the origin of its thought. For despite the "homely" ballad form and style, and the 
anecdotal Fenwick note attached to it, the poem indeed follows closely the tenets 
of Godwin. The poet, talking to the boy, breaks all the Godwinian rules regarding 
the relationship between teacher and pupil in his manner of seeking the truth. It 
reminds us of Godwin's exhortations in The Enquirer, for example, in Essay XII, 
that young persons must always be shown the value of their sincerity; or the 
theme of Essay XIII, to bring children up with tolerance and respect. It also 
reminds us of Godwin's first definition of education, the "education of accident" 
(PJ,'96,I,46) or also, the second definition, "education of design" where Godwin 
tells us that
children are not inclined to consider him entirely as their friend whom 
they detect in an attempt to impose on them. (PJ,'96,1,48)
It is this thought which gives the direction and moral force to Wordsworth's poem;
here, if ever, we have a harmonious blend of Godwin and Wordsworth. The
dramatic effect, the incidental description, the patience and reticence of the boy,
the garrulous coercion by the poet, all help us to understand why the boy "lies";
hence we respond sympathetically to the moral stance of this poem. Godwin
would certainly have approved of such an attitude.
Without wishing to make any extravagant claims that this is an intentionally "pro- 
Godwinian" poem, or that Wordsworth is consciously advocating views of 
education imbibed from Godwin, I find it impossible to ignore what is at least a
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very close coincidence between Godwin's views (views to which Wordsworth had 
undoubtedly been exposed) and the ideas essential to this poem. There is no need 
to reject the Fenwick note; but, despite Wordsworth's later comments, these do 
not explain the poem adequately. On the other hand, Godwin's influence, seen 
as part of the context of this poem, provides an essential element in understanding 
the poet's intention in writing the piece.
Poems of Re-Invention: the emergence of Wordsworth’s poetic vision
Having now seen that in some of the most "central" poems of Lyrical Ballads there 
is not to be found the rejection of Godwinian thinking that has been claimed, it 
is appropriate to turn to that group of poems introduced in the Advertisement as 
poems which
arose out of conversation with a friend who was somewhat unreasonably
attached to modem books of moral philosophy.
These, however, Expostulation and Reply and The Tables Turned relate very 
closely to two other poems which occur earlier in Lyrical Ballads: Lines written 
at a small distance from mv house and Lines written early in Spring. It is in this 
group of poems, (along with Old Man Travelling and, of course, Tintem Abbevl 
that we see the emergence of the Wordsworth recognisable as the poet of the 1800 
Lyrical Ballads, of The Prelude and of nature and the imagination. My principal 
concern is not to claim that by showing a more substantial residual influence of 
Godwinian thinking in the 1798 Lyrical Ballads than has previously been 
accepted, this detracts from the view that this group of poems represents the 
most "seminal" in the development of Words worth's major poetic achievement. 
However, the questions that have already been raised concerning Wordsworth's
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apparent determination to obscure and distort the role of Godwin in his deve­
loping poetic sensibility and vision can be approached through a careful exami­
nation of these four poems in the 1798 Lyrical Ballads (as well as the fragment: 
Essav on Morals').
To turn, first of all, to the two poems to which Wordsworth, in the
Advertisement, directs our attention, both Expostulation and Reply and The
Tables Turned have their origin well enough documented by Hazlitt's record of
the visit to Wordsworth and even the conversation which inspired or possibly
"provoked" the two poems. In his record of this meeting, Hazlitt concentrates
more upon Coleridge than upon Wordsworth, and, perhaps inevitably, we find
evidence that during the visit, there was considerable discussion of matters
political and philosophical: the names of Mackintosh, Godwin, Paley, Berkeley,
Paine, and Wollstonecraft are recorded as subjects of conversation between
Hazlitt and Coleridge, but the famous conversation with Wordsworth provides
only a general description:
I got into a metaphysical argument with Wordsworth in which we
neither of us succeeded in making ourselves perfectly clear or in­
telligible. (58)
Was the subject of this conversation, at least in part, Godwin? It could have been: 
Hazlitt's comments regarding Coleridge's remarks about Godwin show that 
Hazlitt held Godwin in some esteem at the time (borne out, of course, in the much 
later portrait of Godwin in Spirit of the Age). But a "metaphysical" argument? 
Can Godwin's arguments or the aspects of his writings which interested 
Wordsworth really be described as "metaphysical"?- This does shed some doubt. 
But there is another important clue given by Hazlitt on one or two other
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occasions in his references to Wordsworth at this time, namely, Wordsworth's
dislike of criticism and the charge of not being original in his ideas:
I once hinted to Wordsworth, as we were sailing on his boat on Grasmere 
Lake, that I thought he had borrowed the idea of his Poems on the Naming 
of Places from the local inscriptions of the same kind in Paul and 
Virginia. He did not own the obligation, and stated some distinction 
without a difference, in defence of his originality. And the slightest 
variation would be sufficient for this purpose in his mind; for whatever 
he added or omitted would inevitably be worth all that anyone else had 
done, and contain the marrow of the sentiment. (59)
This is fairly consistent with Hazlitt's later views on Wordsworth,(60) but it is
interesting to see how early in his relationship Hazlitt wants to records this
impression of the poet.
In the context of the above, The T ables T umed is by far the more important poem,
Expostulation and Reply acting as a form of preamble to it. There are two main
points to be made regarding the first poem; the first concerns Wordsworth's
reference to "books":
Where are your books? that light bequeathed 
To beings else forlorn and blind! (5-6)
By this, Wordsworth refers not just to literature, but to all knowledge gained from 
the study of "academic" works. His rather ambivalent attitude on the matter of 
learning and reading needs no elaboration here.(61) It can be summed up,on the 
one hand, in his Cambridge experience, and, on the other, in the constant com­
plaints about lack of adequate reading material which we find scattered in his 
various writings. There is the added difficulty of his developing attitude to 
literature and its "teaching " powers, as is seen later in, for example, Preface 
to the Lyrical Ballads andEssav on Epitaphs. Hence my use of the alternative term 
"provoked", above, in what might have precipitated the writing of these two
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poems. The background as described by Hazlitt, as well as this outburst against 
books, has all the signs of a sudden reaction to that argument he had with Hazlitt. 
What is important is that it is the first explicit adoption of such a view by Words­
worth as a "philosophy" for his poetry. And, to some extent, on such a slender 
foundation, much is to be built.
The second point concerns that "wise passiveness", and the suggestion that this 
might be drawn from Hartley. (62) I would strongly dispute this on several 
grounds. Although, in Hartley, we can find sections devoted to the various 
sensations, and also to the pleasures of nature, these descriptions are tied up in 
Hartley's complicated and exceptionally tedious speculative physiology, of which 
not a trace can be found in this poem. Perhaps Hartley's section on "the Pleasures 
arising from the Beauty of the Natural World" is not so open to this charge, but 
its ideas are complex, and go far beyond Wordsworth's limited statement about 
that "wise passiveness". As to that last phrase, l ean, in Hartley, find no equi­
valent; true, it is implicit in much of Hartley's associationism, but we can also 
find evidence of it in Godwin, for example:
In volition, if the doctrine of necessity be true, the mind is altogether 
passive.. .  .(PJ,'96,1,404)
and, on the next page,
It is at present generally admitted by all accurate reasoners upon the nature 
of the human mind, that its whole internal history may be traced to one 
single principle, association.(PJ,'96,I,405-6)
Similar comments can be found throughout Political Justice. There is no doubt
that Wordsworth is drawing on associationism here, but it is in a fairly simple
manner, and could easily come from Godwin, Coleridge or even his memories
of his Cambridge days.(63)
264
Essentially, the final comment on this poem must be that it shows the first clear 
emergence of an explicit change of attitude and perspective in Wordsworth, 
out of which will develop the philosophical perspectives of Tintem Abbev 
and The Prelude. Yet, as I have said, I feel it acts as a preamble to the more 
important The Tables Turned.
This poem is more complex. There are signs of thought and consideration here;
yet also signs of haste. The rejection of "bookish learning", first hinted at in the
previous poem, is stressed (though not elaborated upon here); the alternative
is made explicit:
Let Nature be your Teacher.(l. 16)
We are told that Nature is the source of "wisdom" and "truth" (virtues that would
be upheld and proclaimed by many thinkers of the time); but it is, of course, in
the manner of moral teaching and growth that we find the originality of
Wordsworth's statement:
One impulse from a vernal wood 
May teach you more of man 
Of moral evils and of good 
Than all the sages can.(21-4)
We will not find this in Godwin. Nor will we find it in Hartley, even in the sections
dealing with the pleasures arising from the beauties of nature, for the "factitious,
associated Nature of these Pleasures" lead, suggests Hartley, not to "wisdom" and
"truth", but to "the Power, Knowledge, and Goodness of the Author of Nature"
and only, anyhow, in those who have "already formed high ideas" of that
Author. (64) Similarly, in his passages on the moral sense, we will not find this
link with nature.
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Yet, before finishing with this poem, it is necessary to consider the two earlier
poems which are related, both written in the Spring of 1798.
Lines written at a small distance from mv house, the earliest piece, contains 
the exhortation:
And bring no book, for this one day 
We'll give to idleness.(15-16)
This origin of the idea developed in the poems I have just examined is then
followed by the lines:
- It is the hour of feeling.
One moment now may give us more 
Than fifty years of reason; (24-6)
Here,in nascent form, lies the origin of the "impulse from a vernal wood", and this
early version is presented, significantly, in terms of the "hostility" between reason
and feeling of which Godwin was popularly accused, a division Wordsworth
presents in The Borderers and repeats later in the 1805 Prelude, but which
Godwin explicitly rejected in the second edition of Political Justice. It would
be wrong to read too much into this simple and rather pleasing poem; it does,
in a sense, reject Godwin's whole approach, but why it does so is, at this stage, not
clear; the clue to that lies in the other poem, written about two months later. For,
in Lines Written Early in Spring, we do have an important step in Wordsworth's
thinking, as both a development of the previous poem, and also the birth of an
idea crucial to much of the greatest poetry Wordsworth will write; an idea I have
already challenged. Wordsworth, in the second stanza of the poem writes:
To her fair works did nature link 
The human soul that through me ran;
And much it grieved my heart to think 
What man has made of man.(5-8)
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As with the previous poem, he uses the ballad form to re-inforce his theme by 
repeating it at the end of the poem:
Have I not reason to lament
What man has made of man? (23-4)
Here now is the clear suggestion that, unless Wordsworth means us to read the 
phrase "human soul" to mean "his soul already bound up with human concerns", 
which seems very unlikely, then he is stating that it was nature which first 
awakened this humanitarian concern in him. Wordsworth does not actually make 
this totally explicit (and we will, later, have to take account of future elaborations 
of this in Tintem Abbev).
Although I have given some preliminary consideration to the question of the 
development of Wordsworth's human concern as portrayed in The Prelude (see 
Chapter Three, Part 1), it was possible at that point only to raise questions about 
the veracity of Wordsworth's account of the awakening of his humanitarian 
spirit by comparing his claims in The Prelude with the evidence emerging from 
the final lines of Descriptive Sketches. Llandaff. and especially the Salisbury 
Plain poems. In this poem, these works are as nought, as apparently, is Beaupuy 
at this stage. What we are witnessing in this group of poems composed towards 
the end of the period of preparation for publication of Lyrical Ballads is the 
moment of Wordsworth's reaction against a poetry inspired by theoretical phil­
osophies as he turns to what was to become his poetic creed, sensibility and vision 
(emerging strongly in his writing and 1798 revisions of The Ruined Cottage and 
soon to be consolidated in Tintem Abbev and then The Prelude!. But Words­
worth does not explain this here. He merely announces his theme here, and then 
re-asserts it initially in The Tables Turned, to which poem I now return.
267
In that later poem, we can see the determination to introduce into this theme of 
nature as the moral teacher, a clearer statement of the corollary (soon to be 
attempted also in prose form,in the fragment, Essay on MoralsV.
Our meddling intellect
Misshapes the beauteous forms of things;
- We murder to dissect.(27-8)
Here lies the reason for the change in Lines Left upon a Yew-Tree seat where 
the original phrase describing the recluse as "by genius nursed" is changed, in 
1800, to "by science nursed". Wordsworth's determination to revoke his earlier 
interest in matters scientific and intellectual (which, in some ways, in Cambridge 
at that time, amounted to the same thing) is clear.(65) The rejection of science 
is repeated in the final stanza of The Tables Turned in this 1798 version.
Whence this outburst? It is difficult to find a reason, especially in two poems 
written in some haste before rushing to the publisher. There is no doubting 
Wordsworth's sincerity of feeling at the time they were written, and, once again, 
the evidence of shift in focus of his poetry from protest against suffering to 
acceptance in the context of a growing vision of nature in The Ruined Cottage 
shows the development of his poetic direction. Nor do I doubt that these poems 
might have resulted from a crystallisation of Wordsworth's ideas between March 
1798 ( the date of Lines written at a distance and approximately the end of May 
or beginning of June of that year, possibly assisted by the conversation with 
Hazlitt). Yet, in considering these poems in the context of what Wordsworth had 
written up till that time, and the rest of Lyrical Ballads one wonders how con­
sidered were the themes of these poems. For much of what is said in them, 
regarding the origins of Wordsworth's humanitarian and moral attitudes is, at
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best, only partly true, given that this collection of poems contains pieces such 
as The Convict and The Female Vagrant that draw so obviously and heavily from 
the source of inspiration against which he is turning.
There is no doubt that this represents a new vision for Wordsworth, and a key 
moment in the genesis of Tintem Abbev. and any of Words worth's poetry that 
looks forward. But, in the poetry which looks back (and this is, of course, crucial 
to Wordsworth's essential poetic vision), above all, in The Prelude, (the begin­
nings of which were to emerge in this year), we must seek to come to terms with 
this seeming contradiction in Wordsworth's account of his early moral growth.
Little wonder that critics have felt the need to invent a "moral crisis" and a sub­
sequent recovery at Racedown at the hands of Dorothy to explain this conflict, 
and how it relates to Wordsworth's account of his development in The Prelude. 
Yet this undermines the achievement of Wordsworth's poetry as conscious 
artifice; for though it will be the place of the final chapter of this thesis to argue 
conclusively my alternative view, it seems appropriate at this point to suggest 
that the very sudden re-appraisal of his poetic vision so clearly and abruptly 
declared in 1798 in these poems (and consolidated particularly in Tintem 
Abbey) were to pose the reflective Wordsworth with a problem, especially when 
deciding on the proposed intention of The Prelude, a problem to which the 
answer of re-inventing himself was to have many attractions.
Yet, clearly, Wordsworth did not feel confident in this new poetry, since, for 
example, he did not publish Old Cumberland Beggar till 1800, though it was at 
a very advanced stage in 1798.(66) In this poem, the legacy of human-
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itarianism from Godwin blends with the new emerging philosophy of nature; 
nature, whence, alone, Wordsworth has claimed, such sympathy for the human 
condition has developed. (A fact reflected in the very few references to the 
poverty Wordsworth saw around him that we can find recorded.(67)
I turn finally, to two other poems which require attention here, since they have 
been particularly singled out as showing evidence of Wordsworth's growing 
allegiance to the ideas of Hartley.
In the first of these, Goody Blake and Harry Gill, there is no mistaking
Wordsworth's debt to Godwin's criticisms of the demeaning nature of poverty.
We have the picture of Goody's poverty presented in Godwinian terms. The
nature and effect of the struggle for basic subsistence as well as the moral crux
of this poem, though seen to reflect simply the growing concern that was being
evinced by political economists in the eighteenth century over the effects of
both the division of labour, and of poverty in fact reflect Godwinian detail:
Now when the frost was past enduring,
And made her poor old bones to ache,
Could anything be more alluring,
Than an old hedge to Goody Blake?(57-60)
Here is Godwin's view of the injustices of inequitable distribution of property
re-vitalised brilliantly by Wordsworth in this agrarian context. Goody is
freezing to death and does not have a property essential to her survival; Harry
Gill has a surfeit or at least an abundance of that essential property. The reason
why we sympathise with Goody Blake's "theft" of the firewood is because her
act is "just" in terms of Godwin's view of our being entitled to property only in
so far as it is of greater benefit to ourselves than to others, a theme associated with
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Godwin's ideas on "virtue","duty", and "justice", which permeates all of his 
discussion on property.
The view that this poem shows Wordsworth drawing on Hartley,(68) when tested
against a study of Hartley, reveals that there is only one statement in Hartley
that could possibly be construed as the origin of the poem:
It is reasonable to think that some (a) ideas may be as vivid as any 
sensation excited by the direct action of objects. (69)
But this would not add anything to Wordsworth's acknowledged source, Erasmus
Darwin's Zoonomia: there is no evidence here of Hartley. The Darwin source is
combined with Godwin's stand against poverty: inequity of distribution of
property, and the tendency of the law to uphold such inequity. Hence Harry Gill
is legally "right" to stop Goody Blake, but has morality and "justice" against him.
If there is any psychological depth in this poem, it lies in the portrait of Goody
Blake, not Harry Gill. This view accords with my interpretation of Last of
the Flock, and a rejection of the more accepted view.
In Tintem Abbev the suggestions of direct Hartleian influence seem groundless.
The lines which would attract such an interpretation are obvious enough:
But oft in lonely rooms, and mid the din 
Of towns and cities, I have owed to them,
In hours of weariness, sensations sweet,
Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart,
And passing even into my purer mind 
With tranquil restoration:.. .(26-31)
To attribute this to a reading of Hartley is to take a sledge hammer to crack a nut.
It would assume areading by Wordsworth of the tedious sections on "vibrations"
(or even Priestly's account of them), the section on memory, which, as I have
shown in Appendix I to this chapter, (on Hartley), is complex and would dictate
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a different pattern to that which Wordsworth presents here. If Wordsworth 
derives some of this from Hartley (which I doubt), then a reading of Godwin's 
summary of Hartley, or what Wordsworth might have heard from the various 
sources already suggested earlier, could equally have supplied what little of 
Hartley he would require. Above all, the "tranquil restoration" is not to be found 
in Hartley, and it is this which is of the essence of Wordsworth's experience here, 
particularly his experience of memory and imagination in that complex and 
creative interaction to which Hartley's mechanistic construct is totally unsuited.
Similarly, Wordsworth's statement that he is
well pleased to recognise
In nature and the language of the sense,
The anchor of my purest thoughts,...(108-110)
derives from Hartley nothing more than an admission of a sensationalist
approach to knowledge: the foundation of Godwin's approach, and of many
philosophers from John Locke on. This passage represents Wordsworth's
vindication of those tentative ideas in the Expostulation and Reply group of
poems, the first statement of his new philosophy.(70)
Once again, that statement contains that belief or posture which study of
Wordsworth's early writings contradicts:
For I have learned 
To look on nature, not as in the hour 
Of thoughtless youth, but hearing oftentimes 
The still, sad music of humanity,
Not harsh nor grating, though of ample power 
To chasten and subdue.(88-93)
Perhaps, however, there is an ambiguity here; for Wordsworth does not make
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clear whether he is ascribing his humanitarian sympathies to nature, or whether 
he is merely finding in nature a means of coming to terms with earlier and more 
urgent feelings regarding the human condition.(71)
To those who seek Hartley's influence, such a view would seem to depend upon 
Beatty's idea of the "three ages of man". Since I have rejected such a reading of 
Hartley ( see Appendix I to this Chapter), it follows that to Wordsworth and to 
Wordsworth alone must be ascribed the recognition of these stages of awareness 
in his consciousness. Similarly, with the lines describing nature's power
for she can so inform 
The mind that is within us, so impress 
With quietness and beauty, and so feed 
With lofty thoughts, that neither evil tongues 
Rash judgements, nor the sneers of selfish men,
Nor greetings where no kindness is, nor all 
The dreary intercourse of daily life,
Shall e'er prevail against us, or disturb 
Our chearful faith that all which we behold 
Is full of blessings.(126-35)
These are not the result of reading Hartley's sensationalist and physiological
writings, but are lines expressive of Wordsworth's sensibility and vision alone;
even the mildly associationist basis is Wordsworth's unique interpretation and
application of this idea.
I have not, of course, dealt with all of the poems in the 1798 Lyrical Ballads: 
links could be shown between e.g. the Salisbury Plain poems and Complaint 
of a Forsaken Indian Woman. And certainly The Thom with its harsh natural 
imagery, its implied criticism of the law (and Wordsworth's strange decision to 
use, as the nameforthe woman in this poem, the name of Basil Montagu's mother 
(72)) shows certain similarities with earlier themes and styles associated with
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Godwin.
Whatemerges from this examination of 1798 Lyrical Ballads in terms of Words­
worth's relationship with Godwin's thinking is, at best, a very erratic picture; 
perhaps best summed up by the placing, in that edition, of The Convict as the 
penultimate poem, with, of course. Tintem Abbev as the last poem of the volume. 
However, the view that this volume represents a rejection of Godwin cannot be 
sustained, given the poems which derive from an earlier period of his interest in 
Godwin, and the evidence of a residuum of Godwin's ideas and moral stance 
in some of the poems essential to Wordsworth's developing poetic vision.
It is more important at this stage, to do two things: first, to recognise the role 
Godwin plays in Wordsworth's development at this transitional time, and second, 
the emerging implications of Wordsworth's new-found poetic vision, charac 
terised above all by Tintem Abbev. In terms of what the second point tells us 
about the first, Tintem Abbev is not significant; yet it is crucial to understanding 
what I wish to call the process of the Lyrical Ballads: the manner in which the 
poems of this volume dictate to the reader their own terms, upon which they 
must be judged. (73) Not only to the reader! For though it will emerge more clearly 
in the 1800 edition, and much more, of course, in the developing Prelude, there 
is the implication that these poems dictated their own terms to the poet also: not 
least, to the poet's understanding of how the poems "came about", to which the 
poet must respond sincerely. This is where the historicist approach of recent 
critics becomes illuminating. Speaking of Tintem Abbev. Marjorie Levinson 
writes:
Epistemologically situated as the object world, the scene confronts the
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writer as a second self - a temporarily displaced double. The enterprise 
invited by or, more precisely encoded in the psychic projections con­
stituting his sense of place, is an introspective act - a self-confrontation. 
When we step back a bit, we can see that the process effectively sutures 
the subject-object wound - in Wordsworth's idiom, heals the breach. Or, 
Tintem Abbey invents and idealises a procedure whereby the mind's ex­
tension (denotation, object representation, quantitative knowledge) 
is experienced as intension (connotation, valorization, qualitative 
knowledge). The functional agency is, of course, memory. Under its 
direction, the return to place is experienced as the passive creation of 
it..(74)
If, therefore, the poem so "invents", it would appear that Wordsworth, in 
responding to that "self-confrontation", responded by recognising a need to "re­
invent" what led to such a poetic vision. I refer again to Levinson and her 
reference in her Introduction to David Erdman:
David Erdman, in a private correspondence, observed the skeptical, 
negative character of scholarship today, and this, ironically among so- 
called historicist readers. What Erdman - a great and greatly historical 
scholar - dislikes about this new move is its penchant for reading what 
he considers "the nothing that is not there". What he fails to appreciate is, 
first, "the nothing that is" and second, the meaning of this interest in that 
absence everywhere. (75)
If I am interpreting this correctly, the decision by Wordsworth to write a number
of poems which now locate the origins of his poetic vision and moral sensibility
in nature and acknowledge other major influences such as the French Revolution
but which do not acknowledge the role of Godwin represents an interesting case
of "the nothing that is".
To return momentarily to The Borderers, and its relationship to Godwin's works,
if that play represents Wordsworth's attempt to replicate, to some extent,
Godwin's own testing of his ideas in Political Justice 1793 through the experience
of Caleb Williams, that is, a "literary" challenge to a work of theoretical principles,
then Wordsworth's attempt, as we have seen, failed. For him, literature (or,
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perhaps his literature, his poetry) had no place for such a purpose; or so he found 
out in his experiment in writing The Borderers. What Wordsworth, as a result, 
is seen to do in Lyrical Ballads, in those critical fourpoems, and more particularly 
in Expostulation and Reply and The Tables Turned, is not simply to reject 
everything that The Borderers and Godwin represent in terms of his literary 
experiment and the resulting literary crisis for himself, but to go a stage further 
than attempting to replicate Godwin's "use" of literature. Wordsworth sees the 
need, for his poetry, to break entirely from theoretical principles and works; only 
thereby can he come to terms with his own poetic consciousness and his moral 
vision as part of that.
The challenge here is to understand what Godwin's role was in Wordsworth's 
development (since Wordsworth is, from this point on, not going to tell us, and 
our examination of texts and other evidence up to this point has only taken us 
part of the way),and to understand exactly why it was that Godwin, or perhaps 
what Godwin represented, was to be excluded by Wordsworth in his portrayal 
of his own poetic development. Only a full perspective on Lyrical Ballads 
including the 1800 edition and the Preface underpins the view that will finally 
emerge from a re-appraisal of The Prelude (in the final chapter of this thesis).
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Part 2: Re-Invention Asserted - Lvrieal Ballads of 1800.
Before proceeding to a brief examination of the Lyrical Ballads of 1800, it is 
important to contextualise this by reference to two related prose pieces: the 
fragment Essay on Morals and the Preface to theLvrical Ballads of 1800. Both 
of these offer important background to an understanding of the process of 
development over the period 1798-1800 under discussion.
Essay on Morals
This "fragment of a moral essay"(76) appears to have been written between
October and December 1798 at Goslar(77). Despite its brevity, its opening
sentences have understandably attracted considerable attention:
I think publications in which we formally & systematically lay down rules 
for the actions of Men cannot be too long delayed. I shall scarcely 
express my self too strongly when I say that I consider such books as Mr 
Godwyn's, Mr. Paley's & those of the whole tribe of authors of that class 
as impotent [? in or ? to] all their intended good purposes; to which I wish 
I could add that they were equally impotent to all bad one[s].(l-7)
Despite the apparently explicit denial in this statement of any admiration for 
Godwin's Political Justice, and although it is supplemented with such state­
ments as, "I have said that these bold and naked reasonings are impotent over our 
habits,.. ."(33-4), nevertheless, it is worth taking some further care over Words­
worth’s arguments.
The most recent editors of Wordsworth’s prose works express themselves 
surprised at Wordsworth’s combining the names of Paley and Godwin in this 
fragment.(78) Surely no such surprise is necessary, since Paley's influence in the 
latter half of the century at Cambridge and the fact that he was on the list of
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Wordsworth's required reading as an undergraduate ( a fact noted in Hazlitt's 
remark concerning Wordsworth's views on Paley(79)) suggest that, in the context 
of Wordsworth's argument, Paley might well be another figure to whom to refer. 
I see no need to go into the role Paley played in Wordsworth's Cambridge days, 
or the general similarities or differences between the two writers: Schneider has 
already done this adequately,(80) although his account does reflect his determi 
nation to see Paley as another significant radical influence on the young Words­
worth.
Although there is much in common between the two,(81) Godwin would have 
been aggrieved to be identified not only with Paley's theological stance and his 
philosophy of self-interest, but also his ideas on punishment, and the role of the 
law and God in distributing justice. Little can be gained from trying to compare 
the ideas of these two writers; what Wordsworth is condemning is the kind of 
theoretical ethical tracts produced by both of them.
Wordsworth is concerned in this fragment with the nature of "habits". Paley's view
of habit can be discerned in his early chapter on the subject of "virtue":
there are habits, not only of drinking, swearing, and lying, and of some 
other things, which are commonly acknowledged to be habits, and called 
so; but of every modification of action, speech and thought. Man is a 
bundle of habits.(82)
Paley claims that constant exposure to pain could make a habit of virtue in us.
Paley's theologico-philosophical stance holds no attractions for Wordsworth, nor 
does his belief in self-interest as opposed to benevolence as a criterion for utility. 
Yet, interestingly, it is Paley's distrust of "instincts" (p 14) in his chapter entitled 
The Moral Sense which points one of the flaws in Wordsworth's argument here.
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For, after Wordsworth's initial introduction to the notion of "habits", the meaning 
of this term takes on wider implications, for example, the "blood and vital juices 
of our minds"(20-21) or "this delicious sensation"(1.44)(83)
What links Wordsworth's criticisms of both Paley and Godwin is the sentence:
All this is the consequence of an undue value set upon that faculty which 
we call reason. (30-31)
Although this suggests a major rejection of Godwin, it is interesting to note a few
inconsistencies. First, as has been noted,(84) Wordsworth's example of the "tale
of distress" (1. 13) and all that he draws from it simply replaces one "system" with
another: his suggested system of "habits" is as much a rule of action as is Godwin's
use of reason (reminding us of Paley's objection to a "system of morality, built
upon instincts"(p 15)).
Wordsworth's own "system" relies on the notion of "habits", and is directed by the 
criterion of benevolence, which is stressed throughout the fragment (for example, 
lines 16ff, 43ff). Wordsworth's embracing of the utilitarian criterion of 
benevolence and the idea of "habits", in as far as they can be understood from 
Words-worth's inexact language and thought here, derive largely from a sensa­
tionalist view of learning and a necessitarian approach to human motivation not 
so very dissimilar to the basis of Godwin's thinking. Where Wordsworth might 
differ, crucially, from Godwin is in the role Godwin would ascribe to reason in 
relation to habits.
Godwin's view of habit can be easily summarised. His two discussions of habit 
can be found in Book I, Chapter V, The Voluntary Actions of Men Originate in
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their Opinions and Book IV. Chapter X, Of Self-Love and Benevolence, both 
chapters already seen to have been important in this argument on Godwin and 
Wordsworth.
Godwin's interest in habit, in the context of his ideas on social change, and the 
role of the doctrine of perfectabilty therein, arises in the discussions over the 
nature of "voluntary actions". Godwin sees perfectibility as being effected 
through approaching as near as possible to the perfectly voluntary act. Being 
realistic (in the second edition of Political Justice) Godwin introduces the idea 
of the imperfectly voluntary act (for example, his famous "church-going" 
illustration). What Godwin is doing is building upon the notion of habit which 
arises out of the belief that all knowledge derives from experience, and patterns 
of cause and effect leading to expectation of a certain result following from an 
action; or, as a corollary, certain actions being undertaken for certain reasons. 
Where habit is allowed to dominate is when volition fails to act under the full 
guidance of reason and may, in fact, rely on a much earlier and now forgotten 
act of reason and understanding which, at one time, motivated a similar act. The 
great danger, as Godwin sees it, is in allowing such habits to continue completely 
unchecked by reason, for it is then that the means can be changed, for example, 
by the passions, to ends in themselves, without the role of reason to judge upon 
the end to be desired. In summary, then, habits are seen by Godwin as part of 
our moral framework; but need to be held under the control of reason if moral 
progress is to be made.
What I am suggesting is that Wordsworth, though apparently rejecting Godwin,
appears yet again, as with The Borderers, to be rejecting Godwin's presumed
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supremacy of reason.(85) Without doubt, that is almost the same as rejecting 
Godwin outright, so central is reason to Godwin's perfectibilian process; but not 
quite. There is much remaining that Wordsworth learned from Godwin and that 
we have seen him draw upon, particularly Godwin's social and humanitarian 
concern as well as the psychological foundation for his moral ethic. Despite 
Wordsworth's protestations, the fragment of argument here does not nullify all of 
that.
Two final points should be made. First, Godwin would probably agree with
Wordsworth that many habits are too entrenched to be moved easily, even by
reason; what Godwin claims is that the idea of perfectability nevertheless
requires that reason be seen to have such a central role. Yet, when Wordsworth
rejects this essential function of reason in favour of the "delicious sensation"
of the "internally" felt "beneficent effect" of our "good actions"(43-4) we
are reminded again of Godwin's words in the pas sage already quoted in the context
of the conclusion to Simon Lee:
He is filled with harmony within; and the state of his thoughts is un­
commonly favourable to what we may venture to style the sublime 
emotion of tranquillity. It is not to be supposed that an experience of 
the pleasures of benevolence should not tend to confirm us in a bene­
volent propensity. (PJ,'96,1,431)
Finally, in the section of Wordsworth's argument that looks forward to the 
Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, where Wordsworth denigrates such theoretical 
tracts because they present no image to the mind (1.26), because they "contain no 
picture of human life; they describe nothing" (1.37), arguments which fore­
shadow the later arguments in favour of nature as a teacher and moral guide, 
it is worth remembering Godwin's view expressed in The Enquirer. Essay V, Of
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an Early Taste for Reading, where he states:
When I read Thomson, I become Thomson; when I read Milton, I 
become Milton.(p 33)
Should we not also remember that very early chapter in the 1793 edition of 
Political Justice (deleted in 1796), which saw literature as one of Three 
Principal Causes of Moral Improvement Considered?(86). Finally, should we 
not remember the success of Caleb Williams? For it seems that in this frag­
mentary outburst, Wordsworth has forgotten all of this, or chosen to forget.
What the above brief discussion suggests is that this fragment offers more 
evidence of a determination in Wordsworth to reject (and justify his rejection of) 
theoretical tracts such as Political Justice, than any considered reason for so 
doing. As such, it raises the questions that Wordsworth, in coming to recount this 
period in The Prelude, would have to face.
The Preface to the Lvrical Ballads of 1800
In examining the Preface to the Lvrical Ballads of 1800, the intention is two-fold. 
First, it is intended to challenge the view that Wordsworth's explication of 
his theory of poetry, especially the matter of the "psychology" of poetry, is 
specifically Hartleian.(87) Second, an alternative view will be proposed showing 
that it is to Godwin's adaptation of Hartley's ideas that Wordsworth owes much 
of the psychological basis of his theory of poetry, thus giving further evidence 
of that residual influence still to be found in Wordsworth's writings at this time.
That Wordsworth's approach is associationist is not denied; the term 
"association" appears several times in the text of the Preface, but its use is so
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generalised that itis not possible to detect the particular work of Hartley behind
these references. Wordsworth's initial statement shows him combining his own
interest in the idea of "habit" with the associationist principle:
It is supposed, that by act of writing in verse an Author makes a formal 
engagement that he will gratify certain known habits of association, that 
he not only thus apprises the Reader that certain classes of ideas and 
expressions will be found in his book, but that others will be carefully 
excluded. (49-53)
This is very much in accord with the argument he started to develop in the Essay 
on Morals fragment, and which has already been evident in his early assertion 
of the importance of the "moral relations"(1.28) present in poetry, as well as his 
insistence that he wished to refrain from the "foolish hope of reasoning (the 
reader) into an approbation of these particular Poems".(33-4) However, Words­
worth's phrase, "habits ofassociation"(l. 150), is used in such a general sense and 
is so self-explanatory that the reader feels no particular need to turn to Hartley 
for its meaning. (88) What Wordsworth is using here is not the theory, but simply 
the language of association, as is the case throughout the Preface.
The next reference to association (1.75), where Wordsworth tells us that he was
interested in "tracing the primary laws of our nature: chiefly as regards the
manner in which we associate ideas in a state of excitement"(74-6) is not 
distinctly Hartleian in origin,(89) unless we are to assume that Wordsworth 
means by these "primary laws" Hartley's complicated theory of vibrations (of 
which there is no evidence). Nowhere do we find Hartley talking about the 
association of ideas in excitement; his notion that certain words and sensations 
can "excite" ideas via association is not the same thing.(90) This is of little use 
when approaching the characters of Harry Gill or Betty Foy; there is no evidence
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of a specifically Hartleian psychology in these characters; conversely, any 
knowledge of Hartley's theories would add nothing to our appreciation of these 
characters.
As the above suggests, Wordsworth's use of the term "association"(91) is, at 
times, so vague as to suggest that his grasp of the idea of association is rather 
tenuous.
Turning now to Wordsworth's discussion of the language of "low and rustic
life" (1.76), and his idea of such a language being a more philosophical language,
his ideas here are very unclear:
Accordingly, such a language arising out of repeated experience and 
regular feelings is a more permanent and a far more philosophical 
language than that which is frequently substituted for it by Poets, who 
think that they are conferring honour upon themselves and their art in 
proportion as they separate themselves from the sympathies of men, and 
indulge in arbitrary and capricious habits of expression..(94-9)
As a note to this passage, Owen and Smyser quote Hartley's definition of a 
"philosophical language",(92) but their selection of quotation amounts to mis­
quotation. Notonly does Hartley notfinish his sentence after "philosophical one", 
he goes on to further definitions which clearly do not relate to Wordsworth's 
ideas. Hartley's section is, in fact, entitled:To explain the general Nature of a 
Philosophical Language, and hint some Methods in which it might be constructed 
upon the foregoing Principles. The full sentence reads:
If we suppose Mankind possessed of such a Language, as they could at 
pleasure denote all their Conceptions adequately, i.e. without any 
Deficiency, Superfluity, or Equivocation; if, moreover, this Language 
depended upon a few Principles assumed, not arbitrarily, but because 
they were the shortest and best possible, and grew on from the same 
principles indefinitely, so as to correspond to every advancement in the 
Knowledge of Things, this Language might be termed a philosophical 
one, and would as much exceed any of the present languages, as a
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Paradisaical State does the Mixture of Happiness and Misery, which 
has been our Portion ever since the Fall. (1,315)
Hartley continues:
And it is no improbable Supposition, that the Language given by God to 
Adam and Eve, before the fall, was of this Kind; and though it might be 
narrow, answered all their Exigencies perfectly well.
Now there are several Methods, in which it does not seem impossible for 
Mankind in future Ages to accomplish so great a Design. (327-8)
This, and the abstruse physiological discussion of language which follows is not
the origin of Wordsworth's ideas.
Another passage which has been seen as Hartleian in origin is part of Words­
worth's discussion of the language of poetry.(93) Two points should be made 
here. First, although parallels can be found between the language of this passage 
andcertainpassagesinHartley,(94)itisnotpossibletofinddirectsimilarities that 
could not be explained by a general awareness of sensationalist theory, and 
earlier theories on the nature and purpose of poetry; second, the illustrations 
in the second half of Wordsworth's own paragraph explain his meaning very 
clearly. There is simply no need of a knowledge of Hartley's ideas to understand 
this passage.
Just as doubt can be shed on the belief in a specific debt to Hartley, evidence 
of influence by Godwin can be seen in two of the most crucial passages in the 
1800 Preface. The passage beginning "I cannot be insensible of the present 
outcry against...."(101-132) can be linked with the later and more famous 
passage (387ff) containing the statement regarding "emotion recollected in 
tranquillity". To expect to find evidence of Godwin here would seem unlikely, 
but it is more likely than that of Hartley.
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When Wordsworth speaks of his "habits of meditation"(l. 111) having formed his 
feelings, again, this is not Hartley. The process of meditation involves, as 
Wordsworth makes clear further on, the process of "thought" which is, in 
Godwinian terms, the activity of the realm of "understanding". Despite Owen’s 
and Smyser's note(95), Hartley's book is marked by its lack of attention to the 
rational faculty (due to the highly mechanistic nature of his scheme), and the term 
"understanding" which Owen and Smyser quote from Hartley's work is used only 
in the Introduction. On the other hand, Godwin's two key chapters , Book I, 
Chapter IV, The Voluntary Actions of Men Originate in their Opinions and Book 
IV, Chapter IX, Of the Mechanism of the Human Mind describe in great detail 
a relationship between reason and feeling very similar to Wordsworth's ideas 
here.(96) In view of the separation of reason and feeling that formed part of the 
premise of Wordsworth's challenge to Godwin in The Borderers (see Chapter 
Four, Part 2), and Godwin's own stance regarding reason and feeling resulting 
from the revisions to the 1796 edition of Political Justice! see Chapter Four, Part 
1), this is significant.
In the well-known passage beginning "For all good poetry is the spontaneous 
overflow of powerful feelings.... "(115-132), the latter part of this passage 
appears, at first sight, to show Wordsworth reverting to his denial of reason and 
his assertion of the role of habit. However, the importance given to "thought" 
in this passage, and Wordsworth's description of the process of classification 
of thought and the development of "habits of mind"(1.126) bears a remarkably 
close resemblance to Godwin's description of the mechanism of the human mind 
throughout Book IV, Chapter IX.
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What appears to happen at the end of the passage is that either Wordsworth 
becomes unclear as to the process he is describing, or he is simply determined to 
assert the mechanism of "habits", and, because of the process of "obeying blindly 
and mechanically the impulses of those habits ",(126-7) contradicts the earlier part 
of his argument ( which resembles closely Godwin's ideas on habit and voluntary 
actions). It is Wordsworth's qualification, "if he be in a healthful state of 
association"... (1.130) which again strongly suggests Wordsworth's rather weak 
grasp of the idea of associationism, and which again suggests that Wordsworth's 
understanding of the process came through a secondary source, most likely 
Godwin, since Godwin's explanation of the role of thought in the mechanism 
of the human mind assumes a central role for association in the rather unsat­
isfactory account he gives of the mind's ability to cope with complex ideas.
What I am suggesting here is not a conscious borrowing from Godwin, but rather 
further evidence of that residual influence as Wordsworth, in this attempt to build 
a psychological dimension to his theory of poetry, draws, probably from memory 
at this stage, upon what was both a summary of some of the principles and 
processes of sensationalist associationist theory and a psychological construct 
in itself, Godwin's Political Justice, with which we know he hadhad, by this time, 
some considerable familiarity.
The implications of this are significant. Most of us are familiar with the mem­
orable phrases such as "allgoodpoetryisthe spontaneous overflow of powerful 
feelings"(115-6) and "poetry...takes its origins from emotion recollected in 
tranquillity"(1.388). But we are not so familiar with the fact that, in the first of 
these statements, Wordsworth heavily qualifies it:
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but though this be true, Poems to which any value can be attached, were 
never produced on any variety of subjects but by a man who being 
possessed of more than usual organic sensibility had also thought (my 
emphasis) long and deeply. For our continued influxes of feelings are 
modified and directed by our thoughts...(116-120)
This view assigns to the "understanding" a role as important as that of feelings. 
Moreover, this is not simply the "thought" which can be unaccompanied 
by "consciousness"; itis "reason", actively engaged in its reflective and selective 
processes.
Similarly, "emotion recollected in tranquillity" uses "reason" as part of the 
process of recollection. Itis interesting to note that here Wordsworth is somewhat 
vague over this process of recollection, referring, as yet, neither to memory or 
imagination. For, at this stage, Wordsworth's own appreciation of the psychologi­
cal process is still at an early stage.
Despite Wordsworth's explicit rejection of Godwin in Essavon Morals, there 
can be little doubt, on examining the Preface to the Lvrical Ballads of 1800 that 
a significant residuum of Godwinian influence remains, principally, at this time, 
in the developing nature of Wordsworth's views on moral and human matters and 
his attempt to explain these in psychological terms; or, in the words of the period, 
in terms of the "mechanism of the human mind". That this should come as no real 
surprise is evidenced by the interest we have already seen Wordsworth take in 
Godwin's "moral psychology" since the poet's revision of Salisbury Plain. In a 
sense, that process of crystallisation of ideas, which can be seen continuing 
throughout the Lvrical Ballads of 1798 (and, as we shall see, even in the 1800 
collection to some extent), is further evidenced in the 1800 Preface, and still
one of the principal influences in that process is the thought of William Godwin. 
The Lvrical Ballads of 1800
In contrast to the 1798 edition of Lyrical Ballads. Wordsworth's second edition 
in 1800 shows considerable editorial concern over the order and presentation 
of the poems, this being well documented in Wordsworth’s own letters.(97) It 
comes as no surprise to find Wordsworth putting Expostulation and Reply, The 
Tables Turned and Animal Tranquillity and Decay at the beginning of the 
first volume; similarly, the concern expressed that The Brothers might open the 
second volume(98) (though this ultimately was not to be the case), and that 
Michael was to conclude that volume(99) shows Wordsworth's conscious 
awareness of his intentions throughout his arranging of the second volume, a fact 
borne out by his letter to Fox.(100)
In light of this, and of Wordsworth's avowed rejection of Godwin in the Essay 
on M orals fragment, it might seem unlikely that there would be evidence of 
Godwinian influence in this collection. However, close examination of the 
poems and of certain deletions and changes reveal further evidence of some 
continuing residual influence, but with evidence also of a surface yet conscious 
reaction against Godwin and what he had come to represent for Wordsworth.
The first point to be made of course is that, with the exception of The Convict.
all of the other poems with some Godwinian import have been retained with
minimal revision. The only one which really deserves attention here is Lines Left
upon a Seat in a Yew-Tree. Wordsworth's alteration of the phrase "by genius
nursed" to "by science nursed" has already been commented upon (see page 268
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above), but it is worth quoting and commenting on more of the revisions here:
In youth by science nursed 
And led by nature into a wild scene 
And lofty hopes, he to the world sent forth,
A favoured being, knowing no desire 
Which genius did not hallow, 'gainst the taint 
Of dissolute tongues, and jealousy, and hate 
And scorn, against all enemies prepared,
All but neglect. The world, for so it thought,
Owed him no service: he was like a plant 
Fair to the sun, the darling of the winds,
But hung with fruit which no-one, that passed by,
Regarded, and, his spirit damped at once,
With indignation did he turn away, (13-22)
Wordsworth's changes are unfortunate, and the image of the solitary "like a plant
 Regarded" is particularly clumsy. Why has he introduced these changes
which mar the quality of the poem and undermine the stature of the central figure?
If we look at the other changes here, for example, "big with lofty views" (1798,
1.14) changed to "led by nature into a wild scene/And lofty hopes (whatever this
means), the deletion of "pure in his heart" and the toning down of
with the food of pride sustained his soul 
In solitude... (1978,20-21)
his spirit damped at once,
With indignation did he turn away...
there seems little doubt that Wordsworth is trying to reflect in the revised poem 
his claimed source, and is consciously trying to retreat from the Godwinian 
origins of the character (Rivers and Falkland). The result is inconsistent. The 
new lines do perhaps harmonise more obviously with later lines of the text, for 
example, lines 21-34 in particular (for the original does seem somewhat over­
intense in relation to these lines); but the poem loses much of its power.
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Evidence of a retreat from Godwinian influence and a reaction against the 
philosopher is, however, much more obvious in the poems of the second volume. 
The general reaction against Godwin was well established by 1800,(101) a fact 
recognised by Godwin in 1801 in his publication of Thoughts Occasioned bv 
Perusal of Dr. Parr's Spital Sermon. What is strange about Wordsworth's 
rejection of Godwin is not simply that his rejection of Godwin's ideas 
accompanied personal acquaintance with Godwin(102) (which is understand­
able), but that he felt able, despite their acquaintanceship, to write the rather 
vitriolic remarks about Godwin in his correspondence. (103) It is this same 
inconsistent pattern (already observed to some extent in the 1798 Lyrical 
Ballads) that can still be found in the second volume of the 1800 edition.
The rejection by Wordsworth of a rationalist approach to moral growth based on 
theoretical principles, as seenin Expostulation and Reply and The Tables Turned, 
is reinforced by his placing these poems at the beginning of the first volume. Only 
one other poem in the second volume of the 1800 edition is explicit in the same 
way as these poems were. A Poet's Epitaph, sent fairly late for inclusion in the 
volume,(104) attracted mixed criticism from Lamb (for Wordsworth's 
manipulation of this, see below, pp 302-3), especially of the "vulgar satire of 
parsons and lawyers". Written in Goslar and very much one of the group of poems 
to which Expostulation and Reply and The Tables Turned belong (later, Poems 
of Sentiment and Reflection), the satire in the first half of this poem shows not 
just Wordsworth’s continuing inability to cope with that form, but also a lack 
of real bite in the lines criticising lawyers or other men of government. There 
is none of the force of the social criticism to be found in Llandaff or Salisbury Plain
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- fuelled so directly by Godwin. Here is a poem which, with the exception of 
the final two stanzas, is as poor as The Convict. Of more particular interest here, 
however, are the stanzas referring to "The Moralist". This, the most extended 
of all of the criticisms in the poem, has been accepted (doubtless, on Lamb's 
authority) as a criticism of "parsons". True, the context created by words such 
as "Heaven", "God" and "soul" can lend itself to such a reading. However,an 
alternative view is to take the term "moralist" to mean what Wordsworth, earlier, 
has often meant by it. There is also the fact that this poem was written between 
October 1798 and February 1799 ( around the same time as the Essay on Morals 
fragment), and corresponds closely to Wordsworth's ideas in that fragment. In 
light of this, such lines in the poem as
A reasoning, self-sufficing thing,
An intellectual All in All!(31-2)
unmistakably reflect criticism in the same vein as the Essav on Morals, possibly 
explicitly directed at Godwin as one of the most prominent proponents of rational 
(and, as Wordsworth was increasingly coming to see it, "intellectualised") 
morality.
For Wordsworth's satire is not literally of the moralist as parson failing to relate 
his "Heavenly task" to more earthly matters (of "this poor sod"(1.26)). Words­
worth's meaning is clearly presented in the later stanzas. The "smooth-rubbed 
soul" (1.29) is that of intellectual elitism and alienation from matters of everyday 
life; the term "intellectual" is repeated.(ll. 32 & 34) The word "unprofitable", 
may even have reference to Godwin's financial problems that were beginning 
at this time. Finally, it should be remembered that Godwin's earliest profession 
was as minister to a congregation of dissenters (also that Wordsworth's own
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religious proclivities which, after his early contact with dissent, were now 
beginning to move towards a more "established" relgious stance). Bearing this 
in mind, the religious "guise" in the satire can be explained.
All of which suggests a satire - or, perhaps, lampoon - more vituperative than 
might at first appear. Moreover, it is a criticism which shows Wordsworth's 
rejection of Godwin following the growing popular reaction against the 
philosopher. And, above all, it is a criticism eminently undeserved.
For, as I have shown earlier, whatever Godwin might have been accused of, 
the idea of an intellectual elitism detached from any real human concern is not 
a reasonable charge. Granted Godwin's rather "bookish" pattern of life, his 
considerable courage in publishing Political Justice and Caleb Williams during 
the reaction against the French Revolution is well recognised. More important, 
in his publication of Cursory Strictures and behaviour at the time of the 1794 
Treason Trials (as I have shown, see Chapter Two, Part 2), he involved himself 
publicly at a time when Wordworth, as we have also seen, withdrew from public 
display of his radical sentiments and responded to fears for his family and his own 
safety. When, later on, Wordsworth omits to mention Godwin's role, it is 
important, to remember such inconsistencies, which, I strongly suspect, 
troubled the reflective Wordsworth just as such discomfiture, in some measure, 
motivated the composition of this poem. For the form and style of this attack are 
important, as is the appearance of the poem in the second edition of Lvrical 
Ballads. It marks a development in the relationship between Wordsworth and 
Godwin; put candidly, one in which the poet was willing to indulge in a level 
of personal attack (reminiscent of the letter previously referred to(105)). Such
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an attitude on Wordsworth’s part at this time offers further evidence for a 
motivation in Wordsworth’s later unwillingness to acknowledge a debt to 
someone towards whom he now directs such criticism. This, despite the fact that, 
as we have seen, a continuing and cordial acquaintance was maintained between 
the two.
Before leaving A Poet’s Epitaph, it is worth noting briefly that in the following 
poem entitled A Character in the Antithetical Manner (a very unsatisfactory 
poem omitted from the 1802 and 1805 versions of Lyrical Ballads). Words- 
worth speaks of
rational peace - a philosopher's ease.(1.8)
Wordsworth here appears to denigrate the peace or escape from genuine cares 
which, he suggests, a "Philosopher" seems to find in his "rational" musings. 
Though this is probably not directed particularly at Godwin, it is in the same vein 
of criticism against those thinkers who pursue a rationalistic line, whom Godwin 
had now come, for Wordsworth, to represent.
The second volume of the 1800 Lyrical Ballads is concerned much more with the
poetry that follows and develops from Expostulation and Reply and The Tables
Turned, and the emerging poetic sensibility and vision associated with these. One
of the earliest compositions in this is There was a Bov (composed in Germany
at the end of 1798, and, of course, seminal in the development of the 1798/99 two-
part Prelude!. Here we see elaboration of Wordsworth's ideas on the origins of
his imaginative and moral growth:
Then, sometimes, in that silence, while he hung 
Listening, a gentle shock of mild surprise 
Has carried far into his heart the voice
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Of mountain torrents, or the visible scene 
Would enter unawares into his mind 
With all its solemn imagery, its rocks,
Its woods, and that uncertain heaven, receiv'd 
Into the bosom of the steady lake.( 18-25)
This,of course, is the Wordsworth recognisable as the poet who, from such
beginnings, eventually composed The Prelude through its various stages of
development, adapting the sensationalist view of experience (whether derived
from Hartley, or, more likely, via Godwin) to his emerging theory of the
imagination. His vision of nature's "nurture", despite an attempt such as this to
portray its origins as essentially experiential, has some debt to those theories to
which he was increasingly to turn a hostile pen.
Somewhat later in composition, Ruth shows evidence that despite Wordsworth's 
avowed rejection of the popular view of Godwinian rationalism, in the very 
originality of his "new" poetry is to be found a residuum of the debt he owes to 
Godwin; for this poem (like Complaint of the Forsaken Indian Woman! shows 
Wordsworth's combination of original view, knowledge derived from the 
literature of travel, and the morality which found its earliest expression in the 
Salisbury Plain poems, particularly the vagrant's tale. What is so new here, and 
so refreshing in this impressive piece, is the moral ambivalence that pervades 
not only the narrative and the social dimensions of the poem, but also the natural 
imagery. Once again, the central male figure is a soldier and the tale is one of 
desertion; even Wordsworth's reference to America,
free
From battle and from jeopardy,...(28-9) 
is reminiscent of his earlier closer drawings upon Godwin, as are Ruth's vagrant 
wanderings and sufferings at the hands of a society ill-equipped to cope with her.
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But it is in the moral stance that the originality of this poem lies as Wordsworth
begins to describe the youth's return to his roamings, and his consequent desertion
of the woman:
Whatever in those climes he found 
Irregular in sight or sound 
Did to his mind impart 
A kindred impulse, seem'd allied 
To his own powers, and justified 
The workings of his heart.
Nor less, to feed voluptuous thought 
The beauteous forms of nature wrought,
Fair trees and gorgeous flowers;
The breezes their own langor lent;
The stars had feelings, which they sent 
Into those favoured bowers.
Yet, in his worst pursuits, I ween 
That sometimes there did intervene 
Pure hopes of high intent:
For passions linked to forms so fair 
And stately, needs must have their share 
Of noble sentiment.(121-38)
Here, Wordsworth's view of nature and his moral views conspire to create a
moral ambivalence which even the stanza soon following, more reminiscent of
Wordsworth's earlier stance, fails to affect:
His genius and his moral frame 
Were thus impair'd, and he became 
The slave of low desires;
A man who without self-controul 
Would seek what the degraded soul 
Unworthily admires.( 145-50)
Wordsworth here seems loath to condemn the youth and turns, instead, to the
sufferings of the vagrant. A similarly ambivalent discussion of her plight and the
moral responsibility for that is expressed in natural images:
The engines of her grief, the tools 
That shaped her sorrow, rocks and pools,
And airs that gently stir
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The vernal leaves, she loved them still,
Nor ever tax'd them with the ill 
Which had been done to her. (193-8)
This leaves us with a picture more reminiscent of The Ruined Cottage than of 
the Salisbury Plain poems. For it is again a transitional poem; and it is in the nature 
of that transition, as Wordsworth moves from Godwin, that the real interest of 
this poem lies. What we see here is the legacy of Godwin's thought, as Words­
worth had wrestled with it within the didacticism of the Salisbury Plain poems 
and also in The Borderers with its claustrophobic motivations, freed to take 
its place and inform and give a moral and psychological depth to Wordsworth's 
new experiment in the Lvrical Ballads. Whether Wordsworth was aware of this 
in his new vision, it is difficult to say; it was, however, by now unlikely that 
he would or could ever acknowledge it.
In The Old Cumberland Beggar, in the form in which Wordsworth first published
it, we have a much more recognisable "formula" in Lvrical Ballads: the patient
figure subjected to some form of hardship, patiently accepting his lot. To see much
of Godwin in this would be wrong; to say even that Godwin (who, in The Enquirer
defined two kinds of beggar, approving only of one(106)), would "approve"
of Wordsworth's view would be wrong. Yet, there are strong hints in this poem
that Wordsworth is still drawing upon Godwin, and was doing so much more
directly in earlier drafts of the poem to be found in the Alfoxden MS. For instance,
Wordsworth's outcry against the statesman's treatment of the beggars was, in
its Alfoxden form, more reminiscent of Wordsworth's earlier outbursts against
the rich which were couched in very similar terms to those of Godwin:
Less useful than the smooth (red) and portly squire 
Who with his steady coachmen, steady steeds
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All slick and bright with comfortable gloss 
Doth in his broad glass'd chariot drive along..(107)
Even the 1800 version seems not far from Godwin's portrayal of the trappings
of the despotism of the rich; again, a common enough theme in radical circles,
but one which Wordsworth's period of closer study of Godwin had helped to
crystallise and focus in his mind.
Such a balance between a residue of Wordsworth's earlier "radical" period, and 
what his reading of Godwin helped to crystallise can be further considered in his 
lengthy treatment in the poem of the pleasures associated with acts of benevo­
lence:
Where’er the aged Beggar takes his rounds,
The mild necessity of use compels 
To acts of love; and habit does the work 
Of reason, yet prepares that after-joy 
Which reason cherishes.(98-102)
The mention of "reason" twice here, and also of habit, is reminiscent of
Wordsworth's concern with Godwin, whether it be his apparent rejection of
reason in favour of "habits" in Essav on Morals, or Godwin's account of the
emotions associated with acts of benevolence (to which I have already referred
on two previous occasions in this chapter(108)). Perhaps a further underlining of
this comes from the earlier deleted lines which followed those quoted above in the
Alfoxden MS:
And meditative, in which reason falls 
Like a strong radiance of the setting sun 
On each minutest feeling of the heart,
Illuminates, and to their view brings forth 
In one harmonious prospect, minds like these 
In childhood..(109)
This deletion might only be a matter of style (three "reasons "would really be too
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much!), but clearly, Wordsworth's interest in the motivation and psychology 
of acts of benevolence is considerable; and it is from Godwin that he undoubtedly 
derived this interest in the relation between matters of morality and the 
mechanism of the mind in making moral decisions. Moreover, the role that 
Godwin gave to reason in the second edition in particular was that of giving 
guidance to feelings, and the idea of "Illuminates" in these deleted lines is very 
reminiscent of this. The link with Godwin is by now very residual, yet that 
interrelation between morality and psychology, and the motivation to human 
concern, is a point that Wordsworth has undoubtedly reached "via" Godwin, 
albeit, by a difficult, tortuous and contradictory path. It is assimilated in the quiet 
confidence of Wordsworth's narrative verse in a poem such as this.
It is appropriate to close with a very brief look at what is more "typical" of the 1800
Lvrical Ballads, what Wordsworth himself saw as most important: the poems
Nutting and Michael seem obvious choices.(110) Both poems are well established
in the vein of "nature and moral growth" introduced in the earlier poems in 1798.
Wordsworth's account in Nutting.
I felt a sense of pain when I beheld
The silent trees and the intruding sky .. .  .(52-3)
is even more consciously developed by the time of writing Michael:
And hence this Tale, while I was yet a Boy 
Careless of books,yet having felt the power 
Of Nature, by the gentle agency 
Of natural objects, led me on to feel 
For passions that were not my own, and think 
(At random and imperfectly indeed)
On man; the heart of man and human life.(27-33)
Whilst questions have earlier been raised concerning Wordsworth's presentation
in The Prelude of the origins and development of his human concern (see
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Chapter Three, Part 1), there is, of course, no questioning the nature of that 
concern as it developed beyond Godwin's expression of it, as evidenced here in 
the 1800 Lvrical Ballads. For the rich detail and pathos of Michael derive from 
Wordsworth's own treatment of humanity in the context of his growing belief 
in the power of nature. In a sense, we are now beyond Godwin, and this is crucial 
to an understanding of why Wordsworth, in The Prelude constructs the argument 
that he does; for it is to this perception of humanitarian concern that he wishes 
to draw our attention. This inevitably has consequences for the focus that he will 
choose in his reflection on his development. If, after all, Wordsworth now 
believes that humanitarian concern is a product simply of experience and nature, 
then he is under a strong complusion to offer himself as an example of this 
process.
To close this brief examination of the poems of 1800, it is appropriate to turn 
once again to Wordsworth's correspondence, this time for his comments on the 
response to his poems. Wordsworth's somewhat over-sensitive response to 
criticism is too well known to require illustration; nevertheless, his letter of 
February/March 1801 to Sarah Hutchinson(EY, 319-20) in which he sends to 
Coleridge "the following harmonies of criticism" is revealing. His choice of John 
Stoddart as a "foil" of misunderstanding against others who offered more 
favourable criticism of his poems is interesting when it is realised that Stoddart 
was aclose acquaintance of Godwin.(lll) Furthermore, Stoddart's comment on 
A Poet’s Epitaph, "the latter part I don't like; it is very ill written", is juxtaposed 
to Wordsworth's selection from Lamb's comment: "the latter part eminently good 
and your own". What Lamb wrote was:
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The Poet's Epitaph is disfigured, to my taste by the vulgar satire upon par 
sons and lawyers in the beginning, and the coarse epithet of pin point in 
the sixth stanza. All the rest is eminently good and your own. "(112)
As already mentioned, with the exception of the final two stanzas, I agree with 
Stoddart's view, though his comments on other poems are rather crass. Never­
theless, this strange indirect criticism of one of the followers of Godwin is 
yet another example of the asides against Godwin to be found throughout these 
years.
Perhaps more important is Wordsworth's own response to John Taylor in April
1801. Wordsworth states:
You say that mine is the pathos of humanity: these words are a favourable 
augury for me, for this is the very excellence at which I aimed.(EY, 325)
Indeed, Wordsworth has, by this stage, largely achieved his aim; and the
influence of William Godwin, though it has played its part, inevitably fades.
By 1800, Wordsworth, alrkdy having written what is now referred to as the two-
part Prelude of 1798/99, was to develop into the projected five- book poem and
then the 1805 Prelude, the principal focus of which was to be the process of
development whereby the poet came to the point in time and the sensibility and
vision of which Lvrical Ballads is the most significant expression. The concept
of the link between his childhood experiences of nature and his developing adult
creativity caught Wordsworth's imagination first of all, as the 1799 Prelude
shows: this is its principal focus. The poetic sensibility and vision that he would
soon want to explain was manifestedin two ways. It emerged in the 1798 Lvrical
Ballads, especially the later poems of that volume; and also through, for example,
There was a Bov and the role these lines were to play in the earliest drafts of The
Prelude, that poem "upon my earlier life, on the growth of my own mind" (113)
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which had started with his exploring the essential link between his remem — 
brances of childhood amongst nature and his adult poetic vision. When, in 
1804, Wordsworth began to develop the 1799 version into the more expanded 
versions, he had to face the reflective task of recounting and presenting to the 
reader and to himself the development of his poetic consciousness, and that, in 
the increasingly essential context of the role of imagination in relation to 
memory.
To quote once again from Jewett,(114) speaking of The Borderers,
readers have not fully registered what is most obvious about thismeta- 
• phor of self-portraiture: that The Borderers is about the failure, even the
danger, of painting one's former self, (p 401)
I am not suggesting for one moment that Wordsworth's Prelude is a failure; but 
given the position Wordsworth had arrived at by 1800, there was, in a figure such 
as Godwin, and in the history of Words worth's relationship with the philosopher, 
a "danger" to be faced. One which his protrayal of that relationship, or rather 
his obvious lack of such a portrayal (to quote Levinson again, "the nothing that 
is" there(115) in the poem) looms large in Books X to XII of The Prelude of 1805. 
For the place and role Wordsworth has chosen to give to Godwin, and also not 
to give to him, is as evocative of Wordsworth's concept of memory, the 
imagination and poetry, as it is of Wordsworth's attitude to Godwin. It was at 
this point that Wordsworth was faced, explicitly, with the need for "re- 
invention", and it is to an examination of that process that we must turn to 
understand fully the complexity of the interrelationship between the poet and 
William Godwin.
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CHAPTER SIX : THE PRELUDE - RE-INVENTION AS RESOLUTION.
The developing argument of this thesis has been that a careful examination of 
Wordsworth's relationship with Godwin and his ideas is important for two 
reasons. First, for what it reveals about the poet and the philosopher and their 
ideas. Second, there is the significance of a developing pattern of questions and 
apparent contradictions that emerge in comparing Wordsworth's recounting of 
his poetic development with what can be deduced from a systematic study 
of that development evidenced through key texts, At this stage in Wordsworth 
criticism, it would be naive to claim any originality in suggesting that a significant 
discrepancy exists between what Wordsworth claims and what actually "hap­
pened"; his determination to play down certain areas of his experience(l) in order 
to enhance his experiential and ultimately his visionary and border(2) sensibili­
ties is well recognised. Yet, in considering his relationship to Godwin's ideas, 
as they emerge over the period 1793-1800 and Wordsworth's response to this as 
portrayed in The Prelude, the nature of this discrepancy is further elucidated. 
Once again, this is not simply an issue of making ethical judgements regarding 
the veracity of Wordsworth's Prelude in relation to his claimed intention; it 
is more complex, and must take into account what the evidence of The Prelude 
actually demonstrates, given Wordsworth's claimed intentions.
It is useful here to do two things: first, to summarise very briefly the view of 
Wordsworth's development that has emerged over the previous four chapters; 
then, to outline the areas to be explored in this concluding chapter.
What has been shown of the relationship between Wordsworth and Godwin and
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his ideas is not any simplistic notion of "discipleship". The earliest period of 
influence by Godwin has been shown to provide some focus to Wordsworth's 
radical experience, and to have offered him some possibility of systematising that 
experience. This is evidenced particularly in Llandaff. in the plans for The 
Philanthropist, and in the first version of Salisbury Plain. The evidence for this 
is often fragmented and erratic as Wordsworth draws upon Godwin's ideas, with 
some indication of an increasingly selective approach to such borrowings, yet 
with an obvious inability to harmonise such libertarian, social and humanitarian 
protests with his poetic form: Salisbury Plain offers the most effective evidence 
of this. With Wordsworth's reading of Caleb Williams comes arecognisable shift 
in his interest in Godwin's work, from the politico-moral to the psychology of 
morality, as motivation plays an increasingly central role in the focus of his 
poetry of protest and of suffering, exemplified in Adventures on Salisbury 
Plain. Yet, much as Political Justice and Caleb Williams provide Wordsworth 
with a crystallising of the significance of his own experiences, the nascent signs 
of a developing literary crisis are already there, even in the powerful Adventures 
on Salisbury Plain, in the ultimate failure of Godwin’s thought and Wordsworth’s 
attempts to borrow from it to coalesce into a poetic vision.
Superimpose upon this a personal acquaintance between the two men, which 
allows Wordsworth personal access to the ideas of Godwin as he revises 
Political Justice, and to the philosopher as the person who took a public stand 
in the years of reaction, and the complexity of the relationship can be glimpsed. 
It is a complexity which expresses itself above all in the decision by Wordsworth 
to challenge, in The Borderers, in a conscious literary experiment, the
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expression of Godwin's ideas as presented in the heavily revised Political Justice 
of 1796, whilst still using the earlier Caleb Williams as a seminal source in that 
challenge; a challenge which, although epistemologically invalid in its distor­
tions of Godwin's premises, actually fails on dramatic, on literary grounds, and 
leaves Wordsworth undecided and solitary. The Borderers represents for Words­
worth a cul-de-sac from which he only extricated himself by rejecting, or 
appearing to reject, Godwin.
From this, we have seen, in the Lvrical Ballads of 1798, his sudden "recovery" 
in poetic terms to produce in The Tables Turned and ultimately Tintem Abbev an 
alternative poetic sensibility and vision; a strong residual influence from Godwin 
still permeates Lvrical Ballads, but inevitably fades as Wordsworth asserts his 
own poetic voice.
There is a danger in such "pat" summaries. Yet it does usefully trace what the 
evidence demonstrates: a significant relationship between the ideas of Godwin 
and Wordsworth in the early development of the poet, and a role for Godwin in 
the recognition by Wordsworth of a need for a significant change of direction. 
Yet, in The Prelude, not only does virtually none of this appear;it is a significantly 
different picture which emerges.
Exactly what is the alternative view that Wordsworth presents, and why he does 
so, can only be discovered through a re-examination of the 1805 Prelude partic­
ularly Books X to XII, in light of the evidence of the previous chapters. In 
such an examination, some of the issues raised previously, particularly in Part 
1 of Chapters Two and Three, must now be revisited. Of particular concern will
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be: Wordsworth's intention in writing The Prelude and some of the problems he 
faced in attempting to fulfil that intention, and the sustained evidence of continu­
ing tensions in the poetry, particularly relating to the period 1793-97. It will also 
be necessary to examine what I refer to as the architectonics of re-invention: 
particularly the separation of reason and feeling and the"spots of time" once again, 
and the so-called "moral crisis", as well as Wordsworth's claims regarding 
imagination "impaired" and "restored".
The Prelude: intention reconsidered.
It is the first of these areas, the question of Wordsworth's intention in writing 
the poem that must first be reconsidered. Whilst earlier exploration of this subject 
(Chapter Three, Part 1) considered Words worth's initial unease over his intention 
in the early stages of composition, there is evidence later in The Prelude of the 
poet's reflecting further upon his purpose. This evidence can be found in Words­
worth's address to Coleridge in Book X:
Thus, O friend 
Through times of honour, and through times of shame,
Have I descended, tracing faithfully 
The workings of a youthful mind, beneath 
The breath of great events - its hopes no less 
Than universal, and its boundless love- 
A story destined for thy ear,...(1805,X,941-6)
and again, in Book XIII, once again in apostrophe to Coleridge, Wordsworth
writes:
this history is brought 
To its appointed close: the discipline 
And consummation of the poet's mind 
In everything that stood most prominent 
Have faithfully been pictured.(l 805,XIII,269-73)
On both occasions, Wordsworth has used the word "faithfully"; yet even in his
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haste to conclude the final Book of 1805, Wordsworth, on the second occasion, 
has slipped in the crucial qualification:
In everything that stood most prominent.
In this qualification lies a clue to Wordsworth!s intention in writing The Prelude: 
a realisation, as he comes to conclude this epic work (by far the most ambitious 
he had attempted up to now (expanded in relative haste to the thirteen books), and 
retrospectively surveys what had been his intention, in the light of what has in fact 
emerged.
Just as that qualification strikes a slightly self-conscious note, so, six lines 
further on, comes yet another example, in Wordsworth's conclusion to The 
Prelude, of that self-consciousness, that discomfiture, identified earlier. (3) 
Having claimed that the development of "the Poet's mind" has "faithfully been 
pictured", Wordsworth almost at once admits:
Yet much hath been omitted,...(1805,XIII,279) 
and, first of all, cites:
Of books how much! (1.280)
It is not enough simply to interpret this as a reference to his scant treatment 
in Book V particularly of literature;(4) for this is the Wordsworth who by now 
has written and published Expostulation and Reply and The Tables Turned with, 
in the case of the latter particularly, his outburst against "books"(5) (as well, 
of course, as his arguments in the Essay on Morals fragment(6)). It is also the 
Wordsworth who has, in Book XII, in the long passage on the subject of 
"love" (1805, XII, 185ff), turned with an unexpected vitriol to decry the 
role of books, in a passage reminiscent of some of his arguments in the Essay on
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Moralsffl:
Yes, in those wanderings deeply did I feel 
How we mislead each other, above all 
How books mislead us - looking for their fame 
To judgements of the wealthy few, who see 
By artificial lights - how they debase 
The many for the pleasure of those few,
Effeminately level down the truth 
To certain general notions for the sake 
Of being understood at once, or else 
Through want of better knowledge in the men 
Who frame them, flattering thus our self-conceit 
With pictures that ambitiously set forth 
The differences, the outside marks by which 
Society has parted man from man,
Neglectful of the human heart.(1805,XII,205-19)(8)
This passage is as uncontextualised as it is unjustified; such an unwarranted and
unqualified summary of the role of "books", whether referring to literature
in its widest sense, or, as seems more likely here, moral and philosophical works,
Wordsworth would have been hard put to defend. To claim, for instance, that
books were only for the "wealthy few" stands little examination in light of the
pirated editions, borrowings, serialisations etc. that were a feature of the widening
literacy of England. And, as to his claims for the role of books in
how they debase 
The many for the pleasure of the few, . . .
the works of, for example, Paine as well as Godwin, and the many works of a
wide spectrum of literature which, despite the reactionary developments of the
later 1790's and early 1800's, were clearly contributing to a social revolution
concerned with the plight of the individual, all refute Wordsworth's astonishingly
ill-considered attack. Yet, simply to write this off as some major "slip" by the poet
is to suggest an ignorance of literature that Wordsworth certainly did not have.
Wordsworth's outburst is intended. The intent behind it becomes obvious as
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Wordsworth's determination to focus upon what "stood most prominent", his 
belief in the experiential, is asserted. If, in writing such poems as The Idiot Bov. 
Wordsworth can be seen to have taken risk as an inevitable part of the process 
necessary to the poetic achievement he intended, so, in The Prelude, he is quite 
prepared to risk such a passage as this in the experiment of portraying the 
development of his poetic sensibility.
This diatribe against "books", nevertheless, is astonishing not only in the fact that 
Wordsworth wrote it, and revised it only minimally in the published 1850 edition 
(by which time the invalid nature of his assertions here would have been only too 
obvious, suggesting again the very conscious nature of his intent here); but also 
in the manner of its misrepresentation of a figure such as Godwin, whose concern 
for the "many" is evident from his early writings and certainly in the first edition 
of Political Justice.
Two further references to "books" point the increased level of self-consciousness 
in Wordsworth's awareness of what he is doing. The first is in the next passage 
of Book XII, where Wordsworth, again proclaiming his determination to write 
of "the very heart of man"(1805,XII,240) through his experience of "those who 
live"(1.241), clumsily qualifies his experiential stance by adding that such 
observation of life will be
Not unexalted by religious faith
Nor uninformed by books (good books,though few),...(242-3)
The self-conscious clumsiness of this latter line is emphasised by its forced syntax 
and the unhappy relationship between the metre and the rhythm. Why has 
Wordsworth written this? The rest of this passage on what Wordsworth sees as
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his literary mission scarcely seems to justify its inclusion; neither do the lines 
which precede it. Unless Wordsworth simply wishes to acknowledge some debt 
to literature (which hardly seems adequately acknowledged in this uncomfortable 
line), there must be some further explanation. What such self-conscious lines as 
these do is to draw attention to themselves and pose questions. Such is the case 
also with the other brief reference to books in Book XII. Wordsworth is speaking, 
significantly, of his sojourn in 1793 on Salisbury Plain, and of
some imperfect verse 
Which in that lonesome journey was composed,...(1805,XII,358-9)(9)
He then continues, in some particularly tortuous syntax, to ascribe to Coleridge
the opinion that the poem (which, of course, was not completed even in its first
version for some time after his joumey(lO)) showed how Wordsworth had
exercised
Upon the vulgar forms of present things 
And actual world of our familiar days,
A higher power-have caught from them a tone,
An image, and a character, by books 
Not hitherto reflected.(1805,XII,360-5)(ll)
Coleridge, in fact, did not read the earlier Salisbury Plain, but had read to him the
revised Adventures on Salisbury Plain.(12) Nevertheless, given the extensive
borrowings from Godwin that have been shown in that poem, particularly
from Caleb Williams (a novel, as I have already noted, that Coleridge did not
appreciate) there is surely not a little irony in Wordsworth's vicarious pleasure
here.
Such self-conscious passages as these, raising questions as they do, are an 
essential clue to how Wordsworth's reflection on and presentation of his 
relationship with Godwin's ideas exemplify and point some central questions
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Wordsworth faced in the task of writing the much-expanded Prelude.
The Prelude: the challenge of re-construction.
It is useful to stand back momentarily from close examination of the text, and to 
address two issues relevant to Wordsworth's task, as he faced it. If the key 
questions that motivated his writing of the two-part Prelude of 1798/99 were the 
repeated interrogatives "Was it for this....?"(13) that expressed Wordsworth's 
despair and frustration over not being able to come to grips with his plans for The 
Recluse,(14) other questions faced Wordsworth as, in the early summer and 
then the winter of 1804, in his work to expand the five-book Prelude, especially 
from Book X onward, he came to deal with his experiences in France and particu­
larly with the period following his return to England. For, in many ways, the 
final book of the five-book Prelude, as far as it can be reconstructed,(15) must 
have presented a more "comfortable" conclusion(16) than was to emerge from his 
re-workings and expansion. Taking account of the probable datings and order 
of composition,(17) the ability to locate composition of the very uneasy Book 
VIII (discussed earlier in chapter Three, Part 1) in October 1804, with the compo­
sition of most of Book IX and the early part of Book X in the preceding summer, 
but with the crucial later stages of Book X written probably in December 1804, 
there is a distinct sense of Wordsworth's not simply recounting "what happened", 
but attempting to reconstruct what he wishes to present, to a very particular 
purpose.
Wordsworth's determination to include, in The Prelude, his revolutionary 
experiences in France and what resulted from there meant that he had to face some
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difficult questions. For one thing, why, for someone to whom the countryside 
and nature meant so much (and was to be given such fundamental significance 
in his poetic sensibility and vision) did he, on his return from France, stay in 
London; and what was he to record of this period?(18) What place would he give 
to the publication and immediate impact of a work such as Political Justice, of 
which he could scarcely have been ignorant? And what of his own writing of 
Llandaff (which, as I have shown, shows signs of an early and ill-digested 
knowledge of Godwin's work)? What Wordsworth chooses to ignore (there is, 
for example, no mention of his numerous visits with Samuel Nicholson to the very 
popular meetings of the dissenters at the Old Jewry) in response to such 
questions is as important as what he decides to include. Wordsworth also faced 
the question of how he was to deal particularly with the period 1794 to 1797, a 
period which includes two significant major works in his early creative devel­
opment: the two Salisbury Plain poems and The Borderers.
In the development of his poetic consciousness, whatrole was he finally to ascribe 
to the rational faculty? For, if "reason" had been, ultimately, some chimera, some 
alternative means of reform and improvement of the human condition to which 
he turned initially and somewhat desperately (through, amongst others, the ideas 
of Godwin) after his disillusion with the French Revolution and the reactionary 
events in England of 1794 and beyond, the role of the rational faculty was 
nevertheless one from which he could not hide. The Prelude, with its many and 
often puzzling references to "reason" bears testimony to this.
These were some critical questions facing the poet as he turned to write of those 
difficult years, with a clear sense of his newly-established vision; and hence of
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whither he was going in writing his great poem. But, how to get there, in some 
retrospective reconstruction which would convince the reader (and perhaps even 
himself) of a developmental process which would vindicate and establish once 
and for all the nature of his poetic vision? That was the challenge of The Prelude. 
What the above questions and their perspective suggest is that it is a conscious 
mythmaking, and it is in that context that its undoubted achievement as well as 
its weaknesses should be judged.
However, Wordsworth also faced another problem. Whether we begin from what 
is now little more than common sense in a psychologically literate society, or 
whether we wish to adopt the useful perception of the "historicist" viewpoint with 
its acknowledgement of the full context in which writers create, (19) those 
residual influences which inevitably must colour any reflection upon or attempt 
to recount a past "as it actually was", Wordsworth inevitably faced the difficulty 
that it is simply not possible ultimately to return to the original perception. This, 
of course, is part of the originality of the conception of The Prelude, as signif­
icantly original and experimental in its own way ( as were the experiments of 
Lvrical Ballads) in using the poet's own mind as the focus of his poetic inspiration. 
It is, in a sense, impossible to have "a mind of winter",(20) to re-create the ephebe. 
Linguistic researches of the past fifty years or so, pointtothe hurdles Wordsworth 
faced: his perceptions of 1804/5 must inevitably be part of his manner of 
perceiving his earlier years; and the role that language is now recognised to play 
in the process of "meaning", never mind the complexities of mediating that 
meaning, only added to Wordsworth's challenge as we perceive it today.
Therefore, it is necessary to undertake a careful examination of some crucial
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passages of Books X and XI of the 1805 Prelude against a background of the 
questions raised earlier in Chapters Two and Three regarding Wordsworth's 
claims in The Prelude in relation to what the available evidence suggests. This 
will indicate that, in looking particularly at the question of Wordsworth's 
relationship with William Godwin, the result of Wordsworth's facing the 
questions outlined above is a similar sense of discomfiture, of self-consciousness, 
and self-justification in The Prelude: which points to what it is that Wordsworth 
is actually trying to achieve in the poem, despite his declared intentions.
In Book X, it is possible to point to certain critical passages which evidence these 
qualities. In terms of the order of the Books in The Prelude (as opposed to order 
of composition), Book IX comes as a relief, and must indeed have done so to 
Wordsworth as he recounts his earliest experiences in France. There is a sense in 
which Book IX is a celebration of the experiential: Wordsworth's learning, not 
so much from nature in this particular case, but from what he observed: and the 
people with whom he conversed. The Beaupuy incident sits comfortably and 
confidently in this Book ( to which it was probably later added(21)), as does 
Wordsworth's somewhat self-conscious jibe at "armchair radicals".(22) But the 
very long Book X of 1805,(23) opening with the establishment of the republic 
in France, soon begins to reflect Words worth's confusions over the development 
of the French Revolution.
Book X : The Language of Re-Invention.
Early on, in the growing welter of feelings thatWordsworth conveys, there enters 
that note of uneasy self-consciousness as the poet, a few lines after asserting that
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he would "willingly have taken up/ ... service" (1805,X, 134-5) introduces an
account of his awareness at the time of the more theoretical ideas of radicalism
with the lines:
On the other side, I called to mind those truths 
Which are the commonplaces of the schools,
A theme for boys, too trite even to be felt,...(1805,X, 158-60)
Why this outburst? This self-conscious admission that he did feel and think that
"tyrannic power is weak"(1.167) and
That nothing hath a natural right to last 
But equity and reason;...(172-3)
It may seem too much to assert that this is a self-conscious "swipe" at Godwin (in 
view of the use of the word "reason"). At the same time, we are reminded of 
Wordsworth's outburst in Llandaff against despotism (24) or his statements to 
Mathews regarding his disapproval of "monarchical and aristocratical govern­
ment" (EY,123) as well as some of the assumptions lying behind the Salisbury 
Plain poems which clearly echo his own belief in "equity andreason". Whether 
or not the lines quoted demonstrate simply an awareness of the popular radical 
themes of the time, or represent a residual memory of more specific Godwinian 
applications of these, what can be seen here is Wordsworth's discomfiture 
overrecountingthis. But why? After all, he has faced up to some very distressing 
memories of his residence in France. Yet here, in this section where he simply 
summarises what few politically aware persons of the time would have been able 
to deny, some level of interest in the "theoretical" background, the thinking 
behind such political convictions and developments, this self-deprecating tone 
draws attention to itself and once more poses questions.
If such overt tonal signals are one manifestation of this self-consciousness in
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Wordsworth's poetry, another is the presence in The Prelude of certain views and 
ideas that function for those areas of Wordsworth's earlier development as 
fossils betraying an earlier stage of development of which, in a work of such 
conscious self-reflection, it is difficult to believe Wordsworth could not have 
been aware. A good example of this occurs where Wordsworth, in describing 
some of the extremes resulting from the Terror and its subsequent developments, 
writes of those
who throned 
The human understanding paramount 
And made of that their god, the hopes of those 
Who were content to barter short-lived pangs 
For a paradise of ages,...(1805,X,317-21)
Whether or not this actually refers to the Girondins or the attempt at religious 
secularism(25) of 1793, Wordsworth could not fail to have been aware of the 
connotative implications this carried in relation to his own espousal of Godwin's 
rationalistic stance in 1795. It is difficult to know if he was consciously aware 
of the potential ironies of his critical reference to those willing to "barter short­
lived pangs/For a paradise of ages" not simply as a derogatory reference to 
the doctrine of perfectibility ( in which, at one time, he had placed much faith), 
but in relation to the ambivalent views on violent reform found in the first edition 
of Political Justice(26) and, more important, Wordsworth's own reflection of that 
in Llandaff. (27) But the energy of the poetry here, with its clear rejection of these 
stances, suggests Wordsworth's satisfaction at being able, in an effectively 
disguised manner, to dissociate himself from such a stance. For the reader of 
Wordsworth's earlier works, such dissociation is, however, not so easily 
accomplished, and again questions are raised regarding Wordsworth's intention 
in The Prelude.
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As we begin to move into the latter half of Book X, (probably composed in 
November/December 1804), and as Wordsworth approaches that period which 
has, historically, been most difficult to enquire into, so the poetry begins more 
frequently to falter, and the self-consciousiiess to increase. Having already 
discussed Wordsworth's astonishingly brief account of the reactionary repres­
sions around the time of the 1794 treason trials, (28) it is appropriate momentarily 
to revisit the conclusion to this passage:
But this is passion over near ourselves,
Reality too close and too intense,
And mingled up with something, in my mind,
Of scorn and condemnation personal 
’ That would profane the sanctity of verse. (1805,X,640-44)
As previously suggested, this seems inadequate as a response to the repression of
liberties that would, one would assume, have truly shocked Wordsworth, a
believer in the ideals of the French Revolution and its early libertarian ideals.
I cannot believe that his reference to the repressions being
mingled up with something, in my mind,
Of scorn and condemnation personal
refers to Annette Vallon or the problematic question of his possible return to
France to see her in September of the previous year; (29) nor that this is some
way of avoiding indulgence of mere personal feeling in his poetry. (30) But such
an enigmatic self-conscious remark in the context of this brief and unnecessarily
obscure reference to a key incident in the history of democratic liberties
in England could indeed be explained by Wordsworth's facing and trying to
come to terms in his developing poem with the kind of questions I outlined earlier
in this chapter. Is it not possible that Wordsworth,' reflecting upon this period,
sees that the way in which he acted (as opposed to the conduct of Godwin) is
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incompatible with the view he is presenting in the poem; and that the lines quoted 
above represent the nearest thing in the poem to the admission of his re-ordering 
and re-inventing in this poem?
Wordsworth's discomfortis reinforced by the fact thatthis passage is immediately 
followed by a sudden ( and initially confusing) return to 1792 and Wordsworth's 
admission in the context of that year that he had taken 
an eager part
In arguments of civil polity...(1805,X,659-660)(31)
He is referring here to the period he spent with Beaupuy, and immediately
interjects with the claim,
I had approached,like other youth,the shield 
Of human nature from the golden side,
And would have fought even to the death to attest 
The quality of the metal which I saw.
What there is best in individual man,...(1805,X,662-6)
before finally referring to his interest in "the management/Of nations-",(685-6) in
language which has residual echoes of Godwin:
What there is strong and pure in household love,
Benevolent in small societies,...(668-9)(32)
not thoroughly understood 
By reason(673-4)(33)
how their worth depended on their laws,
And on the constitution of the state.(687-8)
As a result, in the following passage, Wordsworth can ascribe to the period of
his residence in revolutionary France the time
When Reason seemed the most to assert her rights
When most intent on making of herself
A prime enchanter to assist the work
Which then was going forwards in her name .(697-700)
This time when the "promise"(1.702) of future improvement is expressed in
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terms of
The budding rose above the rose full-blown.(l;705) 
is as redolent of Wordsworth's (conscious or unconscious) assimilation of his 
Godwinian-inspired optimisms, especially his brief commitment to the doctrine 
of perfectibility, as of his enthusiasms over the French Revolution. What I 
suggest is that those residual influences which echo through the lines betray the 
complex emotion here for the "gestalt" that it is. Despite Wordsworth's conscious 
attempts to obscure the place of Godwin in his own development, the nature of 
language is such as to defeat such intent; and allows the reader access to what 
Wordsworth, in his attempt to obscure, actually reveals. Whether it is a case 
of Wordsworth being aware of his experiences in relation to Godwin (as opposed 
to his being influenced by Godwin, which he is certainly unwilling to acknowl­
edge explicitly), or the reader being aware of the semantics of the Godwinian 
context, the poetry itself reveals the true complexity of Words worth's emotion 
and thought here.
It is with such a perception that we have to be prepared to approach lines such 
as Wordsworth's admission that he was
not uninformed that men 
See as it hath been taught them, and that time 
Gives rights to error; on the other hand 
That throwing off oppression must be work 
As well of licence as of liberty;...(1805,X,743-7)
For, whilst Wordsworth carefully introduces his account of his developing
perceptions here in terms of a particular experiential context,
An active partisan, I thus convoked 
From every object pleasant circumstance 
To suit my ends.I moved among mankind 
With genial feelings still predominant,...(736-9)
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the fact is that the perception arrived at in the lines quoted previously was the result 
of much more than observation anddiscussion.To arrive at this view, Wordsworth 
required to go through his reading of Godwin and others, as well as his writing 
of Llandaff: yet he insists on presenting it in experiential terms alone, seemingly 
unaware that the language in which he couches it is strongly evocative of the 
language of the radical writers as well as speakers of the day.
Despite Wordsworth's conscious attempts to disguise the fact, the experience and 
perceptions attributed here to 1792 are expressed in a language which can be seen 
by a careful reader to be consciously, even self-consciously "post 1792" in terms 
of Wordsworth's experience. This betrays and perhaps reveals the inevitable 
inability of Wordsworth to represent, unalloyed by intervening experiences, his 
earlier perceptions.
The Architectonics of Re-invention.
As we approach the crux of this dilemma, it is useful to examine the next passage 
in Book X. Once again, what attracts our attention is the sense of self-consci­
ousness and discomfiture in the poetry, for Wordsworth does not simply give us 
an account of his involvement with rationalistic theories, but rather, in a highly 
self-conscious passage, seems not so much to explain as to offer a reason, or even 
an "excuse" for why it was that he dallied temporarily with rationalistic theories.
I say "dallied", for, as the early lines of Book XI. Imagination. How Impaired 
and Restored as well as the earlier intended final Book of the Five Book Prelude (34) 
make clear, Wordsworth's intention in recounting this is to present his involve­
ment with rationalistic theory and with Godwin as some temporary, aberrant
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interlude:
This history, my friend, hath chiefly told 
Of intellectual power from stage to stage 
Advancing hand in hand with love and joy,
And of imagination teaching truth 
Until that natural graciousness of mind 
Gave way to over-pressure of the times 
And their disastrous issues.(1805,XI,42-8)
Wordsworth's intention here is not to explore or recount faithfully "what
happened"; once again, it is to continue to reconstruct events in order to underpin
and offer a plausible explanation for a point of view he now maintains. This
is very evident in the self-justifying lines in Book X (where Wordsworth, having
recorded the fact of England's declaration of war on France and its effect upon
himself), states:
And thus a way was opened for mistakes 
And false conclusions of the intellect,
As gross in their degree, and in their kind 
Far, far more dangerous.(1805,X,765-8)
Then, in a passage that is difficult to interpret due to the tense (35) in which
Wordsworth expresses it, the poet tells us how
Meantime,
As from the first, wild theories were afloat,
Unto the subtleties of which at least,
I had but lent a careless ear - assured
Of this,that time would soon set all things right,
Prove that the multitude had been oppressed,
And would be so no more.(l805,X,773-9)
Whether or not the reference to those "wild theories" does or does not refer
immediately to Godwin is less important than recognising what Wordsworth is
doinghere. Just as. in the passage immediately following this in The Prelude. (And
now, become oppressors in their turn/Frenchmen... 1805,X,791ff), it is difficult
to find contemporary evidence for the strength of feeling Wordsworth claims
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regarding the threats to "liberty "(1.796) both in in France and in England through 
the repressions of liberty and the treason trials of 1794, so it is difficult to find 
evidence of what these "wild theories" were,(36) to which he was now drawn, in 
the hope that they would offer
- evidence 
Safer, of universal application, such 
As could not be impeached,...(788-90)
The purpose of this passage, as I have said, is not to explain what happened, but, 
rather, to create, retrospectively, a motivation for what happened. More impor­
tant, a motivation which will ultimately be seen as flawed, and so will inevitably 
cause the reader to sympathise with, and accept, Wordsworth's rapidly approach­
ing, but (as we shall see), inadequately explained rejection of his period of 
rationalistic allegiance.
Following that brief passage recounting his sustained commitment to libertarian
values, Wordsworth presents his account of what must be recognised as the period
of his interest in Godwin. The style in which this section is introduced is an
important guide to Wordsworth's intentions here, and it is valuable to quote the
whole first passage:
This was the time when, all things tending fast 
To depravation, the philosophy 
That promised to abstract the hopes of man 
Out of his feelings, to be fixed thenceforth 
For ever in a purer element,
Found ready welcome. Tempting region that 
For zeal to enter and refresh herself,
Where passions had the privilege to work,
And never hear the sound of their own names- 
But, speaking more in charity, the dream 
Was flattering to the young ingenuous mind 
Pleased with extremes, and not the least with that 
Which makes the human reason's naked self 
The object of its fervour. What delight!-
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How glorious!- in self-knowledge and self-rule 
To look through all the frailties of the world,
And, with a resolute mastery shaking off 
The accidents of nature, time, and place,
That make up the weak being of the past,
Build social freedom on its only basis:
The freedom of the individual mind,
Which, to the blind restraint of general laws 
Superior, magisterially adopts 
One guide - the light of circumstances, flashed 
Upon an independent intellect.(1805,X,805-29)
Not here the personal and somewhat tortured narrative of the following passage
(where Wordsworth recounts his own espousal of rationalistic beliefs); butrather
a contrived objectivity, an assumed freedom from any personal involvement.
If the reason for this seems only too obvious, especially in the first half of the
passage, with its apparent attemptin a clumsy quasi-ironic tone to represent what
Wordsworth now sees as the soul-lessness of such a perception, it nevertheless
points further the manner in which Wordsworth is determined architectonically
to portray rationalism simply as something to be rejected in a process of strategic
reconstruction designed to gain the sympathy and support of the reader. That
tone indicates that it is not simply Godwin at which he is aiming, but at what, for
Wordsworth, Godwin had come to represent: the arrogance and unfeeling nature
of rationalism Even over this we must be careful, for the unfeeling tone, of course,
gives way in the middle of this passage to the outburst: "What delight!/How
glorious!". Yet even here, the exclamatory phrases lack any real feeling, a sense
which the lines following them reinforces. For Wordsworth's disapproval is
obvious, and then we reach the end of the passage and read the claim of rationalism
to
Build social freedom on its only basis,
.... - the light of circumstances, flashed 
Upon an independent intellect.
323
(the last two lines, of course, being those of Rivers in The Bordererst37IY
This is an important passage, not so much for what it presents, but in terms of 
how it presents it; it is a key example of the challenge Wordsworth faced in trying 
to replicate perceptions of an earlier stage in his development, or trying to 
reconstruct or re-invent perceptions that will accord with his poetic vision. For 
Wordsworth came to the writing of such a passage having gone through the 
experience of writing The Borderers, and this inevitably coloured how, at the 
time of writing this passage, he perceived the events he recounts. Similarly, the 
reader, conscious of earlier developments in Wordsworth's life, including his 
relationship with Godwin's ideas, comes to a reading of this passage aware not 
simply of the fact of The Borderers, but also of the perceptions that, by 1804, 
Wordsworth would bring to recounting this episode of nine or ten years earlier. 
What, above all, strikes such a reader is Wordsworth's claim that such a 
philosophy
promised to abstract the hopes of man 
Out of his feelings.
This distortion of Godwin's ideas, particularly as they appear in the second edition
of Political Justice, probably initiated by the impression in the revisions of a
greater role being given to reason than careful reading of Godwin's revised
arguments warrants,(38) (and which Wordsworth has used as the premise of his
challenge to rationalism in The Borderers), is fundamental in Wordsworth's
manipulation of his developing account (and justification) of a poetic sensibility,
founded on the role of feeling in human perception. Wordsworth may, of course,
be assuming knowledge by most readers of the first edition, or its reputation,
where, on Godwin's own admission, the role of the passions in motivation was not
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given any extended attention, and where it is easier to justify Wordsworth's claim 
here, although the poet was aware at this time of the revisions in the second edition. 
What Wordsworth was groping towards in The Borderers and ultimately left 
incomplete (unable at that stage in his development to arrive at a consequence 
of his rejection of rationalism), he has established in the Lyrical Ballads. 
especially by 1800. Now, with the pieces in place, he is able to return to the 
argumentpremisedby The Borderers. This view is reinforced if we briefly follow 
Wordworth's other references in The Prelude to the separation of reason and 
feeling in Books X and XI.
Earlier in Book X, inapassage already discussed,(39) Wordsworth, in speaking
of his interest in the ideas of "civil polity" states that there, though they were
Felt deeply, were not thoroughly understood 
By reason.(l 805,X,673-4)
It would be easy to make too much of this, but two points are relevant. First, whilst
not wishing to ascribe to the term "reason" particular reference to Godwin's ideas,
itis equally impossible, to rule such out; particularly in the context ofthis passage
which, as shown earlier, includes echoes of Godwin. There is an ambivalence
here (of which Wordsworth was possibly aware), in that Wordsworth is referring
to limited rational comprehension and assimilation of these political ideas, but
would certainly be aware in his own mind of the role Godwin had played in this.
This is crucial: as with the question of "books", so with "reason" ( especially
in relation to feeling) Wordsworth, without naming Godwin, is nevertheless
using his experience of his relationship with the philosopher's ideas as a
developing, sustained, but hidden metaphor for the kind of rationalistic stance
he ultimately was to reject. For Wordsworth, whether or not that view of
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rationalism faithfully reflects Godwin's ideas was not less important than estab­
lishing the process by which he arrived at the ultimate vision of his poetry.
In this sense, Godwin, like "books", is used, as Beaupuy has earlier been used, 
(40) as a rhetorical device, a literary shorthand to represent some value or pattern 
of values in Wordsworth's scheme and intention. As with Beaupuy, however, a 
process of re-ification can be observed, as the rhetorical device that Wordsworth 
has initiated establishes its own identity and impetus.
In this context, Wordsworth's intention here can be seen. It is to present to us a 
stage in his development where he saw that mere intuitive response to matters 
of "civil polity", mere "feeling" was seen by him to be inadequate. At that time, 
he did indeed envisage and set considerable store by rationalistic enquiry. But the 
clue to the fact that this is less likely to represent a factual account of what was 
the case, and is more likely part of the architectonics of re-invention and 
justification of a position already arrived at, is the way in which, even in this 
brief reference, Wordsworth so consciously separates "reason" and "feeling".
It is useful at this point to return for a moment to Wordsworth's "false
conclusions of the intellect"(1805,X,766) and his reference to
the philosophy 
That promised to abstract the hopes of man 
Out of his feelings,...
as well as his portrayal of rationalism as a philosophy which
makes the human Reason’s naked self 
The object of its fervour.
It is now possible to see how Wordsworth has consciously structured the
development of his theme and argument against rationalistic thought in such a
326
way as to vindicate and underpin his belief in his new vision. The conscious 
allusion to the sterility and moral dangers inherent in Rivers' vision is used both 
to re-inforce Wordsworth's anti-rationalistic stance, and to provide evidence that 
he had indeed been aware of the dangerous attractions of a philosophy such as 
Godwin's.
Yet, as we have seen, Wordsworth's argument against Godwin is flawed, since he 
rejects a totally rationalistic philosophy on the grounds of its inability to recognise 
the place of feeling. Yet, in the character of Rivers, he simply assumes such a 
division; and this is further flawed by the character of Rivers himself, who, though 
in many ways powerfully presented as the figure of "naked" reason, is 
motivated initially by feelings of revenge more reminiscent, in some ways, 
of Iago. As I have shown, Godwin, in the second edition particularly, neither 
assumed nor accepted any such clear-cut division. Additionally, the portrayal 
of the role of feelings in The Borderers, in Herbert particularly, and the guiding 
force of nature (as particularly evidenced in the somewhat over-convenient 
appearance of the star) is so dramatically weak that it convinces no-one.
Wordsworth's allusion to The Borderers, therefore, brings doubtful support to his 
argument. There is a significant gulf between Wordsworth's portrayal in The 
Prelude of the philosophy of "reason's naked self', with its objective, distanced 
almost derogatory or even condescending tone, and the evidence of Godwin's 
role in such texts as the Salisbury Plain poems, and the conscious experimenting 
with Godwin's ideas in The Borderers. It is significant that Wordsworth uses 
this passage as a brief prelude to the more personalised summary of his own 
involvement with rationalism.
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However, before turning to that section, it is important to follow through a little
further Wordsworth's overall intent in his representation of reason and feeling.
Book XI, (much of which, particularly in the case of the "spots of time" passage,
had been composed earlier for the two part (41) and then the five-book (42)
versions of The Prelude), confirms, as does most ofthe final three Books of 1805,
that Wordsworth had a clear view of the point of development, sensibility and
vision at which he wished to arrive; and therefore had decided to portray his
development as
Of intellectual power from stage to stage 
Advancing hand in hand with love and joy,
And of imagination teaching truth 
Until that natural graciousness of mind 
Gave way to over-pressure of the times 
And their disastrous issues.(1805,XI,43-8)
Just how determined he has been to portray this view of his now-established
vision as previously his original view, and only temporarily interrupted by
his reaction to the French Revolution and aberrations into such areas as Godwin's
rationalism, can be seen in the disparity between the very brief account of that
period itself (in 1805, less than one hundred lines, though expanded a little by
the time of publication in 1850) and the number and nature of the passages that
Wordsworth devotes to looking back, again somewhat self-consciously, over this
period.
Part of that further reflection on this period is in terms of the division of reason 
and feeling, as Wordsworth re-establishes the dominance of feeling, guided by 
nature, that is to be his final imaginative and poetic vision. In a very intense and 
at times obscure and confusing section (indicative again of Wordsworth's some­
what self-conscious uncertainty over how to re-construct this supposed "crisis"
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in his development), Wordsworth tells us
Thus strangely did I war against myself;
A bigot to a new idolatry,
Did like a monk who hath forsworn the world
Zealously labour to cut off my heart
From all the sources of her former strength;...(1805,XI,74-8)
stressing the repression of feeling (nurtured by nature) consequent upon his
espousal of a rationalistic stance. Then, in an exceptionally unclear passage
(deleted from the 1850 text), as Wordsworth continues in an increasingly self-
conscious tone to reflect on this period of rationalistic "aberration", he refers
again to feeling and its relationship to nature, as he affects to remember what
it was that, in such a time of sterile espousal of rationalistic beliefs, maintained
some potentially saving force:
What then remained in such eclipse, what light 
To guide or chear? The laws of things which lie 
Beyond the reach of human will or power,
The life of Nature, by the God of love 
Inspired - celestial presence ever pure- 
These left, the soul of youth must needs'be rich 
Whatever else be lost; and these were mine,
Not a deaf echo merely of the thought 
(Bewildered recollections, solitary),
But living sounds. Yet in despite of this- 
This feeling, which howe'er impaired or damped,
Yet having once been bom can never die-... (1805,XI,96-107)
In this rather unconvincing passage, and the poetry and rhythms creak under the
tortuous syntax as it labours to contain the unconvincing concatenation of
ideas. His determination to establish, even in such alleged dark moments,
some link between the opening books of The Prelude and this account of his
alleged moral crisis, and between the role of nature in his childhood and a
continuation and development of that role in the poems that emerged particularly
in Lyrical Ballads of 1798 and 1800, is at the expense of the achievement of the
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poetry in this passage.
Yet where do we see evidence of such a relationship between Wordsworth's sens­
ibilities and nature evidenced in his writing of this period? If the revisions in 
Adventures on Salisbury Plain do show a considerable development over the 
earlier version in the role ascribed to nature, it is not the nurturing nature of 
the opening and closing of the The Prelude: nor does the harsher imagery that 
Wordsworth learned, as part of his imaginative development to appreciate 
and see as nurturing his vision, evidence itself adequately in the early period 
to which Wordsworth here refers. This also raises another even more interesting 
question: what evidence is there to support the degree of subservience to "reason" 
that Wordsworth, in a passage such as the above, is suggesting?
Yet Wordsworth continues, determined to portray his lapse into rationalism as a 
betrayal of those intuitive and natural feelings which, he now claims, were nascent 
in him, already developing the humanitarian and moral sense and sensitivities 
which he has now acknowledged. In the following passage, again deleted from 
1850, Wordsworth, to borrow a term of his, trifles (43) with the distinction 
between two ideas of reason: "the grand/And simple reason"( 1805,XI, 123- 
4) and
that humbler power 
Which carries on its no inglorious work 
By logic and minute analysis-...(1805,X, 124-6)
He then goes on to assert the limitation of the rational power which, instead of
perceiving truth, allows one merely "to sit in judgement" rather than "to feel"
(1.136), a weakness to which he confesses very forcibly by repetition of the idea
only thirty lines further on:
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Nor only did the love 
Of sitting thus in judgement interrupt 
My deeper feelings,...(163-5)
Here, flawed though it is, is a reconstruction of events, a construct that will give
credence to the themes of The Tables Turned (referred to briefly in Wordsworth’s
reference to the "maid" a few lines later,(1.198)44) and to Tintem Abbey and the
role that poem ascribes to memory and the imagination). Wordsworth records
how, after the "degradation"(l 805,XI,242) caused, above all, by his espousal
of a rationalistic philosophy, imagination ultimately triumphed:
I had felt 
Too forcibly, too early in my life,
Visitings of imaginative power 
For this to last: I shook the habit off 
Entirely and for ever, and again 
In Nature's presence stood, as I stand now,
A sensitive, and a creative soul.( 1805,XI,250-6)
Here, at last, is a place for the re-placed "spots of time" passage, composed four 
years earlier in the context of the two-part Prelude. For Wordsworth, this 
passage now spans the significant gap and the period of loss of direction (as he has 
now described it) between the early nurturing by nature of his imagination and 
the ultimate expression of that in Tintem Abbev.
It has been Wordsworth's intention, throughout, to arrive at this point, at this 
presentation of the triumph of feeling, the imagination and nature in relation to 
his creativity. The lines last quoted above evoke such a tone of triumph; but over 
what? This is a key question. For if, by 1804, as he turned dissatisfied still with 
the relatively modest achievement of the five-book Prelude (and still aware of 
his lack of success in tackling the intended and much-mooted Recluse! to attempt
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to write some major piece, some "epic" of the poetic consciousness, then such 
a task might seem less daunting, less potentially tedious, more attractive and 
more satisfying egotistically if it were to record some significant achievement. 
Not simply the development of a poet's mind, as originally intended, but the
development of a poet's mind, and its triumph of imagination over.........
something! For Wordsworth, his reactions to the French Revolution and, even 
more, his temptation into the wilderness of Godwinian rationalism provided an 
ideal "something". In the case of the latter, the fact that, in the five-book Prelude, 
in the intended concluding book, there was already some brief reference to 
this(45) gave Wordsworth the idea of how his triumph might be ennobled.
Thatit was Wordsworth's intention to present some chimera of a "moral crisis" can 
be seen from the obvious manipulation of the experience of Books X and XI, in 
the discrepancy between what they claim and what textual evidence shows. 
However, it is now appropriate to return to Wordsworth's brief initial account of 
his encounter with Godwinism as he presents it in Book X, and, once again, to his 
reflections on that in Book XI.
Moral Crisis
In approaching the matter of Wordsworth's alleged moral crisis, the first 
question must concern what evidence there is to support the existence of such a 
crisis, at least on the scale Wordsworth suggests. For in his various revisions 
of the poem, Wordsworth shows evidence both of some discomfort and and 
considerable dissatisfaction over his presentation of this. He also appears 
particularly concerned over the weakness of his initial presentation of his
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"despair", as a result adding the crucial lines of Book XI that appear in the 1850 
text (306-327), beginning with the famous:
This was the crisis of that strong disease,...(1850,XI,306).
It is a most significant revision, and one which should be examined both in terms 
of what it adds to the experience outlined in the preceding section written for 
the 1805 text, and the nature of that section itself.
The interpolation of the passage between Wordsworth's
Yielded up moral questions in despair,...(1805,X,900) 
and his account, immediately following, of how, as a result he turned to "math­
ematics" (1805,X,903) (which, of course, in 1850 becomes "abstract science" 
(1850,XI,328)) ameliorates somewhat the rather inept (and, again, self-consci­
ously uncomfortable) attempt by Wordsworth in 1805 to move so quickly from 
the depths of his alleged moral crisis to the process of his rehabilitation by 
Dorothy. In revising the poem, Wordsworth himself saw a weakness here; 
exactly what that weakness was is well indicated by the nature of the additions 
in the revision which reinforce two facets of the 1805 account. First, in such lines 
as
..the soul's last and lowest ebb; I drooped,...(1850,XI,307)
and
Depressed, bewildered thus,...(1850,XI,321)
Wordsworth apparently has seen a need to reinforce the depths of his alleged
despair. Second, his identification of the cause of this, his account of
Deeming our blessed reason of least use 
Where wanted most:...(1850,XI,308-9)
and the lines following (up to 320) make much more explicit the purported cause
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of his despair. In a sense, the line
Yielded up moral questions in despair, 
is significantly clarified and reinforced by the addition of this section; indeed, 
the detail in which lines 309-320 of 1850 question Godwin's ideas not simply on 
reason, but on the thought, motivation and the role of reason in perceiving the 
"right" choice, leaves no doubt that Godwin and his rationalistic moral 
philosophy is Wordsworth's target here.
The original 1805 lines (850-900) are not as clear on either point, and these have, 
by 1850, been subject to much detailed revision. Initially, Wordsworth presents 
his sense of disillusion with the established order effectively enough, with his 
sense of frustration over whence he might find some "secure" philosophy for the 
improvement of the human condition, recognising that "A veil had been/Uplifted 
(1805,X,855-6) and that
a shock had then been given 
To old opinions...(1805,X,860-1).
But if we examine the language and images associated with exactly what 
processes of moral enquiry he was involved in, these lines seem more concerned 
to convey reflective rejection of what he did, rather than describe the nature 
and processes of enquiry he followed. Wordsworth, in speaking of the way in 
which his rationalistic enquiries resulted in sacrificing an organic view of man­
kind and nature to "scrupulous and microscopic views" (1805,X,845) and his 
endless probing of "the living body of society"(1.875) and remorseless speculat­
ing in his moral enquiries scarcely gives a concrete, never mind a detailed, 
picture. For a poet who, in remembering and describing those crucial "spots of 
time", can describe so accurately, making use of specifics as well as evoking the
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feelings and thoughts associated with such incidents, who has described London 
and the events in France with such economy yet concrete realisation, these lines 
stand out as notable for their generality. Little wonder that Wordsworth 
interrupts by suggesting that "some dramatic story" will be necessary to make 
clearer
What then I learned - or think I learned - of truth,
And the errors into which I was betrayed...(1805,X,881-2)(46)
We are left with a mere fifteen lines, approximately, to convey to us Wordsworth's
alleged moral and spiritual nadir:
Thus I fared 
Dragging all passions, notions, shapes of faith,
Like culprits to the bar, suspiciously 
Calling the mind to establish in plain day 
Her titles and her honours, now believing,
Now disbelieving, endlessly perplexed
With impulse, motive, right and wrong, the ground
Of moral obligation - what the rule,
And what the sanction - till, demanding proof,
And seeking it in every thing, I lost 
All feeling of conviction, and, in fine,
Sick, wearied out with contrarieties,
Yielded up moral questions in despair,(1805,X,888-900)
Wordsworth's reaction, on coming to review this, wastoaddthepassage to which
I have drawn attention.
It is useful to compare the poetry of this passage with two other passages: the
first, already examined earlier in this chapter ("This was the time.............
independent intellect",see pp 322-3 above); the second is earlier in Book X, 
where Wordsworth gives us an account of his reactions to the Terror in France 
(11. 329-380), and, in recounting his response to these "enormities",(1805,X,374) 
speaks of the nightmares he suffered:
my dreams were miserable;
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Through months, through years, long after the last beat 
Of those atrocities (I speak bare truth,
As if to thee alone in private talk)
I scarcely had one night of quiet sleep,
Such ghastly visions had I of despair,
And tyranny, and implements of death,
And long orations which in dreams I pleaded
Before unjust tribunals, with a voice
Labouring, a brain confounded, and a sense
Of treachery and desertion in the place
The holiest that I knew of - my own soul.(l 805,X,369-80)
Wordsworth is, of course, describing two very different events: his sense of 
intellectual and perhaps spiritual frustration in his moral and rationalistic quest­
ionings and also the spiritual despair and frustration evidenced by his horror over 
the atrocities of the Terror. Nevertheless, there is a sense of sincerity, of poig­
nancy and pathos, reinforced by the images, syntax and rhythm that is simply 
not present in Wordsworth's account of his moral crisis. What we do feel in the 
moral crisis passage is more reminiscent of the first of the two passages to which 
I have drawn attention. Wordsworth's attempt there to adopt a somewhat 
distanced tone (See my earlier discussion of this, pp 322-3 above) is also reflected, 
to some extent, in the "moral crisis" passage; the diction, even the images used, 
the complex syntax broken by the punctuation producing a fragmented rhythm, 
is more reflective of an intellectual frustration than some crisis of feeling or 
of the spirit. And even if the loosening of the rhythm and softening of the diction 
in the last four and a half lines does underwrite the intended sense of "despair", 
the sudden
And for my future studies, as the sole 
Employment of the enquiring faculty,
Turned towards mathematics, and their clear 
And solid evidence.(1805,X,901-4)
undermines that limited achievement. The consonantal clusters here, reinforcing
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the assertive rhythm may be effective in evoking Wordsworth's sense of the 
"solid evidence" of mathematics, but one can understand why, in revising this 
section, Wordsworth at least allowed the vowels, rhythms and cadence of
Yielded up moral questions in despair,... 
to linger in our consciousness, before proceeding to his additions.
Once again, it is the sheer self-consciousness of the passage describing the moral 
crisis that is crucial; one can understand and even admire the difficult balance that 
Wordsworth is trying to achieve: to represent or somehow replicate in poetry 
a spiritual frustration and then despair arising out of a misguided intellectual 
quest. But Wordsworth reveals his consciousness of intent; so different from 
the faithful re-creation of an experience in the lines describing his reactions to 
the Terror. We do not doubt for a moment that Wordsworth experienced those 
feelings over the Terror"; the pathos of his soul is conveyed "naturally" by the 
pathos of the poetry. Not so in the case of the account of his supposed moral 
crisis; the artifice of the poetry is what is most in evidence.
Wordsworth's revisions show he was not convinced by it; hence he is reduced to 
simply telling us:
This was the crisis of that strong disease,
This the soul's last and lowest ebb; I drooped,. .  .(1850,XI,306-7)
The word "drooped" is clumsy and unconvincing; and the rest of the revision, 
although economically summarising this crucial aspect of Godwin's thought, 
fails to rescue Wordsworth's earlier attempt to represent some genuine moral and 
spiritual "crisis" which impaired his imaginative powers. Yet again the 1850 text 
points how consciously structured is Wordsworth's intent here. For Wordsworth
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is determined that his dalliance with
reason of least use 
Where wanted most:...(1850,XI,308-9)
should be seen to have caused his being "Depressed, bewildered..(1850,XI,321),
not because of a fundamental mistrust of the rational faculty, but because of its
irrelevance as he then applied reason (as he now perceives it) in matters of
moral guidance; certainly as exemplified in such doctrines as Godwin's. It is the
1850 text that makes this clear; and again, in this revision, we sense the self-
consciousness, even at this late date, with Wordsworth's clumsy qualification that
he did not abandon rational enquiry altogether:
with an utter waste 
Of intellect; such sloth I could not brook,
(Too well I loved, in that my spring of life,
Pains-taking thoughts, and truth, their dear reward)...(1850,XI,324-7) 
The self-justifying tone of these last unfortunate lines contrasts with the more 
stark
And for my future studies, as the sole 
Employment of the inquiring faculty,...(1805,X,901-2).
Revising his poem in light of the claims he makes in the final Books regarding
imagination and his new poetic vision, Wordsworth probably realised that his
own rational faculty required to be left more "in tact" at this stage than his 1805
text suggested.
Such a sceptical approach to Wordsworth's "moral crisis", based on the scant
evidence from the period of this crisis and the unconvincing account in The
Prelude raises the question: if it did not happen, then why does Wordsworth
suggest that it did.(and re-inforce that suggestion in the published text)? The
answer to that question (which will contribute considerably to understanding
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the nature of The Prelude) is partly that it fills an essential gap in Wordsworth's 
attempt to present how he arrived at the poetic vision of The Tables Turned and 
Tintem Abbev. Exactly why he felt he had to do this raises an important question. 
After all, why not accept what seems to have been the case: that Wordsworth, in 
responding to the frustrations over that famous conversation with Hazlitt (see 
p 263 above) did, on the spur of the moment, write Expostulation and Reply and 
The Tables Turned, and from the perspective and declaration emerging there 
from, began to build; culminating in Tintem Abbev where, at last, his thought 
and poetry coalesced into an expression of poetic vision which did indeed draw 
upon the experiences of his childhood and youth?
Yet Wordsworth does notdo this; The Prelude shows, ironically, that Wordsworth 
himself is
endlessly perplexed 
With impulse, motive, right and wrong, the ground 
Of moral obligation-
If I am open to the charge of using Wordsworth's own words a little too conven­
iently here, it should be remembered that a great theme of this poem is that of 
Wordsworth's moral humanitarianism; with its exploration of impulse, feeling, 
and, above all, motivation. Moreover, it was his interest in Godwin, as evidenced 
particularly in the revisions in Adventures on Salisbury Plain and in The 
Borderers, that nurtured Wordsworth's interest in motivation. That interest, now 
expressed in his own concern to portray his motivation in his poetic development 
can be seen in the way Wordsworth returns to the issue of his period of rationalistic 
enquiry several times in the remaining Books o fThe Prelude, having ostensibly 
dispensed with the role played by reason (and Godwin in particular) and the
consequent damage to his poetic sensibility, and having turned very quickly 
to the role played by Dorothy in the re-establishment of that sensibility,
For in these early lines of Book XI, Wordsworth, in a series of extended images, 
returns at some length to this period, despite his statement in the opening lines 
of Book XI that he must turn from man's unhappiness and guilt and his assertion,
Not with these began 
Our song, and not with these our song must end.(1805,XI,7-8)
These lines are followed by an apostrophe to nature and her delights that is 
reminiscent of the imagery and opening lines of Book I of The Prelude, and which 
seems, at first, to mark a new direction in the poem, looking beyond the experi­
ences of his period of rationalistic enquiry. Yet he soon returns to reflect further 
on "those distracted times"(1805,XI,31) and his "history/Of intellectual power". 
(47) In fact, this return by Wordsworth to when
that natural graciousness of mind 
Gave way to over-pressure of the times 
And their disastrous issues.. .(1805,XI,46-8)
is interesting from two viewpoints. First, it should be noted that Wordsworth 
seems determined to revisit this period and to reflect further upon how his imagin­
ation was "impaired" by the experience. (48) Yet, the poetry and close of Book X 
would surely have allowed him to move directly to his period of spiritual and 
imaginative rehabilitation with Dorothy at Racedown. But, in approaching 
composition of Book XI (which originally began at line 42(49)), Wordsworth 
was drawing on some of the material used in the incomplete final Book of the 
five-book Prelude.(50) This book originally began with the first third of what is 
now 1805 Book XIII (Ascent of Snowdon plus a version of XIII, 70-165), and 
concluded with 123-388 of 1805, Book XI, the "spots of time" sequence which
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was now the intended conclusion of that version of thepoem.(51) Wordsworth 
therefore decided to draw upon the latter two thirds of the five-book Prelude. 
Book V, with the obvious view that further portrayal and explanation of the 
reasons for impairment of the imagination was as crucial to his intention as was 
the manner of its restoration.
Wordsworth was, of course, holding back his "spots of time" passage to fulfil the 
key function in the portrayal of the nature and source of his imaginative recovery; 
Wordsworth knew, at this stage, where he was going. But he was determined 
by now to give motivation and credibility to what, he realised, was an ultimately 
intensely "visionary" experience. To carry the sympathy of his readers, in that 
vision, Wordsworth was aware of the need for a convincing portrayal of the 
sterility of the experiences which brought about his moral crisis.
Hence, he draws on a lengthy section, some of it previously written, revisiting 
this period of moral crisis. The very fact of his doing so, as well as the manner 
in which he does it, draws attention to itself. It is worth looking at these passages 
in some detail and asking what they bring to the poem, what they add. These 
reflections on the reasons for imaginative impairment began in the earlier five- 
book version around the equivalent of 1805, line 123(52) and with only a few 
"bridging" lines. (53) The passage beginning "This history, my Friend..." 
(which, as previously indicated, originally was intended to open Book XI) is 
a considerable expansion; one throughout which Wordsworth, at considerable 
length, and bearing in mind the lines from Book V leading up to the climactic 
"spots of time" passage, prepares the ground to justify and make acceptable 
to us the visionary sensibility he now possesses.
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In a momentary outburst of natural imagery, he contrasts the "fragrance....
of the shore,..."(1805,XI,50-1), with all its natural attractions and the equally
natural responses of the senses and feelings to such a scene, to his "business..........
upon the barren seas,... "(1.55).(54) This, with its plosive alliteration expresses 
his
sense of what he now sees as the arid rationalistic perfectibilian view of
The man to come parted as by a gulph 
From him who had been? (1805,XI,59-60).
This is a conscious distortion of Godwin's stance, but one which allows him
convincingly to continue to characterise reason as divorced from the natural
feelings of
Sage, patriot, lover, hero;...(1805,XI,64)
He concludes the passage which challenges reason to respond to the natural
sympathies and humanitarianism of poets who respond to the various weaknesses
evidenced in mankind,stating:
Then I said 
"Go to the poets, they will speak to thee 
More perfectly of purer creatures - yet 
If reason be nobility in man,
Can aught be more ignoble than the man
Whom they describe, would fasten if they may
Upon our love by sympathies of truth?"(1805,XI,67-73)(55)
If, as seems likely, this is intended to be an ironic jibe, pointing the "weakness"
of poets in responding to man as he merely is (as opposed to Godwin's view
of man’s potential in "the perfectly voluntary state"(56)) then it is a distortion of
Godwin (by taking perfectibility out of its context), intended to justify and create
sympathy for a poet, such as Wordsworth, who would spurn such intellectual
aridity through the writing of such poems as The Idiot Bov. Goodv Blake and
Harry Gill. Simon Lee, and the other poems which celebrate the spectrum of
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human character and frailties.
It is aconscious and accomplished tactic by Wordsworth; however, it is difficult
to find evidence supporting this perspective in his earlier writings. On the
contrary, as we have seen, Godwin's contribution to Wordsworth's thinking
and his developing humanitarianism as evidenced in the Salisbury Plain poems
is significant. Yet, havingreadthe passage just examined, we are ready to accept
Wordsworth's assertion:
Thus strangely did I war against myself;
A bigot to a new idolatry,
Did like a monk who hath forsworn the world
Zealously labour to cut off my heart
From all the sources of her former strength;...(1805,XI,74-8)
For Wordsworth has provided (has now invented) a motivation; we are ready to
accept what he asserts, because the experience he has created to underpin that
statement is logically convincing. Hence, we have a further dimension to his
developing argument to buttress his view of the division in him between reason
and feeling, a division he ascribes to his temporary espousal of rationalistic
thought, particularly that of William Godwin.
However, Wordsworth is determined to reinforce this still further. He goes on to 
a clumsily overt reference to reason's power "to exalt and to refine" (1805, 
XI,87) and hence "unsoul"(1.81) the "mysteries"(1.84) of the "brotherhood of 
all the human race"(1.88) (which he revised later), and then an equally overt and 
clumsy reference to the work
Of poets, pregnant with more absolute truth.. .(1.92) 
whom he has failed properly to appreciate, due to his supposed fixation with
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reason. (Again these lines are deleted in later revisions.) Then comes apassage 
interpolated between the one just examined, and a briefer one (121-136), drawn
from the draft of the final Book of the five-book Prelude (but, interestingly,
deleted in the 1850 published text) which opened the final two thirds of that Book,
referring, to
reason - not the grand 
And simple reason, but that humbler power 
Which carries on its no inglorious work 
By logic and minute analysis- 
Is of all idols that which pleases most 
The growing mind.(1805,XI,123-8)
The sheer overtness, and, (by this stage in the 1805 text) the tedious repetitiveness
of the references to reason and its "impairment" of the imagination surely
attracts suspicion due to the lengths to which Wordsworth goes over the cause of
such impairment. Yet in another passage (96-120) in which, as we have seen,
Wordsworth asks
When then remained in such eclipse, what light 
To guide or chear?.. .(1805,XI,96-7)
he answers with a combination of obscurity, unhappy natural imagery and
tortuous syntax that fails to convey either the intended sense of nature's values
persisting in him or the unsympathetic and unfeeling responses his rationalistic
stance brought to his vision of nature. In fact, nature seems to surrender not to
"reason" here, as was intended, but to the onslaught of the quality of the poetry.
No wonder that, in his revisions, Wordsworth reduced these lines to a more
economic summary of his argument.(57)
Wordsworth's revisions, his own unhappiness over 180511.42-135 (to become, 
by 1850, 11. 44-92 in drastic revision over several years beginning as early as 
1807(58)) provide an important example of how the self-conscious discomfiture
in the poetry draws attention to itself, posing questions concerning Wordsworth's 
intentions in writing The Prelude. These lines, pointing significantly to the 
period of his relationship with Godwin, echo the same unease identified in earlier 
passages associated with that relationship; where again the discomfiture results 
from his conscious manipulation of "the facts", of the logic and of the 
architectonics of the poem.
Spots of Time
This view can be further supported by examination of three other passages in the 
poem: the "spots of time" passage, the first 219 lines of Book XII, and, finally, 
Wordsworth's account of his journey across Salisbury Plain and his reference in 
that to the poem, Salisbury Plain. The interrelationship between these reflects 
strongly the self-conscious pattern that has built up in the poem over the latter 
half of Book X and over Book XI.
Earlier discussions of the "spots of time" passage(59) indicate that, following 
his shift of this passage from Part I of the two-part Prelude, even as late as Spring 
1804, Wordsworth intended this to be the conclusion of his poem. Despite the 
fact that such a shift did undermine the original intention of declaring the "spots 
of time" philosophy and its architectonic implications in order to underpin what 
was to come in the poem, I would have to agree with Jonathan Wordsworth, on 
the evidence he provides, that the intended five-book poem would have been the 
most "formally rounded"(60) of the versions of The Prelude with such a con­
clusion. The intended use of this passage as a conclusion, points to Words­
worth's understanding, from the time of the conception of the five-book Prelude.
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that the purpose of his great poem was, in a sense, to arrive once again "at the 
beginning". Similarly, the existence, as early as January 1799 of the following 
lines,
whence, depressed 
By trivial occupations and the round 
Of ordinary intercourse, our minds 
(Especially the imaginative power)
Are nourished, and invisibly repaired.. .(61)
points to Wordsworth's intention at an early stage to take account of the fact
that repair of the imagination must have been preceded by some impairment,
caused by
trivial occupations and the round 
Of ordinary intercourse,...
the exact nature of this being unclear. But, whatever it was, it does not refer
to what the addition in 1805 clearly suggests:
By false opinion and contentious thought,
Or aught of heavier or more deadly weight...(1805,XI,260-1).
This considerably alters the sense of "trivial occupations", suggesting that such 
rationalistic activities are themselves "trivial". With this small but highly signifi­
cant revision, Wordsworth very effectively adapts his long-intended "conclu­
sion" to encompass briefly the long, repetitive and rather fragmented account 
of his imaginative impairment. He has provided a "moral crisis" now to give 
even greater significance and heroic stature to the process whereby his mind can 
be
nourished and invisibly repaired-...(1805,XI,264)
The "spots of time" passage itself, is, of course an impressive achievement; it
makes its point as poetry should, through the experience and perception it
expresses, and would have made a fitting conclusion.
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Yet he did not leave things here; in his reworkings and expansion, Wordsworth 
was still left with the Ascent of Snowdon incident (1805,Book XIII, 1-65) which 
had originally opened the final Book of the five-book Prelude (a recent compo­
sition (62)) with which he was obviously determined to do something. Words­
worth adds to the end of the "spots of time" sequence yet another concluding 
and clumsy apostrophe to Coleridge:
Thou wilt not languish here, O friend, for whom 
I travel in these dim uncertain ways - 
Thou wilt assist me as a pilgrim gone 
In quest of highest truth. Behold me then 
Once more in Nature's presence, thus restored,
Or otherwise, and strengthened once again 
(With memory left of what had been escaped)
To habits of devoutest sympathy.(l805,XI,389-96)
With its parenthetical aside concerning his escape from rationalism’s alleged
dominance, this is a weakpassage, andit is little wonder that by 1832Wordsworth
deleted it in favour of an expansion to the closing of the "spots of time" passage.
Imagination Restored
In Book XII, with its reflectively assertive opening celebration of nature’s
nurturing, it is evident, despite the confidence that the "spots of time" passage
brought to the closing of Book XI, that Wordsworth still feels unable to leave
behind him totally his moral crisis. For though the purpose of this Book is to
return (in a sense) to the theme of Book VIII, Love of Nature Leading to Love
of Mankind, there is, again, a stumbling self-consciousness in the early stages
of Wordsworth's account of this. In the passage beginning "Such benefit my soul
..."(1805,XII,15ff), as Wordsworth speaks of his rehabilitation and his having
been taught to reverence a power 
That is the very quality and shape
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And image of right reason,...(1805,X II24-6)
his reference to the power of nature in these terms sets his poetry off in an
unnecessarily defensive direction and tone, as the syntax of this long sentence
catalogues a virtual litany of what Wordsworth now rejects:
no impatient or fallacious hopes,
No heat of passion or excessive zeal,
No vain conceits, no quick turns
Of self-applauding intellect,...(28-31).
Why return to this? Wordsworth's determination to return yet again to this period 
draws attention to itself. His re-assertion of the role of "feeling", a position arrived 
at by insisting on the opposition of feeling and reason, provides a fitting and 
convincing context for a credible account of imaginative, spiritual and humani­
tarian restoration. As Wordsworth continues with this account of his spiritual 
recovery, the residual echoes of his period associated with Godwin and what, 
for Wordsworth he now represents, are consciously allowed to echo persistently; 
whether it be in the tangential reference to "rulers of the world" as
these
Even when the public welfare is their aim
Plans without thought, or bottomed on false thought
And false philosophy;...(1805,XII,73-6)(63)
or the more obvious reference to Wordsworth's
having gained
A more judicious knowledge of what makes 
The dignity of individual man - 
Of man, no composition of the thought,
Abstraction, shadow, image, but the man 
Of whom we read, the man whom we behold 
With our own eyes-...(81-7)(64)
Wordsworth presents this as an account of how nature slowly restored his natural
feelings and perceptions and re-instated his original natural humanitarian
sympathies which his period of rationalistic enquiry had damaged and diverted.
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Yet this contradicts the evidence of the Salisbury Plain poems, which, despite 
their weaknesses, reflect Wordsworth's attempt to present a developing humani­
tarian response, and bring this strong sympathy to his poetry; a considerable 
development on the generalities of Descriptive Sketches or even the outrage of 
Llandaff.
Above all, one wonders if Wordsworth failed to see the irony in his
anxious wish 
To ascertain how much of real worth,
And genuine knowledge, and true power of mind,
Did at this day exist in those who lived 
By bodily labour, labour far exceeding 
Their due proportion, under all the weight 
Of that injustice which upon ourselves 
By composition of society 
Ourselves entail.(1805,XII,98-105)
This reflects a humanitarian concern for the effects of unremitting toil on the
minds of the poor that is at the heart of Godwin's humanitarian concern, of which
Wordsworth was aware and which, through the crystallisation of ideas and
experiences that reading Godwin enabled, brings conviction to such lines. As if
an awareness of this crosses Wordsworth's mind at the time of composition,
the poet defensively asserts:
To frame such estimate 
I chiefly looked (what need to look beyond?)
Among the natural abodes of men,...(105-7)
There is a defensiveness here which he repeats further on in this this Book as he
decries education(l. 170) and then, as previously mentioned, "books"(1.207).
Only now in Book XII does Wordsworth feel he can confidently express the 
poetic sensibility and vision of Lyrical Ballads of 1800, as being
349
in reverence 
To Nature and the power of human minds,
To men as they are men within themselves.(1805,XII,223-5)
To such "men" from his "rural neighbourhood" (1.222) he dedicates his future 
"song"(1.231). This confidence resulting not fromany voyage of discovery for 
himself through the experiences he has portrayed, but from Wordsworth's con­
fidence that he will have carried his readers with him through those experiences. 
It is a considerable achievement, but the strain of it has shown.
Salisbury Plain and The Borderers Revisited.
A few lines further into Book XII, Wordsworth, confident in his presentation of 
hisnewvision, returns to an earlier incident: that time when he was "a traveller..../ 
Upon the plain of Sarum-..."(1805,XII,313-4) and now gives an account of the 
origins of the Salisbury Plain poems as a conclusion to Book XII. This is a crucial 
passage again in what it reveals of Wordsworth's intention in The Prelude. 
Essentially, in this closing section of Book XII (11. 312 to the end of the Book) 
Wordsworth either recounts or makes claims regarding three essential matters. 
First, there is the account of what happened, the visionary experience which 
he presents as the essential spot of time (if I might use his own term) where his 
imaginative response to the historical context of the plain, in his vision of the 
Druids, brought very early to him a sense of his own poetic vocation. Second, 
there is his reference to the poem we now know as Salisbury Plain and the 
judgement upon that by Coleridge he mentions; third, the awakening in him 
then of aperception of the essential "dignity "(1.374) of man. It is worth examining 
all three of these briefly in relation to what we now know of the Salisbury Plain 
poems, and I shall rely heavily here on my earlier detailed examination of these
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poems.
With regard to his visionary experience of the Druids, his account in The Prelude 
highlights the contrast not only between Wordsworth's ability to present such 
an experience in the poetry of 1804 as opposed to that of 1793-4 (which is only 
to be expected) but, more important, the contrast between how, by 1804, he sees 
this vision as the essential experience of his wanderings on the plain, as opposed 
to the rather peripheral and almost embellishing role it plays in the 1793-4 
Salisbury Plain, (whilst, of course, it disappears totally from the later Adventures 
on Salisbury Plain (see mv earlier discussion, ChapterTwo. Part2,pp 131-2). As 
we have seen, at the time that Wordsworth was actually inspired to write the 
"imperfect verse"(1.358) of which he goes on to speak in The Prelude, the 
visionary experience referred to was not the central inspiration of that poem. As 
suggested earlier, that confusing third paragraph in the Advertisement to Guilt 
and Sorrow (discussed on pp 121/2 of Chapter 2), is an example of Words­
worth re-creating or re-inventing the matter of his inspiration for this poem, if not 
in whole, at least in terms of its thrust and balance. For the essential inspiration 
of Salisbury Plain was radical concern, fed by the ideas and, especially towards 
the close of the poem, the idealisms of William Godwin. However, for Words­
worth who has spent so much time in creating a "moral crisis" largely ascribed 
to misplaced espousal of rationalistic theories, such a view will not do now at all.
With regard to the second point, Wordsworth's address to Coleridge, is useful to 
quote here:
Nor is it, friend, unknown to thee; at least -
Thyself delighted - thou for my delight
Hast said, perusing some imperfect verse
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Which in that lonesome journey was composed,
That also I must then have exercised 
Upon the vulgar forms of present things 
And actual world of our familiar days,
A higher power - have caught from them a tone,
An image,and a character by books 
Not hitherto reflected.(1805,XII,356-65)
It is important to acknowledge that Wordsworth has accepted that Salisbury Plain
was a flawed poem (though this version was almost certainly not the one that
Coleridge hadread to him - see below); nevertheless, the qualities that he ascribes
to it, cleverly presented as those identified by Coleridge, are carefully selected.
Wordsworth does not really make any claims for literary merit, but rather for the
qualities upon which, at this time ( in 1804 and in light of the nature of his
experiments in Lyrical Ballads of 1798-1800 andfurther extrapolated in the 1800
Preface to the Lyrical Ballads! and at this stage in his developing re-invention
in The Prelude, he would wish to reinforce. These are a fidelity to his belief
in the experiential and the everyday as the route to genuine humanitarian
concern, and as the true inspiration of poetry; as opposed to any such perception
and inspiration being derived from "books", or otherwise from theoretical
perspectives.
In response to this, it is interesting to note two things. First, whether or not 
Wordsworth is referring to the 1793-4 or 1795 version of the poem, the fact is 
that the "theoretical" (if one must use such a term) philosophy of Godwin inspires 
both versions of the poem, though more effectively in the second version, where, 
as we have seen, what Wordsworth has drawn upon is less the ideas of Political 
Justice itself than those ideas mediated throu eh Godwin's novel. Caleb Williams. 
Wordsworth, in The Prelude, in choosing not only to ignore this, but also to make
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an overt reference to "books" (given what that term has come to represent) can 
again be seen clearly to be manipulating "what happened" to an envisaged 
purpose. Moreover, as the editors of the recent authoritative texts of both the 
Salisbury Plain poems and The Prelude of 1798/99 have noted,(65) Coleridge, 
in Biographia Literaria did, a few years later, make comment upon the poem.(66) 
However, both editors have been rather selective in their quotation of Coleridge's 
comments. It is important to know whether or not Coleridge's comments refer 
to the 1793-4 or 1795 version of the poem.
Two pieces of evidence suggest it must, in fact, have been the later Adventures 
on Salisbury Plain. First, if Coleridge is right in ascribing his first experience of 
the poem to his "twenty-fourth year",(67) then that must be between 22nd 
October, 1795 and 20th October, 1796. Revision of Salisbury Plain can be 
ascribed to the autumn of 1795 (as mentioned in Wordsworth's letter to 
Wranghamof 20th November, 1795(EY,159)). Since the Wordsworths had 
moved to Racedown only in the September of that year, and contact with Cole­
ridge over the crucial period was limited to correspondence,(68) then I do not see 
how Gill can claim it was the first version that Coleridge commented upon. This, 
I think, is further re-inforced by the nature of Coleridge's comments on the 
language of the poem:
the fine balance of truth in observing with the imaginative faculty in 
modifying the objects observed; and above all the original gift of 
spreading the tone, the atmosphere and with it the depth and height of 
the ideal world, around forms, incidents and situations which, from the 
common view, custom had bedimmed all the lustre, had dried up the 
sparkle and the dew-drops.(69)
It would be difficult to imagine Coleridge responding to the earlier Salisbury Plain
with all its clumsiness and fragmentation in such terms. Yet, although these
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comments by Coleridge have been well acknowledged,(70) it is worth examining 
his comment rather more carefully. Coleridge's comments derive from his aware­
ness that the version of Saliburv Plain that he heard read was a considerable 
advance on earlier poems by Wordsworth (such as Descriptive Sketches, to 
which he draws attention as having been guilty of lines notable for their "worth­
lessness and incongruity"(71)); Coleridge notes that this poem showed "no mark 
of strained thought or forced diction, no crowd or turbulence of imagery", a view 
he could scarcely have expressed of the earlier Salisbury Plain.
Second, and more important, Coleridge's praise is partly of the
union of deep feeling with profound thought; [my emphasis] the fine 
balance of truth in observing with the imaginative faculty in modifying 
the objects observed.(72)
In large measure the "thought" that pervades the poem is Godwin's, more 
effectively harmonised, as Coleridge has noted, with the humanitarian concern 
(that Wordsworth also developed partly as a result of his contact with Godwin and 
his ideas). In many ways, these words by Coleridge sum up acutely what it was 
that Wordsworth's relationship with Godwin's ideas brought to his poetic devel­
opment: a more solid philosophico-moral basis, an emerging expression of 
humanitarian concern, and a quest for truth, upon which (as Coleridge has 
pointed out) the particular quality of Words worth's imaginative vision was able 
to build to produce the uniquely "Wordsworthian" perception that is evidenced, 
in early form, in Adventures on Salisbury Plain.
A final point to be made (whilst recognising that the words Wordsworth
ascribes to Coleridge are not those written later in Biographia Literaria) concerns
the fact that, although Coleridge experienced only the revised poem, Wordsworth,
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in the context of what he says in The Prelude here, leaves the clear suggestion 
that Coleridge's remarks were related to the the original poem. The extent of 
Wordsworth's distortion is exposed by the realisation that the vision of the Druids 
on which he spends so much time in The Prelude, prior to mentioning Coleridge's 
comments, was deleted from the revised poem.
To deal now with the third matter originally raised, Wordsworth's claim in the 
closing lines ofBookXH regarding the awakening in him of a perception of man's 
essential dignity. What Wordsworth asserts is that "about this period" (1805, XII, 
320) he seemed
to have sight
Of a new world - a world, too, that was fit 
To be transmitted and made visible 
To other eyes, as having for its base 
That whence our dignity originates,
That which both gives it being, and maintains 
A balance, an ennobling interchange 
Of action from within and from without:
The excellence, pure spirit, and best power,
Both of the object seen, and the eye that sees.( 1805,XII,370-9)
Yet this claim, ascribed to the period of his walk across Salisbury Plain and his
composition of the first poem, suggests a complex and border vision that is
evidenced in neither of the first two versions of the poem purportedly inspired
by this experience. Not even the most sympathetic reading of these poems can
interpret them in these terms. Of course, Wordsworth is not ascribing explicitly
such a vision of the complex interaction of man, the imagination and poetry
to the poetry of that time; yet, the implicit assumption behind his record of
the walk and resulting visionary experience, juxtaposed to his reference to the
poem and the very nature of Coleridge's comments leave the reader in little doubt
as to Wordsworth's intention. Wordsworth again wishes us to believe that the
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vision of Lvrical Ballads was well established in him early in 1793, prior to 
his aberrations into rationalistic philosophy. In view of his careful manipula­
tions, he has carefully manipulated, especially in Books X and XI, he feels 
confident in claiming this now.
Examination of Wordsworth's reference to the Salisbury Plain incident reveals, 
in microcosm, his intention in writing, and his achievement in The Prelude: an 
incident is chosen, placed appropriately, is suitably contextualised, and is thus 
re-interpreted within the envisaged overall purpose of the poem. It is essentially 
dishonest, but it is impressive.
Before leaving the Salisbury Plain poems, it should however be noted that 
neither the experience of the poem itself, nor Coleridge’s comment on it 
(suggesting its "union of feeling with profound thought") bears out Wordsworth's 
repeatedly claimed impairment of his imagination, particularly as a result of his 
exploration of Godwin's ideas; the psychological power and humanitarian 
sympathy of Adventures on Salisbury Plain, drawing so strongly upon Godwin, 
pose a large question mark over Words worth's totally negative view, as presented 
in The Prelude, of his period of rationalistic enquiry. I shall return to this point 
again.
Some further reflection at this point upon The Borderers is now apposite. What, 
above all, those self-conscious repetitive passages on Wordsworth's imaginative 
"impairment" present is an almost totally negative view of the role of rationalistic 
philosophy in his poetic development. Also presented in the purported "moral 
crisis" is a view of the poet having had his nascent sensitivity to nature and his
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original humanitarianism extinguished by his rationalistic enquiries, reducing 
him apparently to some kind of creative inertia. The Borderers offers a clue 
as to why Wordsworth saw his rationalistic period as so negative; it also offers 
a clue as to why, on coming to reflect upon it for the purpose of dealing with 
it in The Prelude, he chose to present it in terms of a "crisis" of moral and 
spiritual dimensions. The Borderers has been seen as a conscious experiment 
by Wordsworth, a conscious manipulation and exploration of Godwin’s ideas; but 
a flawed one. Flawed, first, in the dramatic sense; Wordsworth's dramatic powers 
are not up to sustaining never mind resolving the pattern of conflicts between truth 
and error that he constructed. Flawed also in the inability of the poetry of the 
play to contain or at times support the ideas with which Wordsworth was 
experimenting. The result was a play rejected for the stage, written to be read 
and to be reflected upon; yet which ultimately offered no answers to the disturbing 
questions that it had indeed raised. Mortimer, as the representative of "feeling", 
or human concern, is defeated in the play above all, aesthetically, by the sheer 
power of the portrayal of Rivers; the star, representative of nature's protective 
forces, appears too conveniently; the inconclusiveness of the original ending 
( as opposed to the imposed "expiation" theme of the revised version), and the 
ambivalence of the theme of "solitariness" leaves us with an essentially inconclu­
sive experience. It is clear that, at the end of the play, he was unsure: not of whither 
now to turn, but of the significance for his own literary direction and poetic 
development experience of the play he had just completed. To this extent only do 
we have evidence of some "crisis" in Wordsworth's development.
But it is important to put that into perspective. Just as The Borderers is a conscious
experiment, so also it is a conscious distortion of Godwin's principles which,
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by now, Wordsworth had explored, but not, I suspect, fully grasped. By the time 
he had completed The Borderers. Wordsworth was confused and was probably 
tired of wrestling with Godwin's ideas, especially if the result was going to be 
the very unsatisfactory piece that The Borderers so obviously was. But there is 
no evidence in the play as such, or indeed in the limited references to it in letters 
or other external evidence (as we have seen) of a "moral crisis" of the scale 
suggested by the 1805 Prelude and reinforced in 1850.
The reason for this is related to the nature and purpose of The Prelude as this can 
now be understood. For Wordsworth, the writing of The Borderers now comes 
to serve a new (and for the purposes of the emerging 1805 Prelude a very valuable) 
role. That role is to provide evidence, in part, of the cause of that imaginative 
"impairment" that is pre-requisite to any restoration; thereby providing both 
a motivation and a convincingly conscious development of his mind as a poet, 
as well as giving a more "heroic" scale to the imaginative and vision. If this seems 
rather fanciful, then it is useful to do two things: to ask, yet again, what evidence 
the text of The Borderers (a key text central to the period of the so-called moral 
crisis) shows of the kind of desperation Wordsworth seems determined to ascribe 
to this crisis? Second, we should consider again the lines taken from the play in 
their new context in Book X of The Prelude, where Wordsworth suggests the 
philosophy to which he became espoused was that which recognised the "only 
basis" of "social freedom" as
The freedom of the individual mind
One guide, the light of circumstances, flashed
Upon an independent intellect.
These are the lines of Rivers, of Wordsworth's conscious creation; not of William
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Godwin, to whom "duty" and "benevolence" were the essential moral contexts 
of the exercise of reason, just as "truth" (against which Rivers constantly acted) 
was the ultimate aim. There is in Wordsworth's distortion here the same element 
of conscious manipulation as was the case in The Borderers: except that 
Wordsworth knows exactly where he is going and why he is using these lines.
To see The Borderers in this light, and to see Wordsworth's use of the play in 
this way is, at once, to recognise both Wordsworth's achievement and its signi­
ficance. Despite the self-conscious strains in the poetry to which I have drawn 
attention, The Prelude does paint a convincing picture of a period of "crisis" 
through which Wordsworth, as apoet, had to emerge if he was ever to re-establish 
and further develop the sensitivities and vision that would lead to Lvrical Ballads 
and Tintem Abbev: it is, on the whole, psychologically impressive and plausible 
and has led to poetry of a significance that has, of course, been recognised and 
acclaimed. This is undoubtedly Wordsworth's achievement.
Yet the full import and significance of that achievement, as a study such as this
of the Wordsworth-Godwin relationship has shown, is that the claimed "moral
crisis" exists solely in the poem; it is an achievement, even a triumph of the
poem itself. It is not a biographical record of a moral crisis, certainly of the nature
and scale that Wordsworth claims. To go further, the poem is not, in fact, a record,
but rather a theoretical reconstruction of the development of a poet's mind; it is
a more complex and boldly imaginative poem. It is a myth-making, consciously
so (and in the best "Romantic" tradition of e.g. Shelley's Queen Mab or Keats'
Hyperion, but without the interposed formal myth) built, in part, upon the
obscure period of Wordsworth's relative poetic silence, a lacuna in his poetic
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development conducive to the kind of imaginative re-interpretation and re- 
invention that provides the motivation to render plausible the myth that Words­
worth sought to create in explaining (to his readers and perhaps to himself) the 
development of the established poetic and imaginative vision of Tintem Abbey 
and Lyrical Ballads. It is, I repeat, a significant achievement.
For the student of Wordsworth and Godwin, therefore, what a study of the 
relationship between the two men suggests is that, just as Wordsworth re­
invented himself and many of the incidents that he saw as "prominent" in his 
development, so also, he saw it as necessary to re-invent Godwin. Obviously, 
Wordsworth had complex feelings towards Godwin, probably some respect ( his 
long-standing acquaintance with Godwin persisted well into Godwin's period of 
decline in popularity when others had deserted him). His ultimate assimilation 
of, and development by way of, his exploration of Godwin's social and psycho­
logical humanitarianism was a process of which Wordsworth must have been 
aware. Yet this was also the Godwin whom, as we have seen, Wordsworth came 
to deride on occasions and the Godwin ,who, when Wordsworth had shown a 
diself-interested caution at the time of the repressions in 1794, had faced 
publicly, with the accused, the threats of the treason trials.
As it became necessary for Wordsworth to re-invent himself to explain his new 
poetic vision, so, partly to come to terms with his personal relationship with 
Godwin, and partly in view of the complex purpose of The Prelude it became 
necessary also to re-invent Godwin: a narrow cold rational Godwin, a metaphor, 
a rhetorical device for a habit of mind and a perception that Wordsworth clearly 
did reject (though a view that totally ignored the public active courage and also
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the humanitarian concern of the philosopher), just as it became necessary 
to useBeaupuy as a rhetorical device to encompass aspects of what Wordsworth 
had learned from Godwin into a more acceptable experiential framework. From 
a study of Wordsworth and Godwin such as this, the purpose of a device such as 
Beaupuy can now be understood more clearly: namely, the way in which Beaupuy 
allowed Wordsworth to present a source and influence he could more readily 
acknowledge, one which did provide some credibility (due to Beaupuy’s actual 
recorded links with Wordsworth's period of interest in the French Revolution). 
Wordsworth would be happy to acknowledge an "influence" from Beaupuy on 
his radical and social humanitarianism; just as he wished to reject any "theoreti­
cal" influences, embodied now in the re-invented narrowly rationalistic Godwin. 
Such a portrayal of Godwin to represent an alternative sensibility against which 
Wordsworth can forcibly and very effectively highlight his own vision is, at 
the very least, extremely convenient to his purpose in The Prelude.
In a sense, what this study has shown is how Wordsworth created and used his 
idea of memory and imagination partly to deal with what I might term matters 
uncomfortable to him, but also in a highly creative and positive manner to create 
the mythology of self that was essential to how his poetic vision emerged as 
to how it operated.
A consequence, therefore, of this particular study of influence concerns the extent 
to which it challenges the tradition of, for example, Legouis and Moorman, and, 
to a great extent, Gill in the most recent biography of Wordsworth, regarding 
the biographical status of The Prelude.
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One consequence of biographical readings of The Prelude is that Wordsworth 
criticism has not asked properly: how far was Wordsworth influenced or in any 
significant way affected by Godwin? It may seem naive to suggest this in view 
of the many comments that have been made since Legouis first suggested the 
link; yet it is a fundamental question'that still, in my view remains to be addressed. 
From the evidence emerging from this study ( which, of course has drawn upon 
much that has gone before it), it would appear that that "influence" was, whilst 
not marginal, certainly limited. This thesis has not proved, nor has it set out 
to prove any "major" influence by Godwin on Wordsworth's thinking or poetic 
development; the argument has always been concerned with the relationship 
between the two figures, and it is claimed that that relationship was a significant 
factor in Wordsworth's development. In examining that, and examining respec­
tively the relevant work of the poet and the philosopher up to the period of the 
writing of the 1805 Prelude, the question must arise: was it not Wordsworth 
himself who claimed a greater role for Godwin, ironically, in his claimed rejection 
of Godwin and all that stood for (and by that, I now mean, of course, the Godwin 
he had re-invented) than any more objective view of the evidence would ever have 
suggested? In the most ironic sense, the "King Charles's Head" that Wordsworth 
criticism has made of the Wordsworth-Godwin issue is the greatest testimony 
to Wordsworth's achievement in The Prelude.
